The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

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http://www.archive.org/details/evidenceincasediOObeck 


THE  EVIDENCE 
IN  THE  CASE 


A  Discussion  of  the  Moral  Responsibility  for   the 

War  of  1914,  as  Disclosed  by  the  Diplomatic 

Records  of  England,    Germany,    Russia, 

France,    Austria,   Italy  and   Belgium. 

BY 

JAMES   M.  BECK,  LL.D. 

Late  Assistant  Attorney-General  of  the  U.  S. 
Author  of  "The  War  and  Humanity." 

With  an  Introduction  by 
HON.   JOSEPH   H.  CHOATE 

Late  U.  S.  Ambassador  to  Great  Britain 

'  'Did  these  bones  cost  no  more  the  breeding  but  to  play  at  loggats 
with  'em  ?   Mine  ache,  to  think  o"  '• 

Hamlet — ^Act  V.,  Sc.  1. 


Revised  Edition,  with  Additional  Material 
NEW  YORK 

GROSSET   &    DUN  LAP 

PUBLISHERS 


Published  by  Arrangement  with  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 


Copyright,  1914,  by 
JAMES  M.  BECK 

Copyright,   191S,  by 
JAMES  M.  BECK 

{For  Revised  Edition) 

Thirteejith  Impression 


'       '  H-^'  James  M.  Blck 

The  Evidence  in  the  Case.         The  War  and  Humanity 


This  edition  is  issued  under  arrangement  with  the  publishers, 
G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  New  York  and  London 


3 

5/1 
/3  388e 


TO 

ALBERT,  OF  BELGIUM 
"Every  Inch  a  King" 


Justum,  et  tenacem  propositi  virum 
Non  civium  ardor  prava  iubentium, 
Non  vultus  instantis  tyranni, 

Mente  quatit  solida,  neque  Auster 

Dux  inquieti  turbidus  Adria;, 

Nee  fulminantis  magna  manus  Jovis. 

Si  f  ractus  .'Uabatur  orbis, 

Impavidum  ferient  ruinae, 

Horace. 


J  Publishers^  Note 

-J 


(S 


ri 


The  volume  The  Evidence  in  the  Case  is  based  upon  an  article 
by  the  Hon.  James  M.  Beck,  which  came  into  print  in   the 

^     "  New  York  Times  "  of  October  25th.     The  article  in  question 

\  made  so  deep  an  impression  with  thinking  citizens  on  both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  that  it  has  been  translated  into  a  number 
of  European  languages,  and  some  400,000  copies  have  been  sold 
in  England  alone. 

In  making  this  acknowledgment,  which  is  due  for  the  courtesy 

■^  of  "The  Times"  in  permitting  an  article  prepared  for  its 
columns  to  be  utilized  as  the  basis  for  the  book,  it  is  in  order 
for  the  publishers  to  explain  to  the  readers  that  the  material 
in  the  article  has  itself  been  rewritten  and  amplified,  while  the 
book  contains,  in  addition  to  this  original  paper,  a  number  of 
further  chapters  comprising  together  more  than  six  times  the 
material  of  the  first  article. 

The  present  book  is  an  independent  work,  and  is  deserving 
of  consideration  on  the  part  of  all  citizens  who  are  interested 
in  securing  authoritative  information  on  the  issues  of  the  great 

f      European  contest. 


New  York,  D«cembsr  12,  1914 


INTRODUCTION 

BY  THE  HON.  JOSEPH  H.  CHOATE,  FORMER  AMERICAN 
AMBASSADOR  TO  GREAT  BRITAIN^ 

For  five  months  now  all  people  who  read  at  all 
have  been  reading  about  the  horrible  war  that  is 
devastating  Europe  and  shedding  the  best  blood 
of  the  people  of  five  great  nations.  In  fact,  they 
have  had  no  time  to  read  anything  else,  and  every- 
thing that  is  published  about  it  is  seized  upon  with 
great  avidity.  No  wonder,  then,  that  Mr.  James 
M.  Beck's  book,  The  Evidence  in  the  Case,  pub- 
lished by  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  which  has  grown 
out  of  the  article  by  him  contributed  to  the  New 
York  Times  Sunday  Magazine,  has  been  warmly 
welcomed  both  here  and  in  England  as  a  valuable 
addition  to  the  literature  of  the  day. 

An  able  and  clear-headed  lawyer  and  advocate, 
he  presents  the  matter  in  the  unique  form  of  a  legal 
argument,  based  upon  an  analysis  of  the  diplomatic 
records  submitted  by  England,  Germany,  Russia, 
France,  and  Belgium,  as  "A  Case  in  the  Supreme 

'  Reprinted,  by  permission,  from  the  N.  Y.  Times. 

V 


vi  Introduction 

Court  of  Civilization,"  and  the  conclusions  to  be 
deduced  as  to  the  moral  responsibility  for  the  war. 

The  whole  argument  is  founded  upon  the  idea 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  public  conscience  of 
the  world,  which  must  and  will  necessarily  pass 
final  judgment  upon  the  conduct  of  the  parties 
concerned  in  this  infernal  struggle.  Many  times 
in  the  course  of  the  book  he  refers  emphatically  to 
that  "decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind" 
to  which  Jefferson  appealed  in  our  Declaration  of 
Independence  as  the  final  arbiter  upon  our  conduct 
in  throwing  off  the  British  yoke  and  declaring  our 
right  to  be  an  independent  nation.  That  this 
"public  opinion  of  the  world"  is  the  final  tribunal 
upon  all  great  international  contests  is  illustrated 
by  the  fact  that  all  mankind,  including  Great 
Britain  herself,  has  long  ago  adjudged  that  our 
great  Declaration  was  not  only  just,  but  necessary 
for  the  progress  of  mankind. 

It  is  evident  from  his  brief  preface  that  Mr. 
Beck  is  a  sincere  admirer  of  historic  Germany, 
and  on  the  eve  of  the  war  he  was  at  Weimar,  after 
a  brief  visit  to  a  little  village  near  Erfurt,  where 
one  of  his  ancestors  was  born,  who  had  migrated 
at  an  early  date  to  Pennsylvania,  a  Commonwealth 
whose  founder  had  made  a  treaty  with  the  Indians 
which,  so  far  from  being  treated  as  a  "mere  scrap 


Introduction  vii 

of  paper,"  was  never  broken.  Like  many  Ameri- 
cans, Mr.  Beck  is  of  mixed  ancestry,  being  in  part 
English  and  in  part  Swiss-German.  He  has  there- 
fore viewed  the  great  question  objectively,  and 
without  any  racial  prejudice. 

A  careful  study  of  the  diplomatic  correspondence 
that  preceded  the  outbreak  of  the  war  had  con- 
vinced Mr.  Beck  that  Germany  was  chiefly  re- 
sponsible for  it,  and  he  proceeds  con  amore  to 
demonstrate  the  truth  of  this  conviction  by  the 
most  earnest  and  forceful  presentation  of  the  case. 

Forensic  lawyers  in  the  cases  they  present  are 
about  half  the  time  on  the  wrong  side,  or  what 
proves  by  the  final  judgment  to  have  been  the 
wrong  side,  but  it  is  always  easy  to  tell  from  the 
manner  of  presentation  whether  they  themselves 
are  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  justice  of  the  side 
which  they  advocate.  It  is  evident  that  Mr.  Beck 
did  not  undertake  to  convince  "  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Civilization"  until  he  was  himself  thoroughly 
persuaded  of  the  justice  of  his  cause,  that  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  by  Germany  was  not  only  a 
gross  breach  of  existing  treaties,  but  was  in  viola- 
tion of  settled  international  law,  and  a  crime 
against  humanity  never  to  be  forgotten,  a  crime 
which  converted  that  peaceful  and  prosperous 
coiintry   into   a   human   slaughterhouse,    reeking 


viii  Introduction 

with  the  blood  of  four  great  nations.  How  any 
intelligent  lawyer  could  have  come  to  any  other 
conclusion  it  is  not  easy  to  imagine,  since  Germany 
confessed  its  crime  while  in  the  very  act  of  com- 
mitting it,  for  on  the  very  day  that  the  German 
troops  crossed  the  Belgian  frontier  and  hostiHties 
began,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  at  the  great 
session  of  the  Reichstag  on  August  4th  declared, 
to  use  his  own  words : 

Necessity  knows  no  law.  Our  troops  have  occu- 
pied Luxemburg,  and  have  possibly  already  entered 
on  Belgian  soil.  That  is  a  breach  of  international 
law.  .  .  .  We  were  jorced  to  ignore  the  rightful  pro- 
tests of  the  Governments  of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium, 
and  the  injustice — /  speak  openly — the  injustice  we 
thereby  commit,  we  will  try  to  make  good  as  soon  as  our 
military  aims  have  been  attained.  Anybody  who  is 
threatened  as  we  are  threatened  and  is  fighting  for 
his  highest  possessions  can  have  only  one  thought — 
how  he  is  to  hack  his  way  through. 

Thank  God,  their  military  aims  have  not  yet 
been  attained,  and  from  present  appearances  are 
not  likely  to  be,  but,  as  Mr.  Beck  believes,  Ger- 
many will  still  be  held  by  the  judgment  of  mankind 
to  make  good  the  damage  done. 

In  reviewing  the  diplomatic  correspondence 
published   by   Germany   that   preceded   the   out- 


Introduction  ix 

break  of  the  war,  Mr.  Beck  lays  great  stress,  and 
we  think  justly,  upon  the  obvious  suppression  of 
evidence  by  Germany,  in  omitting  substantially  all 
the  important  correspondence  on  vital  points  that 
passed  between  Germany  and  Austria,  and  the 
suppression  of  important  evidence  in  judicial 
proceedings  always  carries  irresistible  weight 
against  the  party  guilty  of  it.  While  England  and 
France  and  Russia  were  pressing  Germany  to 
influence  and  control  Austria  in  the  interests  of 
peace,  not  a  word  is  disclosed  of  what,  if  anything, 
the  German  Foreign  Office  said  to  Austria  toward 
that  end.    To  quote  IMr.  Beck's  own  words : 

Among  the  twenty-seven  communications  ap- 
pended to  the  German  White  Paper,  it  is  most  signi- 
ficant that  not  a  single  communication  is  given  of 
the  many  which  passed  from  the  Foreign  Office  of 
BerHn  to  that  of  Vienna,  and  only  two  which  passed 
from  the  German  Ambassador  in  Vienna  to  the 
German  Chancellor,  and  the  purpose  of  this  sup- 
pression is  even  more  clearly  indicated  by  the 
complete  failure  of  Austria  to  submit  any  of  its 
diplomatic  records  to  the  scrutiny  of  a  candid  world. 

Notwithstanding  the  disavowal  given  by  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  to  the  Rus- 
sian Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  that  the  Ger- 
man Government  had  no  knowledge  of  the  text 


X  Introduction 

of  the  Austrian  note  before  it  was  handed  in, 
and  did  not  exercise  any  influence  on  its  contents, 
Mr.  Beck  establishes  clearly  by  the  admissions  of 
the  German  Foreign  Ofhce  itself  that  it  was  con- 
sulted by  Austria  previous  to  the  ultimatum,  and 
that  it  not  only  approved  of  its  course,  but  literally 
gave  to  Austria  carte  blanche  to  proceed.  And  the 
German  Ambassador  to  the  United  States  for- 
mally admitted  in  an  article  in  The  Independent 
of  September  7,  19 14,  that  "Germany  had  ap- 
proved in  advance  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Servia." 

This  brutal  ultimatum  by  a  great  nation  of  fifty 
millions  of  people,  making  impossible  demands 
against  a  little  one  of  four  millions  which  had  itself 
just  emerged  from  two  conflicts  and  was  still  suffer- 
ing from  exhaustion — an  ultimatum  which  set  all 
the  nations  of  Europe  in  agitation — is  proved  to 
have  been  jointly  concocted  by  the  two  members  of 
the  Triple  Alliance,  Germany  and  Austria.  But 
the  third  member  of  that  Alliance,  Italy,  found  it 
to  be  an  act  of  aggression  on  their  part  which 
brought  on  the  war,  and  that  the  terms  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  therefore,  did  not  bind  her  to  take 
any  part. 

The  peace  parleys  which  passed  between  the 
several  nations  involved  are  carefully  reviewed  by 


Introduction  xi 

Mr.  Beck,  who  concludes,  as  we  think  justly,  that 
up  to  the  28th  of  July,  when  the  German  Imperial 
Chancellor  sent  for  the  EngHsh  Ambassador  and 
announced  the  refusal  of  his  Government  to  accept 
the  conference  of  the  Powers  proposed  by  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  every  proposal  to  preserve  peace 
had  come  from  the  Triple  Entente,  and  that  every 
such  proposal  had  met  with  an  uncompromising 
negative  from  Austria,  and  either  that  or  obstruc- 
tive quibbles  from  Germany. 

At  this  point,  the  sudden  return  of  the  Kaiser  to 
Berlin  from  his  annual  hohday  in  Norway,  which 
his  own  Foreign  Office  regretted  as  a  step  taken  on 
his  Majesty's  own  initiative  and  which  they  feared 
might  cause  speculation  and  excitement,  and  his 
personal  intervention  from,  that  time  until  his 
troops  invaded  Luxemburg  and  he  made  his  abrupt 
demand  upon  the  Belgian  Government  for  per- 
mission to  cross  its  territory  are  reviewed  with 
great  force  and  effect  by  Mr.  Beck,  with  the  con- 
clusion on  his  part  that  the  Kaiser,  who  by  a  timely 
word  to  Austria  might  have  prevented  all  the 
terrible  trouble  that  followed,  was  the  supremely 
guilty  party,  and  that  such  will  be  the  verdict  of 
history. 

Mr.  Beck's  review  of  the  case  of  Belgium  is 
extremely    interesting,    and   his    conclusion    that 


xii  Introduction 

England,  France,  Russia,  and  Belgium  can  await 
with  confidence  the  world's  final  verdict  that  their 
quarrel  was  just,  rests  safely  upon  the  plea  of 
"Guilty"  by  Germany,  a  conclusion  which  seems 
to  have  been  already  plainly  declared  by  most  of 
the  civilized  nations  of  the  world. 

We  think  that  Mr.  Beck's  opinion  that  England 
and  France  were  taken  unawares  and  were  wholly 
unprepared  for  war  is  a  little  too  strongly  expressed. 
France,  certainly,  had  been  making  ready  for  war 
with  Germany  ever  since  the  great  conflict  of  1870 
had  resulted  in  her  loss  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  and 
had  had  a  fixed  and  unalterable  determination  to 
get  them  back  when  she  could,  although  it  is  evi- 
dent that  she  did  not  expect  her  opportunity  to 
come  just  when  and  as  it  did.  That  Great  Britain 
had  no  present  expectation  of  immediate  war  with 
Germany  is  clearly  obvious.  That  she  had  long 
been  apprehending  the  danger  of  it  in  the  indefinite 
future  is  very  clear,  but  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  and 
the  Government  and  the  people  that  he  represented 
did  all  that  they  possibly  could  to  prevent  the  war 
seems  to  be  clearly  established. 

Mr.  Beck's  book  is  so  extremely  interesting 
from  beginning  to  end  that  it  is  difficult  when  once 
begun  to  lay  it  down  and  break  off  the  reading,  and 
we  shall  not  be  surprised  to  hear,  not  only  that  it 


Introduction  xiii 

has  had  an  immense  sale  in  England  and  America, 
but  that  its  translation  into  the  languages  of  the 
other  nations  of  Europe  has  been  demanded. 

Joseph  H.  Choate. 

New  York,  January  lo,  1915. 


FOREWORD 

On  the  eve  of  the  Great  War  I  sat  one 
evening  in  the  reading  room  of  the  Hotel  Erb- 
prinz  in  classic  Weimar.  I  had  spent  ten  happy- 
days  in  Thuringia,  and  had  visited  with  deep 
interest  a  little  village  near  Erfurt,  where  one 
of  my  forbears  was  bom.  I  had  seen  Jena, 
from  whose  historic  university  this  paternal  an- 
cestor had  gone  as  a  missionary  to  North  America 
in  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  This 
simple-minded  German  pietist  had  cherished  the 
apparent  delusion  that  even  the  uncivilized 
Indians  of  the  American  wilderness  might  be 
taught — the  Bemhardis  and  Treitschkes  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding — that  to  increase  the 
political  power  of  a  nation  by  the  deliberate  and 
highly  systematized  destruction  of  its  neighbors 
was  not  the  truest  political  ideal,  even  of  an 
Indian  tribe. 

This  missionary  had  gone  most  fittingly  to  the 
Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania,  where  its  enlight- 
ened founder  had  already  given  a  demonstration  of 
the  truth  that  a  treaty  of  peace,  even  though  not 


xvi  Foreword 

formally  expressed  in  a  "  scrap  of  paper, "  might  be 
kept  by  white  men  and  so-called  savages  with 
scrupulous  fidelity  for  at  least  three  quarters  of  a 
century,  for  even  the  cynical  Voltaire  said  in  sin- 
cerest  admiration  that  the  compact  between  William 
Penn  and  the  Indians  was  the  only  treaty  which 
was  never  reduced  to  parchment,  nor  ratified  by 
an  oath  and  yet  was  never  broken.  When  Penn, 
the  great  apostle  of  peace,  died  in  England,  a  dis- 
appointed, ruined,  and  heart-broken  man,  and  the 
news  reached  the  Indians  in  their  wigwams  along 
the  banks  of  the  Delaware,  they  had  for  him, 
whom  they  called  the  "white  Truth  Teller"  so 
deep  a  sense  of  gratitude  that  they  sent  to  his 
widow  a  sympathetic  gift  of  valuable  skins,  in 
memory  of  the  "man  of  unbroken  friendship 
and  inviolate  treaties." 

These  reflections  in  a  time  of  broken  friendships 
and  violated  treaties  are  not  calculated  to  fill  the 
man  of  the  twentieth  century  with  any  justifiable 
pride. 

My  mind,  however,  as  I  spent  the  quiet  evening 
in  the  historic  inn  of  Thackeray's  Pumpernickel, 
did  not  revert  to  these  far  distant  associations  but 
was  full  of  other  thoughts  suggested  by  the  most 
interesting  section  of  Germany,  through  which  it 
had  been  my  privilege  to  pass. 


Foreword  xvii 

I  had  visited  Eisenach  and  reverentially  stood 
within  the  room  where  the  great  master  of  music, 
John  Sebastian  Bach,  had  first  seen  the  Hght  of 
day,  and  as  I  saw  the  w^alls  that  he  loved  and  w^hich 
are  forever  hallowed  because  they  once  sheltered 
this  divine  genius,  the  question  occurred  to  me 
whether  he  may  not  have  done  more  for  Ger- 
many with  his  immortal  harmonies,  which  are  the 
foundation  of  all  modem  music,  than  all  the 
Treitschkes,  and  Bemhardis,  with  their  gospel  of 
racial  hatred,  pseudo-patriotism,  and  imperial 
aggran  dizemen  t . 

I  had  climbed  the  slopes  of  the  Wartburg  and 
from  Luther's  room  had  gazed  w4th  delight  upon 
the  lovely  Thuringian  forests.  Quite  apart  from 
any  ecclesiastical  considerations  that  room  seemed 
to  suggest  historic  Germany  in  its  best  estate. 
It  recalled  that  scene  of  undying  interest  at  the 
Diet  of  Worms,  when  the  peaceful  adherence 
to  an  ideal  was  shown  to  be  mightier  than  the 
power  of  the  greatest  empire  since  the  fall  of 
Rome.  The  monk  of  Wittenburg,  standing  alone 
in  the  presence  of  the  great  Emperor,  Charles 
the  Fifth,  and  the  representatives  of  the  most 
powerful  religious  organization  that  the  world 
has  ever  known,  with  his  simple,  "Hier  stehe 
ich;    ich   kann    nicht  andcrs/'    represented    the 


xvili  Foreword 

truest  soul  and  highest  ideal  of  the  nobler 
Germany. 

These  and  other  glorious  memories,  suggested 
by  Eisenach,  Frankfort,  Erfurt,  Weimar,  Jena, 
and  Leipzig,  made  this  pilgrimage  of  intense  in- 
terest, and  almost  the  only  discord  was  the  sight 
of  the  Leipzig  Voelkerschlacht  Denkmal,  probably 
the  largest,  and  certainly  the  ugliest  monument 
in  all  the  world.  It  has  but  one  justification,  in 
that  it  commemorates  war,  and  no  monument  ever 
more  fully  symbolized  by  its  own  colossal  cru- 
dity the  moral  ugliness  of  that  most  ghastly  phe- 
nomenon of  human  life.  Let  us  pray  that  in  the 
event  of  final  victory  Prussia  will  not  commission 
the  architects  of  the  Leipzig  monument,  or  the 
imperial  designer  of  the  Sieges-Allee  to  rebuild  that 
Gothic  masterpiece,  the  Rheims  Cathedral.  That 
day  in  Leipzig  an  Alsatian  cartoonist,  Hansi,  had 
been  sentenced  to  one  year's  imprisonment  for  a 
harmless  cartoon  in  a  book  for  children,  in  which 
the  most  supersensitive  should  have  found  occa- 
sion for  nothing,  except  a  passing  smile. 

On  the  library  table  of  the  Erbprinz,  I  found  a 
large  book,  which  proved  to  be  a  Bismarck 
memorial  volume.  It  contained  hundreds  of 
pictures  glorifying  and  almost  deifying  the  Iron 
Chancellor.     One  particularly  arrested  my  atten- 


Foreword  xix 

tion .  It  was  the  familiar  picture  of  the  negotiation  s 
for  peace  between  Bismarck  and  Jules  Favre  in 
the  terrible  winter  of  1871.  The  French  states- 
man has  sunk  into  a  chair  in  abject  despair, 
struck  speechless  by  the  demands  of  the  conqueror. 
Bismarck  stands  triumphant  and  his  proud  bear- 
ing and  arrogant  manner  fail  to  suggest  any  such 
magnanimous  courtesy  as  that  with  which  Grant 
accepted  the  sword  of  Lee  at  Appomattox.  The 
picture  breathed  the  very  spirit  of  "  Vce  victis.^* 
Had  a  French  artist  painted  this  picture,  I  could 
understand  it,  for  it  would  serve  effectively  to 
stimulate  undying  hatred  in  the  French  heart. 
It  seemed  strange  that  a  German  artist  should 
treat  a  subject,  calling  for  a  spirit  of  most  delicate 
courtesy,  in  a  manner  which  represented  Prussian 
militarism  in  its  most  arrogant  form. 

This  unworthy  picture  reminded  me  of  a  later 
scene  in  the  Reichstag,  in  which  the  Iron  Chancel- 
lor, after  reviewing  with  complacency  the  profit- 
able results  of  Germany's  deliberately  provoked 
wars  against  Denmark,  Austria,  and  France, 
added  the  pious  ejaculation : 

Wir  Deutsche  Jiirchten  Gott  sonst  nichts  in  der  Welt. 
(We  Germans  fear  God  but  nothing  else  in  the  world.) 

It  is  not  necessary  to  impeach  the  sincerity  of 


XX  Foreword 

this  pious  glorification  of  the  successful  results  of 
land  grabbing.  The  mind  in  moments  of  exal- 
tation plays  strange  tricks  with  the  soul.  Bis- 
marck may  have  dissembled  on  occasion  but  he 
was  never  a  hypocrite.  It  is  the  spirit  which 
inspired  this  boastful  and  arrogant  speech,  which 
has  so  powerfully  stimulated  Prussian  Junkerism, 
to  which  I  wish  to  refer. 

Had  an  American  uttered  these  words  we  would 
have  treated  the  boast  as  a  vulgar  exhibition  of 
provincial  "spread-eagleism,"  such  as  character- 
ized certain  classes  in  this  country  before  the  Civil 
War,  and  which  Charles  Dickens  somewhat  over- 
caricatured  in  Martin  Chuzzlewit,  but  in  the  mouth 
of  Bismarck,  with  his  cynical  indifference  to  moral 
considerations  in  questions  of  statecraft,  this  piece 
of  rhetorical  spread  double-eagleism,  manifests  the 
spirit  of  the  Prussian  military  caste  since  its  too 
easy  triumph  over  France  in  1 870-1 871,  a  triumph, 
which  may  yet  prove  the  greatest  calamity 
that  ever  befell  Germany,  not  only  in  the  seeds 
of  hatred  which  it  sowed,  of  which  there  is  now  a 
harvest  of  blood  past  precedent,  but  also  in  the 
development  of  an  arrogant  pride  which  has  pro- 
foundly affected  to  its  prejudice  the  noble  Germany 
of  Luther,  Bach,  Beethoven.  Goethe,  Schiller,  Kant, 
Humboldt,  and  Lessing. 


Foreword  xxi 

To  say  that  Germany  "fears"  nothing  save 
God  is  contradicted  by  its  whole  diplomatic  his- 
tory of  the  last  half  century.  In  this  it  is  not 
peculiar.  The  curse  of  modern  statecraft  is  the 
largely  unreasoning  fear  which  all  nations  have 
of  their  neighbors.  England  has  feared  Germany 
only  less  than  Germany  has  feared  England  and 
this  nervous  apprehension  has  bred  jealousy, 
hatred,  suspicion,  until  to-day  all  civilized  nations 
are  reaping  a  harvest  horrible  beyond  expression. 

The  whole  history  of  Germany  since  1870  has 
shown  a  constant,  and  at  times  an  unreasoning 
fear,  first  of  France,  then  of  the  Slav,  and  latterly 
and  in  its  most  acute  form,  of  England.  I  do  not 
mean  that  Germany  has  been  or  is  now  animated 
by  any  spirit  of  craven  cowardice.  There  has  not 
been  in  recorded  history  a  braver  nation,  and 
the  daimtless  courage  with  which,  even  at  this 
hour,  thousands  of  Germans  are  going  with  patri- 
otic songs  on  their  lips  to  "their  graves  as  to 
their  beds,"  is  worthy  of  all  admiration. 

The  whole  statecraft  of  Germany  for  over  forty 
years  has  been  inspired  by  an  exaggerated  appre- 
hension of  the  intentions  of  its  great  neighbors. 
This  fear  followed  swiftly  upon  the  triumph  of 
1 87 1,  for  Germany  early  showed  its  apprehension 
that  France  might  recover  its  military'  strength. 


xxii  Foreword 

When  that  fallen  but  indomitable  foe  again  strug- 
gled to  its  feet  in  1875,  the  Prussian  military 
caste  planned  to  give  the  stricken  gladiator  the 
coup  de  grace  and  was  only  prevented  by  the  in- 
tervention of  England  and  Russia.  Later  this 
acute  and  neurotic  apprehension  took  the  form 
of  a  hatred  and  fear  of  Russia,  and  this  not- 
withstanding the  fact  that  the  Kaiser  had  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  exalted  the  Czar  as  the 
"champion  of  Christianity"  and  the  "representa- 
tive of  the  white  race"  in  the  Far  East. 

When  the  psychology  of  the  present  conflict 
is  considered  by  future  historians,  this  neu- 
ropathic feature  of  Germany's  foreign  poHcy 
will  be  regarded  as  a  contributing  element  of  first 
importance. 

Latterly  the  Furor  Teutonicus  was  especially 
directed  against  England,  and  although  it  was 
obvious  to  the  dispassionate  observer  in  neutral 
countries  that  no  nation  was  making  less  prepar- 
ations or  was  in  point  of  fact  so  illy  prepared 
for  a  conflict  as  England,  nevertheless  Germany, 
with  a  completeness  of  preparation  such  as  the 
world  has  never  witnessed,  was  constantly  indulg- 
ing in  a  very  hysteria  of  fear  at  the  imaginary 
designs  of  England  upon  Germany's  standing  as  a 
world   power. 


Foreword  xxiii 

Luther's  famous  saying,  already  quoted,  and 
Bismarck's  blustering  speech  to  the  Reichstag 
measure  the  difference  between  the  Gennany  of 
the  Reformation  and  the  Prussia  of  to-day. 

I  refuse  to  believe  that  this  Bismarckian  attitude 
is  that  of  the  German  people.  If  a  censored  press 
permitted  them  to  know  the  real  truth  with  respect 
to  the  present  crisis,  that  people,  still  sound  in 
heart  and  steadfast  in  soul,  would  repudiate 
a  policy  of  duplicity,  cunning,  and  arrogance, 
which  has  precipitated  their  great  nation  into 
an  abyss  of  disaster.  The  normal  German  is  an 
admirable  citizen,  quiet,  peaceable,  thrifty,  in- 
dustrious, faithful,  efficient,  and  affectionate  to 
the  verge  of  sentimentality.  He,  and  not  the 
Junker,  has  made  Germany  the  most  efficient  po- 
litical State  in  the  world.  If  to  his  genius  for 
organization  could  be  added  the  individualism  of 
the  American,  the  resultant  product  would  be 
incomparable.  A  combination  of  the  German 
fortiter  in  re  with  the  American  suaviter  in  modo 
would  make  the  most  efficient  repubHc  in  the 
world. 

The  Germany  of  Luther,  that  still  survives  and 
will  survive  when  "  Junkerism"  is  a  dismal  memory 
of  the  past,  believes  that  "the  supreme  wisdom, 
the  paramount  vitality,  is  an  abiding  honesty,  the 


x:dv  Foreword 

doing  of  right,  because  right  is  right,  in  scorn  of 
consequence." 

That  the  German  people  have  rallied  with  en- 
thusiastic unanimity  to  the  flag  in  this  great  crisis, 
I  do  not  question.  This  is,  in  part,  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  truth  has  never  yet  been  disclosed  to 
them,  and  is  not  likely  to  be  until  the  war  is  over. 
They  have  been  taught  that  in  a  time  of  profound 
peace  England,  France,  and  Russia  deliberately 
initiated  a  war  of  aggression  to  destroy  the  com- 
mercial power  of  Germany.  The  documents 
hereinafter  analyzed  will  show  how  utterly 
baseless  this  fiction  is.  Even  if  the  truth  were 
known,  no  one  can  blame  the  German,  who  now 
rallies  to  his  flag  with  such  superhuman  devo- 
tion, for  whether  the  cause  of  his  country  is  just 
or  unjust,  its  prestige,  and  perhaps  its  very  ex- 
istence, is  at  stake,  and  there  should  be  for  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  German  people  only  a  feeling 
of  profound  pity  and  deep  admiration.  Edmund 
Burke  once  said,  "We  must  pardon  something  to 
the  spirit  of  Hberty."  We  can  paraphrase  it  and 
say  in  this  crisis,  "We  must  pardon  something  to 
the  spirit  of  patriotism."  The  whole-hearted  de- 
votion of  this  great  nation  to  its  flag  is  worthy  of 
the  best  traditions  of  the  Teutonic  race.  Thor 
did  not  wield  his  thunder  hammer  with  greater 


Foreword  xxv 

eftect  than  these  descendants  of  the  race  of  Wotan. 
If  the  ethical  question  depended  upon  relative 
bravery,  who  could  decide  between  the  German, 
"faithtul  unto  death";  the  English  soldier,  stand- 
ing like  a  stone  wall  against  fearful  odds,  the 
French  or  Russian  not  less  brave  or  resolute,  and 
the  Belgian,  now  as  in  Caesar's  time  the  "bravest  of 
all  the  tribes  of  Gaul." 

No  consideration,  either  of  sympathy,  admira- 
tion, or  pity,  can  in  any  manner  affect  the  deter- 
mination of  the  great  ethical  question  as  to  the 
moral  responsibility  for  the  present  crime  against 
civilization.  That  must  be  determined  by  the 
facts  as  they  have  been  developed,  and  the  nations 
and  individuals  who  are  responsible  for  this 
world-wide  catastrophe  must  be  held  to  a  strict 
accountability.  The  truth  of  history  inexorably 
demands  this. 

To  determine  where  this  moral  responsibility 
lies  is  the  purpose  of  these  pages. 

In  determining  this  question  Posterity  will  dis- 
tinguish between  the  military  caste,  headed  by  the 
Kaiser  and  the  Crown  Prince,  which  precipitated 
this  great  calamity,  and  the  German  people. 

The  very  secrecy  of  the  plot  against  the  peace 
of  the  world  and  the  failure  to  disclose  to  the 
German   nation   the   diplomatic   communications 


ixxvi  Foreword 

hereinafter  quoted,  strongly  suggest  that  this 
detestable  war  is  not  merely  a  crime  against  civili- 
zation, but  also  against  the  deceived  and  misled 
German  people.  They  have  a  vision  and  are 
essentially  progressive  and  peace-loving  in  their 
national  characteristics,  while  the  ideals  of  their 
military  caste  are  those  of  the  dark  ages. 

One  day  the  German  people  will  know  the  full 
truth  and  then  there  will  be  a  dreadful  reckoning 
for  those  who  have  plunged  a  noble  nation  into 
this  unfathomable  gulf  of  suffering. 

Though  the  mills  of  God  grind  slowly, 
Yet  they  grind  exceeding  small, 

Though  with  patience  He  stands  waiting, 
With  exactness  grinds  He  all. 

Or  to  put  this  ancient  Greek  proverb  in  its 
German  form: 
*'Gottes  Milhle  geht  langsam  aber  die  mahltfein. " 

James  M.  Beck. 
New  York,  November  30,  1914. 


Xrbe  Mftnesses 

ENGLAND 
HIS  MAJESTY,  KING  GEORGE  V. 

Mr.  Asquith Premier. 

Mr.  Beaumont Councilor  of  Embassy    at 

Constantinople. 

Sir  F.  Bertie Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Sir  G.  Buchanan Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. 

Sir  M.  De  Bunsen Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

Sir  E.  Goschen Ambassador  at  Berlin. 

Sir  Edward  Grey Foreign  Secretary. 

Sir  A.  Johnstone Minister  at  Luxemburg. 

Sir  Arthur  Nicholson Under  Secretary  for  Foreign 

Affairs. 

Sir  R.  Rood Ambassador  to  Italy. 

Sir  H.  Rumbold Councilor   of   Embassy    at 

Berlin. 

Sir  F.  Villiers Minister  to  Belgium. 

GERMANY 

HIS  MAJESTY,  EMPEROR  WILLIAM  II. 

Herr  von  Below  (Saleske  ') Minister  to  Belgium. 

Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg Chancellor. 

Herr  von  Buch Minister  at  Luxemburg. 

I  Herr  von  Below  Saleske  is  referred  to  in.  despatches  as  Herr  von  Below, 
xxvii 


-xviii  The  Witnesses 

Herr  von  Heeringen Minister  of  War. 

Herr  von  Jagow Secretary  of  State. 

Prince  Lichnowsky Ambassador  at  London. 

Herr  von  Mueller Minister  at  The  Hague. 

Count  Pourtales Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. 

Baron  von  Schoen Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Herr  von  Zimmermann Under  Secretary  of  State. 

Herr  von  Tschirschky Ambassador  at  Vienna. 

FRANCE 

PRESIDENT  RAYMOND  POINCARE 

M.  Viviani Premier  of  France. 

M.  Berthelot Of  the  French  Ministry  for 

Foreign  Affairs. 

M.  Paul  Cambon Ambassador  to  England. 

M.  Klobukowski Minister  to  Belgium. 

M.  De  Margerie Of  the  French   Diplomatic 

Service. 

M.  Jules  Cambon Ambassador  to  Germany. 

RUSSIA 
HIS  MAJESTY,  EMPEROR  NICHOLAS  II. 

M.  Sazonof Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Count  Benckendorff Ambassador  at  London. 

M.  Bronewsky Charge  d'Affaires  at  Berlin, 

M.  De  Etter Councilor  of  Embassy    at 

London. 

M.  IsvoLSKY Ambassador  to  France. 

Prince  Kudachef Councilor  of    Embassy  at 

Vienna. 

M.  Salviati Consul  General  at  Fiume. 

M.  Schebeko Ambassador  to  Austria. 

M.  Sevastopoulo Charg6  d'Affaires  at  Paris. 


The  Witnesses  xxix 

M.  Strandtman Charge  d'Aflfaires  at    Bel- 
grade. 

M.  SucHOMLiNOF Minister  for  War. 

M.  De  Swerbeew Ambassador  to  Germany. 

BELGIUM 

HIS  MAJESTY.  KING  ALBERT 

M.  Davignon Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Baron  von  der  Elst .  .Secretary  General  to  Minis- 
try of  Foreign  Affairs. 
Count  Errembault  de  Dudzeele  . .  Minister  at  Vienna. 

Baron  Fallon Minister  at  The  Hague. 

Baron  Grenier Minister  at  Madrid. 

Baron  Guillaume Minister  at  Paris. 

Count  de  Lalaing Minister  at  London. 

SERVIA 

HIS  MAJESTY,  KING  PETER 

M.  Pachitch Premier    and    Minister    of 

Foreign  Affairs. 

M.  Boschkovitch Minister  at  London. 

Dr.  Patchou Minister  of  Finance. 

AUSTRIA 

HIS  MAJESTY,  EMPEROR  FRANCIS  JOSEPH 

Count  Berchtold Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Count  Clary  und  Aldringen Minister  at  Brussels. 

Baron  Giesl  von  Gieslingen Minister  at  Belgrade. 

Baron  Macchio Councilor  of  Austrian  Min- 
istry of  Foreign  Affairs. 

Count  Mensdorff Ambassador  to  England. 

Count  Szapary Ambassador  to  Russia. 


XXX  The  Witnesses 

ITALY 

HIS  MAJESTY,  KING  VICTOR  EMMANUEL  IIL 

Marquis  di  San  Giuliano Minister  of  Foreign  AflFairs. 


CONTENTS 

PAG* 

Introduction      ......         v 

Foreword    .         .         .         .        .        .        .      xv 

The  Witnesses xxvii 

CHAPTER  I 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization 

Existence  of  the  Court — The  conscience  of  mankind — ^The 
philosophy  of  Bernhardi — The  recrudescence  of  Mach- 
iavellism — Treitschke  and  Bernhardi's  doctrine — Re- 
cent utterances  of  the  Kaiser,  Crown  Prince,  and 
representative  officials — George  Bernard  Shaw's  de- 
fense— Concrete  illustration  of  Bernhardiism       .  .         I 

CHAPTER   II 
The  Record  in  the  Case 

The  issues  stated — Proximate  and  underlying  causes — A 
war  of  diplomats — The  masses  not  parties  to  the  war — 
The  official  defenses — The  English  White  Paper — 
The  German  White  Paper — The  Russian  Orange  Paper 
— The  Belgian  Cray  Paper — Austria  and  Italy  still 
silent — Obligation  of  these  nations  to  disclose  facts       .       l8 

CHAPTER  III 
The  Suppressed  Evidence 

No  apparent  suppression  by  England,  Russia,  and  Belgium 
— Suppression    by    Germany    of    vital    documents — 
Suppression  by  Austria  of  entire  record — Significance 
of  such  suppression  ......       27 

2uixi 


xxxii  Contents 

CHAPTER  IV 

Germany's  Responsibility  for  the  Austrian 
Ultimatum 

PAG3 

Silence  which  preceded  ultimatum — Europe's  ignorance  of 
impending  developments — Duty  to  civilization — 
Germany's  prior  knowledge  of  ultimatum — Its  dis- 
claimer to  Russia,  France,  and  England  of  any  respon- 
sibility— Contradictory  admission  in  its  official  defense 
— Further  confirmation  in  Germany's  simultaneous 
threat  to  the  Powers — Further  confirmation  in  its  con- 
fidential notice  to  States  of  Germany  to  prepare  for 
eventualities  ........      31 


CHAPTER  V 
The  Austrian  Ultimatum  to  Servia 

Extreme  brutality  of  ultimatum — Limited  time  given  to 
Servia  and  Europe  for  consideration — Ultimatum  and 
Servia's  reply  contrasted  in  parallel  columns — Relative 
size  of  two  nations — Germany's  intimations  to  Servia — 
Brutality  of  ultimatum  shown  by  analogy — Disclaimer 
of  intention  to  take  territory  valueless         ...       47 

CHAPTER  VI 
The  Peace  Parleys 

Possibility  of  peace  not  embarrassed  by  popular  clamor — 
Difficulties  of  peaceful  solution  not  insuperable — 
Policy  of  Germany  and  Austria — Russia's  and  Eng- 
land's request  for  time — Germany's  refusal  to  co- 
operate— Germany's  and  Austria's  excuses  for  refusal 
to  give  extension  of  time — Berchtold's  absence  from 
Vienna — Austria's  alleged  disclaimer  of  territorial 
expansion — Sazonof's  conference  with  English  and 
French  Ambassadors — Their  conciliatory  counsel  to 


Contents  xxxiii 


Servia — Servia's  pacific  reply  to  ultimatum — Austria, 
without  considering  Servian  reply,  declares  war — 
England  proposes  suspension  of  hostilities  for  peace 
parleys — Germany  refuses — Its  specious  reasons — 
Germany's  untenable  position  as  to  localization  of 
conflict — England's  proposal  for  a  conference — Ger- 
many's refusal — Austria  declines  all  intervention, 
refusing  to  discuss  Servian  note — Germany  supports 
her  with  a  quibble  as  to  name  of  conference — Russia 
proposes  further  discussion  on  basis  of  Servian  note — 
Russia  then  again  proposes  European  conference — 
Austria  and  Germany  decline  .....      6l 


CHAPTER  VII' 
The  Attitude  of  France 

The  French  Yellow  Book — Its  editors  and  contents — 
M.  Jules  Cambon — The  weakness  Oi."  German  dip- 
lomacy— Cambon's  experience  and  merits — iutcrvicw 
between  the  German  Kaiser  and  the  King  of  Belgium 
— The  Kaiser's  change  of  attitude — The  influence  of 
the  Moroccan  crisis — The  condition  of  the  German 
people  in  1913 — The  suppression  of  news  in  Austria — 
Attitude  of  the  military  party — Servia's  warning  to 
Austria — Germany's  knowledge  of  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum before  its  issuance — Italy's  ignorance  of  the 
Austrian  ultimatum — Significance  of  the  fact — Ger- 
many's reasons  for  concealing  its  intentions  from  Italy 
— The  policy  of  secrecy — Prince  Lichnowsky's  anxiety 
— Cambon's  interview  with  von  Jagow — The  methods 
of  deception — Sazonof's  frank  offer — Germany's  at- 
tempt to  influence  France — Cambon's  dramatic  in- 
terview with  von  Jagow — His  plea  "  In  the  name  of 
humanity  " — The  diff'erent  attitudes  of  the  two  groups 
of  powers        ........      102 


xxxiv  Contents 

CHAPTER  VIII 
The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser 

PAGE 

The  Kaiser's  return  to  Berlin — His  inconsistent  record  and 
complex  personality — German  Foreign  Office  depre- 
cates his  return — Its  many  blunders — The  Kaiser  takes 
the  helm — He  telegraphs  the  Czar — The  Czar's  reply — 
The  ICaiser's  second  telegram — His  untenable  position 
— The  Czar's  explanation  of  military  preparations  and 
pledge  that  no  provocative  action  would  be  taken  by 
Russia — King  George's  telegram  proposing  temporary 
occupation  by  Austria  of  Belgrade  pending  further  peace 
negotiations — The  Kaiser's  reply — The  Kaiser's  tele- 
gram to  the  Czar  demanding  Russian  discontinuance  of 
military  preparations — His  insistence  upon  unilateral 
conditions — Germany's  preparations  for  war — Its  offer 
to  England  to  insure  its  neutrality — England's  reply — 
Russia's  offer  to  stop  conditionally  military  prepara- 
tions— England  requests  Germany  to  suggest  any  peace 
formula — Austria  expresses  willingness  to  discuss  with 
Russia  Servian  note — Motives  of  Austria  for  this  re- 
versal of  policy — The  Kaiser  sends  ultimatum  to  Russia 
— The  Czar's  last  appeal — The  Kaiser's  reply — 
Russia's  'lability  to  recall  mobilization — England's 
last  efforts  for  peace — Germany  declares  war — The 
Czar's  telegram  to  King  George      ....      138 

CHAPTER  IX 
The  Case  of  Belgium 

The  verdict  of  history  not  affected  by  result  of  war — 
Belgium  at  outbreak  of  war — The  Treaty  of  1839 — 
Its  affirmation  by  Bismarck — France's  action  in  1871 — 
Reaffirmation  by  Germany  of  Belgian  neutrality  ia 
1911-1914 — The  Hague  Peace  Conference  of  1907 — • 
England  asks  Germany's  and  France's  intentions  with 
respect  to  Belgium's  neutrality — France  replies — 
Germany's  refusal  to  reply — Germany's  second  offer  to 
England — Germany's    ultimatum    to    Belgium — Bel- 


Contents  xxxv 


gium's  reply — France's  offer  of  five  army  corps — 
Belgium  refuses  aid — Germany's  declaration  of  war 
against  Belgium — The  German  Chancellor's  explana- 
tion in  the  Reichstag — The  Belgian  King  appeals  to 
England — England's  ultimatum  to  Germany — The 
"scrap  of  paper"  incident — England  declares  war 
against  Germany — The  apologies  for  Germany's  action 
discussed — Belgium's  rights  independent  of  Treaty  of 
1839  or  The  Hague  Convention — Germany's  allegation 
that  France  had  violated  Belgium's  neutrality  an 
afterthought — Von  Mach's  plea  for  the  suspension  of 
judgment — The  Brussels  documents  discussed — The 
negotiations  between  England  and  Belgium — The  Ger- 
man Chancellor's  belated  explanation  of  the  "  Scrap 
of  paper"  phrase — Invasion  of  Belgium  a  recrudes- 
cence of  Machiavellism — The  great  blunder  of  Ger- 
many's diplomats  and  soldiers  ....      196 

CHAPTER  X 
The  Judgment  of  the  World 

The  completeness  of  the  evidence — The  force  of  public 
opinion — The  judgment  of  neutral  States — The  United 
States  as  a  moral  arbiter — ^A  summary  of  the  probable 
verdict  of  history  .  ......     246 


Epilogue 252 


The  Evidence  in  the  Case 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  CIVILIZATION 

Let  us  suppose  that  in  this  year  of  dis-Grace, 
1914,  there  had  existed,  as  let  us  pray  will  one  day 
exist,  a  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization,  before 
which  the  sovereign  nations  could  litigate  their 
differences  without  resort  to  the  iniquitous  arbi- 
trament of  arms  and  that  each  of  the  contend- 
ing nations  had  a  sufficient  leaven  of  Christianity 
or  shall  we  say  common-place,  every-day  morality, 
to  have  its  grievances  adjudged  not  by  the  ethics 
of  the  cannon,  but  by  the  eternal  criterion  of 
justice. 

What  would  be  the  judgment  of  that  august 
tribunal? 

It  may  be  suggested  that  the  question  is  aca- 
demic, as  no  such  Supreme  Court  exists  or  is  likely 
to  exist  within  the  life  of  any  living  man. 

I 


2  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Casuists  of  the  Bemhardi  school  of  moral  phil- 
osophy will  further  suggest  that  to  discuss  the 
ethical  merits  of  the  war  is  to  start  with  a  false 
premise  that  such  a  thing  as  international  mor- 
ality exists,  and  that  when  once  the  conven- 
tionalities of  civilization  are  laid  aside  the 
leading  nations  commence  and  make  war  in  a 
manner  that  differs  only  in  degree  and  not  in  kind 
from  the  methods  of  Frederick  the  Great  and 
Napoleon,  and  that  these  in  turn  only  differed  in 
degree  from  those  of  Alaric  and  Attila.  According 
to  this  theory,  the  only  law  of  nations  is  that 
ascribed  by  the  poet  to  Rob  Roy : 

"The  good  old  rule 
Sufficeth  them,  the  simple  plan 
That  they  should  take  who  have  the  power, 
And  they  should  keep  who  can." 

Does  the  Twentieth  Century  only  differ  from  its 
predecessors  in  having  a  thin  veneering  of  hypoc- 
risy, or  has  there  developed  in  the  progress  of  civil- 
ization an  international  morality,  by  which,  even 
though  imperfectly,  the  moral  conduct  of  nations 
is  judged? 

The  answer  can  be  an  unqualified  affirmative. 
With  the  age  of  the  printing  press,  the  steamship, 
the  railroad,  and  the  telegraph  there  has  developed 
a  conscience  of  mankind. 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization      3 

When  the  founders  of  the  American  Republic 
severed  the  tie  which  bound  them  to  Great  Britain, 
they  stated  that  "  a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions 
of  mankind  requires  that  they  should  declare  the 
causes  which  impel  them  to  the  separation." 

The  Declaration  assumed  that  there  was  a 
rule  of  right  and  wrong  that  regulated  the  inter- 
course of  nations  as  well  as  individuals;  it  be- 
lieved that  there  was  a  great  human  conscience, 
which  rises  higher  than  the  selfish  interests  and 
prejudices  of  nations  and  races,  and  which  approves 
justice  and  condemns  injustice.  It  felt  that  this 
approval  is  more  to  be  desired  than  national  ad- 
vantage. It  constituted  mankind  a  judge  between 
contending  nations  and  lest  its  judgment  should 
temporarily  err  it  established  posterity  as  a  court 
of  last  resort.  It  placed  the  tie  of  humanity 
rbove  that  of  nationality.  It  proclaimed  the 
:  olldarity  of  mankind. 

In  the  years  that  have  intervened  since  this 
noble  Declaration,  the  world  has  so  far  progressed 
towards  an  enlightened  sense  of  justice  that  a 
"decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind"  has 
proved  an  efficient  power  in  regulating  peacefully 
and  justly  the  intercourse  of  nations.  Each  nation 
does  at  least  in  some  measure  fear  to-da}'  the 
disapproval  of  civilization.      The  time  gives  this 


4  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

proof  in  the  eager  desire  of  Germany  to-day — 
despite  its  policy  of  "blood  and  iron" — to  gain 
the  sympathetic  approval  of  the  American  peo- 
ple, not  with  the  remotest  hope  of  any  practical 
cooperation  but  to  avoid  that  state  of  moral  iso- 
lation, in  which  the  land  of  Luther  now  finds  itself. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization  does  exist. 
It  consists  of  cosmopolitan  men  in  every  country, 
who  put  aside  racial  and  national  prejudices  and 
determine  the  right  and  wrong  of  every  issue 
between  nations  by  that  slowly  forming  system 
of  international  moraUty  which  is  the  conscience 
of  mankind. 

To  a  certain  class  of  German  statesmen  and 
philosophers  this  Court  of  Public  Opinion  is  a 
visionary  abstraction.  A  group  of  distinguished 
German  soldiers,  professors,  statesmen,  and  even 
doctors  of  divinity,  pretending  to  speak  in  behalf 
of  the  German  nation,  have  consciously  or  un- 
consciously attempted  to  revive  in  the  twentieth 
century  the  cynical  political  morality  of  the 
sixteenth. 

As  Symonds,  the  historian  of  the  Renaissance, 
says  in  his  Age  of  the  Despots,  Machiavelli  was  the 
first  in  modern  times  to  formulate  a  theory  of 
government  in  which  the  interests  of  the  ruler 
are  alone  regarded,  which  assumes 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization      5 

a  separation  between  statecraft  and  morality, 
which  recognizes  force  and  fraud  among  the  legiti- 
mate means  of  attaining  high  political  ends,  which 
makes  success  alone  the  test  of  conduct  and  which 
presupposes  the  corruption,  baseness,  and  venality 
of  mankind  at  large. 


Even  the  age  of  Cesare  Borgia  revolted  against 
this  philosophy  and  the  name  of  Machiavelli 
became  a  byword.  "Am  I  a  Machiavel?"  says 
the  host  in  The  Merry  Wives  of  Windsor,  and 
the  implication  of  this  question  indirectly  mani- 
fests the  revolt  of  the  seventeenth  century  against 
the  sinister  philosophy  of  the  great  Florentine. 

Nothing  can  be  more  amazing  than  that  not 
only  leading  militarists  of  Germany  but  many  of  its 
foremost  philosophers  and  teachers  have  become  so 
intoxicated  with  the  dream  of  Pan-Germanism 
that  in  the  utmost  sincerity  they  have  espoused 
and  w^ith  a  certain  pride  proclaimed  the  vicious 
principles  of  Alachiavelli  in  all  their  moral  nudity. 
There  is  an  emotional  and  mystical  element  in 
the  advanced  German  thinker,  which  makes  him 
capable  of  accepting  in  full  sincerity  intellectual 
and  moral  absurdities  of  which  the  more  ^obust 
common  sense  of  other  nations  would  be  incapable. 
The  advanced  German  doctrinaire  is  the  "wises*- 
fool  in  Christendom."     The  depth  of  his  learning 


6  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

is  generally  in  the  inverse  ratio  to  the  shallowness 
of  his  common  sense. 

Nothing  better  demonstrates  this  than  the 
present  negation  by  advanced  and  doubtless  sin- 
cere German  thinkers  of  the  very  foundations  of 
public  morality  and  indeed  of  civilization.  They 
have  been  led  with  Nietzsche  to  revile  the  Beati- 
tudes and  exalt  the  supremacy  of  cruelty  over 
mercy.  Indeed  Treitschke  in  his  lectures  on 
Politik,  which  have  become  the  gospel  of  Junker- 
dom,  avowedly  based  his  gospel  of  force  upon  the 
teaching  of  Machiavelli,  for  he  points  out  that 
it  was  Machiavelli  who  first  clearly  saw  that  the 
State  is  power  {der  Staat  ist  Macht).  Therefore 
"to  care  for  this  power  is  the  highest  moral  duty 
of  the  State"  and  "of  all  political  weaknesses  that 
of  feebleness  is  the  most  abominable  and  despicable ; 
it  is  the  sin  against  the  holy  spirit  of  politics." 
He  therefore  holds  that  the  State  as  the  ultimate 
good  "cannot  bind  its  will  for  the  future  over 
against  other  States,"  and  that  international 
treaties  are  therefore  only  obligatory  "for  such 
time  as  the  State  may  find  to  be  convenient." 

To  enforce  the  will  of  the  nation  contrary  to  its 
own  solemn  promises  and  to  increase  its  might, 
war  is  the  appointed  means.  Both  Treitschke  and 
Moltke  conceived  it  as  "an  ordinance  set  by  God" 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization      7 

and  "one  of  the  two  highest  functions"  of  the 
State.  The  doctrine  is  carried  to  the  blasphemous 
conclusion  that  war  is  an  ordinance  of  a  just  and 
merciful  God;  that,  to  quote  Bemhardi,  "it  is  a 
biological  necessity"  and  that  "the  living  God  will 
see  to  it  that  war  shall  always  recur  as  a  terrible 
medicine  for  humanity."  Therefore  "might  is  at 
once  the  supreme  right  and  the  dispute  as  to  what 
is  right  is  decided  by  the  arbitrament  of  war," 
v.'liich  gives  a  "biologically  just  decision," 

This  means  that  the  42  centimeter  howitzer  is 
more  moral  than  a  gun  of  smaller  caliber  and  that 
the  justice  of  God  depends  upon  the  superiority 
of  Krupp  to  other  ordnance  manufacturers. 

Treitschke  tells  us,  and  the  statement  is  quoted 
by  Bemhardi  with  approval,  that  "the  end  all 
and  be  all  of  a  state  is  power,  and  he  who  is 
not  man  enough  to  look  this  truth  in  the  face 
should  not  meddle  with  politics. "  To  this 
Bemhardi  adds  that  the  State's  highest  moral  duty 
is  to  increase  its  power  and  in  so  doing  ''the  State 
is  the  sole  judge  of  the  morality  of  its  own  action. 
It  is  in  fact  above  morality  or,  in  other  words 
whatever  is  necessary  is  moral." 

Again  we  learn  that  the  State  must  not  allow 
any  conventional  sympathies  to  distract  it  from 
its  object  and  that  "conditions  may  arise  which 


8  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

are  more  powerful  than  the  most  honorable 
intentions. " 

All  efforts  directed  towards  the  abolition  of  war 
are  denominated  as  not  only  "foolish  but  ab- 
solutely immoral."  To  indicate  that  in  this 
prosecution  of  war  for  the  increase  of  dominion, 
chivalry  would  be  a  weakness  and  magnanimity  a 
crime,  we  are  finally  told  that  "the  State  is  a  law 
unto  itself"  and  that  "weak  nations  have  not  the 
same  right  to  live  as  powerful  and  vigorous 
nations. ' '  Even  as  to  weak  nations,  we  are  further 
advised  that  the  powerful  and  vigorous  nation — 
which  alone  apparently  has  the  right  to  live — 
must  not  wait  for  some  act  of  aggression  or  legiti- 
mate casus  belli,  but  that  it  is  justified  in  de- 
liberately provoking  a  war,  and  that  the  happiest 
results  have  always  followed  such  "deliberately 
provoked  wars,"  for  "the  prospects  of  success  are 
the  greatest  when  the  moment  for  declaring  war 
can  be  selected  to  suit  the  political  and  military 
situation. " 

As  the  weak  nations  have  no  moral  right  to  live 
it  becomes  important  to  remember  that  in  the 
economy  of  Prussian  Junkerdom  there  is  only  one 
strong  race — his  own.  "  Wir  sind  die  Weltrasse.^* 
The  ultimate  goal  is  the  super-nation,  and  the 
premise  upon  which  the  whole  policy  is  based  is 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization      9 

that  Germany  is  predestined  to  be  that  super- 
nation.  Bemhardi  beHeves — and  his  beHef  is  but 
the  reflex  of  the  oft-repeated  boast  of  the  Kaiser — 
that  history  presents  no  other  possibility.  "  For 
us  there  are  two  alternatives  and  no  third — 
world  power  or  ruin "  {Weltmacht  oder  Nieder- 
gang).  To  assimilate  Germany  to  ancient  Rome 
the  Kaiser  on  occasion  reminds  himself  of  Cctsar 
and  affects  to  reign,  not  by  the  will  of  the  people, 
but  by  divine  right.  No  living  monarch  has  said 
or  done  more  to  revive  this  mediaeval  fetich.  To 
his  soldiers  he  has  recently  said :  "You  think  each 
day  of  your  Emperor.  Do  not  forget  God. " 
What  magnanimity! 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  he  again 
illustrated  his  spirit  of  fanatical  absolutism, 
which  at  times  inspires  him,  by  saying  to  his 
army: 

Remember  that  the  German  people  are  the  chosen 
of  God.  On  me,  as  German  Emperor,  the  spirit 
of  God  has  descended.  I  am  His  weapon;  His 
sword;  His  Vicegerent.  Woe  to  the  disobedient! 
Death  to  cowards  and  unbelievers ! 

The  modem  world  has  had  nothing  like  this 
since  Mahomet  and,  accepted  literally,  it  claims 
for  the  Kaiser  the  divine  attributes  attributed  to 
the  Caesars.    Even  the  Caesars,  in  baser  and  more 


10  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

primitive  times,  found  posing  as  a  divine  superman 
somewhat  difficult  and  disconcerting.  Shakespeare 
subtly  suggests  this  when  he  makes  his  Caesar  talk 
like  a  god  and  act  with  the  vacillation  of  a  child. 

When  the  war  was  precipitated  as  the  natural 
result  of  such  abhorrent  teachings,  the  world  at 
large  knew  little  either  of  Treitschke  or  Bemhardi. 
Thoughtful  men  of  other  nations  did  know  that 
the  successful  political  immoralities  of  Frederick  the 
Great  had  profoundly  affected  the  policies  of  the 
Prussian  Court  to  this  day.  The  German  poet, 
FreiHgrath,  once  said  that  "Germany  is  Ham- 
let," bu:t  no  analogy  is  less  justified.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  supersensitive,  introspective,  and 
amiable  dreamer  of  Elsinore  to  suggest  the  Prussia 
of  to-day,  which  Behelha.scalled"  Siegesbetrunken.'* 
(Victory-dnmk.) 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  the  world 
has  become  familiar  with  these  abhorrent  teachings 
and  as  a  result  of  a  general  revolt  against  this 
recrudescence  of  Borgiaism  attempts  have  been 
made  by  the  apologists  for  Prussia,  especially  in 
the  United  States,  to  suggest  that  neither  Treitsch- 
ke nor  Bemhardi  fairly  reflect  the  political 
philosophy  of  official  Germany.  •  Treitschke's  in- 
fluence as  an  historian  and  lecturer  could  not  well 
be  denied  but  attempts  have  been  made  to  im- 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization     ii 

press  America  that  Bemhardi  has  no  standing 
to  speak  for  his  country  and  that  the  importance 
of  his  teachings  should  therefore  be  minimized. 

Apart  from  the  wide  popularity  of  Bemhardi's 
writings  in  Germany,  the  German  Government 
has  never  repudiated  Bemhardi's  conclusions  or 
disclaimed  responsibility  therefor.  While  pos- 
sibly not  an  officially  authorized  spokesman,  yet 
he  is  as  truly  a  representative  thinker  in  the 
German  military  system  as  Admiral  Mahan  was 
in  the  Navy  of  the  United  States.  Of  the 
acceptance  by  Prussia  of  Bemhardi's  teachings 
there  is  one  irrefutable  proof.  It  is  Belgium.  The 
destruction  of  that  unoffending  country  is  the  full 
harvest  of  this  twentieth-century  Machiavellism. 

A  few  recent  utterances  from  a  representative 
physician,  a  prominent  journalist,  and  a  distin- 
guished retired  officer  of  the  German  Army  may 
be  quoted  as  showing  how  completely  infatuated  a 
certain  class  of  German  thinkers  has  become  with 
the  gospel  of  force  for  the  purpose  of  attaining 
world  power. 

Thus  a  Dr.  Fuchs,  in  a  book  on  the  subject  of 
preparedness  for  war,  says: 

Therefore  the  German  claim  of  the  day  must  be : 
The  family  to  the  front.  The  State  has  to  follow 
at  first  in  the  school,  then  in  foreign  politics.     Edu- 


12  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

cation  to  hate.  Education  to  the  estimation  of  hatred. 
Organization  of  hatred.  Education  to  the  desire  for 
hatred.  Let  us  abolish  unripe  and  false  shame 
before  brutality  and  fanaticism.  We  must  not  hesi- 
tate to  announce:  To  us  is  given  faith,  hope,  and 
hatred,  but  hatred  is  the  greatest  among  them. 

Maximilian  Harden,  one  of  the  most  influential 
German  journalists,  says: 

Let  us  drop  our  miserable  attempts  to  excuse 
Germany's  action.  Not  against  our  will  and  as  a 
nation  taken  by  surprise  did  we  hurl  ourselves  into 
this  gigantic  venture.  We  luilled  it.  We  had  to 
will  it.  We  do  not  stand  before  the  judgment  seat 
of  Europe.  We  acknowledge  no  such  jurisdiction. 
Our  might  shall  create  a  new  law  i?z  Europe.  It  is 
Germany  that  strikes.  When  she  has  conquered 
new  domains  for  her  genius  then  the  priesthoods 
of  all  the  gods  will  praise  the  God  of  War. 

Still  more  striking  and  morally  repellent  was  the 
very  recent  statement  by  Major-General  von  Dis- 
furth,  in  an  article  contributed  by  him  to  the 
Hamburger  Nachrichten,  which  so  completely  illus- 
trates Bemhardiism  in  its  last  extreme  of  avowed 
brutality  that  it  justifies  quotation  in  extenso. 

No  object  whatever  is  served  by  taking  any  notice 
of  the  accusations  of  barbarity  leveled  against 
Germany  by  our  foreign  critics.  Frankly,  we  are 
and  must  be  barbarians,  if  by  these  we  understand 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization     13 

those  who  ivage  ivar  relentlessly  and  to  the  uttermost 
degree.  .  .  . 

We  Give  no  explanations  to  any  one.  There  is 
nothing  for  us  to  justify  and  nothing  to  explain  away. 
Every  act  of  ivhalcver  nature  committed  by  our  troops 
for  the  purpose  of  discouraging,  defeating,  and  destroy- 
ing our  enemies  is  a  brave  act  and  a  good  deed,  and  is 
fully  justified.  .  .  .  Germany  stands  as  the  supreme 
arbiter  of  her  own  methods,  which  in  the  time  of  war 
must  be  dictated  to  the  world.  .  .   . 

They  call  us  barbarians.  What  of  it?  We  scorn 
them  and  their  abuse.  For  my  part  I  hope  that  in 
this  war  we  have  merited  the  title  of  barbarians.  Let 
neutral  peoples  and  our  enemies  cease  their  empty 
chatter,  which  may  well  be  compared  to  the  twitter 
of  birds.  Let  them  cease  their  talk  of  the  Cathedral 
at  Rheims  and  of  all  the  churches  and  all  the  castles 
in  France  which  have  shared  its  fate.  These 
things  do  not  interest  us.  Our  troops  must  achieve 
victory.     What  else  matters? 

These  hysterical  vaporings  of  advanced  Junkers 
no  more  make  a  case  against  the  German  people 
t,han  the  tailors  of  Tooley  Street  had  authority  to 
speak  for  England,  but  they  do  represent  the 
spirit  of  the  ruling  caste,  to  which  unhappily  the 
German  people  have  committed  their  destiny. 
It  would  not  be  difficult  to  quote  both  the  Kai- 
ser and  the  Crown  Prince,  who  on  more  than 
one  occasion  have  manifested  their  enthusiastic 
adherence  to  the  gospel  of  brute  force.    The  world 


14  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

is  not  likely  to  forget  the  Crown  Prince's  congratu- 
lations to  the  brutal  military  martinet  of  the 
Zabem  incident,  and  still  less  the  shameful  fact 
that  when  the  Kaiser  sent  his  punitive  expedition 
to  China,  he  who  once  stood  within  sight  of 
the  Mount  of  Olives  and  preached  a  sermon 
breathing  the  spirit  of  Christian  humility,  said  to 
his  soldiers: 

When  you  encounter  the  enemy  you  will  de- 
feat him.  No  quarter  shall  be  given,  no  prisoners 
shall  be  taken.  Let  all  who  fall  into  your  hands  be 
at  your  mercy.  Just  as  the  Huns  a  thousand  years 
ago  under  the  leadership  of  Etzel  {Attila),  gained  a 
reputation  in  virtue  of  which  they  still  live  in  historical 
tradition,  so  may  the  name  of  Germany  become  known 
in  such  a  manner  in  China  that  no  Chinaman  will 
ever  again  even  dare  to  look  askance  at  a  German. 

And  this  campaign  of  extermination — worthy 
of  a  savage  Indian  chief — was  planned  for  the 
most  pacific  and  unaggressive  race,  the  Chinese, 
for  it  is  sadly  true  that  the  one  nation  which 
has  more  than  any  other  been  inspired  for  two 
thousand  years  by  the  spirit  of  "peace  on 
earth"  is  the  hermit  nation,  into  which  imtil  the 
nineteenth  century  the  light  of  Christianity  never 
shone. 

In  a  recent  article,  George  Bemhard  Shaw, 
the  Voltaire  of  the  twentieth  century,  with  the 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization     15 

intellectual  brilliancy  and  moral  shallowness  of 
the  great  cynic,  attempts  to  justify  Bemhardiism 
by  resort  to  the  unconvincing   **et  tu  quoque'* 
argument.      He  contends  that  England  also  has 
had  its  "Bemhardis,"  and  refers  to  a  few  books 
which  he  affects  to  think  bear  out  his  argument. 
That  these  books  show  that  there  have  been  ad- 
vocates of  militarism  in  England   is  undoubtedly 
true.     The  present  war  illustrates  that  there  was 
need  of  such  literature,  for  a  nation  which  faced  so 
great  a  trial  as  the  present,  with  a  standing  army 
that  was  pitiful  in  comparison  with  that  of  Ger- 
many and  without  any  involuntary  service  law, 
certainly  had  need  of  some  literary  stimulus   to 
self -preparation.     No  one  quarrels  with  Bemhardi 
in  his  discussions  of  the  problems  of  war  as  such. 
It  is  only  when  the  soldier  ceases  to  be  a  strategist 
and  becomes  a  moralist  that  the  average  man  with 
conventional  ideas  of  morality  revolts  against  Bem- 
hardiism.    The  books  to  which  Mr.  Shaw  refers  can 
be  searched  in  vain  for  any  passages  parallel  to 
those  which  have  been  quoted  from  Treitschke, 
Bemhardi,  and  other  German  writers.    The  bril- 
liant but  erratic  George  Bernard  Shaw  cannot  find 
in  all  English  literature  any  such  Machiavelliisms 
as  those  of  Treitschke  and  Bemhardi. 

Shaw's  whole  defense  of  Germany,  betrays  his 


i6  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

characteristic  desire  to  be  clever  and  audacious 
without  regard  to  nice  considerations  of  truth. 
Much  as  we  may  admire  his  intellectual  badinage 
under  other  circumstances,  it  may  be  questioned 
whether  in  this  supreme  tragedy  of  the  world  it 
was  fitting  for  Shaw  to  daub  himself  anew  with  his 
familiar  vermilion  and  play  the  intellectual  clown. 

It  was  either  courage  of  an  extraordinary  but 
unenviable  character  or  else  crass  stupidity  that 
led  Bemhardi  to  submit  to  the  civilization  of 
the  present  day  such  a  debasing  gospel,  for  if  his 
brain  had  not  been  hopelessly  obfuscated  by  his 
Pan-Germanic  imperialism,  he  would  have  seen 
that  not  only  would  this  philosophy  do  his  country 
infinitely  more  harm  than  a  whole  park  of  artillery 
but  would  inevitably  carry  his  memory  down  to 
a  wondering  posterity,  like  Machiavelli,  detestable 
but,  unlike  Machiavelli,  ridiculous. 

Machiavelli  gave  to  his  Prince  a  literary  finish 
that  placed  his  treatise  among  the  classics,  while 
Bemhardi  has  gained  recognition  chiefly  because 
his  book  is  a  moral  anachronism. 

One  concrete  illustration  from  Bemhardi  clearly 
shows  that  the  sentences  above  quoted  are 
truly  representative  of  his  philosophy,  and  not 
unfair  excerpts.  In  explaining  that  it  is  the  duty 
of  every  nation  to  increase  its  power  and  territory 


The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization     17 

without  regard  for  the  rights  of  others,  he  alludes 
to  the  fact  that  England  committed  the  ^^unpar- 
donable blunder  from  her  point  of  view  of  not 
supporting  the  Southern  States  in  the  American 
War  of  Secession, "  and  thus  forever  severing  in 
twain  the  American  Republic.  In  this  striking 
illustration  of  applied  Bernhardiism,  there  is  no 
sujrgestion  a3  to  the  moral  side  of  such  interven- 
tion. Nothing  is  said  with  respect  to  the  moral 
question  of  slavery,  or  of  the  obligations  of 
England  to  a  friendly  Power.  Nothing  as  to 
how  the  best  hopes  of  humanity  would  have 
been  shattered  if  the  American  Republic — that 
''pillar  of  cloud  by  day  and  pillar  of  fire  by  night" 
to  struggling  humanity — had  been  brought  to 
cureless  ruin.  All  these  considerations  are  com- 
pletely disregarded,  and  all  Bemhardi  can  see  in 
the  situation,  as  it  presented  itself  to  England 
in  1 86 1,  was  its  opportunity,  by  a  cowardly  stab 
in  the  back,  to  remove  forever  from  its  path  a  great 
and  growing  nation. 

Poor  Bemhardi !  He  thought  to  serve  his  royal 
master.  He  has  simply  damned  him.  As  Mach- 
iavcUi,  as  the  eulogist  of  the  Medicis,  simply  em- 
phasized their  moral  nudity,  so  Bemhardi  has 
shown  the  world  the  inner  significance  of  this 
>2rude  revival  of  Csesarism. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  RECORD  IN  THE  CASE 

All  morally  sane  men  in  this  twentieth  century- 
are  agreed  that  war  abstractly  is  an  evil  thing, — - 
perhaps  the  greatest  of  all  indecencies, — and  that 
while  it  may  be  one  of  the  offenses  which  must 
come,  "woe  to  that  man  (or  nation)  by  whom  the 
offense  cometh!" 

They  are  of  one  mind  in  regarding  this  present 
war  as  a  great  crime — perhaps  the  greatest  crime — 
against  civilization,  and  the  only  questions  which 
invite  discussion  are  : 

Which  of  the  two  contending  groups  of  Powers 
is  morally  responsible? 

Was  Austria  justified  in  declaring  war  against 
Servia? 

Was  Germany  justified  in  declaring  war  against 
Russia  and  France? 

Was  Germany  justified  in  declaring  war  against 
Belgium? 

Was  England  justified  in  declaring  war  against 
Germany? 

S8 


The  Record  in  the  Case  19 

Primarily  and  perhaps  exclusively  these  ethical 
questions  turn  upon  the  issues  developed  by  the 
communications  which  passed  between  the  various 
chancelleries  of  Europe  in  the  last  week  of  July, 
for  it  is  the  amazing  feature  of  this  greatest  of  wars 
that  it  was  precipitated  by  the  ruling  classes 
and,  assuming  that  all  the  diplomats  sincerely 
desired  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  questions  raised 
by  the  Austrian  ultimatum  (which  is  by  no 
means  clear)  the  war  is  the  result  of  ineffective 
diplomacy.^ 

I  quite  appreciate  the  distinction  between  the 
immediate  causes  of  a  war  and  the  anterior  or 
underlying  causes.  The  fundamental  cause  of  the 
Franco-German  War  of  1870  was  not  the  incident 
at  Ems  nor  even  the  question  of  the  Spanish 
succession.  These  were  but  the  precipitating 
pretexts  or,  as  a  lawyer  would  express  it,  the 
"proximate  causes."  The  underlying  cause  was 
unquestionably  the  rivalry  between  Prussia  and 
France  for  political  supremacy  in  Europe. 

Behind  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  were 
also  great  questions  of  State  policy,  not  easily 
determinable  upon  any  tangible  ethical  principle, 
and  which  involved  the  hegemony  of  Europe. 
Germany's  domination  of  Europe  had  been  es- 
tablished   when  by  the  rattling   of  its  saber    it 


20  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

compelled  Russia  in  1908  to  permit  Austria  to 
disturb  the  then  existing  status  in  the  Balkans  by 
the  forcible  annexation  of  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, and  behind  the  Austrian-Servian  question 
of  1914,  arising  out  of  the  murder  of  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Austria  at  Serajevo,  was  the  determina- 
tion of  Germany  and  Austria  to  reassert  that 
dominant  position  by  compelling  Russia  to  submit 
to  a  further  humiliation  of  a  Slav  State. 

The  present  problem  is  to  inquire  how  far  Ger- 
many and  her  ally  selected  a  just  pretext  to  test 
this  question  of  mastery. 

The  pretext  was  the  work  of  diplomatists.  It 
was  not  the  case  of  a  nation  rising  upon  some  great 
cause  which  appealed  to  popular  imagination. 
The  acts  of  the  statesmen  in  that  last  fateful 
week  of  July,  19 14,  were  not  the  mere  echo  of  the 
popular  will. 

The  issues  were  framed  by  the  statesmen  and 
diplomats  of  Europe  and  whatever  efforts  were 
made  to  preserve  the  peace  and  whatever  ob- 
structive tactics  were  interposed  were_not__the 
acts  qf_any  of  the  nations  now  in  arms  but  those 
of  a  srnall  coterie  of  men  who,  Jn  the  secrecy 
of  their  respective  cabinet^,  made  their  moves  and 
countermoves  upon  the  chessboard  of  nations. 

The  future  of  Europe  in  that  last  week  of  July 


The  Record  in  the  Case  21 

was  in  the  hands  of  a  small  group  of  men,  number- 
ing not  over  fifty,  and  what  they  did  was  never 
known  to  their  respective  nations  in  any  detail 
until  after  the  fell  Rubicon  had  been  crossed  and  a 
world  war  had  been  precipitated. 

If  all  of  these  men  had  sincerely  desired  to  work 
for  peace,  there  would  not  have  been  any  w^ar. 

So  swiftly  did  events  move  that  the  masses  of  the 
people  had  time  neither  to  think  nor  to  act.  The 
suddenness  of  the  crisis  marks  it  as  a  species  of 
"midsummer  madness,"  a  very  "witches'  sab- 
bath" of  diplomatic  demagoguery. 

In  a  peaceful  summer,  when  the  nations  now 
struggling  to  exterminate  each  other  were  fraterniz- 
ing in  the  holiday  centers  of  Europe,  an  issue  was 
suddenly  precipitated,  made  the  subject  of  com- 
munications between  the  various  chancelleries,  and 
almost  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye  Europe  found 
itself  wrapped  in  a  universal  flame.  The  appall- 
ing toll  of  death  suggests  the  inquiry  of  Hamlet: 
"  Did  these  bones  cost  no  more  the  breeding,  but 
to  play  at  loggats  with  'em?"  and  if  the  di- 
plomatic "loggats"  of  1914  were  ineffectively 
played,  some  ojie  must  accept  the  responsibility 
for  such  failure. 

This  sense  of  responsibility  against  the  dread 
Day  of  Accounting  has  resulted  in  a  disposition 


22  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

beyond  past  experience  to  justify  the  quarrel 
by  placing  before  the  world  the  diplomatic 
record. 

The  English  Government  commenced  shortly 
after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  by  publishing  the 
so-called  White  Paper,  consisting  of  a  statement 
by  the  British  Government  and  i6o  diplomatic 
documents  as  an  appendix.  This  was  preceded 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey's  masterly  speech  in  Parli- 
ament. That  speech  and  all  his  actions  in  this 
fateful  crisis  may  rank  him  in  future  history  with 
the  younger  Pitt. 

On  August  4th,  the  German  Chancellor  for  the 
first  time  explained  to  the  representatives  of  his 
nation  assembled  in  the  Reichstag  the  causes  of 
the  war,  then  already  commenced,  and  there  was 
distributed  among  the  members  a  statement  of 
the  German  Foreign  Office,  accompanied  by 
27  Exhibits  in  the  form  of  diplomatic  com- 
munications, which  have  been  erroneously  called 
the  German  White  Paper  and  which  sets  forth 
Germany's  defense  to  the  world. 

Shortly  thereafter  Russia,  casting  aside  all  the 
traditional  secrecy  of  Muscovite  diplomacy,  sub- 
mitted to  a  candid  world  its  acts  and  deeds  in  the 
form  of  the  so-called  Russian  Orange  Paper,  with 
79  appended  documents,  and  this  was  followed 


The  Record  in  the  Case  23 

later  by  the  publication  by  Belgium  of  the  so- 
called  Belgian  Gray  Paper. 

Late  in  November  France  published  its  Yellow 
Book,  the  most  comprehensive  of  these  diplomatic 
records.  Of  the  two  groups  of  powers,  therefore,  only 
Austria  and  Italy  have  failed  to  disclose  their  dip- 
lomatic correspondence  to  the  scrutiny  of  the  world. 

The  former,  as  the  originator  of  the  controversy, 
should  give  as  a  matter  of  "decent  respect  to  the 
opinions  of  mankind"  its  justification,  if  any,  for 
what  it  did.  So  far,  it  has  only  given  its  ultimatum 
to  Servia  and  Servia's  reply. 

Italy,  as  a  nation  that  has  elected  to  remain 
neutral,  is  not  under  the  same  moral  obligation  to 
disclose  the  secrets  of  its  Foreign  Office,  and  while 
it  remains  on  friendly  terms  with  all  the  Powers  it 
probably  feels  some  delicacy  in  disclosing  con- 
fidential communications,  but  as  the  whole  world 
is  vitally  interested  in  determining  the  justice  of 
the  quarrel  and  as  it  is  wholly  probable  that  the 
archives  of  the  Italian  Foreign  Office  would  throw 
an  illuminating  searchlight  upon  the  moral  issues 
involved,  Italy,  in  a  spirit  of  loyalty  to  civilization, 
should  without  further  delay  disclose  the  documen- 
tary evidence  in  its  possession. 

While  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  full  diplomatic 
record  is  not  made  up,  yet  as  we  have  the  most 


24  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

substantial  part  of  the  record  in  the  commimica- 
tions  which  passed  in  those  fateful  days  between 
Berlin,  St.  Petersburg,  Paris,  and  London,  there  is 
sufficient  before  the  court  to  justify  a  judgment, 
especially  as  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the 
documents  as  yet  withheld  would  only  confirm 
the  conclusions  which  the  record  already  given 
to  the  world  irresistibly  suggests. 

Thus  we  can  reasonably  assume  that  the  Italian 
documentary  evidence  would  fairly  justify  the 
conclusion  that  the  war  was  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria  a  war  of  aggression,  for  Italy, 
by  its  refusal  to  act  with  its  associates  of  the  Tri- 
ple Alliance,  has  in  the  most  significant  manner 
thus  adjudged  it. 

f  Under  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  Italy  had 
obligated  itself  to  support  Germany  and  Austria 
in  any  purely  defensive  war,  and  if  therefore  the 
communications,  which  undoubtedly  passed  be- 
tween Vienna  and  Berlin  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Rome  on  the  other,  justified  the  conclusion  that 
Germany  and  Austria  had  been  assailed  by  Russia, 
England,  and  France  or  either  of  them,  then  we 
must  assume  that  Italy  would  have  respected  its 
obligation,  especially  as  it  would  thus  relieve  Italy 
from  any  possible  charge  of  treachery  to  two  al- 
lies, whose  support  and  protection  it  had  enjoyed 


The  Record  in  the  Case  25 

from  the  time  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  first 
made.  ) 

When  Italy  decided  that  it  was  under  no  ob- 
ligation to  support  its  allies,  it  effectually  af- 
firmed the  fact  that  they  had  commenced  a  war 
of  aggression,  and  until  the  contrary  is  shown,  we 
must  therefore  assume  that  the  archives  of  the 
Foreign  Office  at  Rome  would  merely  confirm 
the  conclusions  hereinafter  set  forth  as  to  the 
moral  responsibility  for  the  war. 

Similarly  upon  considerations  that  are  familiar 
to  all  who  have  had  any  experience  in  the  judicial 
investigation  of  truth,  it  must  be  assumed  that 
if  Austria  had  in  its  secret  archives  any  docu- 
mentary evidence  that  would  justify  it  in  its 
pretension  that  it  had  been  unjustly  assailed  by  one 
or  more  of  the  Powers  with  which  it  is  now  at  war, 
it  would  have  published  such  documents  to  the 
world  in  its  own  exculpation.  The  moral  respon- 
sibility for  this  war  is  too  great  for  any  nation 
to  accept  it  unnecessarily.  Least  of  all  could 
Austria — which  on  the  face  of  the  record  com- 
menced the  controversy  by  its  ultimatum  to 
Servia — leave  anything  undone  to  acquit  itself 
at  the  bar  of  public  opinion  of  any  responsibility 
for  the  great  crime  that  is  now  drenching  Europe 
with  blood.     The  time  is  past  when  any  nation 


26  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

can  ignore  the  opinions  of  mankind  or  needlessly 
outrage  its  conscience.  Germany  has  recognized 
this  in  publishing  its  defense  and  exhibiting  a  part 
of  its  documentary  proof,  and  if  its  ally,  Austria, 
continues  to  withhold  from  the  knowledge  of  the 
world  the  documents  in  its  possession,  there  can 
be  but  one  conclusion  as  to  its  guilt. 

Upon  the  record  thus  made  up  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Civilization,  that  tribunal  need  no  more 
hesitate  to  proceed  to  judgment  than  would  an  or- 
dinary court  hesitate  to  enter  a  decree  because  one 
of  the  litigants  has  deliberately  suppressed  docu- 
ments known  to  be  in  its  possession.  It  does  not 
lie  in  the  mouth  of  such  a  litigant  to  ask  the  court 
to  suspend  judgment  or  withhold  its  sentence  until 
the  full  record  is  made  up,  when  the  incompleteness 
of  that  record  is  due  to  its  own  deliberate  sup- 
pression of  vital  documentary  proofs. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE   SUPPRESSED   EVIDENCE 

The  official  defenses  ol  England,  Russia,  France, 
and  Belgium  do  not  apparently  show  any  failure  on 
the  part  of  either  to  submit  any  essential  diplo- 
matic document  in  their  possession.  They  have 
respectively  made  certain  contentions  as  to  the 
proposals  that  they  made  to  maintain  the  peace  of 
the  world,  and  in  every  instance  have  supported 
these  contentions  by  putting  into  evidence  the 
letters  and  communications  in  which  such  proposals 
were  expressed. 

When  the  German  White  Paper  is  exam- 
ined it  discloses  on  its  very  face  the  suppres- 
ion  of  documents  of  vital  importance.  The 
fact  that  commimications  passed  between  Ber- 
lin and  Vienna,  the  text  of  which  has  never  been 
disclosed,  is  not  a  matter  of  conjecture.  Germany 
asserts  as  part  of  its  defense  that  it  faithfully  ex- 
ercised its  mediatory  influence  on  Austria,  but 
not  only  is  such  influence  not  disclosed  by  any 
practical    results,   such    as   we  would  expect    in 

27 


28  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

view  of  her  dominating  relations  with  Austria, 
but  the  text  of  these  vital  communications  is  still 
kept  in  the  secret  archives  of  Berlin  and  Vienna. 
Germany  has  carefully  selected  a  part  of  her  dip- 
lomatic records  for  publication  but  withheld  others. 
Austria  has  withheld  all. 

Thus  in  the  official  apology  for  Germany  it  is 
stated  that,  in  spite  of  the  refusal  of  Austria  to 
accept  the  proposition  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  treat 
the  Servian  reply  "as  a  basis  for  further  conversa- 
tions, " 

wc  [Germany]  continued  our  mediatory  efforts 
to  the  utmost  and  advised  Vienna  to  make  any 
possible  compromise  consistent  with  the  dignity 
of  the  Monarchy.^ 

This  would  be  more  convincing  if  the  German 
Foreign  Office  had  added  the  text  of  the  advice 
which  it  thus  gave  Vienna. 

A  like  significant  omission  will  be  found  when 
the  same  official  defense  states  that  on  July  29th 
the  German  Government  advised  Austria  "to 
begin  the  conversations  with  Mr.  Sazonof. "  But 
here  again  the  text  is  not  found  among  the  docu- 
ments which  the  German  Foreign  Office  has  given 
to  the  world.     The  communications,  which  passed 

'  German  White  Paper. 


The  Suppressed  Evidence  29 

between  that  office  and  its  ambassadors  in  St. 
Petersburg,  Paris,  and  London,  are  given  in 
extenso,  but  among  the  twenty-seven  communica- 
tions appended  to  the  German  White  Paper  it  is 
most  significant  that  not  a  single  communication  is 
given  of  the  many  which  passed  from  the  Foreign  Office 
of  Berlin  to  that  of  Vienna  and  only  two  which 
passed  from  the  German  Ambassador  in  Vienna  to 
the  German  Chancellor.  While  the  Kaiser  has  fa- 
vored the  world  with  his  messages  to  the  Czar 
and  King  George,  he  has  wholly  failed  to  give  us 
any  message  that  he  sent  in  those  critical  days  to 
the  Austrian  Emperor  or  the  King  of  Italy.  We 
shall  have  occasion  to  refer  hereafter  to  the  fre- 
quent failure  to  produce  documents,  the  existence 
of  which  is  admitted  by  the  exhibits  w^hicli  Ger- 
many appended  to  its  White  Paper. 

This  cannot  be  an  accident.  The  German  For- 
eign Office  has  seen  fit  to  throw  the  veil  of  secrecy 
over  the  text  of  its  communications  to  Vienna,  al- 
though professing  to  give  the  purport  of  a  few  of 
them.  The  purpose  of  this  suppression  is  even 
more  clearly  indicated  by  the  complete  failure  of 
Austria  to  submit  any  of  its  diplomatic  records  to 
the  scrutiny  of  a  candid  world.  Until  Germany 
and  Austria  are  willing  to  put  the  most  im- 
portant documents  in  their  possession  in  evidence, 


30  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

they  must  not  be  surprised  that  the  Worid,  re- 
membering Bismarck's  garbling  of  the  Ems  dis- 
patch, which  precipitated  the  Franco-Prussian  War, 
will  be  incredulous  as  to  the  sincerity  of  their  pacific 
protestations. 

ADDENDUM 

The  Austrian  Red  Book,  published  more  than  six  months  after 
the  declaration  of  war,  simply  emphasizes  the  policy  of  suppres- 
sion of  vital  documents,  which  we  have  already  discussed.  Of 
its  69  documentary  exhibits,  there  is  not  one  which  passed  directly 
between  the  Cabinets  of  Berlin  and  Vienna.  The  text  of  the  com- 
munications, in  which  Germany  claims  to  have  exercised  a 
mediatory  and  conciliatory  influence  with  its  ally,  is  still  withheld. 
Not  a  single  document  is  produced  which  was  sent  between  July  the 
6lh  and  July  the  21st,  the  period  when  the  great  co^^p  was  secretly 
planned  by  Berlin  and  Vienna. 

In  the  Red  Book  we  find  eight  communications  from  Count 
Berchtold  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Berlin  and  four  replies 
from  that  official,  but  not  a  letter  or  telegram  passing  between 
Berchtold  and  von  Bethmann-HoUwcg  or  between  the  German 
and  Austrian  Kaisers.  The  Austrian  Red  Book  gives  additional 
evidence  that  at  the  eleventh  hour,  and  shortly  before  Germany 
issued  its  ultimatum  to  Russia,  Austria  did  finally  agree  to  discuss 
the  Servian  question  with  Russia;  but  the  information,  which 
Germany  presumably  gave  to  its  ally  cf  its  intention  to  send  the 
ultimatum  to  Russia,  is  carefully  withheld.  Notwithstanding  this 
suppression  of  vital  documents,  the  diplomatic  papers  of  Germany 
and  Austria,  now  partially  given  to  the  world,  disclose  an  un- 
mistakable purpose,  amounting  to  an  open  confession,  that  they 
intended  to  force  their  will  upon  Europe,  even  though  this  course 
involved  the  most  stupendous  war  in  the  history  of  mankind. 

March  i,  1915. 


CHAPTER  IV 

Germany's  responsibility  for  the  Austrian 
ultimatum 

On  June  28,  19 14,  the  Austrian  Crown  Prince 
tvas  murdered  at  Serajevo.  For  nearly  a  month 
thereafter  there  was  no  public  statement  by  Aus- 
tria of  its  intentions,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
semi-inspired  dispatches  to  the  effect  that  it  would 
act  with  the  greatest  moderation  and  self-restraint. 
A  careful  examination  made  of  the  files  of  two 
leading  American  newspapers,  each  having  a  sep- 
arate news  service,  from  June  28,  19 14,  to  July  23, 
19 14,  has  failed  to  disclose  a  single  dispatch  from 
Vienna  which  gave  any  intimation  as  to  the  drastic 
action  which  Austria  was  about  to  take. 

The  French  Premier,  Viviani,  in  his  speech  to 
the  French  Senate,  and  House  of  Deputies,  on 
August  4,  1914,  after  referring  to  the  fact  that 
France,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain  had  cooperated 
in  advising  Servia  to  make  any  reasonable  con- 
cession to  Austria,  added : 

31 


32  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

This  advice  was  all  the  more  valuable  in  view  of 
the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary's  demands  had  been 
inadequately  foreshadowed  to  the  governments 
of  the  Triple  Entente,  to  whom  during  the  three 
preceding  weeks  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government 
had  repeatedly  given  assurance  that  its  demands 
would  be  extremely  moderate. 

The  movements  of  the  leading  statesmen  and 
rulers  of  the  Triple  Entente  clearly  show  that  they, 
as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  world,  had  been  lulled  into 
false  security  either  by  the  silence  of  Austria,  or, 
as  Viviani  avers,  by  its  deliberate  suggestion  that 
its  treatment  of  the  Serajevo  incident  would  be 
conciliatory,  pacific,  and  moderate. 

Thus,  on  July  20th,  the  Russian  Ambassador, 
obviously  anticipating  no  crisis,  left  Vienna  on  a 
fortnight's  leave  of  absence.  The  President  of  the 
French  Republic  and  its  Premier  were  far  distant 
from  Paris.  Pachitch,  the  Servia.n  Premier,  was 
absent  from  Belgrade,  when  the  ultimatum  was 
issued. 

The  testimony  of  the  British  Ambassador  to 
Vienna  is  to  the  same  effect.  He  reports  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey: 

The  delivery  at  Belgrade  on  the  23d  of  July  of 
the  note  to  Servia  was  preceded  by  a  period  of 
absolute  silence  at  the  Ballplatz. 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  33 

He  proceeds  to  say  that  with  the  exception  of  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  (note  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  exception)  not  a  single  member  of  the 
Diplomatic  Corps  knew  anything  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  and  that  the  French  Ambassador,  when 
he  visited  the  Austrian  Foreign  Office  on  July  23d 
(the  day  of  its  issuance),  was  not  only  kept  in 
ignorance  that  the  ultimatum  had  actually  been 
issued,  but  was  given  the  impression  that  its 
tone  would  be  moderate.  Even  the  Italian  Am- 
bassador was  not  taken  into  Count  Berchtold's 
confidence.  ^ 

The  Servian  Government  had  formally  dis- 
claimed any  responsibility  for  the  assassination  and 
had  pledged  itself  to  pimish  any  Servian  citizen 
implicated  therein.  No  word  came  from  Vienna 
excepting  the  semi-official  intimations  as  to  its 
moderate  and  conciliatory  course,  and  after  the 
funeral  of  the  Archduke,  the  world,  then  en- 
joying its  summer  holiday,  had  almost  forgotten 
the  Serajevo  incident.  The  whole  tragic  occur- 
rence simply  survived  in  the  sympathy  which  all 
felt  with  Austria  in  its  new  trouble,  and  especially 
with  its  aged  monarch,  who,  like  King  Lear,  was 
"as   full   of    grief   as    age,    wretched    in    both." 

'  Dispatch  from  Sir  IM.  de  Bunsen  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  dated 
September  I,  1914. 


34  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Never  was  it  even  hinted  that  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria were  about  to  apply  in  a  time  of  peace  a 
match  to  the  powder  magazine  of  Europe. 

Can  it  be  questioned  that  loyalty  to  the  highest 
interests  of  civilization  required  that  Germany 
and  Austria,  when  they  determined  to  make  the 
murder  of  the  Archduke  by  an  irresponsible 
assassin  the  pretext  for  bringing  up  for  final  de- 
cision the  long-standing  troubles  between  Austria 
and  Servia,  should  have  given  all  the  European 
nations  some  intimation  of  their  intention,  so  that 
their  confreres  in  the  family  of  nations  could  co- 
operate to  adjust  this  trouble,  as  they  had  adjusted 
far  more  difficult  questions  after  the  close  of  the 
Balko-Turkish  War? 

Whatever  the  issue  of  the  present  conflict, 
it  will  always  be  to  the  lasting  discredit  of 
Germany  and  Austria  that  they  were  false  to 
this  great  duty,  and  that  they  precipitated  the 
greatest  of  all  wars  in  a  manner  so  underhanded 
as  to  suggest  a  trap.  They  knew,  as  no  one  else 
knew,  in  those  quiet  mid-summer  days  of  July, 
that  civilization  was  about  to  be  suddenly  and 
most  cruelly  torpedoed.  The  submarine  was  Ger- 
many and  the  torpedo,  Austria,  and  the  work  was 
most  effectually  done. 

This  ignorance  of  the  leading  European  states- 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  35 

men  (other  than  those  of  Germany  and  Austria) 
as  to  what  was  impending  is  strikingly  shown 
by  the  first  letter  in  the  English  White  Paper 
from  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Sir  H,  Rumbold,  dated 
July  20,  19 14.  When  this  letter  was  written  it  is 
altogether  probable  that  Austria's  arrogant  and 
unreasonable  ultimatum  had  already  been  framed 
and  approved  in  Vienna  and  Berlin,  and  yet  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  a  great 
and  friendly  country,  had  so  little  knowledge  of 
Austria's  policy  that  he 

asked  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  (July  20th) 
if  he  had  any  news  of  what  was  going  on  in  Vienna. 
He  replied  that  he  had  not,  but  Austria  was  cer- 
tainly going  to  take  some  step. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  adds  that  he  told  the  German 
Ambassador  that  he  had  learned  that  Count 
Berchtold,  the  Austrian  Foreign  Minister, 

in  speaking  to  the  Italian  Ambassador  in  Vienna, 
had  deprecated  the  suggestion  that  the  situation 
was  grave,  but  had  said  that  it  should  be  cleared 
up. 

The  German  Minister  then  replied  that  it  would 
be  desirable  "if  Russia  could  act  as  a  mediator 
with  regard  to  Servia, "  so  that  the  first  suggestion 
of  Russia  playing  the  part  of  the  peacemaker  came 
from  the  German   Ambassador   in    London.     Sir 


36  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Edward  Grey  then  adds  that  he  told  the  German 
Ambassador  that  he 

assumed  that  the  Austrian  Government  would  not 
do  anything  until  they  had  first  disclosed  to  the 
public  their  case  against  Servia,  founded  presum- 
ably upon  what  they  had  discovered  at  the  trial, 

and  the  German  Ambassador  assented  to  this 
assumption.  ^ 

Either  the  German  Ambassador  was  then  deceiv- 
ing Sir  Edward  Grey,  or  the  submarine  torpedo 
was  being  prepared  with  such  secrecy  that  even 
the  German  Ambassador  in  England  did  not  know 
what  was  then  in  progress. 

The  interesting  and  important  question  here 
suggests  itself  whether  Germany  had  knowledge  of 
and  approved  in  advance  the  Austrian  ultimatum. 
If  it  did,  it  was  guilty  of  duplicity,  for  the  German 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  gave  to  the  Russian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  an  express  assurance 
that 

the  German  Government  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
text  of  the  Austrian  note  before  it  was  handed  in  and 
had  not  exercised  any  influence  on  its  contents.  It 
is  a  mistake  to  attribute  to  Germany  a  threatening 
attitude.^ 

I  English  White  Paper,  No.  i. 
-  Russian  Orange  Paper-,  No.  i8- 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  37 

This  statement  is  inherently  improbable.  Aus- 
tria was  the  weaker  of  the  two  allies,  and  it  was 
Germany's  saber  that  it  was  rattling  in  the  face 
of  Europe.  Obviously  Austria  could  not  have 
proceeded  to  extreme  measures,  which  it  was 
recognized  from  the  first  would  antagonize  Russia, 
unless  it  had  the  support  of  Germany,  and  there 
is  a  probability^  amounting  to  a  moral  certainty, 
that  it  would  not  have  committed  itself  and 
Germany  to  the  possibility  of  a  European  war 
without  first  consulting  Germany. 

Moreover,  we  have  the  testimony  of  Sir  M. 
de  Bunsen,  the  English  Ambassador  in  Vienna, 
who  advised  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  he  had  "private 
information  that  the  German  Ambassador  (at 
Vienna)  knew  the  text  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
to  Servia  before  it  was  dispatched,  and  telegraphed 
it  to  the  German  Emperor, "  and  that  the  German 
Ambassador  himself  "indorses  every  line  of  it."^ 
As  he  does  not  disclose  the  source  of  his  "private 
information,"  this  testimony  would  not  by  itself 
be  convincing,  but  when  we  examine  Germany's 
official  defense  in  the  German  White  Paper,  we  find 
that  the  German  Foreign  Office  admits  that  it  was  con- 
sulted by  Atistria  previous  to  the  idtimatiim  aiid  ?wt 

*  English  White  Paper,  No.  95. 

^7  3,^^ 


38  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

only  approved  of  Austria's  course  hut  literally  gave 
that  country  a  carte  blanche  to  proceed. 

This  point  seems  so  important  in  determining 
the  sincerity  of  Germany's  attitude  and  pacific 
protestations  that  we  quote  in  extenso.  After  re- 
ferring to  the  previous  friction  between  Austria 
and  Servia,  the  German  White  Paper  says: 

In  view  of  these  circumstances  Austria  had  to 
admit  that  it  would  not  be  consistent  either  with 
the  dignity  or  self-preservation  of  the  Monarchy 
to  look  on  longer  at  the  operations  on  the  other 
side  of  the  border  without  taking  action.  The 
Austro-Himgarian  Government  advised  us  of  its 
view  of  the  situation  and  asked  our  opinion  in  the 
matter.  We  were  able  to  assure  our  Ally  most  heartily 
of  our  agreement  with  her  view  of  the  silnatio7i  and 
to  assure  her  that  any  action  that  she  might  consider 
it  necessary  to  take  in  order  to  put  an  evd  to  the  move- 
ment in  Servia  directed  against  the  existence  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  woidd  receive  our 
approval.  We  were  fully  aware  in  this  connection 
that  warlike  moves  on  the  part  of  Austria-Hungary 
against  Servia  would  bring  Russia  into  the  question 
and  might  draw  us  into  a  war  in  accordance  with 
our  duties  as  an  Ally 

Sir  M.  de  Bunsen's  credible  testimony  is  further 
confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  British  Ambassador 
at  Berlin  in  his  letter  of  July  22d,  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  states  that  on  the  preceding  night  (July  21st) 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  39 

he  had  met  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  an  allusion  was  made  to  a 
possible  action  by  Austria. 

His  Excellency  was  evidently  of  opinion  that  this 
step  on  Austria's  part  would  have  been  made  ere 
this.  He  insisted  that  the  question  at  issue  was 
one  for  settlement  between  Servia  and  Austria 
alone,  and  that  there  should  be  no  interference  from 
outside  in  the  discussions  between  those  two  coun- 
tries. 

He^  adds  that  while  he  had  regarded  it  as  in- 
advisable that  his  country  should  approach 
Austria  in  the  matter,  he  had 

on  several  occasions,  in  conversation  with  the 
Servian  Minister,  emphasized  the  extreme  import- 
ance that  Austro- Servian  relations  should  be  put 
on  a  proper  footing.  ^ 

Here  we  have  the  first  statement  of  Germany's 
position  in  the  matter,  a  position  which  subsequent 
events  showed  to  be  entirely  untenable,  but  to 
which  it  tenaciously  adhered  to  the  very  end, 
and  which  did  much  to  precipitate  the  war. 
Forgetful  of  the  solidarity  of  European  civiliza- 
tion, and  the  fact  that  by  policy  and  diplomatic 
intercourse  continuing  through  many  centuries 
a  united  European  State  exists,  even  though  its 

*  English  White  Paper,  No.  2  » Von  Jagow. 


40  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

organization  be  as  yet  inchoate,  he  took  the 
ground  that  Austria  should  be  permitted  to  proceed 
to  aggressive  measures  against  Servia  without 
interference  from  any  other  Power,  even  though, 
as  was  inevitable,  the  humiliation  of  Servia  would 
destroy  the  status  of  the  Balkan  States  and 
threaten  the  European  balance  of  power^  .Jhe^ 
consistency  between  German/s  claimjhatjt  cotjlcf 
giveAAistna^_a_^ar^^  proceed   against 

Servia  and  agree  to  support  its  action  with  the 
sword  of  Germany,  and  the  other  contention  that 
neither  Russia  nor  any  European  State  had  any 
right  to  interfere_onJbeh^if_of^ 
It  was  the  greatest  blunder  of  Germany's  many 
blunders  in  this  Tragedy  of  Errors. 

No  space  need  be  taken  in  convincing  any  rea- 
sonable man  that  this  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Servia  was  brutal  in  its  tone  and  unreasonable  in 
its  demands.  It  would  be  difficult  to  recall 
a  more  offensive  document,  and  its  iniquity  was 
enhanced  by  the  short  shriving  time  which  it 
gave  either  Servia  or  Europe.  Servia  had  forty^^ 
eight_hours  to  answer  whether  it  would  compro- 

mise    its sovereignty,    and    virtually    ad?5:?-^.   ^^?. 

complicity  in  a  crime_whichL.itJiad^eadily  dis- 
avowed. The  other  European  nations  had  little 
more  than  a  day  to  consider  what  could  be  done 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  UltimafeiuTi  41 

to    preserve   the  peace  of  Europe    before    that 
peace  was  fatally  compromised.^ 

Further  confirmation  that  the  German  Foreign 
Office  did  have  advance  knowledge  of  at  least  the 
substance  of  the  ultimatum  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  on  the  day  the  ultimatum  waS-issued  the 
Chs^cellor  of  the  German  Empire  instructed  its 
Ambassadors  in  Paris,  London,  and  St.  Peters- 
burg to  advise  the  English,  French,  and  Russian 
governments  that 

the  acts  as  well  as  the  demands  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  cannot  but  be  looked 
upon  as  justified. ' 

How  could  Germany  thus  indorse  the  "de- 
mands" if  it  did  not  know  the  substance  of  the 
ultimatum?  Xs  itprobable  that  Gerrgajixjwoidd 
^ye^venjn  a^matterjQlliLe  gravest  importance 
a  blanket  endorsement  of  Austria's  demands,  un- 
less the  German  Government  had  first  been  fully 
advised  as  to  their  nature? 

The  hour  when  these  instructions  were  sent  is 
not  given,  so  that  it  does  not  follow  that  these 
significant  instructions  were  necessarily  prior  to 
the  service  of  the  ultimatum  at  Belgrade  at  6  p.m. 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  5;  Russian  Orange  Piper,  No.  3. 
'  German  White  Paper,  Annex  i  B. 


42  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Nevertheless,  as  the  ultimatum  did  not  reach  the 
other  capitals  of  Europe  until  the  following  day, 
as  the  diplomatic  correspondence  clearly  shows, 
it  seems  improbable  that  the  German  Foreign 
Office  would  have  issued  this  very  carefully  pre- 
pared and  formal  warning  to  the  other  Powers 
on  July  the  23d  unless  it  had  full  knowledge  not 
only  of  Austria's  intention  to  serve  the  ultimatum 
but  also  of  the  substance  thereof. 

While  it  may  be  that  Germany,  while  indorsing 
in  blank  the  policy  Ol  Austria,  purposely  refrained 
from  examining  the  text  of  the  communication, 
so  that  it  could  thereafter  claim  that  it  was  not 
responsible  for  Austria's  action — a  policy  which 
would  not  lessen  the  discreditable  character  of  this 
iniquitous  conspiracy  against  the  peace  of  Europe, 
■ — yet  the  more  reasonable  assumption  is  that  the 
simultaneous  issuance  of  Austria's  ultimatum  at 
Belgrade  and  Germany's  warning  to  the  Powers 
was  the  result  of  a  concerted  action  and  had  a 
common  purpose.  No  court  or  jury,  reasoning 
along  the  ordinary  inferences  of  human  life,  would 
question  this  conclusion. 

The  commimication  from  the  German  Foreign 
Office  last  referred  to  anticipates  that  Servia  "will 
refuse  to  comply  with  these  demands" — why,  if 
they  were  justified? — and  Germany  suggests  tc 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  43 

France,  England,  and  Russia  that  if,  as  a  result 
of  such  noncompliance,  Austria  has  "recourse  to 
military  measures,"  that  "the  choice  of  means 
must  be  left  to  it." 

The  German  Ambassadors  in  the  three  capitals 
were  instructed 

to  lay  particular  stress  on  the  view  that  the  above 
question  is  one,  the  settlement  of  which  devolves 
solely  upon  Austria-Hungary  and  Servia,  and  one 
which  the  Powers  should  earnestly  strive  to  confine 
to  the  two  countries  concerned, 

and  the  instruction  added  that  Germany  strongly 
desired 

that  the  dispute  be  localized,  since  any  intervention 
of  another  Power,  on  account  of  the  various  alliance 
obligations,  would  bring  consequences  impossible  to 
measure. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  significant  documents 
in  the  whole  correspondence.  If  the  German  For- 
eign Office  were  as  ignorant  as  its  Ambassador  at 
London  affected  to  be  of  the  Austrian  policy  and 
ultimatum,  and  if  Germany  were  not  then  instiga- 
ting and  supporting  Austria  in  its  perilous  course, 
why  should  the  German  Chancellor  have  served 
this  threatening  notice  upon  England,  France,  and 
Russia,  that  Austria  ''must''  be  left  free  to  make 


44  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

war  upon  Servia,  and  that  any  attempt  to  inter- 
vene in  behalf  of  the  weaker  nation  would  "bring 
consequences   impossible  to  measure"?^ 

A  still  more  important  piece  of  evidence  is  the 
carefully  prepared  confidential  commimication, 
which  the  Imperial  Chancellor  sent  to  the  Feder- 
ated Governments  of  Germany  shortly  after  the 
Servian  reply  was  given. 

In  this  confidential  commimication,  which  was 
nothing  less  than  a  call  to  arms  to  the  entire 
German  Empire,  and  which  probably  intended 
to  convey  the  intimation  that  without  formal 
mobilization  the  constituent  states  of  Germany 
should  begin  to  prepare  for  eventualities,  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg  recognized  the  possibility  that 
Russia  might  feel  it  a  duty  "to  take  the  part  of 
Servia  in  her  dispute  with  Austria-Hungary." 
Why,  again,  if  Austria's  case  was  so  clearly  justi- 
fied? 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  added  that 

if  Russia  feels  constrained  to  take  sides  with  Servia 
in  this  conflict,  she  certainly  has  a  right  to  do  it, 

but  added  that  if  Russia  did  this  it  would  in  effect 
challenge  the  integrity  of  the  Austro-Hungariaa 

'  German  White  Paper,  Annex  i  B. 


Germany  and  the  Austrian  Ultimatum  45 

Monarchy,    and    that    Russia    would    therefore 
alone 

bear  the  responsibility  if  a  European  war  arises 
from  the  Austro-Servian  question,  which  all  the 
rest  of  the  great  European  Powers  wish  to  localize. 

In  this  significant  confidential  communication 
the  German  Chancellor  declares  the  strong  interest 
which  Germany  had  in  the  punishment  of  Servia 
by  Austria.  He  says,  "  our  closest  interests  therefore 
summon  us  to  the  side  oj  Austria-Hungary,^^  and 
he  adds  that 

if  contrary  to  hope,  the  trouble  should  spread, 
owing  to  the  intervention  of  Russia,  then,  true  to 
our  duty  as  an  Ally,  we  should  have  to  support  the 
neighboring  monarchy  with  the  entire  might  of  the 
German  Empire. ' 

It  staggers  ordinary  credulity  to  believe  that 
this  portentous  warning  to  the  constituents  of  the 
German  Empire  to  prepare  for  "theDay".  should 
not  have  been  written  with  advance  knowledge  of 
the  Austrian  ultimatum,  which  had  only  been  issued 
on  July  23d  and  only  reached  the  other  capitals  of 
Europe  on  July  24th.  The  subsequent  naive  dis- 
claimer by  the  German  Foreign  Office  of  any  ex- 
pectation that  Austria's  attack  upon  Servia  could 

'  German  White  Paper,  Annex  2. 


46  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

possibly  have  any  interest  to  other  European  Pow< 
ers  is  haidly  consistent  with  its  assertion  that 
Germany's  "closest  interests"  were  involved  in  the 
question,  or  the  :^ortentous  warnings  to  the  States 
of  the  Empire  to  prepare  for  eventualities. 

The  German  Ambassador  to  the  United  States 
who  attempted  early  in  the  controversy  and  with 
disastrous  results,  to  allay  the  rising  storm  of  in- 
dignation in  that  country,  formally  admitted  in 
an  article  in  the  Independent  of  September  7,  19 14, 
that  Germany  **  did  approve  in  advance  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  to  Servia^ 

Why  then  was  Germany  guilty  of  duplicity  in 
disclaiming,  concurrently  with  its  issuance,  any 
such  responsibility?  The  answer  is  obvious.  This 
was  necessary  to_suppgrt^  its  conjgntigiiJthaLthg 
quarrel  b£t_ween_Ajistria^ and  Servia_was_purely 
"locaT." 

Note. — In  Chapter  VII  it  will  appear  from  the  French  Yellcv 
Booh  that  the  Prime  Minister  of  Bavaria  had  knowledge  of  t!.3 
Austrian  ultimatum  before  its  delivery  in  Belgrade. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  ULTIMATUM  TO   SERVIA 

To  convince  any  reasonable  man  that  this 
Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  was  brutal  in  its 
tone  and  iinreasonable  in  its  demands,  and  that 
the  reply  of  Servia  was  as  complete  an  acqui- 
escence as  Servia  could  make  without  a  fatal 
compromise  of  its  sovereignty  and  self-respect,  it 
is  only  necessary  to  print  in  parallel  columns 
the  demands  of  Austria  and  the  reply  of  Servia. 


AUSTRIA'S     ULTIMATUM 
TO  SERVIA 

"To  achieve  this  end  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Govern- 
ment sees  itself  compelled  to 
demand  from  the  Royal  Ser- 
vian Government  a  formal 
assurance  that  it  condemns  this 
dangerous  propaganda  against 
the  Monarchy;  in  other  words, 
the  whole  series  of  tenden- 
cies, the  ultimate  aim  of  which 
is  to  detach  from  the  Monarchy 
territories  belonging  to  it,  and 
that  it  undertakes  to  suppress 


THE    SERVIAN    REPLY 

"The  Royal  Government 
has  received  the  notification  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment of  the  loth  inst.,  and  is 
convinced  that  its  answer  will 
remove  every  misunderstand- 
ing that  threatens  to  disturb 
the  pleasant  neighborly  rela- 
tions between  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the 
Servian  Kingdom. 

"The  Royal  Government  is 
certain  that  in  dealing  with 
the    great    neighboring    mon- 


47 


48 


The  Evidence  in  the  Case 


by  every  means  this  criminal 
and  terrorist  propaganda. 

"In  order  to  give  a  formal 
character  to  this  undertaking 
the  Royal  Servian  Government 
shall  publish  on  the  front  page 
of  its  'Official  Journal'  of  the 
26  th  July,  tlie  following 
declaration : 

'"The  Royal  Government 
of  Servia  condemns  the  propa- 
ganda directed  against  Austria- 
Hungary — i.e.,  the  general  ten- 
dency of  which  the  final  aim 
is  to  detach  from  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  terri- 
tories belonging  to  it,  and  it 
sincerely  deplores  the  fatal 
consequence  of  these  criminal 
proceedings. 

"'The  Royal  Government 
regrets  that  Servian  officers 
and  functionaries  participated 
in  the  above-mentioned  pro- 
paganda, and  thus  compro- 
mised the  good  neighborly 
relations  to  which  the  Royal 
Government  was  solemnly 
pledged  by  its  declaration  of 
the  31st  March,  1909. 

"'The  Royal  Government, 
which  disapproves  and  repu- 
diates all  idea  of  interfering 
or  attempting  to  interfere  with 
the  destinies  of  the  inhabitants 
of  any  part  whatsoever  of 
Austria-Hungary,  considers  it 
its  duty  formally  to  warn 
officers  and  functionaries,  and 
the   whole  population   of   the 


archy  these  protests  have 
under  no  pretexts  been  re- 
newed which  formerly  were 
made  both  in  the  Skupshtina 
and  in  explanations  and  nego- 
tiations of  responsible  repre- 
sentatives of  the  State,  and 
which,  through  the  declaration 
of  the  Servian  Government  of 
March  18,  1909,  were  settled; 
furthermore,  that  since  that 
time  none  of  the  various 
successive  Governments  of  the 
kingdom,  nor  any  of  its  officers, 
has  made  an  attempt  to  change 
the  political  and  legal  condi- 
tions set  up  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  The  Royal 
Government  is  certain  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government 
has  made  no  representations  of 
any  kind  along  this  line  except 
in  the  case  of  a  textbook  con- 
cerning which  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  re- 
ceived an  entirely  satis- 
factory reply.  _Servia,  during 
the  Balkan  crisis,  gave  evidence 
in  numerous  cases  of  her  pacific 
and  temperate  policies,  and  it 
will  be  thanks  to  Servia  alone 
and  the  sacrifices  that  she 
alone  made  in  the  interest  of 
European  peace  if  that  peace 
continue. 

"The  Roj^al  Government 
cannot  be  held  responsible  for 
utterances  of  a  private  char- 
acter such  as  newspaper  articles 
and  the  peaceful  work  of  so- 


The  Ultimatum  to  Servia 


49 


kingdom,  that  henceforward  it 
will  proceed  with  the  utmost 
rigor  against  persons  who  may 
be  guilty  of  such  machinations, 
which  it  will  use  all  its  efforts 
to  anticipate  and  suppress.' 

"This  declaration  shall  simul- 
taneously be  communicated  to 
the  Royal  Army  as  an  order 
of  the  day  by  His  Majesty 
the  King  and  shall  be  published 
in  the  '  Official  Bulletin '  of  the 
Army. 


cieties,  utterances  which  are 
quite  ordinary  in  almost  all 
countries,  and  which  are  not 
generally  under  State  control, 
especially  since  the  Royal 
Government,  in  the  solution 
of  a  great  number  of  questions 
that  came  up  between  Servia 
and  Austria-Hungary,  showed 
much  consideration  as  a  result 
of  which  most  of  these  ques- 
tions were  settled  in  the  best 
interests  of  the  progress  of  the 
two  neighboring  countries. 

"The  Royal  Government 
was  therefore  painfully  sur- 
prised to  hear  the  contention 
that  Servian  subjects  had  taken 
part  in  the  preparations  for  the 
murder  committed  in  Serajevo. 
It  had  hoped  to  be  invited  to 
cooperate  in  the  investigations 
following  this  crime,  and  was 
prepared,  in  order  to  prove  the 
entire  correctness  of  its  acts, 
to  proceed  against  all  persons 
concerning  whom  it  had  re- 
ceived information. 

"In  conformity  with  the 
wish  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government,  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment is  prepared  to  turn 
over  to  the  court,  regardless  of 
station  or  rank,  any  Servian 
subject  concerning  whose  par- 
ticipation in  the  crime  at 
Serajevo  proofs  may  be  gi\-en 
to  it.  The  Government 
pledges  itself  especially  to 
publish  on  the  first  page  of  the 


50 


The  Evidence  in  the  Case 


"The  Royal  Servian  Gov- 
ernment further  undertakes: 

"i.  To  suppress  any  pub- 
lication which  incites  to  hatred 
and  contempt  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy  and  the 
general  tendency  of  which  is 
directed  against  its  territorial 
integrity; 


official  organ  of  July  26th  the 
following  declaration: 

'"The  Royal  Servian  Gov- 
ernment condemns  every  pro- 
paganda that  may  be  directed 
against  Austria- Hungary;  that 
is  to  say,  all  efforts  designed 
ultimately  to  sever  territory 
from  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy,  and  it  regrets  sin- 
cerely the  sad  consequences  of 
these  criminal  machinations.' 

"The  Royal  Government 
regrets  that,  in  accordance 
with  advices  from  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government,  cer- 
tain Servian  officers  and  func- 
tionaries are  taking  an  active 
part  in  the  present  propaganda, 
and  that  they  have  thereby 
jeopardized  the  pleasant  neigh- 
borly relations  to  the  main- 
tenance of  which  the  Royal 
Government  was  formally 
pledged  by  the  declaration  of 
March  31,  1909. 

"The  Government  (what 
follows  here  is  similar  to  the 
text  demanded). 

"The  Royal  Government 
further  pledges  itself: 

"i.  To  introduce  a  provi- 
sion in  the  press  law  on  the 
occasion  of  the  next  regular 
session  of  the  Skupshtina, 
according  to  which  instigations 
to  hatred  and  contempt  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian    Monarchy, 


The  Ultimatum  to  Servia 


51 


"2.  To  dissolve  immediate- 
ly the  society  styled  Narodna 
Odbrana,  to  confiscate  all  its 
means  of  propaganda,  and  to 
proceed  in  the  same  manner 
against  other  societies  and 
their  branches  in  Servia  which 
engage  in  propaganda  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy. The  Royal  Govern- 
ment shall  take  the  necessary 
measures  to  prevent  the  socie- 
ties dissolved  from  continuing 
their  activity  under  another 
name  and  form; 

"3.  To  eliminate  without 
delay  from  public  instruction 
in  Servia,  both  as  regards  the 
teaching  body  and  also  as  re- 
gards the  methods  of  instruc- 
tion, everything  that  serves, 
or  might  serve,  to  foment  the 
propaganda  against  Austria- 
Hungary; 


as  well  as  any  publication 
directed  in  general  against  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  shall  be  punished 
severely. 

"The  Government  pledges 
itself,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
coming  revision  of  the  Con- 
stitution, to  add  to  Article 
XXII.  a  clause  permitting  the 
confiscation  of  publications, 
the  confiscation  of  which, 
under  the  present  ArticleXXII. 
of  the  Constitution,  would  be 
impossible. 

"2.  The  Government  pos- 
sesses no  proof — and  the  Note 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment provides  it  with  none 
— that  the  '  Narodna  Odbrana' 
Society  and  other  similar  asso- 
ciations have  up  to  the  present 
committed  any  criminal  acts 
through  any  of  their  members. 
Nevertheless,  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment will  accept  the  de- 
mand of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  and  dissolve  the 
Narodna  Odbrana  Society,  as 
well  as  all  societies  that  may 
work  against  Austria-Hungary. 

"3.  The  Royal  Servian 
Government  agrees  to  elimi- 
nate forthwith  from  public 
education  in  Servia  everything 
that  might  help  the  propaganda 
against  Austria-Hungar>',  pro- 
vided that  the  Austro-Hungar- 
ian Government  gives  it  actual 
proof  of  this  propaganda. 


52 


The  Evidence  in  the  Case 


"4.  To  remove  from  the 
military  service,  and  from  the 
administration  in  general,  all 
officers  and  functionaries 
guilty  of  propaganda  against 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy whose  names  and  deeds 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment reserves  to  itself  the 
right  of  communicating  to  the 
Royal  Government ; 


"5.  To  accept  the  collabo- 
ration in  Servia  of  representa- 
tives of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  in  the  suppression 
of  the  subversive  movement 
directed  against  the  territorial 
integrity    of    the    Monarchy; 


"6.  To  take  judicial  pro- 
ceedings against  accessories  to 
the  plot  of  the  28th  June  who 
arc  on  Servian  territory.  Dele- 
gates of  the  Austro-Hungarian 


"4.  The  Royal  Govern- 
ment is  also  ready  to  discharge 
from  military  and  civil  service 
such  officers — provided  it  is 
proved  against  them  by  legal 
investigation — who  have  im- 
plicated themselves  in  acts 
directed  against  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Monarchy;  the  Govern- 
ment expects  that,  for  the 
purpose  of  instituting  pro- 
ceedings, the  Austro-Hunga- 
rian Government  will  impart 
the  names  of  these  officers  and 
employes  and  the  acts  of  which 
they  are  accused. 

"5.  The  Royal  Servian 
Government  must  confess  that 
it  is  not  quite  clear  as  to  the 
sense  and  scope  of  the  desire  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment to  the  effect  that  tlie 
Royal  Servian  Government 
bind  itself  to  allow  the  co- 
operation within  its  territory 
of  representatives  of  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian Government, 
but  it  nevertheless  declares 
itself  willing  to  permit  such 
cooperation  as  might  be  in 
conformity  with  international 
law  and  criminal  procedure,  as 
well  as  with  friendly  neighborly 
relations. 

"6.  The  Royal  Govern- 
:.ient  naturally  holds  itself 
bound  to  institute  an  investiga- 
tion against  all  such  persons 
as  were  concerned  in  the  plot 


The  Ultimatum  to  Servia 


53 


Government  will  take  part 
in  the  investigation  relating 
thereto; 


"7.  To  proceed  without 
delay  to  the  arrest  of  Major 
Voija  Tankositch  and  of  the  in- 
dividual named  Milan  Cigano- 
vitch,  a  Servian  State  employ^, 
who  have  been  compromised  by 
the  results  of  the  magisterial 
enquiry  at  Serajevo; 


of  June  I5th-28th,  or  are 
supposed  to  have  been  con- 
cerned in  it,  and  arc  on  Servian 
soil.  As  to  the  cooperation  of 
special  delegates  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  in  this 
investigation,  the  Servian 
Government  cannot  accept 
such  cooperation,  since  this 
would  be  a  violation  of  the 
laws  and  criminal  procedure. 
However,  in  individual  cases, 
information  as  to  the  progress 
of  the  investigation  might  be 
given  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
delegates. 

"7.  On  the  very  evening  on 
which  your  Note  arrived  the 
Royal  Government  caused  the 
arrest  of  Major  Voislar  Tan- 
kosic.  But,  regarding  Milan 
Ciganovic,  who  is  a  subject  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Mon- 
archy, and  who  was  employed 
until  June  15th  (as  candidate) 
in  the  Department  of  Railroads 
it  has  not  been  possible  to 
arrest  this  man  up  till  now, 
for  which  reason  a  warrant 
has  been  issued  against 
him. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  is  requested,  in 
order  that  the  investigation 
may  be  made  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble, to  make  known  in  the 
specified  form  what  grounds  of 
suspicion  exist,  and  the  proofs 
of  guilt  collected  at  the  in- 
vestigation in  Serajevo. 


54 


The  Evidence  in  the  Case 


"8.  To  prevent  by  eflfective 
measures  the  cooperation  of 
the  Servian  authorities  in  the 
illicit  traffic  in  arms  and  explo- 
sives across  the  frontier,  to 
dismiss  and  punish  severely  the 
officials  of  the  frontier  service 
at  Schabatz  and  Loznica  guilty 
of  having  assisted  the  perpe- 
trators of  the  Serajevo  crime 
by  facilitating  their  passage 
across  the  frontier; 


"9.  To  furnish  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government 
with  explanations  regarding 
the  unjustifiable  utterances  of 
high  Servian  officials,  both  in 
Servia  and  abroad,  who,  not- 
withstanding their  official  posi- 
tion, did  not  hesitate  after  the 
crime  of  the  28th  June  to  ex- 
press themselves  in  interviews 
in  terms  of  hostility  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment;  and  finally, 


"10.  To  notify  the  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Government 
without  delay  of  the  execution 
of  the  measures  comprised 
under  the  preceding  heads. 

"The  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  expects  the  reply 


"8.  The  Servian  Govern- 
ment will  increase  the  severity 
and  scope  of  its  measures 
against  the  smuggling  of  arms 
and  explosives. 

"  It  goes  without  saying  that 
it  will  at  once  start  an  investi- 
gation and  mete  out  severe 
punishment  to  the  frontier 
officials  of  the  Sabac-Loznica 
line  who  failed  in  their  duty 
and  allowed  those  responsible 
for  the  crime  to  cross  the 
frontier. 

"9.  The  Royal  Govern- 
ment is  willing  to  give  explana- 
tions of  the  statements  made  in 
interviews  by  its  officials  in 
Servia  and  foreign  countries 
after  the  crime,  and  which, 
according  to  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government,  were  anti- 
Austrian,  as  soon  as  the  said 
Government  indicates  where 
these  statements  were  made, 
and  provides  proofs  that  such 
statements  were  actually  made 
by  the  said  officials.  The 
Royal  Government  will  itself 
take  steps  to  collect  the  neces- 
sary proofs  and  means  of 
transmission  for  this  purpose. 

"10.  The  Royal  Govern- 
ment will,  in  so  far  as  this  has 
not  already  occurred  in  this 
Note,  inform  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Government  of  the 
taking  of  the  measures  con- 
cerning the  foregoing  mat- 
ters, as  soon  as  such  measures 


The  Ultimatum  to  Servia  55 

of  the  Royal  Government  at      have  been  ordered  and  carried 

the  latest  by  six  o'clock  on  Sat-      out. 

urday  evening,  the  25th  July."  "The  Royal  Servian  Govern- 

ment is  of  the  opinion  that  it 
is  mutually  advantageous  not 
to  hinder  the  settlement  of  this 
question,  and  therefore,  in  case 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
,  emment  should  not  consider 
itself  satisfied  with  this  answer, 
it  is  ready  as  always  to  accept 
a  peaceful  solution,  either  by 
referring  the  decision  of  this 
question  to  the  international 
tribunal  at  The  Hague,  or  by 
leaving  it  to  the  great  Powers 
who  cooperated  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  the  explanation  given 
by  the  Servian  Government  on 
the   i7th-3ist   March,    1909." 

It  increases  the  ineffaceable  discredit  of  this 
brutal  ultimatum  when  we  consider  the  relative 
size  of  the  two  nations.  Austria  has  a  population 
of  over  50,000,000  and  Servia  about  4,000,000. 
Moreover,  Servia  had  just  emerged  from  two  ter- 
rible conflicts,  from  which  it  was  still  bleeding  to 
exhaustion.  Austria's  tdtimatum  was  that  of  a  Go- 
liath to  David,  and,  up  to  the  hour  that  this  book 
goes  to  press,  the  result  has  not  been  different  from 
that  famous  conflict. 

Germany  itself  had  already  given  to  Servia  an 
intimation  of  its  intended  fate.  It  had  anticipated 
the  Austrian  ultimatum  by  some  pointed  sugges- 


56  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

tions  to  Servia  on  its  own  account,  for  in  the 
letter  already  quoted  from  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  we  learn  that  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  told  the  British  Ambassador 
before  the  ultimatum  was  issued  that  he 

on  several  occasions,  in  conversation  with  the 
Servian  Minister,  emphasized  the  extreme  import- 
ance that  Austro-Servian  relations  should  be  put 
on  a  proper  footing.  ^ 

This  pointed  intimation  from  Germany,  thus 
preceding  the  formal  ultimatum  from  Austria, 
naturally  gave  Servia  a  quick  appreciation  that 
within  the  short  space  allowed  by  the  ultimatum, 
it  must  either  acquiesce  in  grossly  unreasonable 
demands  or  perish  as  an  independent  nation. 

To  appreciate  fully  the  brutality  of  this  ulti- 
matum let  us  imagine  a  precise  analogy. 

The  relations  of  France  and  Germany— leav- 
ing aside  the  important  difference  of  relative  size 
— are  not  unlike  the  relations  that  existed  be- 
tween Servia  and  Austria.  In  1908,  Austria  had 
forcibly  annexed  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  both 
of  them  Slav  coimtries,  and  when  Servia  had 
emerged  from  the  Balkan-Turkish  War  with  signal 
credit  to  itself,  it  was  again  Austria  that  had 

« In  English  White  Paper,  No.  2. 


The  Ultimatum  to  Servia  57 

intervened  and  deprived  it  of  the  fruit  of  its 
victories  by  denying  it  access  to  the  sea. 

Similarly,  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  Germany 
had  forcibly  annexed  Alsace  and  Lorraine  from 
France.  As  there  existed  in  Servia  voluntary 
organizations  of  men,  which  ceaselessly  agitated 
for  the  recovery  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  so 
in  France  similar  patriotic  organizations  have  for 
the  last  forty  years  continuously  agitated  for  a 
war  which  would  lead  to  the  ultimate  recovery  of 
Alsace  and  Lorraine.  The  statue  of  Strassburg  in 
the  Place  de  la  Concorde  has  been  covered  with 
the  emblems  of  mourning  from  the  time  that  Bis- 
marck wrung  from  Jules  Favre  the  cession  of  the 
Rhine  territory.  If  Austria's  grievance  against 
Servia  were  just,  Germany  has  an  equal  and 
similar  grievance  against  France. 

Under  these  circumstances  let  us  suppose  that 
on  the  occasion  of  the  visit  of  the  German  Crown 
Prince  to  Strassburg,  that  an  Alsatian  citizen  of 
German  nationality,  having  strong  French  sym- 
pathies, had  assassinated  the  Crown  Prince,  and 
that  France  had  formally  disclaimed  any  com- 
plicity in  the  assassination  and  expressed  its 
sympathy  and  regret. 

Mutatis  mutandis,  let  us  suppose  that  Germany 
had  thereupon  issued  to  France  the  same  ultima- 


58  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

turn  that  Austria  issued  to  Servia,  requiring  France 
to  acknowledge  moral  responsibility  for  a  crime, 
which  it  steadily  disavowed.  The  ultimatum  to 
France  in  that  event  would  have  included  a  per- 
emptory demand  that  the  government  of  France, 
a  proud  and  self-respecting  country,  should  pub- 
lish in  the  Official  Journal,  and  communicate  as 
an  "order  of  the  day"  to  the  army  of  France,  a 
statement  that  the  French  Government  formally 
denounced  all  attempts  to  recover  Alsace  and 
Lorraine;  that  it  regretted  the  participation  of 
French  officers  in  the  murder  of  the  German  Crown 
Prince ;  that  it  engaged  to  suppress  in  the  Press  of 
France  any  expressions  of  hatred  or  contempt  for 
Germany;  that  it  would  dissolve  all  patriotic 
societies  that  have  for  their  object  the  recovery 
of  the  "lost  provinces";  that  it  would  eliminate 
from  the  public  schools  of  France  all  instruction 
which  served  to  foment  feeling  against  Germany; 
that  it  would  remove  from  its  army  all  officers  who 
had  joined  in  the  agitation  against  Germany; 
that  it  would  accept  in  the  courts  of  France  the 
participation  of  German  officials  in  determining 
who  were  guilty,  either  of  the  Strassburg  murder 
or  of  the  propaganda  for  the  recovery  of  Alsace 
and  Lorraine;  that  it  would  further  proceed  to 
arrest  and  punish  certain  French  officers,  whom  the 


The  Ultimatum  to  Servia  59 

German  Government  charged  with  participating 
in  the  offensive  propaganda,  and  that  it  would 
furnish  the  German  Government  with  full  explana- 
tions and  information  in  reference  to  its  execution 
of  these  peremptory  demands. 

Let  us  suppose  that  such  an  ultimatum  having 
been  sent,  that  France  had  been  given  forty- 
eight  hours  to  comply  with  conditions  which  were 
obviously  fatal  to  its  self-respect  and  forever 
destructive  of  its  prestige  as  a  great  Power. 

Can  it  be  questioned  what  the  reply  of  France 
or  the  judgment  of  the  world  would  be  in  such  a 
quarrel? 

Every  fair-minded  man  would  say  without  hesi- 
tation that  such  aji  tdtimatum  would  be  an  unprece- 
dented outrage  upon  the  fine  proprieties  of  civilized 
life. 

The  only  difference  between  the  two  cases  is  the 
fact  that  in  the  case  of  Germany  and  France  the 
power  issuing  the  ultimatum  would  be  less  than 
double  the  size  of  that  nation  which  it  sought  to 
coerce,  while  in  the  case  of  Austria  and  Servaa, 
the  aggressor  was  twelve  times  as  powerful  as  the 
power  whose  moral  prestige  and  political  indepen- 
dence it  sought  to  destroy. 

In  view  of  the  nature  of  these  demands,  the 
assurance  which  Austria  subsequently  gave  Russia, 


6o  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

that  she  would  do  nothing  to  lessen  the  territory  of 
Servia,  goes  for  nothing.  From  the  standpoint 
of  Servia,  it  would  have  been  far  better  to  lose 
a  part  of  its  territory  and  keep  its  indepen- 
dence and  self-respect  as  to  the  remainder,  than  to 
retain  all  its  existing  land  area,  and  by  submitting 
to  the  ultimatum  become  virtually  a  vassal  state 
of  Austria.  Certainly  if  Servia  had  acquiesced 
fully  in  Austria's  demands  without  any  qualifica- 
tion or  reservation  (as  for  the  sake  of  peace  it 
almost  did),  then  Austria  would  have  enjoyed  a 
moral  protectorate  over  all  of  Servia's  territory, 
and  its  ultimate  fate  might  have  been  that  of  Bos- 
nia and  Herzegovina,  which  Austria  first  governed 
as  a  protectorate,  and  later  forcibly  annexed. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE  PEACE  PARLEYS 

The  issuance  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  precipi- 
tated a  grave  crisis.  //  did  not,  however,  present 
any  insoluble  problem.  Peace  could  and  should  have 
been  preserved.  Its  preservation  is  always  possi- 
ble when  nations,  which  may  be  involved  in  a 
controversy,  are  inspired  by  a  reasonably  pacific 
purpose.  Only  when  the  masses  of  the  people  are 
inflamed  with  a  passionate  desire  for  war,  and  in  a 
time  of  popular  hysteria  responsible  statesmen  are 
helplessly  borne  along  the  turgid  flow  of  events 
as  bubbles  are  carried  by  the  swift  current  of  a 
swollen  river,  is  peace  a  visionary  dream. 

It  is  the  peculiarity  of  the  present  crisis  that 
no  such  popular  hysteria  existed.  No  popular  de- 
mand for  war  developed  until  after  it  was  virtually 
precipitated.  Even  then  large  classes  of  working- 
men,  both  in  Germany  and  France,  protested. 

The  peoples  of  the  various  countries  had  scant 
knowledge  of  the  issues  which  had  been  raised 
by  their  diplomats  and  had  little,  if  any,  interest 

6i 


62  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

in  the  Servian  trouble.  The  chief  exception  to  this 
was  in  Austria,  where  unquestionably  popular  feel- 
ing had  been  powerfully  excited  by  the  murder 
of  the  Archdiike  and  where  there  had  been,  es- 
pecially in  Vienna,  popular  manifestations  in  favor 
of  war.  In  Russia  also  there  was  not  unnaturally 
a  strong  undercurrent  of  popular  sympathy  for 
Servia. 

The  writer  was  in  the  Engadine  at  the  time 
referred  to,  and  cosmopolitan  St.  Moritz,  although 
a  little  place,  was,  in  its  heterogeneous  population, 
Europe  in  microcosmic  form.  There  the  average 
man  continued  to  enjoy  his  midsummer  holiday 
and  refused  to  believe  that  so  great  a  catastrophe 
was  imminent  until  the  last  two  fateful  days  in 
July.  The  citizens  of  all  nations  continued  to 
fraternize,  and  were  one  in  amazement  that  a  war 
could  be  precipitated  on  causes  in  which  the 
average  man  took  so  slight  an  interest. 

Unembarrassed  by  any  popiilar  clamor,  this  war 
could  have  been  prevented,  and  the  important 
question  presents  itself  to  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Civilization  as  to  the  moral  responsibility  for  the 
failure  of  the  negotiations. 

Which  of  the  two  groups  of  powers  sincerely 
worked  for  peace  and  which  obstructed  those 
efforts? 


The  Peace  Parleys  63 

In  reaching  its  conclusion  our  imaginary  Court 
would  pay  little  attention  to  mere  professions  of  a 
desire  for  peace.  A  nation,  like  an  individual, 
can  covertly  stab  the  peace  of  another  while 
saying,  "Art  thou  in  health,  my  brother?"  and 
even  the  peace  of  civilization  can  be  betrayed  by  a 
Judas-kiss.  Professions  of  peace  belong  to  the 
cant  of  diplomacy  and  have  always  characterized 
the  most  bellicose  of  nations. 

No  war  in  modem  times  has  been  begun  without 
the  aggressor  pretending  that  his  nation  wished 
nothing  but  peace,  and  invoking  divine  aid  for  its 
murderous  policy.  To  paraphrase  the  words  of 
I.ady  Teazle  on  a  noted  occasion,  when  Sir  Joseph 
Surface  talked  much  of  "honor,"  it  might  be  as 
well  in  such  instances  to  leave  the  name  of  God 
out  of  the  question. 

The  uTiter  will  so  far  anticipate  the  conclusions, 
which  he  thinks  these  records  indisputably  show, 
as  to  suggest  the  respective  attitudes  of  the  differ- 
ent groups  of  diplomats  and  statesmen  as  revealed 
by  these  papers.  If  the  reader  will  realize  fully 
the  policy  which  from  the  first  animated  Germany 
and  Austria,  then  the  documents  hereinafter  quoted 
will  acquire  new  significance. 

Germany  and  Austria  had  determined  to  impose 
their  will  upon  Servia,  even   though  it  involved 


64  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

a  European  war.  From  the  outset  they  clearly 
recognized  such  a  possibiHty  and  were  willing  to 
accept  the  responsibility. 

The  object  to  be  gained  was  something  more 
than  a  neutralization  of  the  pro-Slav  propaganda. 
It  was  to  subject  Servia  to  such  severe  punitive 
measures  that  thereafter  her  independence  of 
will  and  moral  sovereignty  would  be  largely  im- 
paired, if  not  altogether  destroyed.  To  do  this 
it  was  not  enough  to  have  Servia  take  measures 
to  prevent  pro-Slav  agitation  within  her  borders. 
Austria  neither  wanted  nor  expected  the  accept- 
ance of  her  impossible  ultimatum. 

It  planned  to  submit  such  an  ultimatum  as 
Servia  could  not  possibly  accept  and,  to  make 
this  resiilt  doubly  sure,  it  was  thought  desirable  to 
give  not  only  Servia  but  Europe  the  minimum 
time  to  take  any  preventive  measures.  Giving  to 
Servia  only  forty-eight  hours  within  which  to  reach 
a  decision  and  to  Europe  barely  twenty-four  hours 
to  protect  the  peace  of  the  world,  it  was  thought 
that  Servia  would  do  one  of  two  things,  either  of 
which  would  be  of  incalculable  importance  to 
Germany  and  Austria. 

If  Servia  accepted  the  ultimatum  for  lack  of 
time  to  consider  it,  then  its  self-respect  was  hope- 
lessly compromised  and  its  independence  largely 


The  Peace  Parleys  65 

destroyed.  Thenceforth  she  would  be,  at  least 
morally,  a  mere  vassal  of  Austria. 

If,  however,  Servia  declined  to  accept  the 
ultimatum,  then  war  would  immediately  begin 
and  Servia  would  be,  as  was  thought,  speedily 
subjected  to  punitive  measures  of  such  a  drastic 
character  that  the  same  result  would  be  attained. 

From  the  commencement,  both  Germany  and 
Austria  recognized  the  possibility  that  Russia 
might  intervene  to  protect  Servia.  To  prevent 
this  it  was  important  that  Russia  and  her  allies  of 
the  Triple  Entente  shoiild  be  given  as  little  time  as 
possible  to  consider  their  action,  and  it  was  thought 
that  this  would  probably  lead  to  Russia's  acqui- 
escence in  the  punishment  of  Servia  and,  if  so, 
France  and  England,  having  no  direct  interest  in 
Servia,  would  also  undoubtedly  acquiesce. 

If,  however,  slow-moving  Russia,  instead  of 
acquiescing,  as  she  did  in  1908  in  the  case  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  should  take  up  the 
gauntlet  which  Germany  and  Austria  had  thrown 
down,  then  it  was  all  important  to  Germany  and 
Austria  that  Russia  should  seem  to  be  the  aggressor. 

For  this  there  were  two  substantial  reasons: 
the  one  was  Italy  and  the  other  was  England. 
Germany  and  Austria  desired  the  cooperation 
of  Italy  and  could  not  claim  it  as  of  right  under 


66  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  unless  they  were 
attacked.  Upon  the  other  hand,  if  England 
believed  that  Russia  and  France  had  declared  war 
upon  Germany  and  Austria,  there  was  little  proba- 
bility of  her  intervention.  For__  these  reasons 
iXit  was  important  thatjjermany  and  Austria  should 
impress^both  England,  and  Italy  that  their  pur- 
poses were  sincerely  pacific  and  that j)n  the  other 
hand  they  should  so  clearly  provoke  Russia  and 
France  that  those  nations  would  declare  war. 

If  the  reader  will  keep  this  Janus-faced  policy 
steadily  in  mind,  he  will  understand  the  apparent 
inconsistencies  in  the  diplomatic  representations 
of  the  German  Foreign  Ofhce.  He  will  under- 
stand why  Germany  and  Austria,  while  at  times 
flouting  Russia  in  the  most  flagrant  manner  and 
refusing  her  the  common  courtesies  of  diplomatic 
intercourse,  were  at  the  same  time  giving  to 
England  the  most  emphatic  assurance  of  pacific 
intentions. 

With  this  preliminary  statement,  let  the 
record  speak  for  itself.  We  have  seen  that  the 
first  great,  and  as  events  proved,  fatal  obstacle  to 
peace  which  Germany  interposed  was  practically 
contemporaneous  with  the  issuance  of  the  ulti- 
matum. Germany  did  not  wait  for  any  efforts 
at  conciliation.     On   the  contrary,  it   attempted 


The  Peace  Parleys  67 

to  bar  effectually  all  such  efforts  by  serving 
notice  upon  France,  England,  and  Russia  almost 
simultaneously  with  the  issuance  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum, 

that  the  acts  as  well  as  the  demands  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  cannot  but  be  looked  upon 
as  justified ; 

and  the  communication  concluded: 

We  strongly  desire  that  the  dispute  be  localized, 
since  any  intervention  of  any  Power  on  account  of 
the  various  alliance  obligations  would  bring  conse- 
quences impossible  to  measure.  ^ 

This  had  only  one  meaning.  Austria  was  to  be 
left  to  discipline  Servia  at  will,  or  there  would 
be  war.  Germany  did  not  even  wait  for  any  sug- 
gestion of  intervention,  whether  conciliatory  or 
otherwise,  but  sought  to  interpose  to  any  plan 
of  peace,  short  of  complete  submission,  an  in- 
superable barrier  by  this  threat  of  war.  With 
this  pointed  threat  to  Europe,  the  next  move  was 
that  of  Russia,  and  it  may  be  remarked  that 
throughout  the  entire  negotiations  Russian  dip- 
lomacy was  more  than  equal  to  that  of  Germany. 

Russia  contented  itself  in  the  first  instance 
by  stating  on   the    morning   of  July  24th,   that 

'  German  While  Paper,  Annex,  i  B. 


68  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Russia  could  not  remain  indifferent  to  the  Austro- 
Servian  conflict.  This  attitude  could  not  surprise 
any  one,  for  Russia's  interest  in  the  Balkans  was 
well  known  and  its  legitimate  concern  in  the 
future  of  any  Slav  state  was,  as  Sir  Edward 
Grey  had  said  in  Parliament  in  March,  1913, 
"a  commonplace  in  European  diplomacy  in  the 
past." 

With  this  simple  statement  of  its  legitimate 
interest  in  a  matter  affecting  the  balance  of  power 
in  Europe,  Russia,  instead  of  issuing  an  ultimatum 
or  declaring  war,  as  Germany  and  Austria  may 
have  hoped,  joined  with  England  in  asking  for  a 
reasonable  extension.jafjfciine^for  all  the  Powers  "to 
concert  for  the  preservation  of  peace.  On 'July 
24th,  the  very  day  that  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
had  reached  St.  Petersburg,  the  Russian  For- 
eign Minister  transmitted  to  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment through  its  Charge  in  Vienna  the  following 
communication : 

The  communication  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  to  the  Powers  the  day  after  the  pre- 
sentation of  the  ultimatum  to  Belgrade  leaves  to  the 
Powers  a  delay  entirely  insufficient  to  undertake  any 
useful  steps  whatever  for  the  straightening  out  of  the 
complications  that  have  arisen.  To  prevent  the 
incalculable  consequences,  equally  disastrous  for  all 
the  Powers,  which  can  follow  the  method  of  action 


The  Peace  Parleys  69 

of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  it  seems 
indispensable  to  us  that  above  all  the  delay  given 
to  Servia  to  reply  should  be  extended.  Austria- 
Hungary,  declaring  herself  disposed  to  inform  the 
Powers  of  the  results  of  the  inquiry  upon  which  the 
Imperial  and  Royal  Government  bases  its  accusations, 
should  at  least  give  them  also  the  time  to  take  note  of 
them  {de  s'en  rendre  comptc).  In  this  case,  if  the 
Powers  should  convince  themselves  of  the  well- 
groundedness  of  certain  of  the  Austrian  demands 
they  would  find  themselves  in  a  position  to  send  to  the 
Servian  Government  consequential  advice.  A  refusal 
to  extend  the  terms  of  the  ultimatum  would  deprive 
of  all  value  the  step  taken  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Government  in  regard  to  the  Powers  and  would 
be  in  contradiction  with  the  very  bases  of  inter- 
national relations. ' 

Could  any  court  question  the  justice  of  this 
contention?  The  peace  of  the  world  was  at  stake. 
Time  only  was  asked  to  see  what  could  be  done  to 
preserve  that  peace  and  satisfy  Austria's  grievances 
to  the  uttermost. 

Germany  had  only  to  intimate  to  Austria  that 
*'a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind," 
as  w^ell  as  common  courtesy  to  great  and  friendly 
nations,  required  that  sufficient  time  be  given  not 
only  to  Servia,  but  to  the  other  nations,  to  concert 
for  the  common  good,  especially  as  the  period  was 
one  of  mid-summer  dullness,   and  many  of  the 

'  Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  4. 


70  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

leading  rulers  and  statesmen  were  absent  from 
their  respective  capitals. 

//  Germany  made  any  communication  to  Aus- 
tria in  the  interests  oj  peace  the  text  has  yet  to 
be  disclosed  to  the  world.  A  word  from  Berlin 
to  Vienna  would  have  given  the  additional  time 
which,  with  sincerely  pacific  intentions,  might 
have  resulted  in  the  preservation  of  peace.  Ger- 
many, so  far  as  the  record  discloses,  never  spoke 
that  word. 

England  had  already  anticipated  the  request  of 
Russia  that  a  reasonable  time  should  be  given  to 
all  interested  parties.  When  the  Austrian  Minister 
in  London  handed  the  ultimatum  to  Sir  Edward 
Grey  on  July  the  24th,  the  following  conversation 
took  place,  which  speaks  for  itself : 

In  the  ensuing  conversation  with  his  Excellency 
I  (Sir  Edward  Grey)  remarked  that  it  seemed  to 
me  a  matter  for  great  regret  that  a  time  limit,  and 
such  a  short  one  at  that,  had  been  insisted  upon  at 
this  stage  of  the  proceedings.  The  murder  of  the 
Archduke  and  some  of  the  circumstances  respecting 
Servia  quoted  in  the  note  aroused  sympathy  with 
Austria,  as  was  but  natural  ,^^iil£LiiZi£_ia  we  time  J  had 
never  before  jeen  one  State  address  to  another  inde- 
pendent State  a  document  of  so  formidable  a  character. 
Count  Mensdorff  replied  that  the  present  situation 
might  never  have  arisen  if  Servia  had  held  out  a 
hand  after  the  murder  of  the  Archduke.    Servia  had, 


The  Peace  Parleys  71 

however,  shown  no  sign  of  sympathy  or  help,  though 
some  weeks  had  already  elapsed  since  the  murder; 
a  time  limit,  said  his  Excellencv\_was  essential, 
paving  to  thg_procrastinatiQrL  oru  Ser viaJ's-parti     ' 

I  said  that  if  Servia  had  procrastinated  in  reply- 
ing a  time  limit  could  have  been  introduced  later; 
hut,  as  things  noiv  stood,  the  terms  of  the  Servian  reply 
had  been  dictated  by  Austria,  who  had  not  been  content 
to  limit  herself  to  a  demajid  for  a  reply  within  a  limit 
of  forty-eight  hours  from  its  presentation. 

Unfortunately  both  Russia  and  England's  re- 
quests for  time  were  refused,  on  the  plea  that 
t!iey  had  reached  the  Austrian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter too  late,  although  it  has  never  yet  been  ex- 
plained why,  even  if  Count  Berchtold  were  unable 
to  take  up  the  requests  before  the  expiration  of 
the  ultimatum,  the  matter  might  not  have  been 
reopened  for  a  few  days  by  a  corresponding  exten- 
sion of  the  time  limit. 

In  the  absence  of  some  explanation,  which  as 
yet  remains  to  be  made,  the  absence  of  the 
Austrian  Premier  from  Vienna  at  the  time  inter- 
vening between  the  issuance  of  the  ultimatum  and 
the  expiration  of  the  time  Hmit  seems  like  an  ex- 
traordinarily petty  piece  of  diplomatic  finesse.  He 
had  without  any  warning  to  the  great  Powers  of 
Europe,  launched  a  thunderbolt,  and  if  there  ever 
was  a  time  when  a  pacific  foreign  minister  should 


72  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

have  been  at  his  post  and  open  to  suggestions  of 
peace,  it  was  in  those  two  critical  days.  And  yet, 
after  issuing  the  ultimatum,  he  immediately  takes 
himself  beyond  reach  of  personal  parleys  by  going 
to  Ischl,  and  this  was  taken  by  the  German  Foreign 
Office  as  a  convenient  excuse  for  an  anticipated 
failure  to  extend  this  courtesy  to  Russia  and  Eng- 
land. Upon  this  we  have  the  testimony  of  the 
English  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  who  in  his  report 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  dated  July  25th,  says: 

[The  German]  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
says  that  on  receipt  of  a  telegram  at  ten  o'clock  this 
morning  from  German  Ambassador  at  London,  he 
immediately  instructed  German  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  to  pass  on  to  the  Austrian  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  your  suggestion,  for  an  extension  of 
time  limit,  and  to  speak  to  his  Excellency  about  it. 
Unfortunately  it  appeared  from  the  press  that  Count 
Bcrchtold  is  at  Ischl,  and  Secretary  of  State 
thought  that  in  these  circumstances  there  would  be 
delay  and  diffictilty  in  getting  time  limit  extended. 
Secretary  of  State  said  that  he  did  not  know  what 
Austria-Hungary  had  ready  on  the  spot,  but  he 
admitted  quite  freely  that  Austro-Hungarian  Govern- 
ment wished  to  give  the  Servians  a  lesson,  and  that 
they  meant  to  take  military  action.  He  also  admitted 
that  Servian  Government  could  not  swallow  certain 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  demands.  .  .  . 

A  like  excuse  is  found  in  a  conversation  with  the 


The  Peace  Parleys  73 

Russian  Charge  at  Berlin,  in  which  Bethmann- 
Hollweg  expressed  the  fear  "that  in  consequence 
of  the  absence  of  Berchtold  at  Ischl,  and  seeing 
the  lack  of  time,  his  (Bethmann-Hollweg's  tele- 
grams suggesting  delay)  will  remain  without 
result." 

These  conversations  are  most  illuminating.  They 
refer  to  instructions  to  the  German  Ambassador 
in  Vienna,  which  are  not  found  in  the  German 
White  Paper,  although  they  would  have  thrown 
a  searchlight  upon  the  sincerity,  with  which 
Germany  "passed  on"  the  most  important  request 
of  England  and  Russia  for  a  little  time  to  save  the 
peace  of  Europe,  and  it  strongly  suggests  the  possi- 
bility that  Count  Berchtold's  most  inopportune 
absence  in  Ischl  was  to  be  the  excuse  for  the  gross 
discourtesy  of  refusing  to  give  any  extension  of 
time. 

Kudachef,  the  Russian  Charge  at  Vienna,  did 
not  content  himself  with  submitting  the  request  to 
the  Acting  Foreign  Minister  (Baron  Macchio)  but 
to  deprive  Austria  of  the  flimsy  excuse  of  Berch- 
told's absence  at  Ischl,  the  Russian  Charge  went 
over  the  head  of  the  Austrian  Acting  Foreign 
Minister  and  telegraphed  the  request  for  time  to 
Count  Berchtold  at  Ischl.     Let  the  record  teU  for 

'  Russian  OrangePaper,  No.  14. 


74  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

itself  how  this  most  reasonable  request  was  made 
and  refused. 

The  Russian  Charge  sent  on  July  25th  the 
two  following  telegrams  to  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister: 

Count  Berchtold  is  at  Ischl.  Seeing  the  im- 
possibility of  arriving  there  in  time,  I  have  tele- 
graphed him  our  proposal  to  extend  the  delay  of  the 
ultimatum,  and  I  have  repeated  it  verbally  to  Baron 
Macchio.  This  latter  promised  me  to  communicate 
it  in  time  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  but 
added  that  he  could  predict  with  assurance  a  categorical 
refusal. ' 

Sequel  to  my  telegram  of  to-day.  Have  just 
received  from  Macchio  the  negative  reply  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  our  proposal  to 
prolong  the  delay  of  the  note.  ^ 

It  is  evident  from  the  Russian  Orange  Paper 
that  that  country  had  no  illusions  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  a  peaceful  outcome.  Germany  has 
contended  that  on  July  the  24th,  before  Count 
Berchtold  made  his  inopportune  visit  to  Ischl, 
he  sent  for  the  Russian  Charge  at  Vienna  and 
assured  him  that  the  punitive  measiu-es  which 
Austria  had  determined   to  take   against   Servia 

^  Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  1 1. 
"Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  12. 


The  Peace  Parleys  75 

at  all  costs  would  not  involve  any  territorial 
acquisitions. 

Of  this  interview  the  chief  evidence  comes  in- 
directly from  two  sources,  which  are  not  entirely 
in  accord. 

In  a  telegram  from  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Vienna  to  the  German  Chancellor,  dated  July 
24th,  it  is  said : 

Count  Berchtold  to-day  summoned  the  Russian 
Charge  d'Affaires  in  order  to  explain  to  him  in 
detail  and  in  friendly  terms  the  position  of  Austria 
regarding  Servia.  After  going  over  the  historical 
developments  of  the  last  few  years,  he  laid  stress 
on  the  statement  that  the  monarchy  did  not  wish  to 
appear  against  Servia  in  the  role  of  a  conqueror. 
He  said  that  Austria-Hungary  would  demand  no 
territory,  that  the  step  was  merely  a  definitive 
measure  against  Servian  machinations ;  that  Austria- 
Hungary  felt  herself  obliged  to  exact  guarantees  for 
the  future  friendly  behavior  of  Servia  toward  the 
monarchy;  that  he  had  no  intention  of  bringing 
about  a  shifting  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Balkans.  The  Charge  dAffaires,  who  as  yet  had 
no  instructions  from  St.  Petersburg,  took  the 
explanations  of  the  Minister  ad  referendum  adding 
that  he  would  immediately  transmit  them  to 
Sazonof .  ^ 

In  a  report  of  the  same  interview  from  the 

» German  White  Paper,  No.  3. 


76  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

English  Ambassador   at   Vienna  to   Sir  Edward 
Grey,  it  is  said : 

Russian  Charge  d'Affaires  was  received  this 
morning  by  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  said 
to  him,  as  his  own  personal  view,  that  Austrian 
note  was  drawn  up  in  a  form  rendering  it  impossible 
of  acceptance  as  it  stood,  and  that  it  was  both 
unusual  and  peremptory  in  its  terms.  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  replied  that  Austrian  Minister 
was  under  instructions  to  leave  Belgrade  unless 
Austrian  demands  were  accepted  integrally  by  4  p.m. 
to-morrow.  His  Excellency  added  that  Dual  Mon- 
archy felt  that  its  very  existence  was  at  stake; 
and  that  the  step  taken  had  caused  great  satis- 
faction throughout  the  country.  He  did  not  think 
that  objections  to  what  had  been  done  could  be 
raised  by  any  power. 

It  will  be  noted  that  in  the  report  of  the  English 
Ambassador  there  is  no  suggestion  of  any  dis- 
claimer of  an  intention  to  take  Servian  territory. 

In  the  Russian  Orange  Paper,  we  find  no  report 
from  its  representative  at  Vienna  of  any  such  in- 
terview and  Austria  has  never  produced  any  docu- 
ment or  memorandum  either  of  such  an  interview 
or  of  such  a  concession  to  Russia.  It  is  probable 
that  such  a  concession  was  made,  as  Germany 
contends,  and  if  so,  Russian  diplomacy  was  far  too 
keen  to  be   led  upon  a  false  trail  by  this  empty 

'  English  White  Papers,  No.  7. 


The  Peace  Parleys  77 

promise  and  as  the  evidences  multiplied  that 
Austria  would  not  consider  either  an  extension 
of  time  or  any  modification  of  its  terms  and  that 
Germany  was  acting  in  complete  accord  and  co- 
operated with  her  Ally,  the  probability  of  war  was 
unmistakable. 

Sazonof  at  once  sent  for  the  English  and  French 
Ambassadors,  and  the  substance  of  the  conference 
is  embodied  in  the  telegram  from  the  British 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
dated  July  24th,  which  throws  a  strong  light  upon 
the  double  effort  of  Russia  and  France  to  preserve 
the  peace  and  also  as  an  obvious  necessity  to 
prepare  for  the  more  probable  issue  of  war: 

Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Austria's 
conduct  was  both  provocative  and  immoral;  she 
would  never  have  taken  such  action  unless  Germany 
had  first  been  consulted;  some  of  her  demands  were 
quite  impossible  of  acceptance.  He  hoped  that  his 
Majesty's  Government  would  not  fail  to  proclaim 
their  solidarity  with  Russia  and  France. 

The  French  Ambassador  gave  me  to  understand 
that  France  would  fulfill  all  the  obligations  entailed 
by  her  alliance  with  Russia,  if  necessity  arose,  be- 
sides supporting  Russia  strongly  in  any  diplomatic 
negotiations. 

I  said  that  I  would  telegraph  a  full  report  to  you 
of  what  their  Excellencies  had  just  said  to  me.  I 
could  not,  of  course,   speak  in  the  name  of  his 


78  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Majesty's  Government,  but  personally  I  saw  no 
reason  to  expect  any  declaration  of  solidarity  from 
his  Majesty's  Government  that  would  entail  an 
unconditional  engagement  on  their  part  to  support 
Russia  and  France  by  force  of  arms.  Direct  British 
interests  in  Servia  were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of 
that  country  would  never  be  sanctioned  by  British 
public  opinion.  To  this  M.  Sazonof  replied  that 
we  must  not  forget  that  the  general  European  ques- 
tion was  involved,  the  Servian  question  being  but 
a  part  of  the  former,  and  that  Great  Britain  could 
not  afford  to  efface  herself  from  the  problems  now 
at  issue. 

In  reply  to  these  remarks  I  observed  that  I 
gathered  from  what  he  said  that  his  Excellency  was 
suggesting  that  Great  Britain  should  join  in  making 
a  communication  to  Austria  to  the  effect  that  active 
intervention  by  her  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Servia 
could  not  be  tolerated.  But,  supposing  Austria 
nevertheless  proceeded  to  embark  on  military 
measures  against  Servia  in  spite  of  our  representa- 
tions, was  it  the  intention  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment forthwith  to  declare  war  on  Austria? 

M.  Sazonof  said  that  he  himself  thought  that 
Russian  mobilization  would  at  any  rate  have  to  be 
carried  out;  but  a  council  of  ministers  was  being 
held  this  afternoon  to  consider  the  whole  question. 
A  further  council  would  beheld,  probably  to-morrow, 
at  which  the  Emperor  would  preside,  when  a  deci- 
sion would  be  come  to.  .  .  . 

Had  England  then  followed  the  sagacious  sug- 
gestion of  Sazonof,  would  war  have  been  averted? 


The  Peace  Parleys  79 

Possibly,  perhaps  probably.  Germany's  princi- 
pal fear  was  the  intervention  of  England.  In  view 
of  its  supremacy  on  the  seas  this  was  natural. 
It  was  England's  intimation  in  the  Moroccan 
crisis  of  191 1,  made  in  Lloyd  George's  Mansion 
House  speech,  which  at  that  time  induced  Ger- 
many to  reverse  the  engines.  Might  not  the 
same  intimation  in  19 14  have  had  a  like  effect  upon 
the  mad  counsels  of  Potsdam?  The  answer  can 
only  be  a  matter  of  conjecture.  It  depends  largely 
upon  how  deep-seated  the  purpose  of  Germany 
may  have  been  to  provoke  a  European  war  at  a 
time  when  Russia,  France,  or  England  were  not 
fully  prepared. 

It  does  not  follow  that  if  Sazonof  was  right, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  was  necessarily  wrong  in  declin- 
ing to  align  England  definitely  with  Russia  and 
France  at  that  stage.  He  was  the  servant  of  a 
democratic  nation  and  could  not  ignore  the  public 
opinion  of  his  country  as  freely  as  the  Russian 
Foreign  Minister.  To  take  such  a  course,  it 
would  have  been  necessary  for  Grey  to  submit 
the  matter  to  Parliament,  and  while  with  a 
large  liberal  majority  his  policy  might  have 
been  endorsed,  yet  it  would  have  been  after 
such  an  acrimonious  discussion  and  such  vehe- 
ment protests  that   England  would  have  stood 


8o  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

before  the  world  "as  a  house  divided  against 
itself." 

Both  Sazonof  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  from  their 
respective  standpoints  were  right.  Neither  made 
a  single  false  step  in  the  great  controversy. 

As  a  result  of  this  interview,  Russia,  England, 
and  France,  after  the  request  for  time  had  been 
abruptly  refused,  next  proceeded  in  the  interests 
of  peace  to  persuade  Servia  to  make  as  conciliatory 
a  reply  to  the  impossible  ultimatum  as  was  possi- 
ble without  a  fatal  compromise  of  her  political  in- 
dependence. 

While  the  lack  of  time  prevented  France  and 
Russia  from  making  any  formal  communication 
to  Servia  on  the  question,  yet  Sazonof  had  a 
conference  with  the  Servian  Minister  and  dis- 
cussed the  wisdom  of  avoiding  an  attack  on 
Belgrade  by  having  the  Servian  forces  with- 
drawn to  the  interior  and  then  appealing  to  the 
Powers,  and  Russia  thereupon  made  the  broad 
and  magnanimous  suggestion  that  if  Servia  should 
appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia  would  be  quite  ready 
to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  tlie  hands  of 
England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy. 

This  interview,  as  reported  by  the  British  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  to  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
dated  July  25th,  is  as  follows: 


The  Peace  Parleys  8i 

I  saw  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  this  morn- 
ing, and  communicated  to  his  Excellency  the  sub- 
stance of  your  telegram  of  to-day  to  Paris,  and  this 
afternoon,  I  discussed  with  him  the  communication 
which  the  French  Ambassador  suggested  should  be 
made  to  the  Servian  Government,  as  recorded  in 
your  telegram  of  yesterday  to  Belgrade.  .  .  . 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Servia 
was  quite  ready  to  do  as  you  had  suggested  and  to 
punish  those  proved  to  be  guilty,  but  that  no  indepen- 
dent State  could  be  expected  to  accept  the  political 
demands  which  had  been  put  forward.  The 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  thought,  from  a  conver- 
sation which  he  had  with  the  Servian  Minister 
yesterday,  that  in  the  event  of  the  Austrians 
attacking  Servia,  the  Servian  Government  would 
abandon  Belgrade  and  withdraw  their  forces  into 
the  interior,  while  they  would  at  the  same  time 
appeal  to  the  Powers  to  help  them.  His  Excellency 
was  in  favor  of  their  making  this  appeal.  He 
would  like  to  see  the  question  placed  on  an  inter- 
national footing,  as  the  obligations  taken  by  Servia 
in  1908,  to  which  reference  is  made  in  the  Austrian 
ultimatum,  were  given  not  to  Austria,  but  to  the 
Powers. 

If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia 
would  he  quite  ready  to  stand  aside  and  leave  the 
questioji  in  the  hands  of  England,  France,  Germany, 
and  Italy.  It  was  possible,  in  his  opinion,  that 
Servia  might  propose  to  submit  the  question  to 
arbitration. 

Pursuant  to  this  polic}^  of  conciliatr.on  Sir  Ed- 
ward  Grey   in   direct   communication   with   the 


82  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Servian  Minister  at  London,  Mr.  Crackenthorpe, 
the  British  Ambassador  at  Belgrade,  in  direct 
communication  with  the  Servian  Foreign  Ministry, 
and  Sazonof  in  interviews  with  the  Servian  Minis- 
ter at  St.  Petersburg,  all  brought  direct  influence 
upon  Servia  to  make  a  conciliatory  reply. 

Thus    Sir    Edward    Grey  instructed  Cracken- 
thorpe : 

Servia  ought  to  promise  that  if  it  is  proved  that 
Servian  officials,  however  subordinate  they  may  be, 
were  accomplices  in  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  at 
Serajevo,  she  will  give  Austria  the  fullest  satisfac- 
tion. She  certainly  ought  to  express  concern  and 
regret.  For  the  rest,  Servian  Government  must 
reply  to  Austrian  demands  as  they  consider  best  in 
Servian  interests. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  military  action 
by  Austria  when  time  limit  expires  can  be  averted 
by  anything  but  unconditional  acceptance  of  her 
demands,  but  only  chance  appears  to  lie  in  avoiding 
an  absolute  refusal  and  replying  favorably  to  as 
many  points  as  the  time  limit  allows.  .   .   . 

I  have  urged  upon  the  German  Ambassador  that 
Austria  should  not  precipitate  military  action.^ 

In  response  to  these  suggestions,  Mr.  Cracken- 
thorpe communicated  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pacific 
suggestions  to  the  Servian  Minister  and  received 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  12. 


The  Peace  Parleys  83 

the  following  reply,  as  reported  in  Crackenthorpe's 
report  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  dated  July  25th. 

The  Council  of  Ministers  is  now  drawing  up  their 
reply  to  the  Austrian  note.  I  am  informed  by  the 
Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  it 
will  be  most  conciliatory  and  will  meet  the  Austrian 
demands  in  as  large  a  measure  as  is  possible.  .   .  . 

The  Servian  Government  consider  that,  unless  the 
Austrian  Government  want  war  at  any  cost,  they 
cannot  but  be  content  with  the  full  satisfaction 
offered  in  the  Servian  reply, ' 

These  pacific  suggestions  to  Servia  met  with 
complete  success,  and  as  a  result  that  country  on 
July  25th,  and  before  the  expiration  of  the  ultima- 
tum, made  a  reply  to  Austria  which  astonished  the 
world  with  its  spirit  of  conciliation  and  for  a  short 
time  gave  rise  to  optimistic  hopes  of  peace. 

At  some  sacrifice  of  its  self-respect  as  a  sovereign 
State,  it  accepted  substantially  the  demands  of 
Austria,  with  a  few  minor  reservations,  which  it 
expressed  its  willingness  to  refer  either  to  arbitra- 
tion at  The  Hague  Tribunal  or  to  a  conference  of 
the  Powers.^ 

Neither  Germany  nor  Austria  seriously  con- 
tended that  the  reply  was  not  on  its  face  a 
substantial  acquiescence  in  the  extreme  Austrian 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  21, 
'  English  White  Paper,  No.  39. 


84  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

demands.  They  contented  themselves  with  im- 
peaching the  sincerity  of  the  assurances,  calHng 
the  concessions  "shams."  Unless  Austria,  in 
asking  assurances  from  Servia,  were  content  to 
accept  them  as  made  in  good  faith  and  allow  their 
sincerity  to  be  determined  by  future  deeds,  why 
should  the  ultimatum,  calling  for  such  assurances, 
have  been  made?  If  Germany  and  Austria  had 
accepted  Servia's  reply  as  sufficient,  and  Servia 
had  subsequently  failed  to  fulfill  its  promises 
in  the  utmost  good  faith,  there  would  have 
been  little  sympathy  for  Servia,  and  no  general 
war.  Russia  and  England  pledged  their  influ- 
ence to  compel  Servia,  if  necessary,  to  meet  fully 
any  reasonable  demand  of  Austria.  The  prin- 
cipal outstanding  question,  which  Servia  agreed 
to  arbitrate  or  leave  to  the  Powers,  was  the 
participation  of  Austrian  officials  in  the  Servian 
courts.  This  did  not  present  a  difficult  problem. 
Austria's  professed  desire  for  an  impartial  in- 
vestigation could  have  been  easily  attained  by 
having  the  Powers  appoint  a  commission  of  neutral 
jurists  to  make  such  investigation. 

In  any  event,  Austria  could  have  accepted  the 
very  substantial  concessions  of  Servia  and  without 
prejudice  to  its  rights  proceeded  to  The  Hague 
Tribunal  or  to  a  concert  of  the  Powers  as  to  the 


The  Peace  Parleys  85 

few  and  comparatively  simple  open  points.  When 
one  recalls  the  infinite  treasure  of  property  and  life, 
which  would  thus  have  been  saved  the  world,  had 
Germany  and  Austria  accepted  this  reasonable  and 
pacific  course,  one  can  only  exclaim,  "But  oh,  the 
pity  of  it!'' 

It  is  significant  that  while  the  entire  official 
German  press  gave  ample  space  to  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  and  rejoiced  in  Austria's  energetic  at- 
titude, it  withheld  from  the  German  people  any 
adequate  information  as  to  the  conciliatory  nature 
of  the  Servian  reply,  for  the  Russian  Charge  at 
Berlin  telegraphed  to  Sazonof : 

The  Wolff  Bureau  has  not  published  the  text  of 
the  Servian  response  which  was  communicated  to 
it.  Up  to  this  moment  this  note  has  not  appeared 
in  extenso  in  any  of  local  journals,  which  ac- 
cording to  all  the  evidence  do  not  wish  to  give  it  a 
place  in  their  columns,  understanding  the  calming 
effect  which  this  publication  would  produce  upon 
the  German  readers.^ 

Instead  of  getting  the  truth,  the  Berlin  populace 
proceeded  to  make  riotous  demonstrations  against 
the  Russian  and  Servian  Embassies. 

The  time  limit  on  the  ultimatum  expired  on 
July  the  25th  at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening. 

'  Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  46. 


86  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

There  is  no  more  significant  and  at  the  same 
time  discreditable  feature  of  an  infinitely  discredit- 
able chapter  in  history  than  that  the  Austrian 
Government,  without  giving  the  Servian  answer  the 
consideration  even  of  a  single  hour,  immediately 
severed  all  diplomatic  intercourse  with  Belgrade 
and  at  6.30  p.m.  the  Minister  of  Austria 

informed  the  Servian  Government  by  note  that,  not 
having  received  within  the  delay  fixed  a  satisfactory 
response,  he  is  leaving  Belgrade  with  the  whole 
personnel  of  the  legation. 

On  the  same  night  Austria  ordered  the  mobil- 
ization of  a  considerable  part  of  its  army. 

Notwithstanding  these  rebuffs,  England,  France, 
and  Russia  continued  to  labor  for  peace,  and  made 
further  pacific  suggestions,  all  of  which  fell  upon 
deaf  ears. 

On  July  25th,  Sir  Edward  Grey  proposed  that 
the  four  Powers  (England,  France,  Italy,  and 
Germany)  should  unite 

in  asking  the  Austrian  and  Russian  Governments 
not  to  cross  the  frontier  and  to  give  time  for  the  four 
Powers,  acting  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  to 
try  and  arrange  matters.  If  Germany  will  adopt 
this  view  I  feel  strongly  that  France  and  ourselves 
should  act  upon  it.  Italy  would  no  doubt  gladly 
cooperate.  ^ 

'  English  White  Paper,  Nos.  24  and  25. 


The  Peace  Parleys  87 

To  this  reasonable  request  the  German  Chan- 
cellor replied : 

The  distinction  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  be- 
tween the  Austro-Servian  and  Austro-Russian  con- 
flict is  quite  correct.  We  wish  as  little  as  England 
to  mix  in  the  first,  and,  first  and  last,  we  take  the 
ground  that  this  question  must  be  localized  by  the 
abstention  of  all  the  Powers  from  intervention  in  it. 
It  is  therefore  our  earnest  hope  that  Russia  will 
refrain  from  any  active  intervention,  conscious  of 
her  responsibility  and  of  the  seriousness  of  the 
situation.  If  an  Austro-Russian  dispute  should 
arise,  we  are  ready,  with  the  reservation  of  our 
known  duties  as  Allies,  to  cooperate  with  the  other 
great  Powers  in  mediation  between  Russia  and 
Austria.  ^ 

This  distinction  is  hard  to  grasp.  If  attempts 
to  measure  the  difference  between  tweedledum 
and  tweedledee.  Russia's  current  difference  with 
Austria  concerned  the  attempt  of  the  latter  to 
crush  Servia  without  interference.  Russia  claimed 
such  right  of  intervention.  Germany  would  not 
interfere  in  the  former  matter,  but  would  abstractly 
but  not  concretely  mediate  between  Russia  and 
Austria  in  the  latter.  Mediate  about  what?  To 
refuse  to  mediate  over  the  Servian  question  was  to 
refuse  to  mediate  at  all.  For  all  practical  purposes 
the  two  things  were  indistinguishable. 

'  German  White  Paper,  Exhibit  13. 


88  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

All  that  Germany  did  on  July  25th,  so  far  as  the 
record  discloses,  was  to  "pass  on"  England's  and 
Russia's  requests  for  more  time,  but  subsequent 
events  indicate  that  it  was  "passed  on"  without 
any  indorsement,  for  is  it  credible  that  Austria 
would  have  ignored  its  ally's  request  for  more 
time  if  it  had  ever  been  made?  Here  again  we 
note  with  disappointment  the  absence  from  the 
record  of  Germany's  message  to  Austria,  "passing 
on"  the  reasonable  request  for  an  extension  of 
time.  The  result  indicates  that  the  request  re- 
ceived, if  any  endorsement,  the  "faint  praise" 
which  is  said  to  "damn." 

Was  ever  the  peace  of  the  world  shattered  upon 
so  slight  a  pretext?  A  little  time,  a  few  days, 
even  a  few  hours,  might  have  sufficed  to  preserve 
the  world  from  present  horrors,  but  no  time 
could  be  granted.  A  snap  judgment  was  to  be 
taken  by  these  pettifogging  diplomats.  The  peace 
of  the  world  was  to  be  torpedoed  by  submarine 
diplomacy.  The  Austrian  Government  could  wait 
nearly  three  months  to  try  the  assassin,  who  ad- 
mittedly slew  the  Austrian  Archduke,  but  could  not 
wait  even  a  few  hours  before  condemning  Servia 
to  political  death.  It  could  not  grant  Russia  any 
time  to  consider  a  matter  gravely  affecting  its 
interests,  even  if  the  peace  of  Europe  and  the 


The  Peace  Parleys  89 

happiness  of  the  world  depended  on  it.  It  would 
be  difficult  to  find  in  recorded  history  a  greater 
discourtesy  to  a  friendly  Power,  for  Austria  was 
not  at  war  with  Russia. 

Defeated  in  their  effort  to  get  an  extension  of 
time,  England,  France,  and  Russia  made  further 
attempts  to  preserve  peace  by  temporarily  arrest- 
ing military  proceedings  until  further  efforts  to- 
ward conciliation  could  be  made.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
proposed  to  Germany,  France,  Russia,  and  Italy 
that  they  should  unite  in  asking  Austria  and  Servia 
not  to  cross  the  frontier  "until  we  had  had  time 
to  try  and  arrange  matters  between  them,"  but 
the  German  Ambassador  read  Sir  Edward  Grey 
a  telegram  that  he  had  received  from  the  German 
Foreign  Office  saying 

that  his  Government  had  not  known  beforehand, 
and  had  had  no  more  than  other  Powers  to  do  with 
the  stiff  terms  of  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia,  but 
that  once  she  had  launched  that  note,  Austria  could 
not  draw  back.  Prince  Lichnowsky  said,  however, 
that  if  what  I  contemplated  was  mediation  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia,  Austria  might  be  able 
with  dignity  to  accept  it.  He  expressed  himself  as 
personally  favorable  to  this  suggestion. 

It  will  be  noted  that  Germany  thus  gave  to 
England,  as  it  had  already  given  to  Russia  and 


90  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

France  in  the  most  unequivocal  terms,  a  disclaimer 
of  any  responsibility  for  the  Austrian  ultimatum, 
but  we  have  already  seen  that  when  the  German 
Foreign  Office  prepared  its  statement  for  the  Ger- 
man nation,  which  was  circulated  in  the  Reichs- 
tag on  August  4th,  Germany  confessed  the 
insincerity  of  these  assurances  by  admitting  that 
before  the  ultimatum  was  issued  the  Austrian 
Government  had  advised  the  German  Foreign 
Office  of  its  intentions  and  asked  its  opinion  and 
that 

we  were  able  to  assure  our  ally  most  heartily  of  our 
agreement  with  her  view  of  the  situation  and  to 
assure  her  that  any  action  that  she  might  consider 
it  necessary  to  take  .  .  .  would  receive  our  ap- 
proval. 

Here  again  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  telegram, 
which  the  German  Foreign  Office  sent  to  Prince 
Lichnowsky,  and  which  that  diplomat  simply  read 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  is  not  set  forth  in  the  exhibits 
to  the  German  White  Paper. 

As  we  have  seen,  Germany  never,  so  far  as  the 
record  discloses,  sought  in  any  way  to  influence 
Austria  to  make  this  or  any  concession  until  after 
the  Kaiser's  return  from  Norway  and  then  only, 
if  we  accept  the  assurances  of  its  Foreign  Office 
which  are  not  supported  by  official  documents. 


The  Peace  Parleys  91 

Its  attitude  was  shown  by  the  declaration  of  its 
Ambassador  at  Paris  to  the  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  which,  while  again  disclaiming  that 
Germany  had  countenanced  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, yet  added  that  Germany  "approved"  its 
point  of  view, 

and  that  certainly,  the  arrow  once  sent,  Germany 
could  not  allow  herself  to  be  guided  except  by  her 
duty  as  ally.  ^ 

This  seemed  to  be  the  fatal  error  of  Germany, 
that  its  duties  to  civilization  were  so  slight  that 
it  should  support  its  ally,  Austria,  whether  the 
latter  were  right  or  wrong.  Such  was  its  policy, 
and  it  carried  it  out  with  fatal  consistency.  To 
support  its  ally  in  actual  war  without  respect  to 
the  justice  of  the  quarrel  may  be  defensible,  but 
to  support  it  in  a  time  of  peace  in  an  iniquitous  de- 
mand and  a  policy  of  gross  discourtesy  to  friendly 
States  offends  every  sense  of  international  morality. 

On  the  following  day  Russia  proposed  to  Austria 
that  they  should  enter  into  an  exchange  of  private 
views,  with  the  object  of  an  alteration  in  common 
of  some  clauses  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum.  To 
this  Austria  never  even  replied. 

The  Russian  Minister  communicated  this  sug- 

'  Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  19. 


92  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

gestion  to  the  German  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
and  expressed  the  hope  that  he  would  "find  it 
possible  to  advise  Vienna  to  meet  our  proposal," 
but  this  did  not  accord  with  German  policy,  for 
on  that  day  the  German  Ambassador  in  Paris 
called  upon  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  submitted  the  following  formal  declaration  : 

"Austria  has  declared  to  Russia  that  she  does  not 
seek  territorial  acquisitions,  and  that  she  does  not 
threaten  the  integrity  of  Servia.  Her  only  object 
is  to  insure  her  own  tranquillity.  Consequently  it 
rests  with  Russia  to  avoid  war.  Germany  feels 
herself  at  one  with  France  in  her  keen  desire  to  pre- 
serve the  peace,  and  strongly  hopes  that  France  will 
use  her  influence  at  St.  Petersburg  in  the  direction 
of  moderation."  The  [French]  Minister  observed  that 
Germany  could  on  her  side  take  similar  steps  at  Vienna, 
especially  in  view  oj  the  conciliatory  spirit  which 
Servia  had  shown.  The  Ambassador  aiiswered  tJiat 
that  was  7iot  possible,  i?i  view  of  the  resolution  taken 
not  to  interfere  in  the  A  ustro-Servian  conflict.  There- 
■  upon  the  Minister  asked  if  the  four  Powers — Eng- 
land, Germany,  Italy,  and  France — were  not  able 
to  take  steps  at  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna,  since 
the  affair  reduced  itself  in  essentials  to  a  conflict 
between  Russia  and  Austria.  The  Ambassador 
pleaded  the  absence  of  instructions.  Finally,  the 
Minister  refused  to  adhere  to  the  German  proposal.  ^ 

This  significant  interview  states  the  consistent 

'  Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  28. 


The  Peace  Parleys  93 

attitude  of  Germany.  The  burden  is  put  upon 
France  to  induce  its  ally  to  desist  from  any  inter- 
vention and  thus  give  Austria  a  free  hand,  while 
Germany  emphatically  declines  to  promote  the 
same  pacific  object  by  suggesting  to  Austria  a 
more  conciliatory  course. 

On  the  same  day  England  asked  France,  Italy, 
and  Germany  to  meet  in  London  for  an  immediate 
conference  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe,  and 
to  this  fruitful  suggestion,  which  might  have 
saved  that  peace,  the  German  Secretary  of  State, 
after  conferring  with  the  British  Ambassador  at 
Berlin,  replied  that  the  conference 

would  practically  amount  to  a  court  of  arbitration 
and  could  not,  in  his  opinion,  be  called  together 
except  at  the  request  of  Austria  and  Russia.  He 
could  not,  therefore,  fall  in  with  your  [Sir  Edward 
Grey's]  suggestion,  desirous  though  he  was  to  co- 
operate for  the  maintenance  of  peace.  I  [Sir  E. 
Goschen]  said  I  was  sure  that  your  idea  had  nothing 
to  do  with  arbitration,  but  meant  that  representa- 
tives of  the  four  nations  not  directly  interested 
should  discuss  and  suggest  means  for  avoiding  a 
dangerous  situation.  He  [Von  Jagow]  maintained, 
however,  that  such  a  conference  as  you  proposed 
was  not  practicable.^ 

Germany's  refusal  to  have  Servia's  case  sub- 

*  English  While  Paper,  No.  43. 


94  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

mitted  to  the  Powers  even  for  their  consideration 
is  the  more  striking  when  it  is  recalled  that  on  the 
same  day  the  German  Ambassador  at  London 
quoted  the  German  Secretary  of  State  as  saying 

that  there  were  some  things  in  the  Austrian  note 
that  Servia  could  hardly  be  expected  to  accept, 

thus  recognizing  that  Austria's  ultimatum  was, 
at  least  in  part,  unjust.  Sir  Edward  Grey  then 
called  the  German  Ambassador's  attention  to  the 
fact  that  if  Austria  refused  the  conciliatory  reply 
of  Servia  and  marched  into  that  country 

it  meant  that  she  was  determined  to  crush  Servia 
at  all  costs,  being  reckless  of  the  consequences  that 
might  be  involved. 

He  added  that  the  Servian  reply 

should  at  least  be  treated  as  a  basis  for  discussion 
and  pause, 

and  asked  that  the  German  Government  should 
urge  this  at  Vienna  but,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
the  German  Secretary  of  State  had  already  replied 
that  such  a  conference  "was  not  practicable, "  and 
that  it  "would  practically  amount  to  a  court  of 
arbitration,"  and  could  not,  in  his  opinion,  be 
called  together  "except  at  the  request  of  Austria 
and  Russia."' 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  46. 


The  Peace  Parleys  95 

That  this  was  a  mere  evasion  is  perfectly  plain. 
Germany  already  knew  that  Austria  would  not  ask 
for  such  a  conference,  for  Austria  had  already  re- 
fused Russia's  request  for  an  extension  of  time  and 
had  actually  commenced  its  military  operations. 

Germany's  attitude  is  again  clearly  indicated  by 
the  letter  of  the  Russian  Minister  in  Germany  to 
the  Russian  Foreign  Office  in  which  he  states  that 
on  July  27th  he  called  at  the  German  Foreign  Office 
and  asked  it, 

to  urge  upon  Vienna  in  a  more  pressing  fashion  to 
take  up  this  line  of  conciliation.  Von  Jagow  replied 
that  he  could  not  advise  Austria  to  yield/ 

Why  not?  Russia  and  its  allies  had  advised 
Servia  to  yield  and  Servia  had  conceded  nearly 
every  claim.  Why  could  not  the  German  Foreign 
Office  advise  Vienna  to  meet  conciliation  by  con- 
ciliation, if  its  desire  for  peace  were  sincere? 

Before  this  interview  took  place,  the  French 
Ambassador  had  called  at  the  German  Foreign 
Office  on  a  similar  errand  and  urged  the  English 
suggestion  that  action  should  at  once  be  taken 
by  England,  Germany,  Russia,  and  France  at  St. 
Petersburg  and  Vienna,  to  the  effect  that  Austria 
and  Servia 

'  Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  38. 


96  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

should  abstain  from  any  act  which  might  aggravate 
the  situation  at  the  present  hour. 

By  this  was  meant  that  there  should  be,  pending 
further  parleys,  no  invasion  of  Servia  by  Austria 
and  none  of  Austria  by  Russia.  To  this  the 
German  Foreign  Minister  opposed  a  categorical 
refusal. 

On  the  same  day  the  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  had  "a  long  and  earnest  conversation" 
with  the  Austrian  Under-Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs.  He  expressed  the  earnest  hope 
that 

something  would  be  done  before  Servia  was  actually 
invaded.  Baron  Macchio  replied  that  this  would 
now  be  difficult,  as  a  skirmish  had  already  taken 
place  on  the  Danube,  in  which  the  Servians  had 
been  aggressors. 

The  Russian  Ambassador  then  said  that  his 
country  would  do  all  it  could  to  keep  the  Servians 
quiet,  "and  even  to  fall  back  before  an  Austrian 
advance  in  order  to  gain  time. " 

He  urged  that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg  should  be  furnished  with  full  powers  to 
continue  discussions  with  the  Russian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs, 


The  Peace  Parleys  97 

who  was  very  willing  to  advise  Servia  to  yield  all 
that  could  be  fairly  asked  of  her  as  an  independent 
Power. 

The  only  reply  to  this  reasonable  suggestion  was 
that  it  would  be  submitted  to  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs. ' 

On  the  same  day  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Paris  called  upon  the  French  Foreign  Office  and 
*' strongly  insisted  on  the  exclusion  of  all  possibility 
of  mediation  or  a  conference''^;  and  yet  contem- 
poraneously the  Imperial  German  Chancellor  was 
advising  London  that  he  had 

started  the  efforts  towards  mediation  in  Vienna, 
immediately  in  the  way  desired  by  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
and  had  further  communicated  to  the  Austrian 
Foreign  Minister  the  wish  of  the  Russian  Foreign 
Minister  for  a  direct  talk  in  Vienna. 

What  hypocrisy!  In  the  formal  German  de- 
fense, the  German  Foreign  Office,  after  stating  its 
conviction 

that  an  act  of  mediation  could  not  take  into  con- 
sideration the  Austro-Servian  conflict,  which  was 
purely  an  Austro-Hungarian  affair, 

claimed    that    Germany    had    transmitted    Sir 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  56. 
"Russian  Orange  Paper,  No.  34. 


98  The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Edward  Grey's  further  suggestion  to  Vienna,  in 
which  Austro- Hungary  was  urged 

either  to  agree  to  accept  the  Servian  answer  as 
sufficient  or  to  look  upon  it  as  a  basis  for  further 
conversations ; 

but  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government — playing 
the  role  of  the  wicked  partner  of  the  combination 
— "in  full  appreciation  of  our  mediatory  activity" 
(so  says  the  German  White  Paper  with  sardonic 
humor),  repHed  to  this  proposition  that,  coming 
after  the  opening  of  hostilities,  ''it  was  too 
late:' 

Can  it  be  fairly  questioned  that  if  Germany  had 
done  something  more  than  merely  "transmit" 
these  wise  and  pacific  suggestions,  Austria  would 
have  complied  with  the  suggestions  of  its  powerful 
ally  or  that  Austria  would  have  suspended  its 
military  operations  if  Germany  had  given  any 
intimation  of  such  a  wish? 

On  the  following  day,  July  28th,  the  door  was 
further  closed  on  any  possibility  of  compromise, 
when  the  Austrian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 

said,  quietly,  but  firmly,  that  no  discussion  could  be 
accepted  on  the  basis  of  the  Servian  note;  that  war 
would  be  declared  to-day,  and  that  the  well-known 
pacific  character  of  the  Emperor,  as  well  as,  he 
might  add,  his  own.  might  be  accepted  as  a  guar- 


The  Peace  Parleys  99 

antee  that  the  war  was  both  just  and  inevitable; 
that  this  was  a  matter  that  must  be  settled  directly 
between  the  two  parties  immediately  concerned. 

To  this  arrogant  and  unreasonable  contention 
that  Europe  must  accept  the  guarantee  of  the 
Austrian  Foreign  Minister  as  to  the  righteousness 
of  Austria's  quarrel,  the  British  Ambassador 
suggested  "the  larger  aspect  of  the  question," 
namely,  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  to  this  "larger 
aspect,"  which  should  have  given  any  reasonable 
official  some  ground  for  pause,  the  Austrian  Foreign 
Minister  replied  that  he 

had  it  also  in  mind,  but  thought  that  Russia  ought 
not  to  oppose  operations  like  those  impending, 
which  did  not  aim  at  territorial  aggrandizement, 
and  which  could  no  longer  be  postponed.  ^ 

The  private  conversations  between  Russia  and 
Austria  having  thus  failed,  Russia  returned  to  the 
proposition  of  a  European  conference  to  preserve 
its  peace.  Its  Ambassador  in  Vienna  on  July  28th 
had  a  further  conference  with  Berchtold  and  again 
earnestly  pleaded  for  peace  on  the  basis  of  friendly 
relations  not  only  between  Austria  and  Servia  but 
between  Austria  and  Russia.  The  conversation  in 
the  light  of  present  developments  is  so  significant 
that  it  bears  quotation  in  extenso: 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  62. 


100        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

I  pointed  out  to  him  in  the  most  friendly  terms 
how  much  it  was  desirable  to  find  a  solution  which, 
while  consolidating  the  good  relations  between  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  Russia,  should  give  to  the  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  Monarchy  serious  guarantees  for  its 
future  relations  with  Servia. 

I  called  the  attention  of  Count  Berchtold  to  all 
the  dangers  to  the  peace  of  Europe  which  would  be 
brought  about  by  an  armed  conflict  between  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Servia. 

Count  Berchtold  replied  that  he  understood 
perfectly  well  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  and  the 
advantages  of  a  frank  explanation  with  the  Cabinet 
of  St.  Petersburg.  He  told  me  that  on  the  other  hand 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Government,  which  had  only 
reluctantly  decided  upon  the  energetic  measures  which 
it  had  taken  against  Servia,  could  now  neither  with- 
draw nor  enter  upon  any  discussion  of  the  terms  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note. 

Count  Berchtold  added  that  the  crisis  had  become 
so  acute  and  that  public  opinion  had  been  excited 
to  such  a  degree  that  the  Government,  even  if  it 
desired,  could  no  longer  consent  to  it,  all  the  less, 
he  said  to  me,  because  the  very  reply  of  Servia  gave 
proof  of  the  lack  of  sincerity  in  its  promises  for  the 
future. 

On  the  same  day,  July  28th,  the  German  Im- 
perial Chancellor  sent  for  the  English  Ambassador 
and  excused  his  failure  to  accept  the  proposed 
conference  of  the  neutral  Powers,  on  the  ground 
that  he  did  not  think  it  would  be  effective, 


The  Peace  Parleys  loi 

because  such  a  conference  would,  in  his  opinion, 
have  the  appearance  of  an  "Areopagus"  consisting 
of  two  Powers  of  each  group  sitting  in  judgment 
upon  the  two  remaining  Powers. 

After  engaging  in  this  narrow  and  insincere 
quibble,  and,  being  reminded  of  Servia's  con- 
ciliatory reph% 

his  Excellency  said  that  he  did  not  wish  to  discuss 
the  Servian  note,  but  that  Austria's  standpoint, 
and  in  this  he  agreed,  was  that  her  quarrel  with 
Servia  was  a  purely  Austrian  concern,  with  which 
Russia  had  nothing  to  do.^ 

At  this  stage  of  the  controversy  it  will  be  noted 
that  every  proposal  to  preserve  peace  had  come 
from  the  Triple  Entente  and  that  every  such  pro- 
posal had  met  with  an  uncompromising  negative 
from  Austria,  and  either  that  or  obstructive 
quibbles  from  Germany. 

'  English  While  Paper,  No.  71. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE 

Before  proceeding  to  record  the  second  and 
final  stage  in  the  peace  parleys,  in  which  the  Ger- 
man Kaiser  became  the  protagonist,  it  is  desirable 
to  interpolate  the  additional  data,  which  the  French 
Yellow  Book  has  given  to  the  world  since  the  pre- 
ceding chapter  was  written  and  the  first  editions 
of  this  book  were  printed.  This  can  be  done  with 
little  sacrifice  to  the  chronological  sequence  of  this 
narrative. 

The  evidence  of  the  Yellow  Book  is  fuller  in 
scope  and  greater  in  detail  than  the  other  govern- 
mental publications,  and  while  largely  cumulative  in 
its  character,  it  serves  to  bring  into  a  sharper  light 
certain  phases  of  this  extraordinary  controversy. 

It  has  been  prepared  with  great  care  by  M. 
Jules  Cambon,  who  was  the  French  Ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  during  the  controversy,  and 
MM.  de  Margerie  and  Berthelot,  experienced 
and  influential  diplomats  in  the  French  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Affairs.     It  consists  of  i6o  documents, 

1 02 


The  Attitude  of  France  103 

classified  into  seven  chapters,  each  dealing  with 
different  periods  of  time  in  the  great  controversy. 
The  delay  in  its  presentation  is  somewhat  com- 
pensated by  the  exceptional  fullness  of  the  data 
which  is  thus  submitted  to  the  scrutiny  of  a 
candid  world. 

The  French  Yellow  Book  confirms  the  impres- 
sion that  France  was  most  fortunate  in  having 
entrusted  its  interests  at  the  difficult  post  of 
Berlin  in  this  great  crisis  to  so  distinguished  and 
experienced  a  diplomat  as  M.  Jules  Cambon. 

Throughout  the  whole  controversy  the  impartial 
reader  is  deeply  impressed  with  the  fact,  which  the 
more  candid  apologists  for  Germany  are  themselves 
disposed  to  admit,  that  Germany's  chief  weakness 
lay  in  its  incapable  diplomatic  representatives. 
An  interesting  subject  for  conjecture  suggests 
itself  as  to  what  would  have  happened  if  Prince 
Bismarck  had  been  at  the  helm  at  this  critical 
juncture.  His  guiding  principles  of  statecraft 
with  reference  to  foreign  relations  were  to  isolate 
the  enemy,  make  him  the  apparent  aggressor, 
and  then  crush  him  as  effectually  and  speedily  as 
possible.  He  never  would  have  initiated  this  war. 
His  nature  was  that  of  the  fox  as  well  as  the  lion. 

In  the  years  that  have  succeeded  his  dis- 
missal, a  certain  dry  rot,  due  to  the  tendency  of 


104        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

the  Prussian  Government  to  distribute  its  diplo- 
matic offices  among  highborn  but  incompetent 
Junkers, — ime  petite  gentilhommerie  pauvre  et 
stupide,  as  Bismarck  once  described  them — had 
affected  the  efficiency  of  German  diplomacy. 
Feebly  attempting  to  walk  in  the  steps  of  the  Iron 
Chancellor,  they  wittingly  or  unwittingly  re- 
versed Bismarck's  pohcy  by  almost  isolating 
Germany,  consohdating  its  enemies,  and  then 
proceeding  to  attack  them  simultaneously.  This 
may  have  been  magnificent  courage,  but  it  was 
not  wise  statecraft.  The  might  of  the  German 
sabre  was  supposed  to  offset  these  blundering  dis- 
ciples of  Machiavelli. 

Russia,  England,  and  France  were  more  fortu- 
nate and  of  their  representatives  few,  if  any,  shone 
with  greater  intellectual  distinction  or  moral 
courage  than  M.  Jules  Cambon.  This  distin- 
guished diplomat  had  had  axceptional  experience 
in  representing  his  country  in  various  capitals  of 
the  world,  and  the  author,  who  enjoyed  the  honor 
of  his  acquaintance,  when  he  was  accredited  to 
Washington,  already  knew,  what  the  documents 
in  the  French  Yellow  Book  so  clearly  reveal,  that 
Cambon  was  a  diplomat  of  great  intellectual 
ability.  With  acute  sagacity  he  grasped  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  fateful  events,  in  which  he  was  a 


The  Attitude  of  France  105 

participant.  To  his  calm  and  well-poised  in- 
tellectuality he  added  a  moral  force,  resulting 
from  the  clear  integrity  of  his  purpose  and  the 
broad  humanity  of  his  aims. 

On  more  than  one  occasion  he  spoke  "in  the 
name  of  humanity,"  and  in  his  constant  attempt 
to  convince  the  German  Foreign  Office  as  to  its 
clear  duty  to  civilization  to  preserve  the  peace 
of  the  world,  he  became  the  representative,  not 
merely  of  France,  but  of  civilization  itself. 

In  this  great  diplomatic  controversy,  one  of 
the  greatest  in  the  history  of  the  world,  the  three 
representatives,  who  stand  out  with  the  greatest 
intellectual  and  moral  distinction,  are  Sazonof, 
Grey,  and  Cambon. 

The  first  displayed  the  greatest  sagacity  in 
divining  from  the  very  outset  the  real  purposes 
of  Germany  and  Austria  and  in  checkmating  the 
diplomatic  moves,  which  sought  to  make  Russia 
apparently  the  aggressor. 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  chief  merit  lay  in  his  un- 
wearying but  ineffectual  efforts  to  bring  about  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  problem  and  also  in  the 
absolute  candor — so  unusual  in  diplomacy — with 
which  he  dealt  on  the  one  hand  with  the  efforts 
of  Russia  and  France  to  align  England  on  their 
side  at  the  beginning  of  the  quarrel,  and  on  the 


io6        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

other,  to  continue  friendly  negotiations  with 
Germany  and  Austria,  without  in  any  respect 
unfairly  misleading  them  as  to  England's  possible 
ultimate  action. 

The  French  Ambassador  will  justly  receive  the 
approval  of  posterity  for  the  high  courage  and 
moral  earnestness  with  which  he  pressed  upon 
the  German  Foreign  Office  the  inevitable  conse- 
quences of  its  acts. 

The  first  chapter  of  the  French  Yellow  Book 
consists  largely  of  communications  written  from 
Berlin  by  M.  Jules  Cambon  in  the  year  191 3. 
Its  most  interesting  document  is  his  report 
from  Berlin  under  date  November  22,  1913,  as 
to  a  conversation  between  the  Kaiser  and  the 
King  of  Belgium,  with  reference  to  a  change  in  the 
pacific  attitude,  which  Cambon  had  previously 
imputed  to  the  Kaiser. 

To  the  world  at  large  this  statement  would  be 
more  convincing  if  the  source  of  the  information 
had  been  disclosed.  Those  who  know  M.  Jules 
Cambon,  however,  will  have  a  reasonable  confi- 
dence that  when  he  states  that  he  received  the 
record  of  this  conversation  "from  an  absolutely 
sure  source,"  more  than  usual  credence  can  be 
given  to  the  statement.  Reading  between  the 
lines,  the  implication  is  not  unreasonable  that  the 


The  Attitude  of  France  107 

source  of  Cambon's  authority  was  King  Albert 
himself,  but  this  rests  only  on  a  plausible  con- 
jecture. 

The  fact  that  so  trained  an  observer  as  the 
French  Ambassador  had  seen  in  the  Kaiser  a 
marked  change  as  early  as  19 13  is  significant, 
and  history  may  justify  Cambon  in  his  shrewd 
conjecture  that  "the  impatience  of  the  soldiers," 
meaning  thereby  the  German  General  Staff,  and 
the  growing  popularity  of  his  chauvinistic  son, 
the  Crown  Prince,  had  appreciably  modified  the 
pacific  attitude  of  the  Kaiser,  which  had  served 
the  cause  of  peace  so  well  in  the  Moroccan  crisis. 
Cambon's  recital  of  the  incident  in  question, 
written  on  November  22,  1913,  justifies  quotation 
in  extenso. 


I  have  received  from  an  absolutely  sure  source  a 
record  of  a  conversation  which  is  reported  between 
the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  in  the 
presence  of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  General 
von  Moltke,  a  fortnight  ago — a  conversation  which 
would  appear  greatly  to  have  struck  King  Albert. 
I  am  in  no  way  surprised  by  the  impression  created, 
which  corresponds  with  that  made  on  me  some  time 
ago.  Hostility  against  us  is  becoming  more  marked, 
and  the  Emperor  has  ceased  to  be  a  partisan  of 
peace.  The  German  Emperor's  interlocutor  thought 
up  to  the  present,  as  did  everybody,  that  William  II., 


io8        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

whose  personal  influence  has  been  exerted  in 
many  critical  circumstances  in  favor  of  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  was  still  in  the  same  state 
of  mind.  This  time,  it  appears,  he  found  him  com- 
pletely changed.  The  German  Emperor  is  no 
longer  in  his  eyes  the  champion  of  peace  against 
the  bellicose  tendencies  of  certain  German  parties. 
William  II.  has  been  brought  to  think  that  war 
with  France  is  inevitable,  and  that  it  will  have 
to  come  one  day  or  the  other.  The  Emperor, 
it  need  hardly  be  said,  believes  in  the  crushing 
superiority  of  the  German  army  and  in  its  assured 
success. 

General  von  Moltke  spoke  in  exactly  the  same 
sense  as  his  sovereign.  He  also  declared  that  war 
was  necessary  and  inevitable,  but  he  showed  himself 
still  more  certain  of  success.  "For,"  said  he  to 
the  King,  "this  time  we  must  put  an  end  to  it" 
(cette  Jois  il  jaut  en  finir),  "and  your  Majesty  can 
hardly  doubt  the  irresistible  enthusiasm  which 
on  that  day  will  carry  away  the  whole  German 
people." 

The  King  of  the  Belgians  protested  that  to  inter- 
pret the  intentions  of  the  French  Government  in 
this  manner  was  to  travesty  them,  and  to  allow 
oneself  to  be  misled  as  to  the  feelings  of  the  French 
nation  by  the  manifestations  of  a  few  hotheads,  or 
of  conscienceless  intriguers. 

The  Emperor  and  his  Chief  of  General  Staff  none 
the  less  persisted  in  their  point  of  view. 

During  this  conversation  the  Emperor,  moreover, 
appeared  overwrought,  and  irritable.  As  the  years 
begin  to  weigh  upon  William  II.  the  family  tradi- 
tions, the  retrograde  feelings  of  the  Court,  and,  above 


The  Attitude  of  France  109 

all,  the  impatience  of  the  soldiers,  arc  gaining  more 
ascendency  over  his  mind.  Perhaps  he  may  feel 
I  know  not  what  kind  of  jealousy  of  the  popularity 
acquired  by  his  son,  who  flatters  the  passions  of  the 
Pan-Germans,  and  perhaps  he  may  find  that  the 
position  of  the  Empire  in  the  world  is  not  commen- 
surate with  its  power.  Perhaps,  also,  the  reply  of 
France  to  the  last  increase  in  the  German  army,  the 
object  of  which  was  to  place  Germanic  superiority 
beyond  question,  may  count  for  something  in  these 
bitternesses,  for  whatever  one  may  say  it  is  felt 
here  that  the  Germans  cannot  do  much  more.  One 
may  ask  what  lay  behind  the  conversation.  The 
Emperor  and  his  Chief  of  General  Staff  may  have 
intended  to  impress  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and 
to  lead  him  not  to  resist  in  case  a  conflict  with  us 
should  arise  ^  .  .  . 

This  picture  of  the  Kaiser  is  interesting  and 
significant. 

Germany's  loss  of  prestige  in  the  Moroccan 
controversy,  due  to  the  Kaiser's  unwillingness 
to  precipitate  a  w^ar  at  that  time  and  his  some- 
what diminished  popularity  with  his  people,  not 
only  accentuated  the  desire  of  his  military  cama- 
rilla to  find  another  pretext  for  a  war,  but  may 
have  modified  the  Kaiser's  resistance  to  this  belli- 
cose policy.  Until  that  time  he  had  been  quite 
content  to  play  the  part  of  Caesar.  It  may  be 
questioned  whether  he  had  previously  a  real  desire 

'  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  6. 


no        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

to  he  a  Ccesar.  To  describe  himself  meta- 
phorically as  "clad  in  shining  armor"  and  to 
shake  the  "mailed  fist"  was  his  constant  pose. 
"And  so  he  played  his  part."  As  long  as  the 
world  was  content  to  take  this  imperial  fustian 
in  a  Pickwickian  sense,  the  imperial  impresario 
found  the  same  enjoyment  as  when  he  staged 
Sardanapalus  on  the  boards  of  the  Berlin 
Theater. 

The  Kaiser  was  destined  to  stage  a  greater 
spectacle  than  the  burning  of  a  Babylonian  pal- 
ace. His  crowning  achievement  was  to  apply  the 
torch  to  civilization  itself. 

Prior  to  1913  neither  his  wishes  nor  plans  car- 
ried him  further  than  the  congenial  art  of  imperial 
posing.  Behind  his  natural  preference  for  peace 
was  ever  the  lurking  fear  that  a  disastrous  war 
might  cost  him  his  throne.  The  experience  of 
Napoleon  the  Third  was  quite  too  recent  to  be 
ignored. 

In  the  Moroccan  controversy,  the  imwillingness 
of  France  to  assent  to  all  demands  and  the  resolute 
purpose  of  England  to  support  its  ally,  presented 
a  crisis,  which  could  not  be  met  with  rhetorical 
phrases,  and  the  Kaiser  found  himself  confronted 
with  a  situation,  in  which  a  very  considerable 
number  of  thoughtful   and   influential   Germans 


The  Attitude  of  France  1 1 1 

favored  an  immediate  appeal  to  arms,  and  as  to 
which  only  his  word  was  wanted  to  precipitate 
hostilities  in  191 1. 

The  Kaiser  at  that  time  failed  to  meet  the 
expectations  of  those  who  had  expected  a  more 
warlike  attitude  from  the  knight  "clad  in  shining 
armor,"  and  the  expression  "William  the  Peace- 
ful" was  bandied  about  with  increasing  contempt 
by  the  war  party  in  Germany,  whose  passions  the 
Crown  Prince — not  unwilling  to  push  his  royal 
father  prematurely  from  the  pedestal  of  popular- 
ity— was  assiduously  fanning. 

While  the  fact  cannot  yet  be  regarded  as  estab- 
lished, the  writer  believes  that  the  future  may 
indubitably  show  that  the  Kaiser  did  have  full 
knowledge  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  in  advance 
of  its  issuance  and  gave  his  consent  to  the  policy 
of  that  coup  in  the  hope  that  it  would  somewhat 
restore  his  diminished  prestige.  He  probably 
followed  this  policy  in  the  confident  expectation 
that  Russia  would  yield,  as  it  had  yielded  in  1908 
in  the  Bosnian  incident,  and  when  he  discovered 
in  Norway  that  Russia,  while  willing  to  maintain 
peace  upon  any  reasonable  terms,  was  not  disposed 
to  surrender  all  its  legitimate  interests  in  the  Ser- 
vian question,  he,  as  will  be  more  fully  narrated 
in  the  next  chapter,  hurried  back  to  Berlin  and  for 


112        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

a  time  attempted  to  reverse  the  policy  and  bring 
about  a  peaceful  adjustment. 

Unfortunately  this  attempt  came  too  late.  His 
military  camarilla  had  determined  upon  war. 
Preparations  were  then  being  feverishly  made, 
and  the  German  and  Austrian  chancelleries  were 
steadily  and  deliberately  shutting  the  door  upon 
any  possibility  of  peace. 

To  withdraw  under  these  circumstances  from 
an  untenable  position  meant  a  substantial  im- 
pairment of  his  already  diminished  prestige.  A 
Washington  would  have  saved  the  situation,  but 
the  Kaiser  was  not  a  Washington. 

Another  most  illuminating  feature  of  this  chap- 
ter of  the  Yellow  Book  is  a  report  from  the  French 
Embassy  in  Berlin  to  its  Foreign  Office  on  the 
public  opinion  of  Germany  in  the  summer  of  1913, 
as  disclosed  by  the  reports  of  the  French  consular 
representatives  in  Germany.  It  gives  an  extra- 
ordinary analysis  of  conditions  in  Germany  prior 
to  the  war,  and  it  describes  in  great  fullness  the 
many  causes  which  were  contributory  to  the  crea- 
tion of  a  powerful  war  party  in  Germany.  As  it 
is  not  in  strictness  a  part  of  the  diplomatic  record, 
it  is  not  embodied  in  the  text  ol  this  book,  but  its 
value  as  an  acute  analysis  of  conditions  in  Germany 
— made  before  the  passions  of  the  war  had  clouded 


The  Attitude  of  France  113 

the  judgment — will  repay  the  reader's  careful 
consideration. 

The  second  chapter  of  the  French  Yellow  Book 
deals  with  the  events  which  took  place  between 
the  murder  of  the  Archduke  and  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  and  presents  new  and  cumulative 
evidence  of  substantial  value. 

The  French  Consul  General  at  Budapest,  in 
a  report  to  his  Foreign  Office  under  date  July 
II,  1914,  after  showing  that  the  Hungarian 
Premier,  Count  Tisza,  had  refused  to  dis- 
close, even  to  the  Hungarian  Chamber,  the 
results  of  the  judicial  inquiry  into  the  Serajevo 
murder  and  the  decision  taken  by  the  Austrian 
Cabinet,  proceeds  to  show  how  the  suppression 
of  the  news  in  Austria  was  a  part  of  the  scheme 
to  make  the  ultimatum  to  Servia  so  abrupt  and 
speedy  that  no  course  would  be  open  to  Servia 
and  Europe  other  than  an  immediate  and  uncon- 
ditional surrender. 

Everything  is  for  peace  in  the  newspapers,  but  the 
mass  of  the  public  believes  in  war  and  fears  it.  .  .  . 
The  Government,  whether  it  be  seriously  desirous 
of  peace,  or  whether  it  be  preparing  a  coup,  is  now 
doing  everything  it  can  to  allay  this  anxiety.  That 
is  why  the  tone  of  the  Government  newspapers  has 
been  lowered  first,  by  one  note  and  then  by  two, 
until  now  it  has  become  almost  optimistic.     But 


114        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

the  Government  newspapers  themselves  have  care- 
fully spread  the  alarm.  Their  optimism  to  order 
is  really  without  an  echo.  The  nervousness  of  the 
Bourse,  a  barometer  one  cannot  neglect,  is  a  sure 
proof  of  that.  Stocks,  without  exception,  have 
fallen  to  improbably  low  prices.  The  Hungarian 
four  per  cent,  was  yesterday  quoted  at  79.95,  a 
price  which  has  never  been  quoted  since  the  first 
issue.  ^ 

Simultaneously  a  very  different  note  was  sound- 
ed by  the  organ  of  the  military  party  in  Vienna. 
The  Militdrische  Rundschau,  a  few  days  before  the 
ultimatum  to  Servia,  said: 

"The  moment  is  still  favorable  for  us.  If  we  do 
not  decide  upon  war,  the  war  we  shall  have  to 
make  in  two  or  three  years  at  the  latest  will  be 
begun  in  circumstances  much  less  propitious;  now 
the  initiative  belongs  to  us.  Russia  is  not  ready, 
the  moral  factors  are  for  us,  might  as  well  as  right. 
Since  some  day  xve  shall  have  to  accept  the  struggle, 
let  us  provoke  it  at  once."^ 

Before  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  issued  there 
had  been  some  preliminary  informal  negotiations 
between  Austria  and  Servia  and  the  latter  had 
expressed  its  willingness  to  give  to  Austria  the 
most  ample  reparation  "provided  that  she  did  not 
demand  judiciary  cooperation,"  and  the  Servian 

»  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  11.  'Ibid.,  No.  12. 


The  Attitude  of  France  115 

Minister  at  Berlin  warned  "the  German  Govern- 
ment that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  endeavor  by 
this  inquiry  {i.  e.,  by  the  participation  of  Austrian 
officials  in  the  courts  of  Servia)  to  damage  the 
prestige  of  Servia."^ 

It  thus  appears  that  Austria  and  Germany  had 
warning  in  advance  of  the  issuance  of  the  ulti- 
matum that  if  this  humiliating  demand  were 
included  it  would  meet  with  refusal.  Their  inten- 
tion to  precipitate  this  war  or  impose  their  \\ill 
upon  Europe  may  therefore  be  measured  by  the 
fact  that,  with  full  knowledge  that  that  particular 
demand  would  not  be  accepted,  it  was  made  a 
leading  feature  of  the  ultimatum,  and  finally 
became  the  principal  outstanding  difference  after 
Servia  had  accepted  substantially  all  the  other 
demands  of  Austria.  This  was  reported  by  Cam- 
bon  to  his  Foreign  Office  two  days  before  the 
ultimatum  was  issued  and  at  that  time  Germany 
was  fully  advised  as  to  the  one  demand,  which 
Servia  could  not  in  justice  to  its  sovereignty  accept. 
In  the  same  letter,  Cambon  advises  his  Foreign 
Office  that  Germany  had  already  issued  the  "pre- 
liminary warning  of  mobilization,  which  places 
Germany  in  a  sort  of  garde-d-vous  during  periods 
of  tension."^ 

'  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  15.  'Ibid.,  No.  15, 


ii6        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

A  further  corroboration  of  Germany's  knowledge 
of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  before  its  issuance  is 
found  in  a  report  of  the  French  Minister  at  Mu- 
nich to  the  French  Foreign  Office,  written  on  the 
day  when  the  Austrian  ultimatum  was  issued, 
and  a  full  day  before  it  reached  any  capital  except 
Berlin  and  Belgrade,     He  writes: 

The  Bavarian  Press  appears  to  believe  that  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  Austro-Servian  incident  is 
not  only  possible  but  even  probable.  Official  circles, 
on  the  contrary,  for  some  time  past,  have  displayed 
with  more  or  less  sincerity  positive  pessimism. 

The  Prime  Mhiister  notably  said  to  me  to-day 
that  the  Austrian  note,  of  which  he  had  cognizance, 
was  in  his  opinion  drawn  np  in  terms  acceptable  to 
Servia,  but  that  the  present  situatioti  appeared  to  him 
none  the  less  to  be  very  grave.  ^ 

As  it  is  unlikely  that  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment would  have  dealt  directly  with  the  Bavarian 
Government  without  similar  communications  to 
the  German  Foreign  Office,  it  follows  as  a  strong 
probability  that  the  German  Foreign  Office  and 
probably  each  of  the  constituent  States  of  Ger- 
many knew  on  July  the  23d  that  Austria  in- 
tended to  demand  that  which  Servia  had  previously 
indicated  its  unalterable  determination  to  refuse. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  repeated  and  in- 

'  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  21. 


The  Attitude  of  France  117 

sistent  assurances  that  the  German  Foreign  Office 
gave  to  England,  France,  and  Russia  that  it  ''had 
no  knowledge  of  the  text  of  the  Austrian  note  before 
it  was  handed  in  and  had  not  exercised  any  influ- 
ence on  its  contents '^  presents  a  poHcy  of  deception 
unworthy  of  a  great  nation  or  of  the  twentieth 
century. 

It  regarded  this  pohcy  of  submarine  diplomacy 
as  necessary,  not  only  to  throw  the  other  nations  off 
their  guard  while  Germany  was  arming,  but  also 
to  support  its  contention  that  the  quarrel  between 
Servia  and  Austria  was  a  local  quarrel.  If  it 
appeared  that  Germany  had  instigated  Austria 
in  its  course,  it  could  not  have  supported  its 
first  contention  that  the  quarrel  was  a  local  one 
and  it  could  not  reasonably  dispute  the  right  of 
Russia  to  intervene.  For  this  purpose  the  fable 
was  invented.     It  deceived  no  one. 

The  French  Yclloiv  Book  discloses  another  even 
more  amazing  feature  of  this  policy  of  deception, 
for  it  shows  on  the  authority  of  the  Italian  Foreign 
Minister  that  Germany  and  Austria  did  not 
even  take  their  own  ally  into  their  confidence. 
The  significance  of  this  fact  cannot  be  over- 
estimated. Nothing  in  the  whole  record  more 
clearly  demonstrates  the  purpose  of  the  German 

■  Ante,  p.  36. 


ii8        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

and  Austrian  diplomats  to  set  a  trap  for  the 
rest  of  Europe. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  it  was 
the  duty  of  each  member  to  submit  to  its  associates 
all  matters  which  might  involve  the  possibility  of 
joint  cooperation.  Even  if  this  had  not  been 
written  in  the  very  terms  of  the  Alliance,  it  would 
follow  as  a  necessary  implication,  for  when  each 
member  obligated  itself  to  cooperate  with  its 
allies  in  any  attack  upon  either  of  them,  but  not 
in  an}'^  aggressive  war,  it  necessarily  followed  that 
each  ally  had  the  right  to  the  fullest  information 
as  to  any  controversy  which  might  involve  such 
action,  so  that  it  might  determine  whether  it  fell 
within  the  terms  of  the  obligation. 

Neither  the  German  nor  the  Austrian  Foreign 
Office  have  ever  submitted  any  documentary  proof 
that  they  discharged  this  obHgation  to  their  ally 
and  it  may  be  added  they  have  never  pretended 
that  they  did  so. 

If  further  proof  were  needed,  we  find  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book  a  report  from  the  French 
Minister  at  Rome  to  his  Foreign  Office,  tmder 
date  July  the  27th,  reporting  a  conversation  be- 
tween the  French  Minister  and  the  Italian  Foreign 
Minister,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  on  that 
day,  in  which  the  latter  spoke  of  the 


The  Attitude  of  France  119 

contents  of  the  Austrian  note,  and  assured  me 
that  he  had  had  no  previous  knowledge  of  them 
whatever. 

He  was  well  aware  that  the  note  was  to  be  vigor- 
ous and  energetic  in  character,  but  he  had  no  idea 
that  it  could  take  such  a  form.  I  asked  him  if  it 
was  true,  as  is  stated  in  certain  newspapers,  that 
in  this  connection  he  had  expressed  in  Vienna  ap- 
proval of  Austrian  action,  and  had  given  the  assur- 
ance that  Italy  would  fulfill  her  duties  as  an  ally 
towards  Austria.  He  replied,  "In  no  way  have  we 
been  consulted;  we  have  been  told  nothing  whatever. 
We  have  therefore  had  no  reason  to  make  any 
communication  of  this  nature  in  Vienna."  ^ 

The  reason  for  this  secrecy  is  not  far  to  seek. 
Almost  a  year  before  the  Archduke's  death,  Aus- 
tria had  sounded  Italy  as  to  its  willingness  to 
acquiesce  or  participate  in  a  war  by  Austria 
against  Servia,  and  Italy  had  refused.  For  this 
reason  and  also  because  an  Austrian  war  against 
Servia  was  not  to  the  interests  of  Italy,  Aus- 
tria and  Germany  both  recognized,  without  even 
consulting  their  ally,  that  they  could  not  count 
upon  its  cooperation  in  such  a  war.  To  submit 
their  proposed  action  to  Italy  was  to  invite 
a  deliberate  expression  of  disapproval,  and  this 
would  make  it  more  difficult  for  them  to  de- 
mand its  cooperation,   if   they   could   carry   out 

'French  Yellow  Book,  No.  72. 


120        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

their  policy  of  so  flouting  Russia  as  to  compel  it 
to  initiate  an  aggressive  war,  as  they  clearly 
hoped  to  do. 

There  was,  however,  another  and  very  practical 
reason  for  this  failure  to  consult  their  ally.  We 
have  seen  that  the  whole  poHcy  of  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  was  founded  upon  secrecy.  The  plan 
was  to  give  to  Europe  no  possible  intimation  of 
the  intended  action  until  it  was  accompHshed  and 
then  to  give  to  Europe  only  twenty-four  hours 
within  which  to  deliberate  or  act.  If  as  a  matter 
of  courtesy  Austria  and  Germany  submitted  to 
their  ally  their  proposed  course  of  action,  Italy, 
being  wholly  opposed  to  any  such  unprovoked 
attack  upon  Servia,  might  find  a  way,  either  by 
open  and  public  protest  or  by  dropping  a  confiden- 
tial intimation,  to  advise  the  other  countries  as 
to  what  was  in  preparation.  This  would  defeat 
the  principal  purpose  of  Germany  and  Austria, 
to  force  a  quick  decision  and  to  prepare  for 
eventuahties  before  any  other  country  could  make 
ready.  Germany  and  Austria  therefore  wholly 
ignored  their  ally  and  pursued  their  stealthy  policy 
to  its  discreditable  end. 

When  their  diplomatic  communications  are  dis- 
closed in  full,  this  feature  of  their  policy  may  dis- 
close some  significant  admissions. 


The  Attitude  of  France  121 

We  have  already  seen  (aw/e,  p.  35)  that  when 
on  July  the  20th,  three  days  before  the  Austrian 
ultimatum  was  issued,  Sir  Edward  Grey  asked 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  German  Ambassador  in 
London,  as  to  what  news  he  had  from  Vienna 
with  reference  to  the  intentions  of  his  country, 
Prince  Lichnowsky  affected  to  be  ignorant.  But 
it  appears  from  a  letter,  which  M.  Paul  Cambon"^ 
wrote  to  his  Foreign  Ofhce  on  July  the  24th,  1914, 
that  Prince  Lichnowsky  had  returned  to  London 
from  Berlin  about  a  month  before  and  had  "dis- 
played pessimistic  views  as  to  the  relations  between 
St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin."  Cambon  adds  that 
the  English  Foreign  Office  and  his  other  diplomatic 
colleagues  had  all  been  struck  "by  the  anxious 
appearance  of  Prince  Lichnowsky  since  his  return 
from  Berlin."^ 

So  designedly  was  the  Austrian  ultimatum 
withheld  from  the  chancelleries  of  Europe,  other 
than  Vienna  and  Berlin,  that  on  the  day  following 
its  issuance  at  Belgrade,  the  only  information 
which  M.  Jules  Cambon  had  of  its  issuance 
were  the  extracts  in  the  press,  and  he  thereupon 
saw  the  German  Secretary  of  State  and  asked 
him  whether  such  an  ultimatum  had  been  sent. 

'  The  French  Ambassador  at  London. 
*  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  7^2, 


122        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  afErmatively,  adding  that 
the  note  was  energetic,  and  that  he  approved  it, 
the  Servian  Government  having  long  since  exhausted 
Austrian  patience.  He  considers,  moreover,  that 
for  Austria  the  question  is  one  of  a  domestic  nature, 
and  he  hopes  that  it  will  be  localized.  I  then  said 
to  him  that,  not  having  received  any  instructions, 
I  only  wished  to  have  with  him  an  entirely  personal 
exchange  of  views.  I  then  asked  him  if  the  Berlin 
Cabinet  had  really  been  in  complete  ignorance  of 
the  Austrian  claims  before  they  were  communicated 
to  Belgrade,  and  as  he  replied  that  this  was  so,  I 
expressed  my  surprise  that  he  should  thus  undertake 
to  support  pretensions,  the  limit  and  nature  of 
which  he  ignored. 

"It  is  only,"  said  Herr  von  Jagow,  interrupting 
me,  "because  we  are  talking  personally  between 
ourselves  that  I  allow  you  to  say  that  to  me." 

"Certainly,"  I  replied,  "but  if  Peter  I.  humiliates 
himself  Servia  will  probably  be  given  over  to  inter- 
nal troubles.  That  will  open  the  door  to  fresh  pos- 
sibilities, and  do  you  know  where  Vienna  will  lead 
you?"  I  added  that  the  language  of  the  German 
Press  was  not  that  of  a  people  who  were  indifferent 
and  foreign  to  the  affair,  but  told  of  active  support. 
Finally,  I  remarked  that  the  shortness  of  the  time 
given  to  Servia  in  which  to  yield  would  make  a  bad 
impression  upon  Europe. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  he  expected  "w» 
peu  d'emotion,"  on  the  part  of  Servia's  friends,  but 
that  he  counted  upon  their  giving  Servia  good 
advice. 

"I  do  not  doubt,"  I  then  said,  "that  Russia  will 
make  an  effort  in  Belgrade  to  bring  the  Cabinet  to 


The  Attitude  of  France  123 

make  what  concessions  are  acceptable,  but  if  you 
ask  something  of  one,  why  not  ask  it  of  the  other  ? 
And  if  it  be  expected  that  advice  will  be  given  in 
Belgrade,  is  it  not  legitimate  to  expect  that  on  the 
other  hand  advice  will  also  be  tendered  to  Vienna? " 
The  Secretary  of  State  allowed  himself  to  say 
that  that  would  depend  on  circumstances,  but,  re- 
covering himself  immediately,  declared  that  the 
matter  must  be  localized.  He  asked  me  if  really 
I  considered  the  situation  serious.  "Assuredly," 
I  replied,  "for,  if  what  is  going  on  has  been  pondered 
over,  I  do  not  understand  v/hy  people  have  cut 
their  bridges  behind  them."^ 

The  Yellow  Book  throws  further  light  upon  the 
extraordinarily  petty  finesse,  with  which  the  chan- 
celleries of  BerHn  and  Vienna  attempted  to  take 
a  snap  judgment  upon  the  rest  of  Europe.  We 
learn  from  Exhibit  No.  55  that  Count  Berchtold 
had  given  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna, 
prior  to  the  issuance  of  the  ultimatum,  an  express 
assurance  "that  the  claims  against  Servia  would 
be  thoroughly  acceptable,"  and  that  upon  this 
assurance  Coimt  Schebeko  had  left  Vienna  on  a 
leave  of  absence.  During  his  absence  and  at  a 
time  when  the  President  of  the  French  Republic, 
the  French  Premier,  and  its  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  were  far  distant  from  Paris  and  on  the 
high  seas,  the  ultimatum  was  issued,  and,  as  we 

^French  Yellow  Book,  No.  30. 


124        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

have  seen,  Count  Berchtold  immediately  betook 
himself  to  Ischl  and  remained  there  until  the  ex- 
piration of  the  brief  time  limit  in  the  ultimatum. 

The  same  policy  was  pursued  with  reference  to 
other  Ambassadors,  for  when  France  instructed 
its  representative  in  Vienna  "to  call  the  attention 
of  the  Austrian  Government  to  the  anxiety  aroused 
in  Europe,  Baron  Macchio  stated  to  our  Ambassa- 
dor that  the  tone  of  the  Austrian  note  and  the 
demands  formulated  by  it  permitted  one  to  coimt 
upon  a  pacific  denouement."^ 

In  the  same  communication,  in  which  this  infor- 
mation is  embodied,  we  gain  the  important  infor- 
mation that  "in  the  Vienna  Diplomatic  Corps 
the  German  Ambassador  recommends  violent 
resolutions  whilst  declaring  ostensibly  that  the 
Imperial  Chancellery  is  not  wholly  in  agreement 
with  him  on  this  point." 

Pursuant  to  the  same  ostrich  policy,  the  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State,  as  we  have  previously 
seen  {ante,  pp.  71-75),  gave  to  both  the  French  and 
English  Ambassadors  the  absence  of  Count  Berch- 
told at  Ischl  as  an  excuse  for  the  failure  of  Ger- 
many to  get  any  extension  of  the  time  limit,  and 
not  only  did  he  assure  them  repeatedly  and  in 
the    most    unequivocal    way    that    the    German 

'  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  20. 


The  Attitude  of  France  125 

Foreign  Office  had  no  knowledge  of,  or  responsi- 
bility for,  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  but  when  on 
July  the  25  th  the  Russian  Charge  requested  a 
personal  appointment  with  von  Jagow  in  order 
to  present  his  country's  request  for  such  an  exten- 
sion, the  German  Secretary  of  State  only  gave 
"him  an  appointment  at  the  end  of  the  afternoon, 
that  is  to  say,  at  the  moment  when  the  ultimatum 
will  expire,''  and  in  view  of  this  illusory  appoint- 
ment the  Russian  Charge  (M.  Broniowski) 

sent,  with  all  speed,  a  written  note  to  the  Secretary 
of  State,  in  which  he  pointed  out  that  the  delay  of 
the  communication  made  by  Austria  to  the  Powers 
rendered  the  effect  of  the  communication  illusory, 
since  it  did  not  give  the  Powers  time  to  become 
acquainted  with  the  facts  alleged  before  the  ex- 
piry of  the  ultimatum.  He  insisted  very  urgently 
on  the  necessity  of  extending  it,  if  one  had  not  in 
view  the  creation  of  a  great  crisis.  ^ 

Thus  in  Berlin  and  Vienna  by  concerted  action 
the  representatives  of  England,  France,  and  Russia 
were  evaded  until  the  time  limit  for  Servia  had 
expired. 

Contrast  with  this  petty  finesse  the  spirit 
with  which  Sazonof  attempted  to  reach  an  agree- 
ment with  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 

» French  Yellow  Book,  No.  42. 


126        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

burg  on  July  26th,  as  set  forth  in  the  report  of 
the  French  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  under 
that  date.     He  says: 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  continues  with 
praiseworthy  perseverance  to  seek  means  to  bring 
about  a  peaceful  solution.  "I  shall  show  myself 
ready  to  negotiate  up  to  the  last  instant,"  he  said 
to  me. 

It  is  in  this  spirit  that  he  has  asked  Count  Szapdry  ^ 
to  come  and  see  him  for  a  "frank  and  loyal  expla- 
nation." In  his  presence  M.  Sazonof  discussed  the 
Austro-Hungarian  ultimatum,  article  by  article, 
showing  clearly  the  insulting  character  of  the  differ- 
ent clauses.  "The  intention  which  inspired  this 
document,"  he  said,  "is  legitimate  if  you  pursue 
no  other  aim  but  the  protection  of  your  territory 
against  the  agitation  of  Servian  anarchists,  but  the 
step  to  which  you  have  had  recourse  is  not  defens- 
ible." He  concluded,  "Take  back  your  ultimatum, 
modify  its  form,  and  I  will  guarantee  the  result."^ 

Upon  one  phase  of  Germany's  foreign  policy 
in  this  crisis  the  French  Yellow  Book  naturally 
throws  more  light  than  the  other  publications.  I 
refer  to  the  attempt  of  Germany  to  coerce  France 
into  a  position  of  neutrality,  or  possibly  to  secure 
from  it  some  definition  of  its  attitude,  which  would 
compromise  its  relations  with  Russia.     The  Yel- 

*  The  Austrian  Ambassador. 

*  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  54. 


The  Attitude  of  France  127 

low  Book  charges  that  the  German  Ambassador, 
under  the  pretext  of  securing  an  authorized  state- 
ment to  the  press  to  allay  public  excitement,  thus 
attempted  to  compromise  France.  The  docu- 
ments go  far  to  suggest  this  possibility  but  are 
not  wholly  convincing. 

The  German  Ambassador  on  July  the  24th,  the 
very  day  that  the  ultimatum  reached  the  chancel- 
leries of  Europe,  and  on  the  day  when  von  Jagow 
untruthfully  claimed  that  it  had  first  reached  Ber- 
lin, called  upon  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  and  read  to  him  a  formal  note,  of  which 
he  was  unwilling  to  leave  a  copy,  although  he  char- 
acterized it  as  a  note  of  importance. 

It  may  be  here  noted  that  on  more  than  one 
occasion  in  this  diplomatic  crisis  the  German 
representatives  were  unwilling  to  leave  a  copy  of 
the  diplomatic  messages  which  they  orally  com- 
municated. 

In  his  memorandum  the  French  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  says : 

The  German  Ambassador  especially  directed  my 
attention  to  the  last  two  paragraphs  of  his  note 
before  he  read  it.  He  indicated  that  in  them  lay 
the  chief  point.  I  took  note  of  the  actual  text, 
which  is  as  follows:  "The  German  Government 
considers  that  the  present  qticstion  is  a  matter  to 
be    settled    exclusively  between  Austria-Hungary 


128        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

and  Servia,  and  that  the  Powers  have  the  greatest 
interest  in  restricting  it  to  the  two  interested  parties. 
The  German  Government  ardently  desires  the 
localization  of  the  conflict,  since  by  the  natural 
play  of  alliances  any  intervention  by  another  Power 
would  have  incalculable  consequences." 

I  remarked  to  the  German  Ambassador  that  just 
as  it  appeared  to  be  legitimate  to  call  for  the  punish- 
ment of  all  those  concerned  in  the  crime  of  Serajevo, 
on  the  other  hand  it  seemed  difficult  to  require 
measures  which  could  not  be  accepted,  having  re- 
gard to  the  dignity  and  sovereignty  of  Servia;  the 
Servian  Government,  even  if  it  was  willing  to  sub- 
mit to  them,  would  risk  being  carried  away  by  a 
revolution. 

I  also  pointed  out  to  Herr  von  Schoen^  that  his 
note  only  took  into  account  two  hypotheses:  that 
of  a  pure  and  simple  refusal  or  that  of  a  provocative 
attitude  on  the  part  of  Servia.  The  third  hypothesis 
(which  would  leave  the  door  open  for  an  arrange- 
ment) should  also  be  taken  into  consideration;  that 
of  Servia's  acceptance  and  of  her  agreeing  at  once 
to  give  full  satisfaction  for  the  punishment  of  the 
accomplices  and  full  guarantees  for  the  suppression 
of  the  anti-Austrian  propaganda  so  far  as  they  were 
compatible  with  her  sovereignty  and  dignity. 

I  added  that  if  within  these  limits  the  satisfaction 
desired  by  Austria  could  be  admitted,  the  means  of 
obtaining  it  could  be  examined;  if  Servia  gave  obvi- 
ous proof  of  goodwill  it  could  not  be  thought  that 
Austria  would  refuse  to  take  part  in  the  conversation. 

Perhaps  they  should  not  make  it  too  difficult  for 

«  The  German  Ambassador. 


The  Attitude  of  France  129 

third  party  Powers,  who  coiild  not  either  morally 
or  sentimentally  cease  to  take  interest  in  Servia,  to 
take  an  attitude  which  was  in  accord  with  the 
wishes  of  Germany  to  localize  the  dispute. 

Herr  von  Schoen  recognized  the  justice  of  these 
considerations  and  vaguely  stated  that  hope  was 
always  poSvSible.  When  I  asked  him  if  we  should 
give  to  the  Austrian  note  the  character  of  a  simple 
mise  en  demeure,  which  permitted  a  discussion,  or 
an  ultimatum,  he  answered  that  personally  he  had 
no  views.  ^ 

On  the  following  day  the  German  Ambassador 
again  called  at  the  French  Foreign  OfRce  and 
protested  against  an  article,  which  had  appeared 
in  a  Paris  newspaper  and  w^hich  had  characterized 
his  communication  of  the  preceding  day  as  the 
"German  menace."  The  German  Ambassador 
again  gave  an  unequivocal  assurance 

that  there  was  no  agreement  between  Austria  and 
Germany  over  the  Austrian  note,  of  which  the 
German  Government  was  ignorant,  although  the 
German  Government  had  subsequently  approved 
it  on  receiving  communication  of  it  at  the  same 
time  as  the  other  Powers.^ 

The  hardihood  of  this  statement,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  on  the  preceding  day,  simultaneously 
with  the  service  of  the  ultimatum,  the  threatening 

'  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  28.  '  Ibid.  No.  36. 


130        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

demand  had  been  delivered  by  Germany  to  the 
leading  European  chancelleries  that  the  quarrel 
between  Austria  and  Servia  must  be  locaHzed, 
is  apparent.  Baron  von  Schoen,  the  German 
Ambassador,  then  denied  that  his  suggestion  of 
"incalculable  consequences,"  if  the  dispute  were 
not  locaHzed,  was  a  "menace."  This  statement, 
repeated  by  German  diplomats  in  other  capitals^ 
approaches  the  ludicrous.  The  first  military 
power  of  Europe  formally  advises  other  nations 
that  unless  they  v\/aive  their  legitimate  claims  and 
interests,  "incalculable  consequences"  will  follow, 
and  it  is  gravely  suggested  that  this  is  not  a 
"menace." 

On  the  following  day  Baron  von  Schoen  made 
two  visits  at  the  French  Foreign  Office  and  assured 
the  acting  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that 

Germany  was  on  the  side  of  France  in  the  ardent  de- 
sire for  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  she  earnestly 
hoped  that  France  would  use  her  influence  in  a 
soothing  manner  in  St.  Petersburg. 

I  replied  to  this  suggestion  that  Russia  was 
moderate,  that  she  had  committed  no  act  throwing 
doubt  upon  her  moderation,  and  that  we  were  in 
agreement  with  her  in  seeking  for  a  peaceful  solution 
of  the  struggle.  It  therefore  appeared  to  me  that  in 
counterpart  Germany  should  act  in  Vienna,  where 
the  efficacy  of  her  action  was  sure,  with  a  view  to 


The  Attitude  of  France  131 

avoiding  military  operations  tending  to  the  occupa- 
tion of  Servia. 

The  Ambassador  having  pointed  out  to  me  that 
that  was  irreconcilable  with  the  position  adopted 
by  Germany,  "that  the  question  only  concerned 
Austria  and  Servia,"  I  said  to  him  that  mediation 
in  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg  might  be  made  by  the 
four  Powers  who  were  less  directly  interested  in  the 
matter. 

Baron  von  Schoen  then  sheltered  himself  behind 
his  lack  of  instructions  on  this  point,  and  I  told  him 
that  in  these  circumstances  I  did  not  feel  able  to 
act  in  St.  Petersburg  alone. 

Our  conversation  concluded  with  the  renewed 
assurance  by  the  Ambassador  as  to  the  peaceful 
intentions  of  Germany,  who,  he  declared,  was  with 
France  on  this  point.  ^ 

The  incident  now  followed,  w^hich  suggested  to 
the  French  Foreign  office  a  subtle  attempt  of 
Germany  to  compromise  the  relations  of  France 
with  Russia  by  imputing  disloyalty  to  the  former. 
On  his  second  visit  a  few  hours  later,  Baron  von 
Schoen  desired  the  French  Foreign  Office  to  give 
to  the  public  a  statement  with  reference  to  the 
preceding  interview,  and  suggested  the  following, 
which  he  dictated  to  the  French  official: 

"The  German  Ambassador  and  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  had  a  further  interview  in  the  course 
of  the  afternoon,  during  which  they  examined,  in 

^  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  56. 


132        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

the  most  friendly  spirit  and  with  a  feeling  of  pacific 
solidarity,  the  means  which  might  he  employed  for 
the  maintenance  of  general  peace.'' 

The  Acting  Political  Director  at  once  replied: 
"Then,  in  your  mind,  everything  is  settled,  and 
you  give  us  the  assurance  that  Austria  accepts  the 
Servian  note,  or  will  be  willing  to  converse  with  the 
Powers  with  regard  to  it?" 

The  Ambassador  appeared  to  be  taken  aback, 
and  made  a  vigorous  denial.  It  was  therefore 
pointed  out  to  him  that  if  nothing  had  changed  in 
the  negative  attitude  of  Germany,  the  terms  of  the 
suggested  "note  to  the  Press"  were  excessive,  and 
likely  to  give  French  opinion  a  false  feeling  of 
security  by  creating  illusions  as  to  the  actual  situ- 
ation, the  dangers  of  which  were  but  too  evident.  ^ 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  French  Foreign 
Office  looked  askance  at  these  German  suggestions 
of  "pacific  solidarity"  with  France,  which  con- 
trasted so  strangely  with  Germany's  refusal  to 
work  for  peace  and  its  sinister  menaces  to  other 
countries.  France's  suspicion  that  Baron  von 
Schoen  was  thus  attempting  to  compromise  its 
loyalty  in  the  eyes  of  Russia  cannot  be  said  to  be 
without  some  foundation,  although  it  is  as  reason- 
able to  assume  that  these  professions  of  the  Ger- 
man Ambassador  were  only  an  incident  to  the 
general  plan  of  lulling  France  and  its  allies  into 

'  French  Yellow  Book,  No.  57. 


The  Attitude  of  France  133 

a  false  sense  of  security.  Here  again  the  full 
truth  can  only  be  ascertained  when  Germany  is 
willing  to  submit  to  the  scrutiny  of  the  world  the 
records  of  its  Foreign  Office. 

On  July  26th,  M.  Jules  Cambon  had  an  inter- 
view with  the  German  Secretary  of  State  and 
earnestly  supported  Sir  Edward  Grey's  suggestion 
that  a  conference  be  called  in  w^hich  England, 
France,  Germany,  and  Italy  should  participate 
for  the  preservation  of  peace.  This  interview  is 
at  once  so  dramatic,  and  almost  prophetic,  that 
it  justifies  quotation  in  extenso: 

To  Cambon's  proposition,  von  Jagow  replied,  as 
he  did  to  the  British  Ambassador,  that  he  could  not 
accept  a  proposal  to  charge  the  Italian,  French,  and 
German  Ambassadors  with  the  task  of  seeking, 
with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  a  means  of  solving  the 
present  difficulties,  for  that  would  be  to  establish  a 
regular  conference  to  deal  with  the  affairs  of  Austria 
and  Russia.  I  replied  to  Herr  von  Jagow  that  I 
regretted  his  response,  but  that  the  great  object, 
which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  in  view,  was  above  a 
question  of  form,  and  what  was  important  was  the 
association  of  England  and  France  with  Germany 
and  Italy  in  laboring  for  peace;  that  this  associa- 
tion could  show  itself  in  common  action  in  St.  Peters- 
burg and  Vienna;  that  he  had  frequently  expressed 
to  me  his  regret  at  seeing  the  two  groups  of  alliances 
always  opposed  to  each  other  in  Europe,  and  that 
here  he  had  an  opportunity  of  proving  that  there 


134        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

was  a  European  spirit,  by  showing  four  Powers 
belonging  to  the  two  groups  acting  in  common 
agreement  to  prevent  a  struggle.  Herr  von  Jagow 
evaded  the  matter  by  saying  that  Germany  had 
her  engagements  with  Austria.  I  pointed  out  that 
the  relations  of  Germany  with  Vienna  were  no  more 
close  than  those  of  France  with  Russia,  and  that  it 
was  he  himself  who  raised  the  question  of  the  two 
opposed  groups  of  alliances. 

The  Secretary  of  State  then  said  that  he  did  not 
refuse  to  act  with  a  view  to  avoiding  an  Austro- 
Russian  conflict,  but  that  he  could  not  intervene 
in  the  Austro-Servian  conflict.  "One  is  the  con- 
sequence of  the  other,"  I  said,  "and  it  would  be 
well  to  prevent  the  creation  of  any  new  state  of 
affairs  calculated  to  bring  about  the  intervention  of 
Russia." 

As  the  Secretary  of  State  persisted  in  saying  that 
he  was  obliged  to  observe  his  engagements  with 
regard  to  Austria,  /  asked  him  if  he  had  pledged 
himself  to  follow  Austria  everywhere  blindfold,  and 
if  he  had  made  himself  acquainted  with  the  Servian 
reply  to  Austria,  which  had  been  handed  to  him 
that  morning  by  the  Servian  Charge  d'affaires. 
"7  have  not  yet  had  time,''  he  said.  "I  regret  it,"  I 
replied.  "You  will  see  that  except  on  points  of 
detail  Servia  has  yielded  completely.  It  would 
seem,  however,  that  since  Austria  has  obtained  the 
satisfaction,  which  your  support  procured  her,  you 
might  to-day  advise  her  to  be  content,  or  to  examine 
with  Servia  the  terms  of  the  Servian  reply." 

As  Herr  von  Jagow  did  not  answer  me  clearly, 
I  asked  him  if  Germ.any  wanted  war.  He  protested 
energetically,  saying  that  he  knew  that  that  was 


r  The  Attitude  of  France  135 

■my  idea  but  that  it  was  completely  incorrect. 
*  **You  must  then,"  I  replied,  "act  in  consequence. 
When  you  read  the  Servian  reply,  weigh  the  terms  with 
your  conscience,  I  beg  you  in  the  name  of  humanity, 
and  do  not  personally  assume  a  portion  of  the  respon- 
sibility jor  the  catastrophe,  whose  preparation  you 
are  allowing.''  Herr  von  Jagow  protested  again, 
adding  that  he  was  ready  to  join  England  and 
France  in  any  common  effort,  but  that  some  form 
must  be  found  for  this  intervention  which  he  could 
accept  and  that  the  Cabinets  should  agree  among 
themselves  upon  the  matter.  "Moreover,"  he 
added,  "direct  conversations  between  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg  are  begun  and  are  proceeding.  I 
expect  much  good  of  them,  and  I  have  hope."' 

In  his  solemn  injunction  to  von  Jagow  "m  the 
name  of  humanity''  to  weigh  the  terms  in  his  con- 
science, Cambon  struck  a  loftier  note  than  any 
of  the  diplomatic  disputants.  Macaulay  has 
said  that  the  "French  mind  has  always  been  the 
interpreter  between  national  ideas  and  those  of 
universal  mankind,"  and  at  least  since  the  French 
Revolution  the  tribute  has  been  deserved. 

He,  who  carefully  and  dispassionately  reads  the 
diplomatic  correspondence  which  preceded  the 
war,  must  be  impressed  with  the  different  point  of 
view  of  the  two  groups  of  disputants.  Both  the 
written  and  oral  communications  of  the  German 

'French  Yellow  Book,  No.  74. 


136        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

and  Austrian  representatives  failed  to  suggest  at 
any  time  a  note  other  than  one  of  selfish  national- 
ism. We  search  in  vain  for  the  most  distant  rec- 
ognition of  the  fact  that  the  world  at  large  had  any 
legitimate  interest  in  the  controversy.  The  insis- 
tent note,  which  Austria  sounded,  was  that  its  in- 
terests required  its  punitive  action  against  Servia, 
even  though  the  peace  of  the  world  were  thereby 
sacrificed,  and  that  of  Germany  repeated  with 
equal  insistence  that  its  "closest  interests"  sum- 
moned it  to  the  side  of  Austria. 

In  marked  contrast  to  this  spirit  of  national 
selfishness  is  the  repeated  admonition  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  that  the  whole  question  should 
be  considered  in  its  "larger  aspects,"  thereby 
meaning  the  peace  and  welfare  of  Europe;  while 
the  Czar,  with  evident  sincerity,  suggested  to 
the  Kaiser  that  "with  the  aid  of  God  it  must  be 
possible  to  our  long  tried  friendship  to  prevent  the 
shedding  of  blood,"  and  proposed  a  reference  of 
the  question  to  the  Hague.  Similarly  the  appeal 
of  Jules  Cambon  to  von  Jagow,  "in  the  name  of 
humanity"  was  more  than  the  ordinary  exchange 
of  diplomatic  views.  Von  Jagow's  conception  of 
his  duty  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  he  had  taken 
a  position  involving  "incalculable  consequences" 
without  even  reading  the  Servian  reply. 


The  Attitude  of  France  137 

Cambon  approved  himself  a  worthy  "yoke 
fellow  in  equity"  with  Sir  Edward  Grey,  and  no 
loftier  tone  was  sounded  by  any  participant  in 
this  great  controversy,  unless  we  except  Goschen's 
solemn  statement  to  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  in 
the  equally  dramatic  interview,  which  succeeded 
the  rupture  of  relations  between  England  and 
Germany,  when  Goschen  stated  that  "it  was  so 
to  speak  a  matter  of  Hfe  and  death  for  the  honor 
of  Great  Britain  that  she  should  keep  her  solemn 
engagement  to  do  her  utmost  to  defend  Belgium's 
neutrality  if  attacked,"  and  added,  "that  fear  of 
consequences  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an 
excuse  for  breaking  solemn  promises." 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  INTERVENTION  OF  THE  KAISER 

The  Kaiser  now  appears  upon  the  scene  with  a 
fatal  result  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  One  fact  in 
this  controversy  is  too  clear  for  dispute.  When 
peace  proposals  were  still  under  consideration  and 
some  slight  progress  had  been  made  by  the 
eleventh -hour  consent  of  Austria  on  July  31  to 
discuss  with  Russia  the  merits  of  the  Servian 
question,  the  Kaiser — like  Brennus  with  his  v(B 
victis — threw  his  sword  into  the  trembling  scales 
and  definitely  turned  the  balance  against  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

Was  it  a  reluctant  Caesar  who  thus  crossed  the 
Rubicon,  at  whose  fateful  margin  he  had  stood  at 
other  crises  of  his  peaceful  reign  without  destroying 
that  peace? 

Our  information  is  still  too  meager  to  justify  a 
satisfactory  answer  at  this  time.  Not  only  are 
the  premises  in  dispute,  but  the  inferences  from 
admitted  premises  are  too  conflicting. 

At  the  time  the  Austrian  Archduke  was  mur- 
138 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    139 

de;-ed  the  Kaiser  was  in  Berlin,  and  he  at  once 
showed  an  intense  interest  in  the  event  and  in  all 
that  it  portended.  It  was  officially  announced 
that  he  planned  to  attend  the  funeral  in  Vienna, 
but  later  the  world  was  advised  that  he  had 
suffered  a  "chill,"  which  would  prevent  such 
attendance.  Perhaps  it  was  a  diplomatic  chill. 
He  then  left  for  Norway,  where  he  remained  in 
the  enjoyment  of  his  annual  holiday  until  the 
evening  of  July  26th,  when  he  suddenly  retiirned 
to  his  Capitol. 

Evidently  his  return  was  imexpected,  for  we 
Icam  from  a  telegram  from  Sir  H.  Rumbold  to 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  dated  July  26th,  that, 

the  Emperor  returned  suddenly  to-night  and  [the 
German]  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs  says  that  the  Foreign  Office  regrets  this 
step  which  was  taken  on  His  Majesty's  own  initia- 
tive. They  fear  that  His  Majesty's  sudden  return 
may  cause  speculation  and  excitement. 

As  the  refusal  of  Austria  to  accept  the  Servian 
reply  and  its  severance  of  all  diplomatic  relations 
with  that  country  had  already  thrown  the  entire 
world  into  a  state  of  feverish  anxiety,  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  why  the  German  Foreign  Office 
should  have  felt  that  the  very  natural  return  of  the 
Kaiser  to  his  Capitol  at  one  of  the  greatest  crises 


140         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

in  the  history  of  his  country  and  of  the  world  should 
be  regarded  as  giving  rise  to  "speculation  and  ex- 
citement," especially  as  the  President  of  the 
French  RepubHc  was  hastening  back  to  Paris. 

The  Under-Secretary  of  State's  deprecation  of 
the  Kaiser's  return  suggests  the  possibiHty  that 
the  German  Foreign  Office,  which  had  already 
made  substantial  progress  in  precipitating  the 
crisis,  did  not  wish  the  Kaiser's  return  for  fear 
that  he  might  again  exert,  as  in  the  Moroccan 
crisis,  his  great  influence  in  the  interests  of  peace. 

It  felt  that  it  had  the  matter  well  in  hand,  but 
never  before  did  a  foreign  office  blunder  so  fla- 
grantly and  with  such  disastrous  results.  From 
beginning  to  end  every  anticipation  that  the 
German  Chancellor  had  was  falsified  by  events. 
This  discreditable  and  blundering  chapter  of  Ger- 
man diplomacy  is  enough  to  make  the  bones  of 
the  sagacious  Bismarck  turn  in  his  grave. 

As  appears  from  Sir  M.  de  Bunsen's  dispatch 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  dated  July  26th,  it  was  the 
confident  belief  of  the  German  diplomats  that 
"  Russia  will  keep  quiet  during  the  chastisement  of 
Servia,"  and  that  "France  too  was  not  at  all  in  a 
position  for  facing  the  war. " ' 

When  the  full  history  of  this  imbroglio  is  written, 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  32. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     141 

it  will  probably  be  found  that  the  extensive  labor 
troubles  in  St.  Petersburg,  the  military  unpre- 
paredness  of  Russia  and  France,  and  the  pohtical 
schism  in  England,  then  verging  to  civil  war,  had 
deeply  impressed  both  Vienna  and  Berlin  that  the 
dual  alliance  could  impose  its  will  upon  Europe 
with  reference  to  Servia  without  any  serious  risk 
of  a  European  war. 

While  for  these  reasons  Germany  and  Austria 
may  not  have  regarded  such  a  war  or  the  inter- 
vention of  England  therein  as  probable,  yet  the 
dual  alliance  recognized  from  the  outset  such  a 
possibility.  The  imcertainty  as  to  the  Kaiser's 
attitude  with  respect  to  such  a  war  may  there- 
fore explain  the  "regret,"  with  which  the  German 
Foreign  Office  witnessed  his  sudden  and  iminvited 
return. 

On  his  return  the  diplomatic  negotiations,  which 
had  commenced  with  an  allegro  con  brio,  for  a 
time  changed  under  the  baton  of  the  Imperial 
Conductor  into  a  more  peaceful  andante,  until  the 
Kaiser  made  one  of  his  characteristically  sudden 
changes  of  purpose  and  precipitated  the  war  by 
an  arrogant  ultimatum  to  Russia,  which  that 
country  could  not  possibly  accept  without  a  fatal 
sacrifice  of  its  self-respect  and  prestige  as  a  nation. 

If  it  be  true — and  the  future  may  demonstrate 


142         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

it — that  this  war  was  planned  by  Germany  at 
least  as  far  back  as  the  Moroccan  crisis,  then  the 
Kaiser's  responsibility  for  the  commencement  of 
the  quarrel  cannot  be  doubted.  It  is  inconceiv- 
able that  the  German  Foreign  Office  could  pursue 
for  three  years  the  policy  of  precipitating  a  Euro- 
pean war  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  of 
the  "Over  War  Lord." 

When  fiill  data  are  accessible  as  to  the  importa- 
tions by  Germany  in  advance  of  the  war,  as  to  its 
withdrawal  of  foreign  credits  and  placing  of 
foreign  loans,  its  sales  of  stocks  by  influential 
investors,  and  its  importations  on  the  eve  of  the 
war  of  horses  and  foodstuffs,  a  strong  circumstan- 
tial case  may  be  developed  of  a  deliberate  purpose 
to  retrieve  the  Moroccan  fiasco  by  an  audacious 
coup  which  would  determine  the  mastery  of  Eu- 
rope. The  levy  in  19 13  of  an  extraordinary'-  tax 
upon  capital,  which  virtually  confiscated  the  earn- 
ings of  the  German  people  for  military  purposes, 
adds  much  support  to  this  contention.  According 
to  Giolitti,  the  former  Italian  Premier,  Austria 
sounded  Italy  in  August,  191 3,  as  to  its  willingness 
to  participate  in  a  war  against  Servia.  ^ 

The  inferences  to  be  drawn  from  the  Kaiser's 
personality  are  somewhat  conflicting.      Like   all 

'Giolitti  Speech,  Italian  Chamber,  Dec.  5,  1914. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    143 

self-centered  and  highly  neurotic  personaHties,  his 
nature  is  essentially  a  dual  one.  This  does  not 
mean  that  he  is  in  any  sense  a  hypocrite,  for  one 
of  the  engaging  features  of  his  attractive  person- 
ality has  been  the  candor  and  sincerity  which 
have  marked  nearly  all  his  public  acts.  He  has, 
shown  himself  to  be  a  man  of  opposite  moods,  and 
conflicting  purposes,  having  almost  as  many 
public  poses  as  he  has  costumes,  and  a  strong 
desire  to  play  as  many  varied  roles  as  possible  on 
the  stage  of  the  world.  Like  Bottom  in  the 
Midsummer  Night's  Dream,  he  would  play  all 
parts  from  the  "roaring  lion"  to  the  shrinking 
Thisbe. 

The  ruler  who  sent  a  sympathetic  message  to 
Kruger  as  an  insult  to  England  is  he  who  shortly 
thereafter  gratuitously  submitted  to  Queen  Vic- 
toria military  plans  for  the  subjugation  of  the 
Boers. 

The  ruler,  who  sent  the  PantJier  to  Agadir,  later 
restrained  his  country  from  declaring  war  against 
England,  when  Lloyd  George  threw  down  the 
gauntlet  in  his  Mansion  House  speech  in  the 
Moroccan  crisis. 

As  preacher,  the  Kaiser  exalted  within  sight  of 
the  Mount  of  Olives  the  precepts  of  Christian 
humility,  and  yet  advised  his  soldiers,  on  their 


144         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

departiire  to  China,  to  "take  no  prisoners  and  give 
no  quarter."  The  most  affable  and  democratic 
monarch  on  occasion  will  in  another  mood  assume 
the  outworn  toggery  of  mediaeval  absolutism.  A 
democratic  business  monarch,  and  as  such  the 
advance  agent  of  German  prosperity,  he  yet 
shocks  the  common  sense  and  awakens  the  ridicule 
of  the  world  by  posing  as  a  combination  of  Cassar 
and  Mahomet. 

The  avowed  champion  of  Christianity,  who  has 
preached  with  the  fervor  of  Peter  the  Hermit 
against  the  Yellow  Race,  he  has  nevertheless,  since 
this  war  began,  instigated  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  to 
proclaim  in  the  Moslem  world  a  "holy  war  "  against 
his  Christian  enemies. 

Pacific  and  bellicose  by  turns  the  monarch,  who 
throughout  his  whole  reign  has  hitherto  kept  the 
peace  of  the  world,  has  yet  on  slight  pretext  given 
utterance  to  the  most  warlike  and  incendiary 
statements. 

How  is  it  possible  to  draw  any  inference  from 
such  a  personality,  of  whom  it  could  be  said,  as 
Sydney  Smith  once  said  of  Lord  John  Russell,  that 

there  is  nothing  he  would  not  undertake.  I  believe 
he  would  perform  an  operation  for  stone,  build  St. 
Peter's,  assume  (with  or  without  ten  minutes'  no- 
tice) the  command  of  the  Channel  Fleet,  and  no  one 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     145 

would  discover  from  his  manner  that  the  patient  had 
died,  that  St.  Peter's  had  tumbled  down,  and  that 
the  Channel  Fleet  had  been  knocked  to  atoms. 

We  should  therefore  dismiss  all  inferences  sug- 
gested by  his  complex  personality  and  should  judge 
him  by  what  he  did  from  the  time  that  he  suddenly 
arrived  in  Berlin  on  July  26th,  until  the  issuance 
by  his  direct  order  of  the  fatal  ultimatum  to 
Russia. 

Before  proceeding  to  analyze  the  very  interest- 
ing and  dramatic  correspondence,  which  passed 
between  the  nders  of  Germany,  England,  and 
Russia — doubly  interesting  because  of  the  family 
relationship  and  the  unusual  personal  and  cousinly 
intimacy  of  these  dispatches — it  is  well  to  inquire 
what  the  Kaiser  could  have  done  that  would  have 
immediately  avoided  the  crisis  and  saved  the 
situation.  So  far  as  the  published  record  goes, 
he  did  not  send  a  single  telegram  in  the  interests 
of  peace  to  his  illustrious  ally,  the  Emperor 
Francis  Joseph. 

Let  us  suppose  that  he  had  sent  the  following: 

I  have  just  returned  to  Berlin  and  find  Europe 
on  the  verge  of  war.  I  sympathize  entirely  with 
you  and  your  country  in  its  demands  upon  Servia. 
I  agree  with  you  that  the  Servian  reply  is  not  satis- 
factory.   In  accordance  with  the  obligations  of  our 


146        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

alliance,  I  shall  in  any  event  support  with  the  full 
power  of  the  German  sword  the  cause  of  Austria. 
Servia  has  by  its  reply  admitted  its  responsibility 
for  the  murder  of  the  Archduke  and  has  unreserv- 
edly accepted  certain  of  your  demands,  and  as  to 
others  has  agreed  to  submit  them  either  to  The 
Hague  Tribunal  for  arbitration,  or  to  a  concert  of 
Powers.     You  will  decide  whether  Austria  is  satis- 
fied to  accept  either  of  these  suggestions,  but  as 
England,  France,  and  Russia  have  asked  that  time 
be  granted  to  consider  a  peaceful  and  satisfactory 
solution   of   the   difficulty,    and   as   the   questions 
reserved  by  Servia  can  be  used  as  the  basis  for 
further  discussion  without  prejudice  to  the  rights 
of  Austria,  and  as  it  is  to  the  interest  of  every 
country  and  the  entire  world  that  its  peace  should 
not  be  broken  unnecessarily,  I  shall  be  gratified  if 
you  can  agree  that  a  reasonable  time  shall  be  granted 
as  a  matter  of  courtesy  to  Russia,  England,  and 
France,  in  order  that  it  may  be  determined  upon 
due   consideration   whether  it  is   not   possible  to 
preserve  peace  without  sacrificing  in  any  respect  the 
legitimate  demands  of  Austria,  which  have  my  full 
sympathy  and  support. 

WiLHELM. 

Would  the  Austrian  Emperor,  himself  a  noble- 
minded  and  peace-loving  monarch,  have  refused 
this  reasonable  request?  A  little  time,  a  Httle 
patience  and  some  forbearance  for  the  rights  of 
other  States  and  the  youth  of  Europe  need  not 
have  perished.     Again,  "the  pity  of  it." 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    147 

In  its  place  the  following  correspondence  took 
place  between  the  Kaiser  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
Czar  and  King  George  on  the  other.  It  is  so 
dramatic  that  it  justifies  quotation  in  extenso.. 

On  the  night  of  July  28th,  the  Kaiser  sent  the 
following  dispatch  to  the  Czar: 

I  have  heard  with  the  greatest  anxiety  of  the 
impression  which  is  caused  by  the  action  of  Austria- 
Hungary  against  Servia.  The  imscrupvdous  agita- 
tion which  has  been  going  on  for  years  in  Servia 
has  led  to  the  revolting  crime  of  which  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand  has  become  a  victim.  The  spirit 
which  made  the  Servians  murder  their  own  King 
and  his  consort  still  dominates  that  country. 
Doubtless  You  will  agree  with  me  that  both  of  us, 
You  as  well  as  I,  and  all  other  sovereigns,  have  a 
common  interest  to  insist  that  all  those  who  are 
responsible  for  this  horrible  murder  shall  suffer 
their  deserved  punishment. 

On  the  other  hand  I  by  no  means  overlook  the 
difficulty  encountered  by  You  and  Your  Govern- 
ment to  stem  the  tide  of  public  opinion.  In  view  of 
the  cordial  friendship  which  has  joined  us  both  for 
a  long  time  with  firm  ties,  I  shall  use  my  entire 
influence  to  mduce  Austria-Hungary  to  obtain  a 
frank  and  satisfactory  understanding  with  Russia. 
I  hope  confidently  that  You  will  support  me  in  my 
efforts  to  overcome  all  difficulties  which  may  yet 
arise.  ^ 

'  Gemian  White  Paper,  No.  20.  The  Capitals  to  the  pronouns 
follow  the  original  correspondence. 


148         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

This  telegram  rings  true,  and  fairly  suggests  a 
pacific  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Kaiser  when  he 
first  took  the  helm  on  his  return  from  Norway. 
Its  weakness  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  record,  as 
presented  by  the  German  Government,  does  not 
disclose  any  communication  which  he  sent  to  his 
Austrian  ally  in  the  interests  of  peace.  We  have 
the  frequent  assurances  of  the  Kaiser  to  the  Czar 
that  he  was  exerting  all  his  influence  to  induce  his 
ally  to  come  to  a  satisfactory  understanding  with 
Russia,  hut  neither  over  the  signature  of  the  Kaiser 
nor  over  that  of  his  Foreign  Minister  does  the  record 
show  a  single  communication  addressed  to  Vienna  in 
the  interests  of  peace. 

The  Czar  did  not  fail  to  appreciate  this,  and  his 
reply  to  the  Kaiser  rings  quite  as  true  and  suggests 
the  crux  of  the  whole  problem.    It  reads: 

I  am  glad  that  You  are  back  in  Germany.  In 
this  serious  moment  I  ask  You  earnestly  to  help  me. 
An  ignominious  war  has  been  declared  against  a 
weak  country,  and  in  Russia  the  indignation,  which  I 
fully  share,  is  tremendous.  I  fear  that  very  soon  I 
shall  be  unable  to  resist  the  pressure  exercised  upon 
me  and  that  I  shall  be  forced  to  take  measures 
which  will  lead  to  war.  To  prevent  such  a  calamity 
as  a  European  war  would  be,  I  urge  You  in  the 
name  of  our  old  friendship  to  do  all  in  Your  power  to 
restrain  Your  ally  from  going  too  far.^ 
'  German  White  Paper,  No.  21. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     149 

Who  can  deny  the  force  of  the  sentence  thus 
italicized?  It  was  Austria  which  was  the  provoca- 
tive factor.  It  was  then  bombarding  Belgrade 
and  endeavoring  to  cross  the  Danube  into  Servia. 
It  had  declared  war,  and  brusquely  refused  even 
to  discuss  the  question  with  Russia.  It  was 
mobihzing  its  army,  and  making  every  effort  to 
make  a  speedy  subjugation  of  Servia.  If  peace 
was  to  be  preserved,  the  pressure  must  begin  with 
Austria.  If  any  question  remained  for  peace  par- 
leys, the  status  quo  must  be  preserved.  Russia 
could  not  permit  Austria  to  destroy  Servia  first  and 
then  discuss  its  justice. 

Thereupon  the  Kaiser  telegraphed  the  Czar  as 
follows : 

I  have  received  Your  telegram  and  I  share  Your 
desire  for  the  conservation  of  peace.  However  I 
cannot — as  I  told  You  in  my  first  telegram — 
consider  the  action  of  Austria-Hungary  as  an  "ig- 
nominious war."  Austria-Hungary  knows  from 
experience  that  the  promises  of  Servia  as  long  as 
they  arc  merely  on  paper  are  entirely  unreliable. 

According  to  my  opinion  the  action  of  Austria- 
Hungary  is  to  be  considered  as  an  attempt  to  receive 
full  guaranty  that  the  promises  of  Servia  are  effec- 
tively translated  into  deeds.  In  this  opinion  I  am 
strengthened  by  the  explanation  of  the  Austrian 
Cabinet  that  Austria-Hungary  intended  no  terri- 
torial gain  at  the  expense  of  Servia.    I  am  therefore 


150         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

of  opinion  that  it  is  perfectly  possible  for  Russia  to 
remain  a  spectator  in  the  Austro-Servian  war  with- 
out drawing  Europe  into  the  most  terrible  war  it  has 
ever  seen,  I  believe  that  a  direct  understanding  is 
possible  and  desirable  between  Your  Government 
and  Vienna,  an  understanding  which — as  I  have 
already  telegraphed  You — my  Government  en- 
deavors to  aid  with  all  possible  effort.  Naturally 
military  measures  by  Russia,  which  might  be 
construed  as  a  menace  by  Austria-Hungary,  would 
accelerate  a  calamity  which  both  of  us  desire 
to  avoid  and  would  undermine  my  position  as 
mediator  which — upon  Your  appeal  to  my  friendship 
and  aid — I  willingly  accepted.  ^ 

The  Kaiser's  fatal  error  lies  in  the  concluding 
paragraph  of  this  telegram,  in  claiming  that  Russia 
should  not  take  any  military  measures  pending  the 
Kaiser's  mediation,  although  Austria  should  be  left 
free  not  merely  to  make  such  preparations  against 
Russia,  but  to  pursue  its  aggressive  war  then  already 
commenced  against  Servia.  If  the  belligerents  were 
expected  to  desist  from  military  preparations, 
should  not  the  obligation  be  reciprocal? 

Later  that  night  the  Kaiser  again  telegraphed 
the  Czar: 

My  Ambassador  has  instructions  to  direct  the 
attention  of  Your  Government  to  the  dangers  and 
serious  consequences  of  a  mobilization;  I  have  told 
'  German  White  Paper,  No.  "?.  See  note,  post.,  p.  189. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    151 

You  the  same  in  my  last  telegram.  Austria-Hun- 
gary has  mobilized  only  against  Servia,  and  only  a 
part  of  her  army.  If  Russia,  as  seems  to  be  tiie 
case  according  to  Your  advice  and  that  of  Your 
Government,  mobilizes  against  Austria-Hungary, 
the  part  of  the  mediator,  with  which  You  have 
entrusted  me  in  such  friendly  manner  and  which  I 
have  accepted  upon  Your  express  desire,  is  threat- 
ened if  not  made  impossible.  The  entire  weight  of 
decision  now  rests  upon  Your  shoulders.  You  have 
to  bear  the  responsibility  for  war  or  peace. ^ 

To  which  the  Czar  replied  as  follows : 

I  thank  You  from  my  heart  for  Your  quick  reply. 
I  am  sending  to-night  Tatisheff  (Russian  honorary 
aide  to  the  Kaiser)  with  instructions.  The  military 
measures  now  taking  form  were  decided  upon  five 
days  ago,  and  for  the  reason  of  defense  against  the 
preparations  of  Austria.  I  hope  with  all  my  heart 
that  these  measures  will  not  influence  in  any 
manner  Your  position  as  mediator  which  I  appraise 
very  highly.  We  need  Your  strong  pressure  upon 
Austria  so  that  an  understanding  can  he  arrived  at 
with  us.* 

Later  the  Czar  again  telegraphed  the  Kaiser: 

I  thank  You  cordially  for  Your  mediation  which 
permits  the  hope  that  everything  may  yet  end 
peaceably.  It  is  technically  impossible  to  discon- 
tinue our  military  preparations  which  have  been 

'  German  White  Paper,  No.  23. 
*  Gennan  White  Paper,  No.  23  A. 


152         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

made  necessary  by  the  Austrian  mobilization.  It  is 
far  from  us  to  want  war.  As  long  as  the  negotiations 
between  Austria  and  Servia  continue,  my  troops  will 
undertake  no  provocative  action.  I  give  You  my 
solemn  word  thereon.  I  confide  with  all  my  faith 
in  the  grace  of  God,  and  I  hope  for  the  success  of 
Your  m.ediation  in  Vienna  for  the  welfare  of  our 
countries  and  the  peace  of  Europe. 

What  more  could  the  Kaiser  reasonably  ask? 
Here  was  an  assurance  from  the  ruler  of  a  great 
nation,  and  his  royal  cousin,  that  on  his  "  solemn 
word"  no  provocative  action  would  be  taken  by 
Russia  "as  long  as  the  negotiations  between  Austria 
and  Servia  continue"  and  this  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  Austria  had  flouted  and  ignored  Russia, 
had  declared  war  against  Servia  and  was  then 
endeavoring  to  subjugate  it  quickly  by  bombarding 
its  capital  and  invading  its  territory  with  superior 
forces. 

It  is  true  that  the  Czar  did  not  order  demobiliza- 
tion, and  apart  from  his  unquestioned  right  to 
prepare  for  eventualities  in  the  event  of  the  failure 
of  the  peace  parleys,  the  Kaiser  himself  recognized 
in  a  later  telegram  that  in  the  case  of  Germany 
when  mobilization  had  once  been  started  it  could 
not  be  immediately  arrested. 

Simultaneously  King  George  had  telegraphed 
the  Kaiser  through  Prince  Henry  as  follows: 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    153 

Thanks  for  Your  telegram ;  so  pleased  to  hear  of 
William's  efforts  to  concert  with  Nicky  to  maintain 
peace.  Indeed  I  am  earnestly  desirous  that  such 
an  irreparable  disaster  as  a  European  war  should 
be  averted.  My  Government  is  doing  its  utmost 
suggesting  to  Russia  and  France  to  suspend  further 
military  preparations  if  Austria  will  consent  to  be 
satisfied  with  occupation  of  Belgrade  and  neigh- 
boring Servian  territory  as  a  hostage  for  satis- 
factory settlement  of  her  demands ;  other  countries 
meanwhile  suspending  their  war  preparations. 
Trust  William  will  use  his  great  influence  to  induce 
Austria  to  accept  this  proposal,  thus  proving  that 
Germany  and  England  are  working  together  to 
prevent  what  would  be  an  international  catastrophe. 
Pray  assure  William  I  am  doing  and  shall  continue 
to  do  all  that  lies  in  my  power  to  preserve  peace  of 
Europe.* 

The  fairness  of  this  proposal  can  hardly  be 
disputed.  It  conceded  to  Austria  the  right  to 
occupy  the  capital  of  Servia  and  hold  it  as  a 
hostage  for  a  satisfactory  adjustment  of  her 
demands  and  even  to  continue  her  military 
preparations,  while  all  other  nations,  including 
Russia,  were  to  suspend  their  military  preparations. 
As  the  Kaiser  precipitated  the  war  because  Russia 
would  not  cease  its  preparations  for  eventualities, 
King  George's  proposal,  upon  which  neither  the 

'  Second  German  White  Paper. 


154         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Kaiser  nor  his  government  ever  acted,  fully  met 
his  demands. 

To  this  the  Kaiser  replied  on  July  31st: 

Many  thanks  for  kind  telegram.  Your  proposals 
coincide  with  My  ideas  and  with  the  statements  I 
got  this  night  from  Vienna  which  I  have  had 
forwarded  to  London.  I  just  received  news  from 
Chancellor  that  official  notification  has  just  reached 
him  that  this  night  Nicky  has  ordered  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  his  whole  army  and  fleet.  He  has  not  even 
awaited  the  results  of  the  mediation  I  am  working  at, 
and  left  Me  without  any  news.  I  am  off  for  Berlin 
to  take  measures  for  ensuring  safety  of  My  eastern 
frontiers  where  strong  Russian  troops  are  already 
posted.^ 

On  its  face  this  reply  seems  not  unreasonable, 
but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Austria  con- 
tinued not  only  to  bombard  Belgrade  but  to 
mobilize  its  armies  against  Russia  as  well  as  Servia. 
Russia  agreed  to  stop  all  military  preparations,  if 
Austria  would  consent  to  discuss  the  Servian 
question  with  a  view  to  peace.  Austria  until  the 
eleventh  hour — when  it  was  too  late — refused  even 
to  discuss  the  Servian  question  and  never  offered 
either  to  demobilize  or  to  cease  its  attack  upon 
Servia.  Germany  upheld  her  in  this  unwarrant- 
able course. 

'  Second  German  White  Paper. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    155 

Wliile  in  principle  the  Kaiser  agreed  with  the 
King  as  to  the  method  of  adjustment,  there  is 
nothing  in  the  record  to  indicate  that  the  Kaiser 
ever  made  any  suggestion  to  his  ally  that  it  should 
stop  its  operations  against  Servia  after  capturing 
Belgrade,  and  await  the  adjustment  of  the  ques- 
tions through  diplomatic  channels. 

Thereupon  King  George  sent  a  brief  telegram, 
stating  that  he  had  sent  an  urgent  telegram  to  the 
Czar  urging  this  course.  Later  on  July  31st  the 
Kaiser  sent  the  following  telegram  to  the  Czar: 

Upon  Your  appeal  to  my  friendship  and  Your 
request  for  my  aid  I  have  engaged  in  mediation 
between  Your  Government  and  the  Government  of 
Austria-Hungary.  While  this  action  was  taking 
place,  Your  troops  were  being  mobilized  against  my 
ally,  Austria-Hungary,  whereby,  as  I  have  already 
communicated  to  You,  my  mediation  has  become 
almost  illusory.  In  spite  of  this,  I  have  continued 
it,  and  now  I  receive  reliable  news  that  serious 
preparations  for  war  are  going  on  on  my  eastern 
frontier.  The  responsibility  for  the  security  of  my 
country  forces  me  to  measures  of  defense.  I  have 
gone  to  the  extreme  limit  of  the  possible  in  my 
efforts  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  of  the  world. 
It  is  not  I  who  bear  the  responsibihty  for  the  mis- 
fortune which  now  threatens  the  entire  civilized 
world.  It  rests  in  Your  hand  to  avert  it.  No  one 
threatens  the  honor  and  peace  of  Russia  w!ich 
might  well  have  awaited  the  success  of  mv  media- 


156         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

tion.  The  friendship  for  You  and  Your  country, 
bequeathed  to  me  by  my  grandfather  on  his  death- 
bed, has  always  been  sacred  to  me,  and  I  have  stood 
faithfully  by  Russia  while  it  was  in  serious  affliction, 
especially  during  its  last  war.  Tlic  peace  of  Europe 
can  still  be  preserved  by  You  if  Russia  decides  to 
discontinue  those  military  prcparatiojis  which  menace 
Germa7iy  and  Austria-Hungary . 

In  this  fair-spoken  message  we  unhappily  find 
no  suggestion  that  Austria  would  stop  its  mobil- 
ization, or  its  military  operations  against  Ser- 
via.  The  untenable  position  of  the  Kaiser,  to 
which  he  adhered  with  fatal  consistency  to  the 
end,  was  that  Austria  should  be  given  the  full 
right  to  mobilize  against  Russia  as  w^ell  as  Servia, 
and  that  his  ally  should  even  be  permitted  to 
press  its  aggressive  operations  against  Servia  by 
taking  possession  of  its  capital  and  holding  it  as 
a  ransom.  In  the  meantime  Russia  should  not 
make  any  military  preparations,  either  to  move 
eflectually  against  Austria  in  the  event  of  the 
failure  of  negotiations,  or  even  to  defend  itself. 

The  Kaiser's  suggestion  did  not  even  carry 
with  it  the  implication  that  Germany  would  stop 
the  military  preparations  that  it  was  then  carry- 
ing on  in  feverish  haste,  so  that  the  contention 
of  the  Kaiser,  however  plausibly  it  was  veiled 
in  his  telegram,  was  that  Germany  and  Austria 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    157 

should  have  full  freedom  to  prepare  for  war  against 
Russia,  while  Russia  was  to  tie  its  hands  and  await 
the  outcome  of  further  parleys,  with  Austrian  cannon 
bombarding  Belgrade. 

In  this  correspondence  the  Kaiser  displayed 
his  recognized  ability  as  a  writer  and  speaker,  for 
in  this  rapid-fire  exchange  of  telegrams  the  Kaiser 
was  easily  the  better  controversialist. 

He  assumed  the  role  of  a  disinterested  party, 
who,  at  the  request  of  a  litigant,  agrees  to  become  an 
impartial  mediator.  He  was  neither.  The  Czar 
had  not  asked  him  to  be  a  mediator,  although  in 
the  later  telegrams  the  Russian  monarch  accepted 
that  term.  The  Czar  in  his  first  telegram  had 
asked  the  Kaiser  as  a  party  to  the  quarrel  "to 
restrain  your  ally  from  going  too  far. "  The  Kaiser, 
having  adroitly  accepted  a  very  different  role, 
promptly  shifts  the  responsibility  upon  the  Czar 
of  embarrassing  the  so-called  "mediation."  This 
enabled  him  to  assume  the  attitude  of  "injured 
innocence"  and  very  skillfully  he  played  that  part. 

This  at  least  is  clear  that  in  this  correspondence 
the  Kaiser  was  either  guilty  of  insincerity  or  he 
betrayed  a  fatal  incapacity  to  grasp  the  essentials 
of  the  quarrel.  I  prefer  the  latter  construction  of 
his  conduct.  Against  the  bellicose  efforts  of  his 
Foreign  Office  and  his  General  Staff,  I  believe  that 


158         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

for  dynastic  reasons  he  strove  for  a  time  to  adjust 
the  difficulty,  but  his  egomania  and  his  Hfe-long 
habit  of  personal  absolutism  blinded   him  to  the 
fact  that  he  was  taking  an  untenable,  indeed  an 
impossible,   position,   in   contending   that  Russia 
should  effectually  tie  its  hands  while  Germany  and 
Austria  should  be  left  free  to  prepare  for  eventu- 
alities.     Had  there  been  a  breathing  spell  and 
the  Kaiser  had  had  more  time  for  reflection,  pos- 
sibly the  unreasonableness  of  his  contention  would 
have  suggested  itself,  but  he  found  on  his  sudden 
return  from  Norway  that  his  country,  through  the 
fatuous   folly   of  its   military  party,  was   almost 
irrevocably  committed  to  war.     Probably  he  did 
not  dare  to  reverse  openly  and  formally  its  policy. 
His  popularity  had  already  suffered  in  the  Moroc- 
can crisis.     This  consideration  and  the  histrionic 
side  to  his  complex  personality  betrayed  him  into 
his  untenable  and  fatal  position. 

The  Kaiser  has  hitherto  been  regarded  as  a  man 
of  exceptional  ability.  Time  and  the  issue  of  this 
war  will  tell.  The  verdict  of  history  may  be  to  the 
contrary.  The  world  for  a  time  may  easily  con- 
fuse restless  energy  and  habitual  meddling  with 
real  ability,  but  its  final  verdict  will  go  far  deeper. 
Since  the  Kaiser  dropped  his  sagacious  pilot, 
Germany's  real  position  in  the  world  has  steadily 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     159 

weakened.  Then  it  was  the  first  power  in  Europe 
with  its  rivals  disunited.  The  Kaiser  has  united 
his  enemies  with  "hoops  of  steel,"  driven  Russia 
and  England  into  a  close  alliance,  forced  Italy- 
out  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  as  the  only  com- 
pensation for  these  disastrous  results,  he  has  gained 
the  doubtful  cooperation  of  moribund  Turkey, 
of  which  he  is  likely  to  say  before  many  months 
are  over:  "  "Who  shall  deliver  me  from  the  body 
of  this  death  ?  " 

In  the  meantime,  Germany  was  not  idle  in  its 
preparations  for  eventualities. 

The  Kaiser  and  his  counsellors  were  already 
definitely  planning  for  the  war,  and  were  taking 
steps  to  alienate  England  from  her  Allies  and 
secure  her  neutrality.  To  insure  this,  the  German 
Chancellor,  having  visited  the  Kaiser  at  Pots- 
dam, sent  for  the  British  Ambassador,  and  made 
the  following  significant  offer: 

'  I  was  asked  to  call  upon  the  Chancellor  to-night. 
His  Excellency  had  just  returned  from  Potsdam. 

He  said  that  should  Austria  be  attacked  by  Russia 
a  European  conflagration  might,  he  feared,  become 
inevitable,  owing  to  Germany's  obligations  as 
Austria's  ally,  in  spite  of  his  continued  efforts  to 
maintain  peace.  He  then  proceeded  to  make  the 
following  strong  bid  for  British  neutrality.  He  said 
that  it  was  clear,  so  far  a<  he  was  able  to  judge  the 
'  Sir  E.  Goschen. 


i6o        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

main  principle  which  governed  British  policy,  that 
Great  Britain  would  never  stand  by  and  allow 
France  to  be  crushed  in  any  conflict  there  might  be. 
That,  however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Germany 
aimed.  Provided  that  neutrality  of  Great  Britain 
were  certain,  every  assurance  would  be  given  to  the 
British  Government  that  the  Imperial  Government 
aimed  at  no  territorial  acquisitions  at  the  expense 
of  France,  shoiild  they  prove  victorious  in  any  war 
that  might  ensue. 

I  questioned  his  Excellency  about  the  French 
colonies,  and  he  said  that  he  was  unable  to  give  a 
similar  undertaking  in  that  respect.  As  regards 
Holland,  however,  his  Excellency  said  that,  so 
long  as  Germany's  adversaries  respected  the  in- 
tegrity and  neutrality  of  the  Netherlands,  Germany 
was  ready  to  give  his  Majesty's  Government  an 
assurance  that  she  would  do  likewise.  It  depended 
upon  the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany 
might  be  forced  to  enter  upon  in  Belgium,  but  when 
the  war  was  over  Belgian  integrity  would  be 
respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany. 

His  Excellency  ended  by  saying  that  ever  since 
he  had  been  Chancellor  the  object  of  his  policy  had 
been,  as  you  were  aware,  to  bring  about  an  under- 
standing with  England;  he  trusted  that  these 
assurances  might  form  the  basis  of  that  understand- 
ing which  he  so  much  desired.  He  had  in  mind  a 
general  neutrality  agreement  between  England  and 
Germany,  though  it  was,  of  course,  at  the  present 
moment  too  early  to  discuss  details,  and  an  assur- 
ance of  British  neutrality  in  the  conflict  which  the 
present  crisis  might  possibly  produce,  would  enable 
him  to  look  forward  to  a  realization  of  his  desire. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     i6i 

In  reply  to  his  Excellency's  inquiry  how  I  thought 
his  request  would  appeal  to  you,  I  said  that  I  did 
not  think  it  probable  that  at  this  stage  of  events 
you  would  care  to  bind  yourself  to  any  course  of 
action  and  that  I  was  of  opinion  that  you  would 
desire  to  retain  full  liberty.  ^ 

While  the  German  Foreign  Office  was  thus 
endeavoring  to  keep  England  neutral,  its  army 
was  on  the  move  against  France.  This  does  not 
rest  upon  vague  allegation,  but  upon  the  detailed 
specifications  in  a  communication  from  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  which  the  French  Ambassador  in 
London  submitted  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July 
31st.  Its  significance  is  apparent  w^hen  it  is  re- 
membered that  simultaneously  the  Kaiser  was  in- 
voking the  Czar  to  demobilize  his  armies,  and  cease 
military  preparations. 

The  German  army  had  its  advance  posts  on  our 
frontiers  yesterday  (Friday).  German  patrols 
twice  penetrated  on  to  our  territory.  Our  advance 
posts  are  withdrawn  to  a  distance  of  10  kilometers 
from  the  frontier.  The  local  population  is  protest- 
ing against  being  thus  abandoned  to  the  attack 
of  the  enemy's  army,  but  the  Government  wishes 
to  make  it  clear  to  public  opinion  and  to  the  British 
Government  that  in  no  case  will  France  be  the 
aggressor.  The  whole  i6th  Corps  from  Metz, 
reinforced  by  a  part  of  the  8th  from  Treves  and 

«  English  White  Paper,  No.  8'^. 


i62        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Cologne,  is  occupying  the  frontier  at  Metz  on  the 
Luxemburg  side.  The  1 5th  Army  Corps  from  Strass- 
burg  has  closed  up  on  the  frontier.  The  inhabitants 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  are  prevented  by  the  threat  of 
being  shot  from  crossing  the  frontier.  Reservists 
have  been  called  back  to  Germany  by  tens  of  thou- 
sands. This  is  the  last  stage  before  mobilization, 
whereas  we  have  not  called  out  a  single  reservist. 

As  you  see,  Germany  has  done  it.  /  would  add 
that  all  my  information  goes  to  show  that  the  German 
preparations  began  on  Saturday,  the  very  day  on, 
which  the  Austrian  note  was  handed  in.^ 

In  reply  to  the  suggestion  of  the  German  Chan- 
cellor as  to  the  neutrality  of  England,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  advised  the  Englivsh  Ambassador  on  July  30th, 
as  follows : 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment 
entertain  the  Chancellor's  proposal  that  they  should 
bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand 
by  while  French  colonies  are  taken  and  France  is 
beaten  so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French 
territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies. 

From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal 
is  unacceptable,  for  France,  without  further  terri- 
tory in  Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could  be  so 
crushed  as  to  lose  her  position  as  a  great  Power, 
and  become  subordinate  to  Germ.an  policy. 

Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  dis- 
grace for  us  to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany  at 

'English  White  Paper,  No.  105.  "Au;trian"  obvious! v 
means  "  Servian.  " 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     163 

the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the 
good  name  of  this  country  would  never  recover. 

The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain 
avv'ay  whatever  obligations  or  interest  we  have  as 
regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not 
entertain  that  bargain  either. 

Having  said  so  much,  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine 
whether  the  prospect  of  a  future  general  neutrality 
agreement  between  England  and  Germany  offered 
positive  advantages  sufficient  to  compensate  us  for 
tying  our  hands  now.  We  must  preserve  our  full 
freedom  to  act  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  us  to 
require  in  any  such  unfavorable  and  regrettable 
development  of  the  present  crisis  as  the  Chancellor 
contemplates. 

You  should  speak  to  the  Chancellor  in  the  above 
sense,  and  add  most  earnestly  that  one  way  of 
maintaining  good  relations  between  England  and 
Germany  is  that  they  should  continue  to  work 
together  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe;  if  we 
succeed  in  this  object,  the  mutual  relations  of 
Germany  and  England  will,  I  believe,  be  ipso  facto 
improved  and  strengthened.  For  that  object  His 
Majesty's  Government  will  work  in  that  way  with 
all  sincerity  and  good- will. 

And  I  will  say  this:  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can 
be  preserved,  and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed,  my 
own  endeavor  will  be  to  promote  some  arrangement,  to 
which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be 
assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be 
pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia, 
and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately. 

This  letter  will  give  Sir  Edward  Grey  lasting 


1 64         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

glory  in  the  history  of  civilization.  Its  chivalrous 
fairness  to  France  needs  no  comment,  but  its  most 
significant  feature  is  the  concluding  portion,  in 
which  the  English  Foreign  Minister  suggested  to 
Germany  that  if  peace  could  be  preserved,  Eng- 
land stood  ready  to  join  with  Germany  in  an 
alliance  which  would  have  insured  all  the  great 
European  nations  against  any  aggressive  war  on 
the  part  of  either  of  them. 

It  was,  in  fact,  the  "United  States  of  Europe" 
in  embryo.  It  was  the  one  solution  possible  for 
these  long-continued  European  wars — essentially 
civil  wars — namely  an  alliance  by  the  six  great 
Powers, — a  merger  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the 
Triple  Entente, — whereby  any  aggressive  act  on 
the  part  of  any  one  of  them  would  be  prevented  by 
the  others.  What  an  infinite  pity  that  the  im- 
prudent act  of  the  Kaiser,  and  the  mad  folly  of  his 
advisers  probably  made  a  fair  trial  of  this  most 
hopeful  plan  for  the  unification  of  Europe  an  im- 
possibility for  another  century! 

In  order  that  Germany  should  have  no  excuse 
whatever  to  declare  war  on  account  of  Russia's 
preparations,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  saw. 
the  German  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  on  July 
30th,  and  then  offered  on  behalf  of  Russia  to  stop 
all  military  preparations,   provided   that  Austria 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     165 

would  simply  recognize  as  an  abstract  principle 
that  the  Servian  question  had  assumed  the  char- 
acter of  a  question  of  European  interest.  As  this 
proposal  fuU}^  met  the  demands  of  the  Kaiser 
with  respect  to  the  cessation  by  Russia  of  military 
preparations,  the  conversation  as  reported  by 
the  English  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  on  July  30th  deserves  quotation 
in  extenso: 

French  Ambassador  and  I  visited  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  this  morning.  His  Excellency 
said  that  German  Ambassador  had  told  him  yes- 
terday afternoon  that  German  Government  were 
willing  to  guarantee  that  Servian  integrity  would  be 
respected  by  Austria.  To  this  he  had  replied  that 
this  might  be  so,  but  nevertheless  Servia  would 
become  an  Austrian  vassal,  just  as,  in  similar 
circumstances,  Bokhara  had  become  a  Russian 
vassal.  There  would  be  a  revolution  in  Russia  if 
she  were  to  tolerate  such  a  state  of  affairs. 

M.  Sazonof  told  us  that  absolute  proof  was  in 
possession  of  Russian  Government,  that  Germany 
was  making  military  and  naval  preparations  against 
Russia — more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  the 
Gulf  of  Finland. 

German  Ambassador  had  a  second  interview 
with  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  2  a.m.,  when 
former  completely  broke  down  on  seeing  that  war 
was  ine\^table.  He  appealed  to  M.  Sazonof  to 
make  some  suggestion  which  he  could  telegraph  to 


i66         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

German  Government  as  a  last  hope.  M.  Sazonof 
accordingly  drew  up  and  handed  to  German  Am- 
bassador a  formula  in  French,  of  which  the  follow- 
ing is  a  translation : 

"//  Austria,  recognizing  that  her  conflict  with 
Servia  has  assumed  character  of  question  of  European 
interest,  declares  herself  ready  to  eliminate  from  her 
ultimatum  points  which  violate  principle  of  sovereignty 
of  Servia,  Russia  engages  to  stop  all  military  prepara- 
tions.^^ 

Later  in  the  day,  at  the  suggestion  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  still  further 
modified  in  the  interests  of  peace  the  proposition 
upon  which  Russia  was  willing  to  cease  all  military 
preparations. 

If  Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her 
armies  upon  Servian  territory,  and  if,  recognizing 
that  the  Austro-Servian  conflict  has  assumed  the 
character  of  a  question  of  European  interest,  she 
admits  that  the  great  Powers  examine  the  reparation 
which  Servia  coidd  accord  to  the  Government  of 
Austria-Hungary  without  injury  to  her  rights  as  a 
sovereign  State  and  to  her  independence — Russia 
undertakes  to  maintain  her  expectant  attitude. 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  formula  implied  that 
Servia  owed  some  reparation  to  Austria,  and  it  did 
not  bind  Austria  to  accept  the  judgment  of  the 
Powers  as  to  the  character  of  such  reparation. 

It  simply  conceded  to  the  Powers  the  oppor- 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    167 

tunity  to  "examine " — not  the  original  controversy 
between  Austria  and  Servia — but  what  reparation 
could  be  made  without  a  compromise  of  sover- 
eignty and  independence.  Austria  did  not  bind 
itself  to  do  anything  except  to  stay  the  advance  of 
her  army  into  Servia,  while  Russia  agreed  to 
desist  from  further  preparations  or  mobilization. 

Could  the  offer  have  been  more  liberal?  In  face 
of  this  assurance,  how  can  the  Kaiser  or  Germany 
reasonably  contend  that  it  was  the  mobilization 
of  the  Russian  army  which  precipitated  the  war. 

In  the  meantime  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  working 
tirelessly  to  suggest  some  peace  formula,  upon 
which  the  Powers  could  agree.  His  suggestions 
for  a  conference  of  the  four  leading  Powers  of 
Europe,  other  than  Russia  and  Austria,  had  been 
negatived  by  Germany  on  the  frivolous  pretext 
that  such  a  conference  was  "too  formal  a  method, " 
quite  ignoring  the  fact  that  its  very  formality 
would  have  necessarily  given  a  "cooling  time"  to 
the  would-be  belligerents.  Thereupon  Sir  Edward 
Grey  urged  that, 

the  German  Government  should  suggest  any  method 
by  which  the  influence  of  the  four  Powers  could  be  used 
together  to  prevent  war  between  Austria  and  Russia. 
France  agreed.  Italy  agreed.  The  whole  idea  of 
mediation  or  mediating  influence  was  ready  to  be 


i68        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

put  into  operation  by  any  method  that  Germany 
could  suggest  if  mine  was  not  acceptable.  In  fact, 
mediation  was  ready  to  come  into  operation  by  any 
method  that  Germany  thought  possible  if  only 
Germany  would  "press  the  button''  in  the  interests 
of  peace. ^ 

Later  in  the  day  Sir  Edward  again  repeated  his 
suggestion  to  the  German  Ambassador  in  London 
and  urged  that  Germany  should, 

propose  some  method  by  which  the  four  Powers 
should  be  able  to  work  together  to  keep  the  peace  of 
Europe.  I  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  Russian 
Government,  while  desirous  of  mediation,  regarded 
it  as  a  condition  that  the  military  operations  against 
Servia  should  be  suspended,  as  otherwise  a  media- 
tion would  only  drag  on  matters  aiid  give  Austria 
time  to  crush  Servia.  It  was  of  course  too  late  for 
all  military  operations  against  Servia  to  be  sus- 
pended. In  a  short  time,  I  supposed,  the  Austrian 
forces  would  be  in  Belgrade,  and  in  occupation  of 
some  Servian  territory.  But  even  then  it  might 
be  possible  to  bring  some  mediation  into  existence, 
if  Austria,  while  saying  that  she  must  hold  the 
occupied  territory  until  she  had  complete  satisfac- 
tion from  Servia,  stated  that  she  would  not  advance 
further,  pending  an  effort  of  the  Powers  to  mediate 
between  her  and  Russia. 

The  only  reply  that  England  received  to  this 
reiterated  request  that  Germany  take  the  lead  in 

'  English  While  Paper,  No.  84. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     169 

suggesting  some  acceptable  peace  formula  was  set 
forth  in  a  dispatch  from  Sir  E.  Goschen  from  Berlin 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey : 

I  was  informed  last  night  that  they  (the  German 
Foreign  Office)  had  not  had  time  to  send  an  answer 
yet.  To-day,  in  reply  to  an  inquiry  from  the  French 
Ambassador  as  to  whether  the  Imperial  Government 
had  proposed  any  course  of  action,  the  [German] 
Secretary  of  State  said  that  he  felt  that  time  would  be 
saved  by  communicating  with  Vienna  direct,  and  that 
he  had  asked  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  what 
would  satisfy  them.  No  answer  had,  however,  yet  been 
returjied. 

The  Chancellor  told  me  last  night  that  he  was 
"pressing  the  button"  as  hard  as  he  could,  and  that 
he  was  not  sure  whether  he  had  not  gone  so  far  in 
urging  moderation  at  Vienna  that  matters  had  been 
precipitated  rather  than  otherwise.'^ 

The  Court  of  PubHc  Opinion  unfortunately  is 
not  favored  in  the  German  White  Paper  with  the 
text  of  its  communication  on  this  subject  to  Vienna, 
nor  is  it  given  any  specifications  as  to  the  manner 
in  which  the  German  Chancellor  "pressed  the 
button." 

What  the  world  knows  without  documentary 
proof  is  that  Austria  continued  its  military  prep- 
arations and  operations  and  that  Russia  then 
ordered  a  general  mobiUzation.    The  only  assur- 

I  See  English  White  Paper,  No.  84. 


1 70        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

ance  which  Russia  received  from  Austria  as  a 
result  of  the  alleged  "pressing  of  the  button"  is 
set  forth  in  the  following  dispatch  from  the 
Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  to  Sazonof ,  dated 
July  31st: 

In  spite  of  the  general  mobilization  I  continue 
to  exchange  views  with  Count  Berchtold  and  his 
collaborators.  All  insist  on  the  absence  of  aggres- 
sive intentions  on  the  part  of  Austria  against  Russia 
and  of  ambitions  of  conquest  in  regard  to  Servia, 
hilt  all  equally  insist  on  the  necessity  for  Austria  of 
pursuing  to  the  very  end  the  action  begun  and  of  giving 
to  Servia  a  serious  lesson  which  would  constitute  a 
certain  guarantee  for  the  future. 

This  was  in  effect  a  flat  refusal  of  all  mediatory 
or  otherwise  pacific  suggestions,  for  the  right  of 
Austria  to  crush  Servia  by  giving  it  "a  serious 
lesson" — what  such  a  lesson  is  let  Lou  vain,  Liege, 
and  Rheims  witness ! — was  the  crux  of  the  whole 
question. 

Concurrently  Sir  Edward  Goschen  telegraphed 
to  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  Germany  had  declared 
that  day  the  "Kriegsgefahr"  and  that  the  German 
Chancellor  had  expressed  the  opinion  that  "all 
hope  of  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  crisis"  was  at 
an  end.  The  British  Ambassador  then  asked  the 
Chancellor, — 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     171 

whether  he  could  not  still  put  pressure  on  the 
authorities  at  Vienna  to  do  something  in  the  general 
interests  to  reassure  Russia  and  to  show  themselves 
disposed  to  continue  discussions  on  a  friendly  basis. 
He  replied  that  last  night  he  had  begged  Austria 
to  reply  to  your  last  proposal,  and  that  he  had 
received  a  reply  to  the  effect  that  Austrian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  would  take  the  wishes  of  the 
Emperor  this  morning  in  the  matter/ 

Here  again  the  world  is  not  favored  with  the 
text  of  the  message,  in  which  the  Chancellor 
"begged  Austria  to  reply,"  nor  with  that  of  the 
Austrian  Foreign  Minister's  reply. 

While  these  events  were  happening  in  Berlin 
and  London,  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna 
advised  Sazonof  "that  Austria  has  determined 
not  to  yield  to  the  intervention  of  the  powers 
and  that  she  is  moving  troops  against  Russia  as 
well  as  Servia."^ 

Russia  thereupon,  on  July  31,  ordered  a  general 
mobilization  of  her  army. 

Concurrently  with  these  interviews,  the  English 
Ambassador  in  Vienna  had  a  conversation  with 
the  Austrian  Under-Secretary  of  State  and 

called  his  attention  to  the  fact  that  during  the 
discussion  of  the  Albanian  frontier  at  the  London 
Conference    of    Ambassadors    the    Russian    Gov- 

»English  White  Paper,  No.  1 12.     ^English  While  Paper,  No.  1 13. 


172         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

ernment  had  stood  behind  Servia,  and  that  a 
compromise  between  the  views  of  Russia  and 
Austria-Hungary  resulted  with  accepted  frontier 
line.  Although  he'  spoke  in  a  conciliatory  tone,  and 
did  not  regard  the  situation  as  desperate,  /  could  not 
get  from  him  any  suggestion  for  a  similar  compromise 
in  the  present  case.  Count  Forgach  is  going  this 
afternoon  to  see  the  Russian  Ambassador,  whom  I 
have  informed  of  the  above  conversation.* 

Nothwithstanding  all  these  discouragements 
and  rebuffs,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  that  unwearying 
friend  of  peace,  still  continued  to  make  a  last 
attempt  to  preserve  peace  by  instructing  the 
British  Ambassador  in  Berlin  to  sound  the  German 
Foreign  Office,  as  he  would  sound  the  Russian 
Foreign  Office, 

whether  it  would  be  possible  for  the  four  disin- 
terested Powers  to  offer  to  Austria  that  they  would 
undertake  to  see  that  she  obtained  full  satisfaction 
of  her  demands  on  Servia,  provided  that  they  did 
not  impair  Servian  sovereignty  and  the  integrity 
of  Servian  territory.  As  your  Excellency  is  aware, 
Austria  has  already  declared  her  willingness  to 
respect  them.  Russia  might  be  informed  by  the 
four  Powers  that  they  would  undertake  to  prevent 
Austrian  demands  from  going  the  length  of  impair- 
ing Servian  sovereignty  and  integrity.  All  Powers 
would  of  course  suspend  further  military  operations 
or  preparations. 

'The  Austrian  Under-Secretary  of  State. 
'English  While  Paper,  No.  1 1 8. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    173 

He  further  instructed  Sir  Edward  Goschen  to 
advise  the  German  Foreign  Office  that  he,  Sir 
Edward  Grey,  had  that  morning  proposed  to  the 
German  Ambassador  in  London, 

that  if  Germany  could  get  any  reasonable  proposal  put 
forward,  which  made  it  clear  that  Germany  and 
Austria  were  striving  to  preserve  European  peace, 
and  that  Russia  and  France  would  be  unreasonable 
if  they  rejected  it,  I  would  support  it  at  St.  Peters- 
burg  and  Paris,  and  go  the  length  of  saying  that,  if 
Russia  and  France  would  not  accept  it,  his  Majesty's 
Government  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the 
consequences ;  that,  otherwise,  I  told  the  German 
Ambassador  that  if  France  became  involved  we 
should  be  drawn  in/ 

What,  then,  was  the  position  when  the  last  fatal 
step  was  taken?  The  Czar  had  pledged  his  per- 
sonal honor  that  no  provocative  action  should 
be  taken  by  Russia,  while  peace  parleys  were  in 
progress,  and  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  had 
agreed  to  cease  all  military  preparations,  provided 
that  Austria  would  recognize  that  the  question  of 
Servia  had  become  one  of  European  interest,  and 
that  its  sovereignty  would  be  respected. 

On  July  31st,  Austria  for  the  first  time  in  the 
negotiations  agreed  to  discuss  with  the  Russian 
Government  the  merits  of  the  Servian  note.    Until 

*  English  White  Paper,  No.  iii. 


174         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

this  eleventh  hour  Austria  had  consistently  con- 
tended that  her  difficulty  with  Servia  was  her  own 
question,  in  which  Russia  had  no  right  to  intervene, 
and  which  it  would  not  under  any  circumstances 
even  discuss  with  Russia.  For  this  reason  it  had 
refused  any  time  for  discussion,  abruptly  declared 
war  against  Servia,  commenced  its  military  opera- 
tions, and  repeatedly  declined  to  discuss  even  the 
few  questions  left  open  in  the  Servian  reply  as  a 
basis  for  further  peace  parleys. 

As  recently  as  July  30th,  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment had  declined  or  refused  any  "direct  exchange 
of  views  with  the  Russian  Government." 

But  late  on  July  31st,  a  so-called  "conversation" 
took  place  at  Vienna  between  Count  Berchtold 
and  the  Russian  Ambassador,  and  as  a  result, 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  was 
instructed  to  "converse"  with  the  Russian  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs.  This  important  concession 
of  Austria  was  conveyed  to  Sazonof  by  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  who  expressed 

the  readiness  of  his  Government  to  discuss  the 
substance  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia. 
M.  Sazonof  replied  by  expressing  his  satisfaction 
and  said  it  was  desirable  that  the  discussions  should 
take  place  in  London  with  the  participation  of  the 
Great  Powers. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     175 

M.  Sazonof  hoped  that  the  British  Government 
would  assume  the  direction  of  these  discussions. 
The  whole  of  Europe  would  be  thankful  to  them. 
It  would  be  very  important  that  Austria  should 
meanwhile  put  a  stop  provisionally  to  her  military 
action  on  Servian  territory.^ 

//  is  important  to  note  that  Austria's  change  oj 
heart  preceded  hy  some  hours  the  Kaiser's  ultimatum 
to  Russia.  The  former  took  place  some  time 
during  the  day  on  July  31st.  The  latter  was  sent 
to  St.  Petersburg  on  the  midnight  of  that  day. 
It  must  also  be  noted  that  while  Austria  thus 
agreed  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  "discuss  the  sub- 
stance of  the  ultimatum,"  it  did  not  offer  to  sus- 
pend military  preparations  or  operations  and  this 
obviously  deprived  the  concession  of  its  chief 
value,  ^ 

The  cause  and  purpose  of  Austria's  partial 
reversal  of  its  policy  at  present  writing  can  be 
only  a  matter  of  conjecture.  When  Austria  pub- 
lishes its  correspondence  with  Germany,  we  may 
know  the  truth. 

Two  theories  are  equally  plausible : 

Austria  may  have  taken  alarm  at  the  steadfast 
purpose  of  Russia  to  champion  the  cause  of  Servia 
with  the  sword.     If  so,  its  qualified  reversal  of  its 

'English  White  Paper,  No.  133.     'See  Addendum,  p.  191-2. 


176        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

bellicose  attitude  may  have  induced  the  war  party 
at  Berlin  to  precipitate  the  war  by  the  ultimatum 
to  Russia.  In  that  event,  Germany's  mad  poHcy 
of  war  at  any  cost  is  even  more  iniquitous.  ^ 

The  supposition  is  equally  plausible  that  Austria 
had  been  advised  from  Berlin  that  that  night  Ger- 
many would  end  all  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace  of 
Europe  by  an  ultimatum  to  Russia,  which  would 
make  war  inevitable.  The  case  of  Germany  and 
Austria  at  the  bar  of  the  world  would  be  made 
morally  stronger  if,  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities, 
the  attitude  of  Austria  had  become  more  concilia- 
tory. This  would  make  more  plausible  their 
contention  that  the  mobilization  of  Russia  and 
not  Austria's  fiat  rejection  of  all  peace  overtures 
had  precipitated  the  conflict. 

This  much  is  certain  that  the  Kaiser,  with  full 
knowledge  that  Austria  had  consented  to  renew  its 
conferences  with  Russia,  and  that  a  ray  of  light  had 
broken  through  the  lowering  war  clouds,  either  on 
his  own  initiative  or  yielding  to  the  importunities 
of  his  military  camarilla,  directed  the  issuance  of 
the  ultimatum  to  Russia  and  thus  blasted  the  last 
hope  of  peace. 

On  midnight  of  July  31st,  the  German  Chan- 
cellor sent  the  following  telegram  to  the  German 
Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg: 

^See  Addendum,  p.  190,  et  seq. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    177 

In  spite  of  still  pending  mediatory  negotiations, 
and  although  we  ourselves  have  up  to  the  present 
moment  taken  no  measures  for  mobilization,  Russia 
has  mobilized  her  entire  army  and  navy;  in  other 
words,  mobilized  against  us  also.  By  these  Russian 
measures  we  have  been  obliged,  for  the  safeguarding 
of  the  Empire,  to  announce  that  danger  of  war 
threatens  us,  which  does  not  yet  mean  mobilization. 
Mobilization,  however,  must  follow  unless  Russia 
ceases  within  twelve  hours  all  warlike  measures 
against  us  and  Austria-Hungary  and  gives  us  defi- 
nite assurance  thereof.  Kindly  communicate  this 
at  once  to  M.  Sazonof  and  wire  hour  of  its  communi- 
cation to  him. 

At  midnight  the  fateful  message  was  delivered. 
As  Sazonof  reports  the  interview: 

At  midnight  the  Ambassador  of  Germany  de- 
clared to  me,  by  order  of  his  Government,  that  if 
within  twelve  hours,  that  is  at  midday  of  Saturday, 
we  did  not  commence  demobilization,  not  only  in 
regard  to  Germany  but  also  in  regard  to  Austria,  the 
German  Government  would  be  forced  to  give  the 
order  of  mobilization.  To  my  question  if  this  was 
war  the  Ambassador  replied  in  the  negative,  but 
added  that  we  were  very  near  it. 

It  will  be  noted  by  the  italicized  portion  that 
Germany  did  not  restrict  its  demand  that  Russia 
cease  its  preparations  against  Germany,  but  it 
should  also  desist  from  any  preparations  to  defend 


178        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

itself  or  assert  its  rights  against  Austria,  although 
Austria  had  made  no  offer  to  suspend  either  its 
preparations  for  war  or  recall  its  general  mobiliza- 
tion order. 

The  twelve  hours  elapsed  and  Russia,  stand- 
ing upon  its  dignity  as  a  sovereign  nation  of 
equal  standing  with  Germany,  declined  to  answer 
this  unreasonable  and  most  arrogant  demand, 
which  under  the  circumstances  was  equivalent  to 
a  declaration  of  war. 

Simultaneously  a  like  telegram  was  sent  to  the 
Ambassador  at  Paris,  requiring  the  French  Govern- 
ment to  state  in  eighteen  hours  whether  it  would 
remain  neutral  in  the  event  of  a  Russian-German 
war. 

The  reasons  given  for  this  double  ultimatum 
are  as  disingenuous  as  the  whole  course  of  German 
diplomacy  in  this  matter.  The  statement  that 
Germany  had  pursued  any  mediatory  negotiations 
was  as  untrue  as  its  statement  that  it  had  taken 
no  measures  for  mobilization.  Equally  disingenu- 
ous was  the  statement  with  respect  to  the  Kriegs- 
gefahr  (state  of  martial  law),  for  when  that  was 
declared  on  July  31st,  the  railroad,  telegraph,  and 
other  similar  pubHc  utiHties  were  immediately 
taken  over  by  Germany  and  the  movement  of 
troops  to  the  frontier  began. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    179 

After  the  fateful  ultimatum  had  thus  been  given 
by  Germany  to  Russia,  the  British  Ambassador, 
pursuant  to  the  instructions  of  his  home  office, 
saw  the  German  Secretary  of  State  on  July  31st, 
and  urged  him 

most  earnestly  to  accept  your  [Sir  Edward  Grey's] 
proposal  and  make  another  effort  to  prevent  the 
terrible  catastrophe  of  a  European  war. 

He  [von  Jagow]  expressed  himself  very  sympa- 
thetically toward  your  proposal,  and  appreciated 
your  continued  efforts  to  maintain  peace  but  said 
it  was  impossible  far  the  Imperial  Government  to  con- 
sider any  proposal  until  they  had  received  an  answer 
from  Russia  to  their  communication  of  to-day;  this 
communication,  which  he  admitted  had  the  form 
of  an  ultimatum,  being  that,  unless  Russia  could 
inform  the  Imperial  Government  within  twelve 
hours  that  she  would  immediately  countermand  her 
mobilization  against  Germany  and  Austria,  Ger- 
many would  be  obliged  on  her  side  to  mobilize  at 
once. 

I  asked  his  Excellency  why  they  had  made  their 
demand  even  more  difficult  for  Russia  to  accept 
by  askino^  them  to  demobilize  in  the  south  as  well. 
He  replied  that  it  was  in  order  to  prevent  Russia 
from  saying  that  all  her  mobilization  was  only 
directed  against  Austria.' 

The  German  Secretary  of  State  also  stated  to 

»  English  White  Paper,  No.  121. 


i8o         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Sir  E.  Goschen  that  both  the  Emperor  William 
and  the  German  Foreign  Office 

had  even  up  till  last  night  been  urging  Austria  to 
show  willingness  to  continue  discussions,  and  tele- 
graphic and  telephonic  communications  from 
Vienna  had  been  of  a  promising  nature,  but  Russia's 
mobilization  had  spoiled  everything. 

Here  again  it  must  be  noted  that  the  telegraphic 
communications  from  Vienna  have  not  yet  been 
published  by  the  Austrian  Government,  nor  by  the 
German  Foreign  Office  in  its  official  defense. 

Sir  Edward  Grey's  last  attempt  to  preserve 
peace  was  on  August  ist,  when  he  telegraphed  to 
Sir  E.  Goschen : 

I  still  believe  that  it  might  be  possible  to  secure 
peace  if  only  a  little  respite  in  time  can  be  gained 
before  any  great  power  begins  war. 

The  Russian  Government  has  communicated  to 
me  the  readiness  of  Austria  to  discuss  with  Russia 
and  the  readiness  of  Austria  to  accept  a  basis  of 
mediation  which  is  not  open  to  the  objections  raised 
in  regard  to  the  formula  which  Russia  originally 
suggested. 

Things  ought  not  to  be  hopeless  so  long  as  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  are  ready  to  converse,  and  I  hope 
that  the  German  Government  may  be  able  to  make 
use  of  the  Russian  communications  referred  to 
above  in  order  to  avoid  tension.      His  Majesty's 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    i8i 

Government  are  carefully  abstaining  from  any  act 
which  may  precipitate  matters.^ 

At  that  time  the  twelve-hour  ultimatum  to 
Russia  had  already  expired,  but  the  British  Am- 
bassador saw  the  German  Secretary  of  State  on 
August  1st,  and,  after  submitting  to  him  the  sub- 
stance of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  telegram  last  quoted, 

spent  a  long  time  arguing  with  him  that  the  chief 
dispute  was  between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  that 
Germany  was  only  drawn  in  as  Austria's  ally.  //, 
therefore,  Austria  and  Russia  were,  as  was  evident, 
ready  to  discuss  matters  and  Germany  did  not  desire 
war  on  her  own  account,  it  seemed  to  me  only  logical 
that  Germany  should  hold  her  hand  and  continue  to 
work  for  a  peaceful  settlement.  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  Austria's  readiness  to 
discuss  was  the  result  of  German  influence  at 
Vienna,  and,  had  not  Russia  mobilized  against 
Germany,  all  would  have  been  well.  But  Russia, 
by  abstaining  from  answering  Germany's  demand 
that  she  should  demobilize,  had  caused  Germany  to 
mobilize  also.  Russia  had  said  that  her  mobiliza- 
tion did  not  necessarily  imply  war,  and  that  she 
could  perfectly  well  remain  mobilized  for  months 
without  making  war.  This  was  not  the  case  with 
Germany.  She  had  the  speed  and  Russia  had  the 
numbers,  and  the  safety  of  the  German  Empire  for- 
bade that  Germany  should  allow  Russia  time  to  bring 
up  masses  of  troops  from  all  parts  of  her  wide  do- 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  131. 


i82         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

minions.  The  situation  now  was  that,  though  the 
Imperial  Government  had  allowed  her  several  hours 
beyond  the  specified  time,  Russia  had  sent  no 
answer.  Germany  had,  therefore,  ordered  mobiliza- 
tion, and  the  German  representative  at  St.  Peters- 
burg had  been  instructed  within  a  certain  time  to 
inform  the  Russian  Government  that  the  Imperial 
Government  must  regard  their  refusal  to  answer 
as  creating  a  state  of  war.  ^ 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  although  Germany  was 
urged  to  the  very  last  to  await  the  result  of  the 
conferences,  which  had  just  commenced  with  some 
slight  promise  of  success  between  Austria  and  Rus- 
sia, it  nevertheless  elected  to  declare  war  against 
Russia  and  thus  blast  beyond  possible  recall  any 
possibility  of  peace.  Its  justification  for  this 
course,  as  stated  in  the  interview  with  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  last  quoted,  was  that  it  did  not 
propose  to  forego  its  advantage  of  speed  as  against 
the  advantage  of  Russia's  numerical  superiority. 
For  this  there  might  be  some  justification,  if 
Russia  had  shown  an  unyielding  and  bellicose 
attitude,  but  apart  from  the  fact  that  Russia  had 
consistently  worked  in  the  interests  of  peace, 
Germany  had  the  express  assurance  of  the  Czar 
that  no  provocative  action  would  be  taken  while 
peace  conferences  continued.     To  disregard  these 

'English  White  Paper,  No.  13S. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    183 

assurances  and  thus  destroy  the  pacific  efforts  of 
other  nations,  in  order  not  to  lose  a  tactical  advan- 
tage, was  the  clearest  disloyalty  to  civilization. 
In  any  aspect,  Germany  could  have  fully  kept  its 
advantage  of  speed  by  inducing  its  ally  to  suspend 
its  aggressive  operations  against  Servia,  for  in  that 
event  Russia  had  expressly  obligated  itself  to 
suspend  all  military  preparations. 

As  the  final  document  in  this  shameful  chapter 
of  diplomacy,  there  need  only  be  added  the  tele- 
gram, sent  by  the  German  Chancellor  to  his  Am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  on  August  i,  1914, 
in  which  war  was  declared  by  Germany  against 
Russia  on  the  ground  that  while  Germany  and 
Austria  should  be  left  free  to  pursue  their  aggres- 
sive military  preparations,  Russia  should,  on  the 
peremptory  demand  of  another  nation,  cease  the 
mobilization  of  its  armies  even  for  self-defense. 
It  reads: 

The  Imperial  Government  has  endeavored  from 
the  opening  of  the  crisis  to  lead  it  to  a  pacific  solu- 
tion. In  accordance  with  a  desire  which  had  been 
expressed  to  him  by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Germany  in 
accord  with  England  had  applied  himself  to  filling 
a  mediatory  role  with  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna  and 
St.  Petersburg,  when  Russia,  without  awaiting 
the    result    of  this,    proceeded    to    the    complete 


184        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

mobilization  of  her  forces  on  land  and  sea.  As  a 
consequence  of  this  threatening  measure,  motived 
by  no  military  "presage''  on  the  part  of  Germany, 
the  German  Empire  found  itself  in  face  of  a  grave 
and  imminent  danger.  If  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment had  failed  to  safeguard  herself  against  this 
peril  it  would  have  compromised  the  safety  and  the 
very  existence  of  Germany.  Consequently  the 
German  Government  saw  itself  forced  to  address 
to  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
all  the  Russias,  an  insistence  on  the  cessation  of  the 
said  military  acts.  Russia,  having  refused  to 
accede  to  (not  having  thought  it  should  reply  to), 
this  demand,  and  having  manifested  by  this  refusal 
(this  attitude)  that  its  action  was  directed  against 
Germany,  I  have  the  honor  to  make  known  to 
your  Excellency  the  following : 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  My  August  Sovereign, 
in  the  name  of  the  Empire,  taking  up  the  challenge, 
considers  himself  in  a  state  of  war  with  Russia. 

The  feverish  haste,  with  which  this  fatal  step 
was  taken,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  German 
Ambassador  could  not  even  wait  to  state  whether 
Russia  had  refused  to  answer  or  answered  nega- 
tively. This  war — thus  begun  in  such  mad  haste^ 
is  likely  to  be  repented  of  at  leisure. 

A  few  hours  before  this  rash  and  most  iniquitous 
declaration  was  made  the  Czar  made  his  last  appeal 
for  peace.  With  equal  solemnity  and  pathos  he 
telegraphed  the  Kaiser: 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     185 

I  have  received  your  telegram.  I  comprehend  that 
you  are  forced  to  mobilize,  hut  I  should  like  to  have 
from  you  the  same  guaranty  which  I  have  given  you, 
viz.,  that  these  measures  do  not  mean  war,  and  that  we 
shall  continue  to  negotiate  for  the  welfare  of  our  two 
countries  and  the  universal  peace  which  is  so  dear  to 
our  hearts.  With  the  aid  of  God  it  must  he  possible 
to  our  long  tried  friendship  to  prevent  the  shedding 
of  blood.  I  expect  with  fidl  confidence  your  urgent 
reply. 

This  touching  and  magnanimous  message  does 
infinite  credit  to  the  Czar.  Had  the  Kaiser  been 
as  pacific,  had  he  been  inspired  by  the  same  en- 
Hghtened  spirit  in  the  interests  of  peace,  had 
he  been  as  truly  mindful  of  the  God  of  na- 
tions, whom  the  Czar  thus  invoked,  it  would 
have  been  possible  to  prevent  the  "shedding  of 
blood,"  which  has  now  swept  aw^ay  after  only 
three  months  of  war  the  very  flower  of  the  youth 
of  Europe. 

To  this  the  Kaiser  replied : 

I  thank  You  for  Your  telegram.  I  have  shown 
yesterday  to  Your  Government  the  way  through 
which  alone  war  may  yet  be  averted.  Although  I 
asked  for  a  reply  by  to-day  noon,  no  telegram  from 
my  Ambassador  has  reached  me  with  the  reply  of 
Your  Government.  I  therefore  have  been  forced 
to  mobilize  my  army.  An  immediate,  clear  and 
tmmistakable  reply  of  Your  Government  is  the  sole 


i86        The  lividence  in  the  Case 

way  to  avoid  endless  misery.  Until  I  receive  this 
reply  I  am  unable,  to  my  great  grief,  to  enter  upon 
the  subject  of  Your  telegram.  I  must  ask  most 
earnestly  that  You,  without  delay,  order  Your 
troops  to  commit,  under  no  circumstances,  the 
slightest  violation  of  our  frontiers. 

In  this  is  no  spirit  of  compromise;  only  the 
repeated  insistence  of  the  unreasonable  and  in 
its  consequences  iniquitous  demand  that  Russia 
should  by  demobilizing  make  itself  "naked  to  its 
enemies,"  while  Germany  and  Austria,  without 
making  any  real  concession  in  the  direction  of  peace* 
should  be  permitted  to  arm  both  for  offense  and 
defense. 

There  were  practical  reasons  which  made  the 
Kaiser's  demand  unreasonable.  Mobilization 
is  a  highly  developed  and  complicated  piece 
of  governmental  machinery,  and  even  where 
transportation  facilities  are  of  the  best,  as  in 
Germany  and  France,  the  mobiHzation  ordinarily 
takes  about  two  weeks  to  complete.  In  Russia, 
with  limited  means  of  transportation,  it  was  im- 
possible to  recall  immediately  a  mobilization  order 
that  had  gone  forward  to  the  remotest  comers 
of  the  great  Empire.  The  record  shows  that 
the  Kaiser  himself  recognized  this  fact,  for  in  a 
telegram  which  he  sent  on  August   1st  to  King 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    187 

George,  with  respect  to  the  possible  neutralization 
of  England,  the  Kaiser  said: 

I  just  received  the  communication  from  Your 
Government  offering  French  neutrality  under  the 
guarantee  of  Great  Britain.  Added  to  this  offer 
was  the  inquiry  whether  under  these  conditions 
Germany  would  refrain  from  attacking  France. 
On  technical  grounds  My  mobilization,  which  had 
already  been  proclaimed  this  afternoon,  must  proceed 
against  two  fronts  east  and  west  as  prepared;  this 
cannot  be  countermanded  because,  I  am  sorry,  Your 
telegram  came  so  late.  But  if  France  offers  Me 
neutrality  which  must  be  guaranteed  by  the  British 
fleet  and  army,  I  shall  of  course  refrain  from  attack- 
ing France  and  employ  My  troops  elsewhere.  I 
hope  that  France  will  not  become  nervous.  The 
troops  on  My  frontier  are  in  the  act  of  being  stopped 
by  telegraph  and  telephone  from  crossing  into 
France.  ^ 

If  it  were  impossible  for  the  Kaiser,  with  all  the 
exceptional  facilities  of  the  German  Empire,  to 
arrest  his  mobilization  for  "technical"  reasons,  it 
was  infinitely  more  difficult  for  the  Czar  to  arrest 
immediately  his  military  preparations.  The  de- 
mand of  Germany  was  not  that  Russia  should 
simply  cancel  the  mobilization  order.    It  was  that 

'  No  such  offer  had  been  made.  The  Kaiser's  error  was  due  to 
a  misunderstanding,  which  had  arisen  quite  honestly  between  Sir 
Edward  Grey  and  the  German  Ambassador  in  London.  King 
George  promptly  corrected  this  misapprehension  of  the  Kaiser. 

See  also  Addendum,  p.  192. 


i88        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Russia  should  "cease  within  twelve  hours  all 
warlike  measures,"  and  it  demanded  a  physical 
impossibility. 

In  any  event,  mobilization  does  not  necessarily 
mean  aggression,  but  simply  preparation,  as  the 
Czar  had  so  clearly  pointed  out  to  the  Kaiser  in 
the  telegram  already  quoted.  It  is  the  right  of 
a  sovereign  State  and  by  no  code  of  ethics 
a  casus  belli.  Germany's  demand  that  Russia 
should  not  arm  to  defend  itself,  when  its  prestige 
as  a  great  European  power  was  at  stake  and  when 
Austria  was  pushing  her  aggressive  preparations, 
treated  Russia  as  an  inferior,  almost  a  vassal,  State. 
Its  rejection  must  have  been  recognized  by  the 
Kaiser  and  his  advisers  as  inevitable,  and,  on  the 
theory  that  a  man  intends  the  natural  consequences 
of  his  acts,  it  must  be  assumed  that  the  Kaiser  in 
this  mad  demand  at  that  time  desired  and  in- 
tended war,  however  pacific  his  purposes  may 
have  been  when  he  first  took  the  helm. 

Such  will  be  his  awful  responsibility  "  to  the  last 
syllable  of  recorded  time." 

How  well  prepared  Germany  was,  the  sequel 
developed  only  too  surely .  On  the  following  day — 
August  2d — its  troops  invaded  Luxemburg  and 
an  abrupt  demand  was  made  upon  Belgium 
for  permission  to  cross  its  territory. 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     189 

Upon  the  declaration  of  war,  the  Czar  tele- 
graphed to  King  George  of  England  as  follows : 

"  In  this  solemn  hour,  I  wish  to  asstire  you  once 
more  I  have  done  all  in  my  power  to  avert  war." 

Such  'will  he  the  verdict  of  history. 

ADDENDUM 
I 

THE  SUPPRESSED  TELEGRAM  FROM  THE  CZAR 

It  is  a  curious  and  suggestive  fact  that  the  German  Foreign 
Office  in  publishing  the  correspondence  between  the  Kaiser  and 
the  Czar  omitted  one  of  the  most  important  telegrams. 

The  Russian  Government  on  January  31,  1915,  therefore, 
made  public  the  following  telegram  which  the  Czar  sent  to  the 
Kaiser  on  July  29,  19 14: 

"  Thanks  for  your  conciliatory  and  friendly  telegram. 
Inasmuch  as  the  official  message  presented  to-day  by 
your  Ambassador  to  my  Minister  was  conveyed  in  a 
very  different  tone,  I  beg  you  to  explain  this  diver- 
gency. It  would  be  right  to  give  over  the  Austro- 
Servian  problem  to  The  Hague  Conference.  I  trust  in 
your  wisdom  and  friendship." 

The  German  Foreign  Office  has  since  explained  that  they  re- 
garded this  telegram  as  too  "  unimportant "  for  publication. 
Comment  is  unnecessary. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  Czar  at  the  beginning  of  his  cor- 
respondence with  the  Kaiser  suggested  that  the  whole  dispute 
be  submitted  to  The  Hague  Tribunal  for  adjustment.  Serv'ia 
had  already  made  the  same  suggestion. 

As  the  world  owes  the  first  Hague  Convention  to  the  Czar's 
initiative,  it  can  justly  be  said  to  his  lasting  credit  that  he  at 
least  was  loyal  to  the  pacific  ideal  of  that  great  convention  of 
the  nations. 


190        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

II 

THE  AUSTRIAN  OFFER  OF  JULY  31,  1914 

The  author  has  noted  (ante,  p.  175)  that  as  the  belated  ofTer  of 
Austria  on  July  the  31st  "  to  discuss  [with  Russia]  the  substance  of 
the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia  "  did  not  offer  to  suspend  mili- 
tary preparations  or  operations,  the  concession  was  more  nominal 
than  real.  The  Austrian  Red  Book  converts  this  inference  into  a 
certainty,  and  makes  clear  that  Austria's  pretended  change  of 
policy  was  only  diplomatic  finesse,  as  it  contained  no  substantial 
modification  of  its  uncompromising  attitude. 

Russia  had  proposed  on  July  the  30th  (atite,  p.  166)  that  "if 
Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her  armies  upon  Servian 
territory"  and  further  agreed  that  the  question  of  "the  repara- 
tion which  Servia  could  accord  to  the  Government  of  Austria- 
Hungary"  could  be  examined  by  the  Great  Powers,  Russia  woul(\ 
suspend  her  military'  preparations.  As  the  underlying  question 
was  whether  Austria  should  be  permitted  to  subjugate  Servia 
without  interference,  it  was  vital  that  that  subjugation  should  not 
proceed  pending  an  examination  by  all  interested  powers  into  its 
justice  and  ultimate  ends. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  had  previously  requested  Germany  on  July 
the  28th  "to  use  its  influence"  with  the  Austrian  Government 
"  to  the  effect  that  the  latter  either  consider  the  reply  from  Bel- 
grade satisfactory  or  else  accept  it  as  a  basis  for  discussion  between 
the  Cabinets."  The  German  Foreign  Office  then  instructed  the 
German  Ambassador  at  Vienna  "to  submit  the  British  proposal 
to  the  Vienna  Cabinet  for  its  consideration"  (Austrian  Red  Book, 
No.  43).  As  a  result  of  this  suggestion,  Count  Berchtold  on 
July  the  29th  (Austrian  Red  Book,  No.  44)  again  shut  the  door 
upon  any  compromise  by  the  contention  that  Austria 

"no  longer  is  in  a  position  to  meet  the  Servian  reply  in 
the  spirit  of  the  British  suggestions,  since  at  the  time 
when  the  German  request  was  presented  here,  a  state 
of  war  already  existed  between  the  Dual  Monarchy  and 
Servia,  and  thus  the  Senian  reply  had  been  superseded  by 
events." 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     191 

The  only  counter-suggestion  which  Austria  then  made  was  as 
follows : 

"Should  the  British  Cabinet  be  prepared  to  exert  its 
influence  upon  the  Russian  Government  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  peace  among  the  Great  Powers,  and  for  a  local- 
ization of  the  war,  which  had  been  forced  upon  us  by  the 
Servian  agitation  of  many  years'  standing,  such  efforts 
would  meet  with  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government's 
appreciation."     (Austrian  Red  Book,  No.  44.) 

On  July  31st  the  German  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  acting  on 
instructions  (which  instructions  are  again  not  disclosed  in  the 
German  White  Book)  informed  Count  Berchtold  "  of  a  conversation 
between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Prince  Lichnowsky,"  in  the  course 
of  which  the  British  Secretary  of  State  declared  to  the  German 
Ambassador  that  Russia  felt  unable  "  to  treat  directly  with 
Austria-Hungary  and  therefore  requested  Great  Britain  to  resume 
her  mediation"  and  that  "as  a  condition  of  this  mediation,  how- 
ever, the  Russian  Government  stipulates  the  suspension  of 
hostilities  in  the  meanwhile."     (Austrian  Red  Book,  No.  51.) 

Thereupon  Count  Berchtold  made  the  eleventh  hour  offer 
in  question  by  instructing  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg 

"  to  express  our  readiness  to  consider  Sir  Edward  Grey's 
proposition  to  mediate  between  us  and  Servia  despite 
the  changes  brought  about  in  the  situation  by  Russia's 
mobilization.  Our  acceptance,  however,  is  subject  to  the 
condition  that  our  military  action  against  Servia  shall  never- 
theless proceed  and  that  the  British  Cabinet  shall  induce  the 
Russian  Government  to  stop  the  mobilization  directed  against 
us.  It  is  understood  that  in  this  case  we  would  at  once  cancel 
our  defensive  military  counter-measures  in  Galicia,  which 
had  been  forced  upon  us  by  Russia's  mobilization."  (Aus- 
trian Red  Book,  No.  51.) 

This  suggestion  was  fatally  objectionable  in  that  it  required 
Russia  to  suspend  its  preparations  to  defend  its  interests  while 
permitting  Austria  to  proceed  with  the  subjugaJ^i'on  of  Servia. 


192        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

As  the  "bone  of  contention"  was  this  siibjugation  of  Servia,  this 
belated  and  ostensibly  conciliatory  proposal  of  Austria  amounted 
to  an  absurdity.  In  that  classic  of  nonsense,  Alice  in  Wonder- 
land, the  unreasonable  and  violent  Queen  announced  in  the  trial 
of  the  Knave  the  similar  procedure  of  "sentence  first,  verdict 
afterwards,"  and  Austria's  final  proposal  was  essentially  a  like 
folly,  for,  stripped  of  diplomatic  pretense,  it  amounted  to  this, 
that  Austria,  while  tying  Russia's  hands,  should  proceed  not 
merely  to  sentence  but  even  to  execute  Servia  and  subse- 
quently discuss  the  justice  of  its  action  when  it  had  become 
irremediable. 

The  possible  theory  which  we  suggested  (ante,  p.  175),  that 
Austria  at  the  eleventh  hour  may  have  experienced  a  change 
of  heart  and  had  adopted  a  more  conciliatory  course,  is  apparently 
untenable. 

Ill 

THE  INVASION  OF  FRANCE  ON  AUGUST  isT 

It  has  been  Germany's  contention  that  not  only  did  the 
mobilization  of  Russia  cause  the  war,  but  that  its  eastern 
and  western  frontiers  were  violated  by  Russian  and  French 
soldiers  at  a  time  when  Germany's  intentions  were  sincerely 
pacific. 

At  7  P.M.  on  July  the  31st,  Germany  had  given  France  until 
I  P.M.  of  the  following  day  to  declare  whether  it  would  remain 
neutral  in  the  event  of  a  Russian-German  war,  and  at  that  hour 
Viviani  advised  the  German  Ambassador  that  France  "  would  do 
that  which  her  interests  dictated."  (German  While  Paper, 
No.  27.)  Notwithstanding  France's  virtual  refusal  to  meet  the 
demand  of  Germany,  the  latter  did  not  declare  war  on  France 
on  that  day,  and  this  is  the  more  significant  as  it  immediately 
declared  war  on  Russia.  The  German  Am.bassador  remained 
in  Pari:4  until  Au.r;iu;t  the  3d,  and  only  then  demanded  his 
passports  when  his  position  in  the  French  Capitol  had  become 
untenable. 

In  the  meantime  Germany  was  awaiting  some  act  of  aggres- 
sion on  the  part  of  France,  that  would  enable  it  under  the  terms 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  to  demand  as  of  right  the  cooperation  of 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser    193 

Italy,  while  France,  determined  for  this  and  other  reasons  not 
to  be  the  aggressor,  had  withdrawn  its  troops  ten  kilometers 
from  the  frontier  and  refused  to  take  any  offensive  step  either 
before  or  after  the  expiration  of  the  ultimatum. 

The  confidential  telegram  of  the  Kaiser  to  King  George  sug- 
gests the  possibility  that  on  August  the  ist,  about  the  time  that 
the  eighteen-hour  ultimatum  had  expired,  Germany  was  ready 
and  intended  to  commence  an  immediate  invasion  of  France,  for 
on  that  day  the  Kaiser  telegraphs  to  King  George: 

"/  hope  that  France  will  not  become  nervous.  The 
troops  on  my  frontier  are  in  the  act  of  being  stopped  by 
telegraph  and  telephone  from  crossing  into  France." 
{Ante,  p.  187.) 

The  exact  hour  when  the  Kaiser  sent  the  King  this  message 
is  conjectural.  We  know  from  the  German  White  Paper  that 
at  II  A.M.  on  that  day  Sir  Edward  Grey  inquired  of  Prince 
Lichnowsky  over  the  telephone  whether  Germany  was  "in  a 
position  to  declare  that  we  would  not  attack  France  in  a  war 
between  Germany  and  Russia  in  case  France  should  remain 
neutral." 

This  message  prompted  the  Kaiser's  telegram  to  King  George. 
How  soon  thereafter  the  Kaiser  sent  his  telegram  we  do  not  knov/, 
but  as  the  impossibility  of  France's  neutrality  was  recognized  in 
Berlin  on  receipt  of  Lichnowsky's  telegram  by  5  p.m.  on  that  day, 
it  is  altogether  probable  that  the  Kaiser's  telegram  was  sent 
between  those  hours. 

If  the  telegram  in  question  is  now  analyzed  and  the  fair  natural 
import  is  given  to  the  Kaiser's  language,  it  would  seem  that  tlie 
invasion  of  France,  either  before  or  in  any  event  simultaneously 
with  the  expiration  of  the  eightcen-hour  ultimatum,  had  been 
determined  upon  by  the  Kaiser  and  his  militarj'-  staff,  for  tha 
Kaiser's  intimation  that  he  has  "stopped  by  telegraph  and 
telephone  [his  army]  from  crossing  into  France"  fairly  implies 
that  previous  orders  had  been  given  to  commence  such  in- 
vasion and  that  these  orders  had  been  hurriedly  recalled  in 
the  most  expeditious  way,  upon  the  supposed  intimation  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey  that  England  might  guarantee  the  neutrality 
of  France. 


194         i  ^"ic  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Under  these  circumstances,  with  the  German  Ambassador 
still  at  Paris  and  ostensibly  preserving  friendly  relations,  it  is 
evident  that  the  invasion  was  either  to  precede  or  to  follow 
immediately  upon  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations.  This 
in  itself  may  not  be  indefensible  under  international  law,  but 
it  throws  a  searchlight  upon  the  contention  of  Germany  that 
its  intentions  were  pacific  and  that  it  had  been  surprised  by  a 
sudden  and  treacherous  attack  on  the  part  of  Russia,  France,  and 
England. 

The  difficulty,  however,  is  to  reconcile  this  apparent  intention 
of  the  Kaiser's  military  staff  to  invade  France  on  August  the 
1st  and  the  action  of  his  Foreign  Office  in  failing  to  make  any 
declaration  of  war  against  France  and  in  retaining  its  Ambassador 
at  Paris  and  permitting  the  French  Ambassador  to  remain  at 
Berlin.  The  diplomatic  records  abundantly  show  that  this 
latter  policy  of  the  German  Foreign  Office  was  followed  in 
the  hope  that  France  would  become  the  aggressor,  but  its 
inconsistency  with  the  policy  of  the  War  Office  implied  in  the 
Kaiser's  telegram  is  obvious. 

Possibly  the  Kaiser's  soldiers  and  diplomats  were  not  working 
in  complete  harmony.  It  may  be  true  that  the  many  blunders 
of  German  diplomats  were  in  part  due  to  the  reckless  im- 
petuosity of  the  War  Office  and  it  is  possible  that  some  of  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg's  and  von  Jagow's  diplomatic  blunders  are 
more  properly  attributable  to  the  Kaiser  and  Moltke. 

It  is  also  possible  that  the  natural  inference  from  the  Kaiser's 
language  above  quoted  is  misleading  and  that  the  telegram  to 
King  George  did  not  mean  to  imply  that  any  orders  for  an  inva- 
sion had  been  cancelled  but  simply  that  the  army  leaders  on  the 
Western  frontier  had  been  cautioned  not  to  cross  the  frontier 
until  further  orders. 

Another  possible  theory  is  that  the  Kaiser  for  political  reasons 
may  have  exaggerated  the  extent  of  his  concession,  and  magnified 
the  urgency  of  the  situation  to  induce  prompt  and  favorable 
action  by  Great  Britain. 

But  the  readiness  of  Germany  to  strike  a  quick  and  fatal  blow 
at  Paris  cannot  be  gainsaid  and  strangely  contrasts  with  the 
"injured  innocence"  protestations  that  it  was  treacherously 
surprised  by  an  unexpected  attack.  Always  with  Prussia, 
"  the  readiness  is  all." 


The  Intervention  of  the  Kaiser     195 

IV 
THE  USE  OF  THE  WORD  "  ENGLAND  " 

In  making  these  scattered  addenda,  I  take  this  occasion  to 
make  the  amende  honorable  to  some  of  my  readers,  who  since 
the  first  editions  of  this  book  appeared  have  taken  exception  to 
my  use  of  the  word  "  England  "  and  "  English,"  where  obviously 
"  Great  Britain  "  and  "  British  "  were  meant.  These  critics,  are 
technically  correct,  but  I  hope  that  they  will  acquit  me  of  any 
intention  of  ignoring  any  part  of  the  British  Empire  in  using  a 
term,  which  by  common  and  immemorial  usage  has  been 
applied  throughout  the  world  as  synonymous  with  the  great 
Empire.  I  should  deeply  regret  it,  if  any  other  intention  were 
imputed  to  me,  for  in  the  magnificent  struggle  which  Great 
Britain  has  made  for  the  highest  ideals  of  civilization  and  the 
basic  rights  of  humanity,  no  one  now  or  hereafter  can  ever 
ignore  the  heroic  part  which  has  been  played  by  Scotland, 
Ireland,  Canada,  and  the  over-sea  dominions. 

May  I  not  plead  that  the  word  "England,"  has  to  common 
intent  a  broader  as  well  as  a  more  restricted  meaning  and  that 
when  the  poet,  the  historian  or — as  in  my  case — the  student 
uses  the  word  "England"  in  reference  to  a  world-wide  contro- 
versy, no  one  is  likely  to  misapprehend  his  meaning.  Such  use 
is  certainly  as  common  and  as  generally  understood  as  that  of 
the  word  "American"  as  applied  to  a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  although  in  both  cases  the  characterization  is  not  strictly 
accurate.  To  my  critics  in  Scotland  and  Ireland  who  have  made 
this  criticism  of  my  book,  I  can  onlj^  say: 

"  Let  my  disclaiming  from  a  purposed  e\'il 
Free  me  so  far  in  your  most  generous  thoughts, 
That  I  have  shot  mine  arrow  o'er  the  house, 
And  hurt  my  brother." 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  CASE  OF  BELGIUM 

The  callous  disregard  by  Germany  of  the  rights 
of  Belgium  is  one  of  the  most  shocking  exhibitions 
of  political  iniquity  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

That  it  has  had  its  parallel  in  other  and  less 
civilized  ages  may  be  freely  admitted,  but  until 
German  scientists,  philosophers,  educators,  and 
even  doctors  of  divinity  attempted  to  justify  this 
wanton  outrage,  it  had  been  hoped  that  mankind 
had  made  some  progress  since  the  times  of 
Wallenstein  and  Tilly. 

The  verdict  of  Civilization  in  this  respect  will  be 
little  affected  by  the  ultimate  result  of  the  war,  for 
even  if  Germany  should  emerge  from  this  titanic 
conflict  as  victor,  and  become,  as  it  would  then 
undoubtedly  become,  the  first  power  in  the  world, 
it  would  none  the  less  be  a  figure  for  the  "time 
of  scorn  to  point  his  slow  unmoving  finger  at." 
To  the  eulogists  of  Alexander  the  Great,  Seneca 
was  wont  to  say,  "Yes,  but  he  murdered  Callis- 
thenes,"  and  to  the  eulogists  of  victorious  Ger- 

196 


The  Case  ot  Belgium  i97 

many,  if  indeed  it  shall  prove  victorious,  the  wise 
and  just  of  all  future  ages  will  say,  "Yes,  but  it 
devastated  Belgium." 

The  fact  that  many  distinguished  and  un- 
doubtedly sincere  partisans  of  Germany  have 
attempted  to  justify  this  atrocious  rape,  suggests 
a  problem  of  psychology  rather  than  of  logic 
or  ethics.  It  strongly  illustrates  a  too  familiar 
phenomenon  that  great  intellectual  and  moral 
astigmatism  is  generally  incident  to  any  passion- 
ate crisis  in  human  history.  It  shows  how  pitifully 
unstable  the  human  intellect  is  when  a  great  man 
like  Dr.  Haeckel,  a  scholar  and  historian  like  Dr. 
von  Mach,  or  a  doctor  of  divinity  like  Dr.  Dry- 
ander,  can  be  so  warped  with  the  passions  of  the 
hour  as  to  ignore  the  clearest  considerations  of 
political  morality. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  Belgium  had 
taken  no  part  whatever  in  the  controversy  and 
was  apparently  on  friendly  relations  with  all  the 
Powers.  It  had  no  interest  whatever  in  the  Servian 
question.  A  thrifty,  prosperous  people,  inhabit- 
ing the  most  densely  populated  country  of  Europe, 
and  resting  secure  in  the  solemn  promises,  not 
merely  of  Germany,  but  of  the  leading  European 
nations  that  its  neutrality  should  be  respected,  it 
calmly  pursued  the  even  tenor  of  its  way,  and 


198        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

was  as  unmindful  of  the  disaster,  which  was  so 
suddenly  to  befall  it,  as  the  people  of  Pompeii 
were  on  the  morning  of  the  great  eruption  when 
they  thronged  the  theatre  in  the  pursuit  of  plea- 
sure and  disregarded  the  ominous  curling  of  the 
smoke  from  the  crater  of  Vesuvius. 

On  April  19,  1839,  Belgium  and  Holland  signed 
a  treaty  which  provided  that  "Belgium  forms  an 
independent  state  of  perpetual  neutrality."  To 
insure  that  neutrality,  Prussia,  France,  Great 
Britain,  Austria,  and  Russia  on  the  same  date 
signed  a  treaty,  by  which  it  was  provided  that 
these  nations  jointly  "became  the  guarantors"  of 
such  "perpetual  neutrality." 

In  his  recent  article  on  the  war,  George 
Bernard  Shaw,  who  is  inimitable  as  a  farceur  but 
not  quite  convincing  as  a  jurist,  says: 

As  all  treaties  are  valid  only  rebus  sic  stantibus, 
and  the  state  of  things  which  existed  at  the  date  of 
the  Treaty  of  London  (1839)  had  changed  so  much 
since  then  .  .  .  that  in  1870  Gladstone  could  not 
depend  on  it,  and  resorted  to  a  special  temporary 
treaty  not  now  in  force,  the  technical  validity  of  the 
1839  treaty  is  extremely  doubtful. 

Unfortunately  for  this  contention,  the  Treaty 
of  1870,  to  which  Mr.  Shaw  refers,  provided  for 


The  Case  of  Belgium  199 

its  own  expiration  after  twelve  months  and  then 
added : 

And  on  the  expiration  of  that  time  the  indepen- 
dence and  neutrahty  of  Belgium  will,  so  far  as  the 
high  contracting  parties  are  respectively  concerned, 
continue  to  rest  as  heretofore  on  the  ist  Article  of 
the  Quintuple  Treaty  of  the  19th  of  April,  1839. 

Much  has  been  made  by  Mr.  Shaw  and  others 
of  an  excerpt  from  a  speech  of  Mr.  Gladstone  in 
1870.  In  that  speech,  Mr.  Gladstone,  as  an 
abstract  proposition,  declined  to  accept  the  broad 
statement  that  under  all  circumstances  the  obliga- 
tions of  a  treaty  might  continue,  but  there  is  noth- 
ing to  justify  the  belief  that  Mr.  Gladstone  in  any 
respect  questioned  either  the  value  or  the  validity 
of  the  Treaty  of  1839  with  respect  to  Belgium. 

Those  who  invoke  the  authority  of  Gladstone 
should  remember  that  he  also  said : 

We  have  an  interest  in  the  independence  of 
Belgium  which  is  wider  than  that  which  we  may 
have  in  the  literal  operation  of  the  guarantee.  It 
is  found  in  the  answer  to  the  question  whether, 
under  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  this  country, 
endowed  as  it  is  with  influence  and  power,  would 
quietly  stand  by  and  witness  the  perpetration  of 
the  direst  crime  that  ever  stained  the  pages  of 
history,  and  thus  become  participators  in  the  sin. 


200        The  Evidence  in- the  Case 

These  words  of  the  great  statesman  read  as  a 
prophecy. 

While  these  treaties  were  simply  declaratory  of 
the  rights,  which  Belgium  indepei;dently  enjoyed 
as  a  sovereign  nation,  yet  this  solemn  guarantee 
of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  was  so  effective  that 
even  in  1870,  when  France  and  Germany  were 
locked  in  vital  conflict,  and  the  question  arose 
whether  Prussia  would  disregard  her  treaty  obliga- 
tion, the  Iron  Chancellor,  who  ordinarily  did  not 
permit  moral  considerations  to  warp  his  political 
policies,  wrote  to  the  Belgian  minister  in  Berlin 
on  July  22,  1870: 

In  confirmation  of  my  verbal  assurance,  I  have 
the  honor  to  give  in  writing  a  declaration,  which,  in 
view  of  the  treaties  in  force,  is  quite  superfluous, 
that  the  Confederation  of  the  North  and  its  allies 
(Germany)  will  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
on  the  understanding  of  course  that  it  is  respected 
by  the  other  belligerent. 

At  that  time,  Belgium  had  so  fine  a  sense  of 
honor,  that  although  it  was  not  inconsistent  with 
the  principles  of  international  law,  yet  in  order  to 
discharge  her  obligations  of  neutrality  in  the  spirit 
as  well  as  the  letter,  she  restricted  the  clear  legal 
right  of  her  people  to  supply  arms  and  ammunition 


The  Case  of  Bel^^ium  201 


t)' 


to  the  combatants,  thus  construing  the  treaty  to 
her  own  disadvantage. 

It  can  be  added  to  the  credit  of  both  France  and 
Prussia  that  in  their  great  struggle  of  1870-71, 
each  scrupulously  respected  that  neutrality,  and 
France  carried  out  her  obligations  to  such  an 
extreme  that  although  Napoleon  and  his  army 
could  have  at  one  time  escaped  from  Sedan  into 
Belgium,  and  renewed  the  attack  and  possibly — ■ 
although  not  probably — saved  France,  if  they  had 
seen  fit  to  violate  that  neutrality,  rather  than 
break  the  word  of  France  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
and  his  army  consented  to  the  crowning  hiuniliation 
of  Sedan. 

In  the  year  191 1,  in  the  course  of  a  discussion  in 
Belgium  in  respect  to  the  fortifications  at  Flush- 
ing, certain  Dutch  newspapers  asserted  that  in  the 
event  of  a  Franco-German  war,  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  would  be  violated  by  Germany.  It  was 
then  suggested  that  if  a  declaration  were  made  to 
the  contrary  in  the  Reichstag,  that  such  a  decla- 
ration, "would  be  calculated  to  appease  public 
opinion  and  to  calm  its  suspicions." 

This  situation  was  communicated  to  the  present 
German  Chancellor,  Von  Bethmann-HoUweg,  who 
instructed  the  German  Ambassador  at  Brussels  to 
assure  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister, 


202        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

that  he  was  most  appreciative  of  the  sentiment 
which  had  inspired  our  [Belgium's]  action.  He 
declared  that  Germany  had  no  intention  of  violating 
our  neutrality,  but  he  considered  that  by  making  a 
declaration  publicly,  Germany  would  weaken  her 
military  preparation  with  respect  to  France,  and 
being  reassured  in  the  northern  quarter  would 
direct  her  forces  to  the  eastern  quarter.^ 

Germany's  recognition  of  the  continuing  obhga- 
tion  of  this  treaty  was  also  shown  when  the  ques- 
tion of  Belgium's  neutrality  was  suggested  at  a 
debate  in  the  Reichstag  on  April  29,  1913.  In  the 
course  of  that  debate  a  member  of  the  Social 
Democratic  Party  said: 

In  Belgium  the  approach  of  a  Franco-German  war 
is  viewed  with  apprehension,  because  it  is  feared 
that  Germany  will  not  respect  Belgian  neutraHty.' 

Herr  von  Jagow,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  rephed:  "The  neutrality  of  Belgium  is 
determined  by  international  conventions,  and 
Germany  is  resolved  to  respect  these  conventions." 

This  declaration  did  not  satisfy  another  member 
of  the  Social  Democratic  Party.  Herr  von  Jagow 
observed  that  he  had  nothing  to  add  to  the  clear 
statement  which  he  had  uttered  with  reference  to 
the  relations  between  Germany  and  Belgium. 

In  reply  to  further  interrogations  from  a  member 
of  the  Social  Democratic  Party,  Herr  von  Heeringen, 

'  Belgian  Gray  Book,  enclosure  No.  12. 
•  Idem. 


The  Case  of  Bele^ium  203 


&' 


Minister  of  War,  stated:  "Belgium  does  not  play 
any  part  in  the  justification  of  the  German  scheme 
of  military  reorganization;  the  scheme  is  justified 
by  the  position  of  matters  in  the  East.  Germany 
will  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  Belgian  neutrality 
is  guaranteed  by  international  treaties." 

A  member  of  the  same  party,  having  again  referred 
to  Belgium,  Herr  von  Jagow  again  pointed  out  that 
his  declaration  regarding  Belgium  was  sufficiently 
clear.  ^ 

On  July  31,  1914,  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister, 
in  a  conversation  with  Herr  von  Below,  the  Ger- 
man Minister  at  Brussels,  asked  him  whether  he 
knew  of  the  assurance  which,  as  above  stated,  had 
been  given  by  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  through 
the  German  Ambassador  at  Brussels  to  the  Govern- 
ment at  Belgium  in  191 1,  and  Herr  von  Below 
replied  that  he  did,  and  added,  "that  he  was 
certain  that  the  sentiments  to  which  expression 
was  given  at  that  time  had  not  changed." 

Thus  on  July  31,  1914,  Germany,  through  its 
accredited  representative  at  Brussels,  repeated  the 
assurances  contained  in  the  treaty  of  1839,  as 
reaffirmed  in  1870,  and  again  reaffirmed  in  191 1 
and  1913. 

Germany's  moral  obligation  had  an  additional 
express  confirmation. 

'  Belgian  Gray  Book,  No.  12. 


204        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

The  second  International  Peace  Conference  was 
held  at  The  Hague  in  1907.  There  were  present 
the  representatives  of  forty-four  nations,  thus  mak- 
ing as  near  an  approach  to  the  poet's  dream  of  the 
"federation  of  the  world"  and  the  "parliament  of 
man"  as  has  yet  been  possible  in  the  slow  progress 
of  mankind. 

That  convention  agreed  upon  a  certain  declara- 
tion of  principles,  and  among  the  signatures 
appended  to  the  document  was  the  representative 
of  His  Majesty,  the  German  Emperor. 

They  agreed  upon  certain  principles  of  interna- 
tional morality,  most  of  them  simply  declaratory 
of  the  uncodified  international  law  then  existing, 
and  these  were  subsequently  ratified  by  formal 
treaties  of  the  respective  governments,  including 
Germany,  which  were  deposited  in  the  archives  of 
The  Hague.  While  this  treaty  as  an  express 
covenant  was  not  binding,  unless  all  belligerents 
signed  it,  yet,  it  recognized  an  existing  moral  ob- 
ligation. The  Hague  Peace  Conference  proceeded 
to  define  the  rights  of  neutral  powers,  and  in  so 
doing  simply  reaffirmed  the  existing  international 
law. 

The  pertinent  parts  of  this  great  compact,  with 
reference  to  the  sanctity  of  neutral  territory,  are  as 
follows: 


The  Case  of  Belgium  205 

CONVENTION  V 

CHAPTER  I— '•THE  RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  OF 
NEUTRAL  POWERS 

ARTICLE  I. 

The  territory  of  neutral  Powers  is  inviolable. 

ARTICLE  II. 

Belligerents  are  forbidden  to  move  troops  or  convoys  of 
either  munitions  of  war  or  supplies  across  the  territory 
of  a  neutral  Power. 

ARTICLE  X. 

The  fact  of  a  neutral  Power  resisting,  even  by  force, 
attempts  to  violate  its  neutrality  cannot  be  regarded  as 
a  hostile  act. 

Notwithstanding  these  assurances,  it  had  been 
from  time  to  time  intimated  by  German  military- 
writers,  and  notably  by  Bemhardi,  that  Germany 
would,  in  the  event  of  a  future  war,  make  a  quick 
and  possibly  a  fatal  blow  at  the  heart  of  France 
by  invading  Belgium  upon  the  first  declaration  of 
hostilities,  and  it  was  probably  these  intimations 
that  led  the  Belgian  Government  on  July  24,  1914, 
to  consider: 

Whether  in  the  existing  circumstances,  It  would 
not  be  proper  to  address  to  the  Powers,  who  had 
guaranteed  Belgium's  independence  and  its  neutral- 
ity, a  communication  for  the  purpose  of  confirming 
to  them  its  resolution  to  carry  out  the  international 


2o6         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

duties  which  are  imposed  upon  it  by  treaties  in  the 
event  of  war  breaking  out  on  the  Belgian  frontiers. 

Confiding  in  the  good  faith  of  France  and  Ger- 
many, the  Belgian  Government  concluded  that 
any  such  declaration  was  premature. 

On  August  2,  1 914,  the  war  having  already 
broken  out,  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister  took  oc- 
casion to  tell  the  German  Ambassador  that  France 
had  reaffirmed  its  intention  to  respect  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  and  Herr  von  Below,  the 
German  Ambassador,  after  thanking  Davignon 
for  his  information,  added  that  up  to  the  present 
he  had  not  been 

instructed  to  make  us  any  official  communication, 
but  we  were  aware  of  his  personal  opinion  respecting 
the  security  with  which  we  had  the  right  to  regard 
our  eastern  neighbors.  I  [Davignon]  replied  at 
once  that  all  we  knew  of  the  intentions  of  the  latter, 
intentions  set  forth  in  many  former  interviews,  did 
not  allow  us  to  doubt  their  [Germany's]  perfectly 
correct  attitude  toward  Belgium. 

It  thus  appears  that  as  late  as  August  2,  191 4, 
Germany  had  not  given  to  Belgium  any  intimation 
as  to  its  intention,  and,  what  is  more  important,  it 
had  not  either  on  that  day  or  previously  made  any 
charge  that  Belgium  had  in  any  way  violated  its 
obligations  of  neutrality,  or  that  France  had  committed 
any  overt  act  in  violation  thereof. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  207 

On  July  31,  1914,  England,  not  unreasonably 
apprehensive  as  to  the  sincerity  of  Germany's  oft- 
repeated  protestations  of  good  faith,  directed  the 
English  Ambassadors  at  Paris  and  Berlin  to  ask 
the  respective  governments  of  those  countries 
"whether  each  is  prepared  to  respect  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  provided  it  is  violated  by  no 
other  Power." 

This  question  was  commimicated  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  to  the  Belgian  Government,  with  the  addition 
that  he  (Sir  Edward  Grey)  asked  that  "the 
Belgian  Government  will  maintain  to  the  utmost 
of  her  power  her  neutrality  which  I  desire,  and 
expect  other  Powers  to  uphold  and  observe." 

Pursuant  to  these  instructions,  the  English 
Ambassador  to  Paris,  on  the  night  of  July  31 ,  19 14, 
called  upon  Viviani,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
and  on  the  same  night  received  a  reply  which  is 
reported  by  Sir  F.  Bertie  to  Sir  Edward  Grey,  as 
follows : 

French  Government  is  resolved  to  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it  would  be  only  in  the 
event  of  some  other  Power  violating  that  neutrality 
that  France  might  find  herself  under  the  necessity, 
in  order  to  assure  defense  of  her  own  security,  to  act 
otherwise.  This  assurance  has  been  given  several 
times.  The  President  of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it 
to  the  King  of  the  Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister 


2oS        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

to  Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed  the  assur- 
ance to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
to-day. ' 

Confirming  this,  the  French  Minister  at  Brussels, 
on  August  1st,  made  to  the  Belgian  Foreign  Minis- 
ter the  following  declaration : 

I  am  authorized  to  declare  that  in  the  event  of 
an  international  conflict,  the  government  of  the 
Republic  will,  as  it  has  always  declared,  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  In  the  event  of  this  neu- 
trality not  being  respected  by  another  Power,  the 
French  Government,  in  order  to  insure  its  own 
defense,  might  be  led  to  modify  its  attitude.  ^ 

On  July  31,  1914,  the  English  Ambassador  at 
Berlin  saw  the  German  Secretary  of  State,  and 
submitted  Sir  Edward  Grey's  pointed  interroga- 
tion, and  the  only  reply  that  was  given  was  that 
"he  must  consult  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor 
before  he  could  possibly  answer, "  and  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  very  significantly  added  that 
for  strategic  reasons  it  was  "very  doubtful  whether 
they  would  return  any  answer  at  all." 

Goschen  also  submitted  the  matter  to  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor,  who  also  evaded  the  question  by 
stating  that  "Germany  would  in  any  case  desire 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  125. 
'  Belgian  Gray  Paper,  No.  15. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  209 

to  know  the  reply  returned  to  you  [the  EngHsh 
Ambassador]  by  the  French  Government." 

That  these  were  mere  evasions  the  events  on  the 
following  day  demonstrated. 

On  August  1st,  Sir  Edward  Grey  saw  the  German 
Ambassador  in  London,  and  the  following  signifi- 
cant conversation  took  place: 

I  told  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  that  the 
reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  a  matter  of  very 
great  regret,  because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
affected  feeling  in  this  country.  If  Germany 
could  see  her  way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as 
that  which  had  been  given  by  France  it  would 
materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and  tension 
here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant, 
while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  country. 
I  said  that  we  had  been  discussing  this  question  at 
a  Cabinet  meeting,  and  as  I  was  authorized  to  teU 
him  this  I  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

He  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a 
promise  net  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  we 
would  engage  to  remain  neutral. 

I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands 
were  still  free,  and  we  were  considering  what  our 
attitude  should  be.  All  I  could  say  was  that  our 
attitude  would  be  determined  largely  by  public 
opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
would  appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here. 


210        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

I  did  not  think  that  we  could  give  a  promise  of 
neutraHty  on  that  condition  alone. ' 

On  the  following  day,  August  2d,  the  German 
Minister  at  Brussels  handed  to  the  Belgian  Foreign 
Office  the  following  "highly  confidential"  docu- 
ment. After  stating  that  "the  German  Govern- 
ment has  received  reliable  information,  according 
to  which  the  French  forces  intend  to  march  on  the 
Meuse,  by  way  of  Givet  and  Namur, "  and  after 
suggesting  a  "fear  that  Belgium,  in  spite  of  its  best 
will,  will  be  in  no  position  to  repulse  such  a  largely 
developed  French  march  without  aid,"  the  docu- 
ment adds : 

It  is  an  imperative  duty  for  the  preservation  of 
Germany  to  forestall  this  attack  of  the  enemy. 
The  German  Government  would  feel  keen  regret 
if  Belgium  should  regard  as  an  act  of  hostility 
against  herself  the  fact  that  the  measures  of  the 
enemies  of  Germany  oblige  her  on  her  part  to 
violate  Belgian  territory.^ 

Some  hours  later,  at  1.30  A.M.  on  August  3d, 
the  German  Minister  aroused  the  Belgian  Secre- 
tary General  for  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
from  his  slumbers  and, 

asked  to  see  Baron  von  der  Elst.     He  told  him  that 
he  was  instructed  by  his  Government  to  inform  us 

'  English  White  Paper,  No.  123.     '  Belgian  Cray  Book,  No.  20. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  211 

that  French  dirigibles  had  thrown  bombs,  and  that 
a  patrol  of  French  cavalry,  violating  international 
law,  seeing  that  war  was  not  declared,  had  crossed 
the  frontier. 

The  Secretary  General  asked  Herr  von  Below 
where  these  events  had  taken  place;  in  Germany, 
he  was  answered.  Baron  von  der  Elst  observed 
that  in  that  case  he  could  not  understand  the 
object  of  his  communication.  Herr  von  Below  said 
that  these  acts,  contrary  to  international  law,  were 
of  a  nature  to  make  one  expect  that  other  acts  con- 
trary to  international  law  would  be  perpetrated  by 
France. ' 


As  to  these  last  communications,  it  should  be 
noted  that  the  German  Government,  neither  then 
nor  at  any  subsequent  time,  ever  disclosed  to  the 
world  the  "reliable  information,"  which  it  claimed 
to  have  of  the  intentions  of  the  French  Govern- 
ment, and  the  event  shows  beyond  a  possibility  of 
contradiction  that  at  that  time  France  was  un- 
prepared to  make  any  invasion  of  Belgium  or  even 
to  defend  its  own  north-eastern  frontier. 

It  should  further  be  noted  that  the  alleged 
aggressive  acts  of  France,  which  were  made  the 
excuse  for  the  invasion  of  Belgium,  according  to 
the  statement  of  the  German  Ambassador  himself, 
did  not  take  place  i?i  Belgium  but  in  Germany. 

'  Belgian  Gray  Paper,  No.  21. 


212         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

On  August  3d,  at  7  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
Belgium  served  upon  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Brussels  the  following  reply  to  the  German 
ultimatum,  which,  after  quoting  the  substance  of 
the  German  demand,  continued: 

This  note  caused  profound  and  painful  surprise 
to  the  King's  Government. 

The  intentions  which  it  attributed  to  France 
are  in  contradiction  with  the  express  declarations 
which  were  made  to  us  on  the  ist  August  in  the 
name  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic. 

Moreover,  if,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  a 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  were  to  be  com- 
mitted by  France,  Belgium  would  fulfill  all  her 
international  duties,  and  her  army  would  offer  the 
most  vigorous  opposition  to  the  invader. 

The  treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  by  the  treaties 
of  1870,  establish  the  independence  and  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
Powers,  and  particularly  of  the  Government  of  His 
Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Belgium  has  always  been  faithful  to  her  inter- 
national obligations;  she  has  fulfilled  her  duties 
in  a  spirit  of  loyal  impartiality;  she  has  neglected 
no  effort  to  maintain  her  neutrality  or  to  make  it 
respected. 

The  attempt  against  her  independence,  with  which 
the  German  Government  threatens  her,  would 
constitute  a  flagrant  violation  of  international  law. 
No  strategic  interest  justifies  the  violation  of  tl:at 
law. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  213 

The  Belgian  Government  would,  hy  accepting  the 
propositions  ivhich  are  notified  to  her,  sacrifice  the 
honor  of  the  nation  while  at  the  same  time  betraying 
her  duties  toward  Europe. 

Conscious  of  the  part  Belgium  has  played  for 
more  than  eighty  years  in  the  civilization  of  the 
world,  she  refuses  to  believe  that  her  independence 
can  be  preserved  only  at  the  expense  of  the  viola- 
tion of  her  neutrality. 

If  this  hope  were  disappointed  the  Belgian 
Government  has  firmly  resolved  to  repulse  by 
every  means  in  her  power  any  attack  upon  her 
rights. 

In  the  records  of  diplomacy  there  are  few 
nobler  documents  than  this,  Belgium  then  knew 
that  she  was  facing  possible  annihilation.  Every 
material  interest  suggested  acquiescence  in  the 
peremptory  demands  of  her  powerful  neighbor. 
In  the  belief  that  then  so  generally  prevailed,  but 
which  recent  events  have  somewhat  modified,  the 
success  of  Germany  seemed  probable,  and  if  so, 
Belgium,  by  facilitating  the  triumph  of  Germany, 
wotdd  be  in  a  position  to  participate  in  the  spoils 
of  the  victory. 

If  Belgium  had  regarded  her  honor  as  lightly  as 
Germany  and  felt  that  the  matter  of  self-preser- 
vation would  excuse  any  moral  dereliction,  she 
would  have  imitated  the  exam.ple  of  Luxemburg, 
also  invaded,  and  permitted  free  passage  to  the 


214        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

German  army  without  essential  loss  of  her  ma- 
terial prosper! t}-,  but  with  a  fatal  sacrifice  to  her 
national  honor. 

Even  under  these  conditions  Belgium  evidently 
entertained  a  hope  that  Germany  at  the  last 
moment  would  not,  in  view  of  its  promises  and  the 
protest  of  Belgium,  commit  this  foul  outrage. 

The  military  attache  of  the  French  Government, 
being  apprised  of  Germany's  virtual  declaration 
of  war,  offered  "the  support  of  five  French  army 
corps  to  the  Belgian  Government,"  and  in  reply 
Belgium,  still  jealously  regardful  of  her  obliga- 
tion of  neutrality,  replied : 

We  are  sincerely  grateful  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment for  offering  eventual  support.  In  the  actual 
circumstances,  however,  we  do  not  propose  to 
appeal  to  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers.  The  Belgian 
Government  will  decide  later  on  the  action  which 
they  think  it  necessary  to  take. 

As  in  Caesar's  time,  the  Belgas,  of  all  the  tribes 
of  Gaul,  are  in  truth  "the  bravest." 

Later  in  the  evening,  the  King  of  Belgium  met 
his  Ministers,  and  the  offer  of  France  was  com- 
mimicated  to  them,  and  again  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment, still  reposing  some  confidence  in  the  Punic 
faith  of   Prussia,   decided  not  to  appeal  to  the 


The  Case  of  Belgium  215 

guaranteeing  Powers,  or  to  avail  itself  of  the  offers 
of  France. 

On  the  following  morning  at  6  o'clock  the 
German  Minister  handed  this  formal  declaration  of 
war  to  the  Belgian  Government: 

I  have  been  instructed,  and  have  the  honor  to 
inform  your  Excellency,  that  in  consequence  of  the 
Government  of  His  Majesty  the  King  having  de- 
cHned  the  well-intentioned  proposals  submitted  to 
them  by  the  Imperial  Government,  the  latter  will, 
deeply  to  their  regret,  be  compelled  to  carry  out — • 
if  necessary  by  force  of  arms — the  measures  of 
security  which  have  been  set  forth  as  indispensable 
in  view  of  the  French  menaces. 

Here  again,  no  active  violation  of  Belgium's 
neutrahty  by  France  is  alleged,  only  "French 
menaces." 

The  conjecture  is  plausible  that  in  the  case  of 
the  Prussian  General  Staff,  it  was  their  "own  hard 
dealings"  which  thus  taught  them  to  "suspect 
the  thoughts  of  others. " 

On  that  day  the  German  troops  crossed  the 
Belgian  frontier  and  hostilities  began. 

On  the  same  day,  at  the  great  session  of  the 
Reichstag,  when  the  Imperial  Chancellor  at- 
tempted to  justify  to  the  world  the  hostile  acts  of 
Germany,  and  especially  the  invasion  of  Belgium, 


2i6        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

the  pretended  defense  was  thus  bluntly  stated  by 
the  German  Premier: 

We  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity  and  necessity 
knows  no  law.  Our  troups  have  occupied  Luxem- 
burg and  perhaps  are  already  on  Belgian  soil. 
Gentlemen,  that  is  contrary  to  the  dictates  of  inter- 
national law.  It  is  true  that  the  French  Govern- 
ment has  declared  at  Brussels  that  France  is  willing 
to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  so  long  as 
her  opponent  respects  it.  We  knew,  however,  that 
France  stood  ready  for  invasion.  France  could 
wait,  hut  we  could  not  wait.  A  French  movement 
upon  our  flank  upon  the  lower  Rhine  might  have 
been  disastrous.  So  we  were  compelled  to  override 
the  just  protest  of  the  Luxemburg  and  Belgian 
Governments.  The  wrong — /  speak  openly — that 
we  are  committing  we  will  endeavor  to  make  good  as 
soon  as  our  military  goal  has  been  reached.  Any- 
body who  is  threatened,  as  we  arc  threatened,  and  is 
fighting  for  his  highest  possessions,  can  only  have 
one  thought — how  he  is  to  hack  his  way  through. 

It  will  be  noted  that  on  this  occasion,  when 
above  all  other  occasions  it  was  not  only  the  duty, 
but  to  the  highest  interests  of  Germany,  to  give 
to  the  world  any  substantial  reason  for  violating 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  the  defense  of  Ger- 
many is  rested  upon  the  ground  of  self-interest, 
— euphemistically  called  "necessity," — and  upon 
none  other. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  217 

While  Von  Bethmann-HoUweg's  statement 
does  state  that  "France  held  herself  in  readiness  to 
invade  Belgium,"  there  was  no  intimation  that 
France  had  done  so,  or  had  any  immediate  inten- 
tion of  doing  so.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  added, 
^^  France  could  wait,  we  {Germany)  could  not.''  If 
Belgium  had  forfeited  its  rights  by  undue  favors 
to  France  or  England,  why  did  the  Chancellor  char- 
acterize its  protest  as  "just"? 

How  Germany  fulfilled  the  promise  of  its 
Chancellor,  to  "make  good"  the  admitted  wrong 
which  it  did  Belgium,  subsequent  events  have 
shown. 

It  may  be  questioned  whether,  since  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  any  country  has  been  subjected  to 
such  general  devastating  horrors.  So  little  effort 
has  been  taken  by  the  conqueror  to  lessen  the 
inevitable  suffering,  that  fines  have  been  levied 
upon  this  impoverished  people,  which  would  be 
oppressive  even  in  a  period  of  prosperity.  It 
is  announced  from  Holland,  as  this  book  goes  to 
press,  that  Germany  has  imposed  upon  this  war- 
desolated  country  a  fine  of  $7,000,000  per  month 
and  an  especial  fme  of  $75,000,000,  for  its 
"violation  of  neutrality." 

Were  this  episode  not  a  tragedy,  the  sardonic 
humor,  which  caused  the  German  General  Staff 


2i8        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

to  impose  this  monstrous  fine  upon  Belgium  for 
its  "violation  of  neutrality,"  would  have  the 
tragi-comical  aspects  of  Bedlam.  It  recalls  the 
fable  of  the  wolf  who  complained  that  the  lamb 
was  muddying  the  stream  and  when  the  lamb 
politely  called  the  wolf's  attention  to  the  fact 
that  it  stood  lower  down  on  the  river  side  than  the 
wolf,  the  latter  announced  its  intention  to  devour 
the  lamb  in  any  event.  Such  is  probably  the 
intention  of  Prussia.  If  it  prevail  Belgium  as 
an  independent  State  will  cease  to  exist  and 
it  will  be  mourned  as  Poland  is.  Like  Poland,  it 
may  have  a  resurrection. 

The  war  having  thus  commenced  between 
Germany  and  Belgium,  the  brave  ruler  of  the 
latter  country — "every  inch  a  King" — addressed 
to  the  King  of  England  the  following  appeal : 

Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your 
Majesty's  friendship  and  that  of  your  predecessor, 
and  the  friendly  attitude  of  England  in  1870  and 
the  proof  of  friendship  you  have  just  given  us  again, 
I  make  a  supreme  appeal  to  the  diplomatic  inter- 
vention of  your  Majesty's  Government  to  safe- 
guard the  integrity  of  Belgium.  ^ 

In  reply  to  that  appeal,  which  no  chivalrous 
nation  could  have  disregarded,  Sir  Edward  Grey 

'  Belgian  Cray  Po^er,  No.  25. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  219 

immediately,  on  August  4th,  advised  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Berlin  as  follows: 

We  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  a  note  to 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that 
German  Government  will  be  compelled  to  carry 
out,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures 
considered  indispensable. 

We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has 
been  violated  at  Gemmenich. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  Germany  declined  to  give  the  same  assurance 
respecting  Belgium  as  France  gave  last  week  in 
reply  to  our  request  made  simiiltaneously  at  Berlin 
and  Paris,  we  must  repeat  that  request,  and  ask 
that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram  of 
this  morning  be  received  here  by  12  o'clock  to-night. 
If  not,  you  are  instructed  to  ask  for  your  passports, 
and  to  say  that  his  Majesty's  Government  feel 
bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to  uphold 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a 
treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a  party  as 
ourselves.^ 

Thereupon  Sir  Edward  Goschen,  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Berlin,  called  upon  the  Secretary  of 
State  and  stated  in  the  name  of  His  Majesty's 
Government  that  unless  the  Imperial  Government 

could  give  the  assurance  by  12  o'clock  that  night 
that   they   would   proceed   no   further  with   their 

'English  WhiU  Paper.  N^,.  159. 


220 


The  Evidence  in  the  Case 


violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  and  step  their 
advance,  I  had  been  instructed  to  demand  my  pass- 
ports and  inform  the  Imperial  Government  that  His 
Majesty's  Government  would  have  to  take  all 
steps  in  their  power  to  uphold  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  and  the  observance  of  a  treaty  to  which 
Germany  was  as  much  a  party  as  themselves. 

Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  to  his  great  regret 
he  could  give  no  other  answer  than  that  which  he 
had  given  me  earlier  in  the  day,  namely,  that 
the  safety  of  the  Empire  rendered  it  absolute- 
ly necessary  that  the  Imperial  troops  should  ad- 
vance through  Belgium.  I  gave  his  Excellency 
a  written  summary  of  your  telegram  and,  pointing 
out  that  you  had  mentioned  12  o'clock  as  the  time 
when  His  Majesty's  Government  would  expect  an 
answer,  asked  him  whether,  in  view  of  the  terrible 
consequences  which  would  necessarily  ensue,  it  wore 
not  possible  even  at  the  last  moment  that  their 
answer  should  be  reconsidered.  He  replied  that 
if  the  time  given  were  even  twenty-four  hours  or 
more,  his  answer  must  be  the  same.  I  said  that 
in  that  case  I  should  have  to  demand  my  passports. 
This  interview  took  place  at  about  7  o'clock.   .  .  . 

I  then  said  that  I  should  like  to  go  and  see  the 
Chancellor,  as  it  might  be,  perhaps,  the  last  time  I 
should  have  an  opportunity  of  seeing  him.  He 
begged  me  to  do  so.  I  found  the  Chancellor  very 
agitated.  His  Excellency  at  once  began  a  harangue, 
which  lasted  for  about  twenty  minutes.  He  said 
that  the  step  taken  by  His  Majesty's  Government 
was  terrible  to  a  degree;  just  for  a  word — "neutra- 
lity, "  a  word  which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been 
disregarded — just  for  a  scrap  of  paper  Great  Britain 


The  Case  of  Belf^ium  221 


to' 


was  going  to  make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  de- 
sired nothing  better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All 
his  efforts  in  that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless 
by  this  last  terrible  step,  and  the  policy  to  which, 
as  I  knew,  he  had  devoted  himself  since  his  acces- 
sion to  office  had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of  cards. 
What  we  had  done  was  unthinkable;  it  was  like 
striking  a  man  from  behind  while  he  was  fighting 
for  his  life  against  two  assailants.  He  held  Great 
Brica\n  responsible  for  all  the  terrible  events  that 
might  happen.  I  protested  strongly  against  that 
statement,  and  said  that,  in  the  same  way  as  he  and 
Herr  von  Jagow  wished  me  to  understand  that  for 
strategical  reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  life  and  death 
to  Germany  to  advance  through  Belgium  and  vio- 
late the  latter's  neutrality,  so  I  would  wish  him  to 
understand  that  it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  matter  of  "life 
and  death''  for  the  honor  of  Great  Britain  that  she 
should  keep  her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost 
to  defend  Belgium's  neutrality  if  attacked.  That 
solemn  compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what 
confidence  could  any  one  have  in  engagements 
given  by  Great  Britain  in  the  future?  The 
Chancellor  said,  "But  at  what  price  will  that  com- 
pact have  been  kept.  Has  the  British  Government 
thought  of  that?"  I  hinted  to  his  Excellency  as 
plainly  as  I  could  that  fear  of  consequences  could 
hardly  be  regarded  as  an  excuse  for  breaking  solemn 
engagements,  but  his  Excellency  was  so  excited,  so 
evidently  overcome  by  the  news  of  our  action,  and  so 
little  disposed  to  hear  reason,  that  I  refrained  from 
adding  fuel  to  the  flame  by  further  argument.  .  .    ' 

» British  White  Paper,  No.  i6o. 


222       The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Here  again  it  is  most  significant,  in  view  of  the 
subsequent  clumsily  framed  defense  by  Geitnan 
apologists,  to  note  that  the  German  Secretary  of 
State,  Herr  von  Jagow,  and  his  superior,  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor,  did  not  pretend  to  suggest  that 
the  invasion  of  Belgium  was  due  to  any  overt  act 
of  France. 

With  even  greater  frankness  Von  Jagow  stated 
the  real  purpose,  which  was,  "to  advance  into 
France  by  the  quickest  and  easiest  way,"  and  to 
"avoid  the  more  Southern  route,"  which,  "in 
view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the  strength  of 
the  fortresses,"  would  have  entailed  "great  loss 
of  time." 

The  damning  conclusion  as  to  the  guilt  of  Ger- 
many, which  irresistibly  follows  from  these  ad- 
mitted facts,  is  sought  to  be  overborne  by  a 
pamphlet  entitled  "  The  Truth  about  Germany,'"  and 
subscribed  to  by  a  number  of  distinguished  Ger- 
mans, who  are  in  turn  vouched  for  in  America  by 
Professor  John  W.  Burgess  of  Columbia  College. 
He  tells  us  that  they  are  the  "salt  of  the  earth," 
and  "among  the  greatest  thinkers,  moralists, 
and  philanthropists  of  the  age."  To  over- 
bear the  doubter  with  the  v/eight  of  such 
authority  we  are  told  that  this  defense  has  the 
support    of  the    great    theologian,  Hamack,    the 


The  Case  of  Belgium  223 

sound  and  accomplished  political  scientist  and 
economist,  Von  Schmoller,  the  distinguished  philo- 
logian,  Von  Wilamowitz,  the  well-known  historian, 
Lamprecht,  the  profound  statesman,  Von  Posadow- 
sky,  the  brilliant  diplomatist.  Von  Biilow,  the 
great  financier,  Von  G winner,  the  great  promoter  of 
trade  and  commerce,  Ballin,  the  great  inventor, 
Siemens,  the  brilliant  preacher  of  the  Gospel, 
Dryander,  and  the  indispensable  Director  in  the 
Ministry  of  Education,  Schmidt.  (The  adjectives 
are  those  of  Professor  Burgess.) 

The  average  American,  as  indeed  the  average 
citizen  of  any  country,  when  his  natural  passions 
are  not  unduly  aroused,  is  apt  to  take  a  very 
prosaic  and  dispassionate  view  of  such  matters, 
and  when  he  has  reached  his  conclusion  based 
upon  everyday,  commonplace  morality,  he  is  not 
apt  to  be  shaken  even  by  an  imposing  array 
of  names,  fortified  by  an  enthusiastic  excess  of 
grandiloquent  adjectives.  The  aristocracy  of 
brains  has  no  monopoly  of  truth,  which  is  often 
best  grasped  by  the  democracy  of  common  sense. 

The  defense  of  these  notable  representatives 
of  German  thought  seems  to  be  based  upon  the 
wholly  unsupported  assertion  that  "England  and 
France  were  resolved  not  to  respect  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium." 


224        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

They  say: 

It  woiild  have  been  a  crime  against  the  German 
people  if  the  German  General  Staff  had  not  antici- 
pated this  intention.  The  inalienable  right  of 
self-defense  gives  the  individual,  whose  very  exist- 
ence is  at  stake,  the  moral  liberty  to  resort  to 
weapons  which  would  be  forbidden  except  in  times 
of  peril.  As  Belgium  would,  nevertheless,  not 
acquiesce  in  a  friendly  neutrality,  which  would 
permit  the  unobstructed  passage  of  German  troops 
through  small  portions  of  her  territory,  although 
her  integrity  was  guaranteed,  the  German  General 
Staff  was  obliged  to  force  the  passage  in  order  to 
avoid  the  necessity  of  meeting  the  enemy  on  the 
most  unfavorable  ground. 

In  other  words,  it  seemed  preferable  to  the 
German  General  Staff  that  it  should  fight  in 
France  rather  than  in  Germany,  and  for  this 
reason  Belgium  must  be  ruined. 

Notwithstanding  this  and  similar  propositions, 
which  are  so  abhorrent  in  their  political  immorality, 
it  is  yet  gravely  suggested  by  Dr.  Dernberg  and 
others  that  Bemhardi's  philosophy  does  not  reflect 
the  true  thought  of  the  Prussian  ruling  classes. 
Here  are  representative  theologians,  economists, 
historians,  statesmen,  diplomatists,  financiers,  in- 
ventors, and  educators,  who,  in  invoking  the  sup- 
port of  the  educated  classes  in  the  United  States, 


The  Case  of  Belgium  225 

deliberately  subscribe  to  a  proposition  at  which 
even  Machiavclli  might  have  gagged. 

We  are  further  told  that  "the  German  troops, 
with  their  iron  discipline  will  respect  the  personal 
property  and  liberty  of  the  individual  in  Belgium 
just  as  they  did  in  France  in  1870,"  and  these 
scientists,  philosophers,  and  doctors  of  divinity 
add  that  "Belgium  would  have  been  wise,  if  it 
had  permitted  the  passage  of  the  German  troops," 
for  the  Belgian  people  ''would  have  fared  well  from 
the  husifiess  point  of  view,  for  the  army  would  have 
proved  a  good  customer  and  paid  well. " 

To  this  defense  we  are  led  in  the  last  analy- 
sis, that  Belgium  should  have  preferred  cash 
to  her  honor,  just  as  the  German  General  Staff 
preferred  dishonor  to  the  sacrifice  of  an  immediate 
military  advantage. 

The  possibilities  of  moral  casuistry  have  been 
severely  tested  in  the  attempt  of  these  apologists 
for  Germany  to  defend  the  forcible  invasion  of 
Belgium. 

The  ethical  question  has  been  made  quite  un- 
necessarily to  pivot  upon  the  express  contractual 
obligations  of  England,  Germany,  and  France 
with  respect  to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  The 
indictment  of  Germany  has  been  placed  upon  the 
sound  but  too  narrow  ground  that  by  the  Treaty 


226        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

of  1839,  and  The  Hague  Convention  of  1907, 
Germany  had  obligated  itself  by  a  solemn  pledge 
to  respect  the  neutrality  both  of  Luxemburg  and 
Belgium. 

If,  however,  there  had  been  no  Hague  Conven- 
tion and  no  Treaty  of  1839,  and  if  Germany. 
England,  and  France  had  never  entered  into  re- 
ciprocal obligations  in  the  event  of  war  to  respect 
Belgium's  neutrality,  nevertheless  upon  the  broad- 
est considerations  of  international  law  the  invasion 
without  its  consent  would  be  without  any  justifica- 
tion whatever. 

It  is  a  fundamental  axiom  of  international  law 
that  each  nation  is  the  sole  and  exclusive  judge 
of  the  conditions  under  which  it  will  permit  an 
alien  to  cross  its  frontiers.  Its  territory  is  sacro- 
sanct. No  nation  may  invade  the  territory  of 
another  without  its  consent.  To  do  so  by  com- 
pulsion is  an  act  of  war.  Each  nation's  land  is  Its 
castle  of  asylum  and  defense.  This  fundamental 
right  of  Belgium  should  not  be  confused  or  ob- 
scured by  balancing  the  subordinate  equities  be- 
tween France,  Germany,  and  England  with  respect 
to  their  formal  treaty  obligations. 

Belgium's  case  has  thus  been  weakened  in  the 
forum  of  public  opinion  by  too  insistent  reference 
to  the  special  treaties.     The  right  of  Belgium  and 


The  Case  of  Belgium  227 

of  its  citizens  as  individuals,  to  be  secure  in  their 
possessions  rests  upon  the  sure  foundation  of 
inalienable  right  and  is  guarded  by  the  immutable 
principle  of  moral  law,  "Thou  shalt  not  steal." 
It  was  well  said  by  Alexander  Hamilton : 

The  sacred  rights  of  man  are  not  to  be  searched 
for  in  old  parchments  and  musty  records ;  they  are 
written  as  with  a  sunbeam  in  the  whole  volume  of 
human  nature  by  the  hand  of  Divinity  itself  and 
can  never  be  erased  by  mortal  power. 

This  truth  can  be  illustrated  by  an  imaginary 
instance.  Let  us  suppose  that  the  armies  of  the 
Kaiser  had  made  the  progress  which  they  so 
confidently  anticipated,  and  had  not  simply  cap- 
tured Paris,  but  had  also  invaded  England,  and 
that,  in  an  attempt  to  crush  the  British  Empire, 
the  German  General  Staff  planned  an  inva- 
sion of  Canada.  Let  us  further  suppose  that 
Germany  thereupon  served  upon  the  United  States 
such  an  arrogant  demand  as  it  made  upon  Bel- 
gium, requiring  the  United  States  to  permit  it  to 
land  an  army  in  New  York,  with  the  accompany- 
ing assurance  that  neither  its  territory  nor  in- 
dependence would  be  injured,  and  that  Germany 
would  generously  reimbiirse  it  for  any  damage. 

Let  us  further  suppose — and  it  is  not  a  very 
fanciful    supposition — that     the    United     States 


228        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

would  reply  to  the  German  demand  that  under  no 
circumstances  should  a  German  force  be  landed  in 
New  York  or  its  territory  be  used  as  a  base  of 
hostile  operations  against  Canada.  To  carry  out 
the  analogy  in  all  its  details,  let  us  then  suppose 
that  the  German  fleet  should  land  an  army  in  the 
city  of  New  York,  arrest  its  Mayor,  and  check 
the  first  attempt  of  its  outraged  inhabitants  to 
defend  the  city  by  demolishing  the  Cathedral,  the 
Metropolitan  Art  Gallery,  the  City  Hall  and  other 
structures,  and  shooting  down  remorselessly  large 
numbers  of  citizens,  because  a  few  non-com- 
batants had  not  accepted  the  invasion  with  due 
humility. 

Although  Germany  had  not  entered  into  any 
treaty  to  respect  the  territory  of  the  United 
States,  no  one  would  seriously  contend  that  Ger- 
many would  be  justified  in  such  an  invasion. 

The  alleged  invalidation  of  the  treaty  of  1839 
being  thus  unimportant,  Dr.  Dernburg  and  Pro- 
fessor von  Mach  fall  back  upon  the  only  remain- 
ing defense,  that  France  had  already  violated  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  with  the  latter's  consent. 
Of  this  there  is  no  evidence  whatever.  We  have,  on 
the  contrar}%  the  express  assurance,  which  France 
gave  on  the  eve  of  the  German  invasion  both 
to  Belgium  and  England,  that  it  would  not  violate 


The  Case  of  Belgium  229 

the  rights  of  Belgium,  and  in  addition  we  have 
the  significant  fact  that  when  Belgium  was 
invaded,  and  it  was  vitally  necessary  that  the 
French  Army  should  go  with  all  possible  speed 
to  its  relief  and  thus  stop  the  invasion  and 
save  France  itself  from  invasion,  it  was  ten  days 
before  France  could  send  any  adequate  support. 
Unhappily  it  was  then  too  late. 

If  it  were  true  that  France  intended  to  invade 
Belgium,  then  of  all  the  blunders  that  the  German 
Foreign  Office  has  made,  the  greatest  w^as  that  it 
did  not  permit  France  to  carry  out  this  step,  for 
it  would  have  palliated  the  action  of  Germany  in 
meeting  such  violation  by  a  similar  invasion,  and 
it  would  thus  have  been  an  immeasurable  gain  for 
Germany  and  a  greater  injury  to  France. 

Germany's  greatest  weakness  to-day  is  its 
moral  isolation.  It  stands  condemned  by  the 
judgment  of  the  civilized  world.  No  physical 
power  it  can  exercise  can  compensate  for  this  loss 
of  moral  power.  Even  success  will  be  too  dearly 
bought  at  such  a  price.  There  are  things  which 
succeed  better  than  success.     Truth  is  one  of  them. 

Under  the  plea  of  necessity,  which  means  Ger- 
many's desire  to  minimize  its  losses  of  life,  Germany 
has  turned  Belgium  into  a  shambles,  trampled 
a  peaceful  nation  under  foot  and  almost  crushed  its 


230        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

soul  beneath  the  iron  tread  of  its  mighty  armies. 

Almost  wounded  unto  death,  and  for  a  time 
prostrate  under  the  heel  of  the  conqueror, 
the  honor  of  Belgium  shines  unsullied  by  any 
selfish  interests,  personal  dishonor,  or  lack  of 
courage. 

It  is  claimed  that  there  were  officers  of  the  French 
Army  in  Liege  and  Namur  before  the  war  broke 
out.  Neither  names  nor  dates  have  been  given, 
and  the  allegation  might  be  fairly  dismissed  be- 
cause of  the  very  vagueness  of  the  charge.  But 
even  if  it  were  true,  international  law  does  not 
forbid  the  officers  of  one  nation  serving  with  the 
armies  of  another.  German  officers  have  for  many 
years  been  thus  employed  in  Turkey  and  engaged 
in  training  and  developing  the  Turkish  Army,  but 
no  one  has  ever  contended  that  the  employment 
by  that  country  of  German  military  officers  was 
a  violation  of  neutrality,  or  gave  rise  to  a  casus 
belli. 

It  is  wholly  probable  that  there  were  some 
German  officers  in  Belgium  before  the  war  com- 
menced, and  if  not.  there  were  certainly  hundreds 
of  spies,  of  whose  pernicious  activities  the  Belgian 
people  were  to  learn  later  to  their  infinite  sorrow, 
but  because  Germany  employed  an  elaborate 
system   of   espionage   in    Belgium,    it    could   not 


The  Case  of  Belgium  231 

justify  France  in  invading  its  territory  without  its 
permission. 

To  a  lawyer,  who  has  had  experience  in  the 
judicial  ascertainment  of  truth,  there  is  one  con- 
sideration that  justifies  him  in  disposing  of  all  these 
vague  allegations  with  respect  to  French  activities 
in  Belgium  on  the  eve  of  the  war,  and  that  is  that 
Germany  has  not  only  failed  to  give  any  testimony 
in  support  of  the  charges,  but  it  never  suggested  this 
defense  until  the  judgment  of  the  civilized  world 
had  branded  it  with  an  ineffaceable  stain. 

Professor  von  Mach,  a  former  educator  of  Har- 
vard University  and  an  apologist  for  Germany, 
feels  this  poverty  of  evidence  and  has  rather 
naively  suggested  an  adjournment  of  the  case.  He 
says : 

Did  French  officers  remain  in  Liege  or  in  any 
other  Belgian  fortress  after  hostilities  had  begun, 
and  did  France  plan  to  go  through  Belgium?  Ger- 
many has  officially  made  both  claims.  The  first 
can  easily  be  substantiated  by  The  Supreme  Court 
of  Civilization  by  an  investigation  of  the  prisoners 
of  war  taken  in  Belgium.  Until  an  impartial 
investigation  becomes  possible  no  further  proof 
than  the  claim  made  by  the  German  Government 
can  be  produced. 

As  the  French  officers  taken  in  Belgium  are 
presumably  in  German  detention  camps,  it  would 


2^)2        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

seem  that  Germany  should  first  substantiate  its 
defense  by  names,  dates,  and  places,  although  even 
then  the  mere  capture  of  French  officers  in  Bel- 
gium after  the  invasion  had  begun  does  not 
necessarily  indicate  that  they  were  in  Belgium 
before  the  invasion. 

Dr.  von  Mach  adds  in  the  reply,  which  he  made 
in  the  New  York  Times  to  an  article  contributed 
by  the  writer  to  that  journal: 

It  is  impossible  to  say  here  exactly  what  these  proofs 
are  which  Germany  possesses,  and  which  for  wdlitary 
reasons  it  has  not  yet  been  able  to  divulge.  .  .  .  This 
is  an  important  question,  and  the  answer  must  be 
left  to  The  Supreme  Court  of  Civilization.  The 
weight  of  the  evidence  would  seem  to  point  to  a 
justification  of  Germany.  Yet  no  friend  of  Ger- 
many can  find  fault  with  those  who  would  wish  to 
defer  a  verdict  until  such  time  when  Germany  can 
present  her  complete  proof  to  the  world,  and  this 
may  be  when  the  war  is  over. 

This  naive  suggestion,  that  the  vital  question  of 
fact  should  be  postponed,  and  in  the  meantime 
judgment  should  be  entered  for  Germany,  is 
refreshing  in  its  novelty.  Its  only  parallel  was 
the  contention  of  the  celebrated  Dr.  Cook,  who 
contended  that  the  world  should  accept  his  claim 
as  to  the  discovery  of  the  North  Pole  and  await 
the  proofs  later. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  233 

Professor  von  Mach,  in  his  hook,'' WhatGermany 
Wants,''  further  explains  this  dilatory  defense  and 
amplifies  it  in  a  manner  that  is  certainly  unusual 
in  an  historian.  He  recognizes  that  the  speech  of 
the  German  Chancellor  in  the  Reichstag  on  August 
4th,  in  which  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  admitted 
that  the  action  of  Germany  in  invading  Belgium 
was  wrong  and  only  justified  it  on  the  ground  of 
self-preservation,  was  a  virtual  plea  of  guilty  by 
Prussia  of  the  crime,  of  which  it  stands  indicted 
at  the  bar  of  the  civilized  world. 

Germany's  scholarly  apologist,  as  amicus  curicB, 
then  suggests  that  in  criminal  procedure,  when 
a  defendant  pleads  guilty,  the  Court  often  re- 
fuses to  accept  his  plea,  enters  a  plea  of  not  guilty 
for  him,  and  assigns  counsel  to  defend  the  case. 
He  therefore  suggests  that  the  Chancellor's  plea 
of  guilty  should  be  disregarded  and  the  Court 
should  assign  counsel. 

One  difficulty  with  the  analogy  is  that  courts 
do  not  ordinarily  refuse  to  accept  a  plea  of 
guilty.  On  the  contrary,  they  accept  it  almost 
invariably,  for  why  try  the  guilt  of  a  man  when  he 
himself  in  the  most  formal  way  acknowledges  it? 

The  only  instance  in  which  a  court  does  show 
such  consideration  to  a  prisoner  is  when  the  de- 
fendant is  both  poor  and  ignorant.     Then,  and 


234        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

only  then,  with  a  fine  regard  for  human  right,  is 
the  procedure  suggested  by  Prof,  von  Mach 
followed. 

To  this  humiliating  position,  Professor  von 
Mach  as  amicus  curicE  consigns  his  great  nation. 
For  myself,  as  one  who  admires  Germany  and  be- 
lieves it  to  be  much  greater  and  truer  than  its 
ruling  caste  or  its  over-zealous  apologists,  I  refuse 
to  accept  the  justification  of  such  an  absurd  and 
degrading  analogy. 

The  blunt  acknowledgment  of  the  German 
Chancellor  in  the  Reichstag,  already  quoted,  is 
infinitely  preferable  to  the  disingenuous  defenses 
of  Germany's  ardent  but  sophistical  apologists. 
Fully  recognizing  the  import  of  his  words,  Von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  addressing  the  representa- 
tives of  the  German  nation,  put  aside  with  admir- 
able candor  all  these  sophistical  artifices  and 
rested  the  defense  of  Germany  upon  the  single 
contention  that  Germany  was  beset  by  powerful 
enemies  and  that  it  was  a  matter  of  necessity  for 
her  to  perpetrate  this  "wrong"  and  in  this  manner 
to  "hack  her  way  through." 

This  defense  is  not  even  a  plea  of  confession  and 
avoidance.  It  is  a  plea  of  "Guilty"  at  the  bar  of 
the  world.  It  has  one  merit.  It  does  not  add  tc 
the  crime  the  aggravation  of  hypocrisy. 


The  Case  of  Belgium  235 

After  the  civilized  world  had  condemned  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  with  an  unprecedented  ap- 
proach to  unanimity,  the  German  Chancellor 
rather  tardily  discovered  that  public  opinion  was 
still  a  vital  force  in  the  world  and  that  the  strategic 
resuluS  of  the  occupation  of  Belgium  had  not 
compensated  for  the  moral  injury.  For  this  reason 
he  framed  five  months  after  this  crime  against 
civilization  a  belated  defense,  which  proved  so 
unconvincing  that  the  Bemhardi  plea  of  military 
necessity  is  clearly  preferable,  as  at  least  having 
the  merit  of  candor. 

After  proclaiming  to  the  world  that  the  German 
Foreign  Office  had  discovered  in  Brussels  certain 
secret  documents,  which  disclosed  the  fact  that 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  at  the  time  of  the  in- 
vasion was  a  sham  and  after  the  civilized  world  had 
refused  to  accept  this  bald  and  unsupported 
assertion,  as  it  had  also  refused  to  accept  the 
spurious  evidence  of  a  well-known  Arctic  explorer, 
the  German  Foreign  Office  in  December,  19 14 
published  its  alleged  proofs. 

The  first  purported  to  be  a  report  of  the  Chief 
of  the  Belgian  General  Staff  to  the  Minister  of 
War  and  reported  his  conversations  in  1906  with 
a  military  attache  of  the  British  Legation  in 
Brussels. 


236        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

The  second  purported  to  be  a  report  of  similar 
conversations  in  191 2  between  the  same  officials. 

In  an  authorized  statement,  published  on  Janu- 
ar}^  27,  191 5,  Sir  Edward  Grey  states  that  there 
is  no  record  of  either  of  these  negotiations  in  the 
English  Foreign  Office  or  the  War  Office ;  but  this 
fact  is  not  in  itself  conclusive  and  as  there  is  no 
evidence  that  the  documents  were  forged,  their 
genuineness  should  be  assumed  in  the  absence  of 
some  more  specific  denial. 

The  documents,  however,  do  not  appreciably 
advance  the  cause  of  Germany,  for  they  disclose 
on  their  face  that  the  conversations  were  not 
binding  on  the  Governments  of  England  or  Bel- 
gium but  were  simply  an  informal  exchange  of 
view  between  the  officials,  and  what  is  far  more  to 
the  purpose,  the  whole  of  the  first  conversation  of 
April  10,  1906,  was  expressly  based  upon  the 
statement  th?t  ''the  entry  of  the  English  into 
Belgium  would  take  place  only  after  the  violation  of 
our  neutrality  by  Germany. " 

The  second  document  also  shows  that  the  Bel- 
gian Chief  of  Staff  expressly  stated  that  any  in- 
vasion of  Belgium  by  England,  made  to  repel  a 
prior  German  invasion,  could  not  take  place  with- 
out the  express  consent  of  Belgium,  to  be  given 
when  the  occasion  arose,  and  it  is  further  evident 


The  Case  of  Belgium  237 

that  the  statement  of  the  EngHsh  miHtary  attache 
— clearly  a  subordinate  official  to  define  the  foreign 
policy  of  a  great  Empire — expressly  predicated  his 
assumption,  that  England  might  disembark  troops 
in  Belgium,  upon  the  statement  that  its  object 
would  be  to  repel  a  German  invasion  of  Belgian 
territory. 

If  it  be  asked  why  England  and  Belgium  were 
thus  in  1906  and  191 2  considering  the  contingency 
of  a  German  invasion  of  Belgium  and  the  method 
of  effectually  repelling  it,  the  reply  is  obvious  that 
such  invasion,  in  the  event  of  a  war  between  Ger- 
many and  France,  was  a  commonplace  of  German 
military  strategists.  Of  this  purpose  they  miade 
little,  if  any,  concealment.  The  construction  by 
Germany  of  numerous  strategic  railway  lines  on 
the  Belgian  frontier,  which  were  out  of  proportion 
to  the  economic  necessity  of  the  territory,  gave  to 
Europe  some  indication  of  Germany's  purpose  and 
there  could  have  been  little  doubt  as  to  such 
intention,  if  Germany  had  not,  through  its  Foreign 
Office,  given,  as  previously  shown,  repeated  and 
continuous  assurances  to  Belgium  that  such  was 
not  its  intention. 

The  German  Chancellor — whose  stupendous 
blunders  of  speech  and  action  in  this  crisis  will  be 
the  marvel  of  posterity — has  further  attempted  to 


238        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

correct  his  record  by  two  equally  disingenuous 
defenses.  Speaking  to  the  Reichstag  on  December 
2,  1914,  he  said: 

When  on  the  4th  of  August  I  referred  to  the 
wrong  which  we  were  doing  in  marching  through 
Belgium,  it  was  not  yet  known  for  certain  whether 
the  Brussels  Government  in  the  hour  of  need  would 
not  decide  after  all  to  spare  the  country  and  to 
retire  to  Antwerp  under  protest.  You  remember 
that,  after  the  occupation  of  Liege,  at  the  request  of 
our  army  leaders  I  repeated  the  offer  to  the  Belgian 
Government.  For  military  reasons  it  was  absolute- 
ly imperative  that  at  the  time,  about  the  4th  of 
Augmst,  the  possibility  for  such  a  development 
should  be  kept  open.  Even  then  the  guilt  of  the 
Belgian  Govermnent  was  apparent  from  many  a  sign, 
although  I  had  not  yet  any  positive  documentary 
proofs  at  my  disposal. 

This  is  much  too  vague  to  excuse  a  great  crime. 
The  guilt  of  Belgium  is  said  to  be  "apparent  from 
many  a  sign,"  but  what  these  signs  are  the  Char.- 
cellor  still  fails  to  state.  He  admits  that  they  were 
not  documentary  in  character.  If  the  guilt  of 
Belgium  had  been  so  apparent  to  the  Chancellor 
on  August  the  4th,  when  he  made  his  confession  of 
wrong  doing  in  the  Reichstag,  then  it  is  incredible 
that  he  would  have  made  such  an  admission. 

As  to  the  overt  acts  of  France,  all  that  the  Chan- 
cellor said  in  his  speech  of  December 2  was  "that 


The  Case  of  Belgium  239 

France's  plan  of  campaign  was  known  to  us  and 
that  it  compelled  us  for  reasons  of  self-preserva- 
tion to  march  through  Belgium."  But  it  is  again 
significant  that,  speaking  nearly  five  months  after 
his  first  public  utterance  on  the  subject  and  with  a 
full  knowledge  that  the  world  had  visited  its 
destructive  condemnation  upon  Germany  for  its 
wanton  attack  upon  Belgium,  the  Chancellor  can 
still  give  no  specific  allegation  of  any  overt  act  by 
France  which  justified  the  invasion.  All  that  is 
suggested  is  a  supposed  "plan  of  campaign. " 

Following  this  unconvincing  and  plainly  disin- 
genuous speech,  the  Chancellor  proceeded  in  an 
authorized  newspaper  interview  on  January  25, 
191 5  to  state  that  his  now  famous — or  infamous 
— remark  about  "the  scrap  of  paper"  had  been 
misunderstood. 

After  stating  that  he  felt  a  painful  "surprise  to 
learn  that  my  phrase,  'a  scrap  of  paper,'  should 
have  caused  such  an  unfavorable  impression  on 
the  United  States,"  he  proceeds  to  explain  that 
in  his  now  historic  interview  with  the  British 
Ambassador, 

he  (von  Bethmann-Hollweg)  had  spoken  of  the 
treaty  not  as  a  "scrap  of  paper"  for  Germany,  but 
as  an  instrument  which  had  become  obsolete  through 
Belgium's  forfeiture  of  its  neutrality  and  that  Great 


240        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Britain  had  quite  other  reasons  for  entering  into  the 
war,  compared  with  which  the  neutrality  treaty 
appeared  to  have  only  the  value  of  a  scrap  of  paper. 

Let  the  reader  here  pause  to  note  the  twofold 
character  of  this  defense. 

It  suggests  that  Germany's  guaranty  of  Bel- 
gium's neutrality  had  become  for  Germany  "a 
scrap  of  paper"  because  of  Belgium's  alleged 
forfeiture  of  its  rights  as  a  neutral  nation,  al- 
though at  the  time  referred  to  the  German  Chan- 
cellor had  not  only  asked  the  permission  of  Belgium 
to  cross  its  territory  but  immediately  before  his 
interview  with  the  British  Ambassador  he  had 
publicly  testified  in  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag 
to  the  justice  of  Belgium's  protest. 

The  other  and  inconsistent  suggestion  is  that, 
without  respect  to  Belgium's  rights  under  the 
treaty  of  1839,  the  violation  of  its  territory  by 
Germany  was  not  the  cause  of  England's  interven- 
tion ;  but  obviously  this  hardly  explains  the  German 
Chancellor's  contemptuous  reference  to  the  long 
standing  and  oft  repeated  guaranty  of  Belgium's 
neutrality  as  merely  a  "scrap  of  paper. " 

Having  thus  somewhat  vaguely  suggested  a 
twofold  defense,  the  Chancellor,  without  impeach- 
ing the  accuracy  of  Goschen's  report  of  the  inter- 
view, then  proceeded  to  state  that  the  conversation 


The  Case  of  Belgium  241 

in  question  took  place  immediately  after  his 
speech  in  the  Reichstag,  in  which,  as  stated, 
he  had  admitted  the  justice  of  Belgium's  protest 
against  the  violation  of  its  territory,  and  he  adds 
that, 

when  I  spoke,  I  already  had  certain  indications  but 
no  absolute  proof  upon  which  to  base  a  public  ac- 
cusation that  Belgium  long  before  had  abandoned 
its  neutrality  in  its  relations  with  England.  Never- 
theless I  took  Germany's  responsibilities  toward  the 
neutral  States  so  seriously  that  I  spoke  frankly  of 
the  wrong  committed  by  Germany. 

If  the  German  Chancellor  is  truthful  in  his  state- 
ment that  on  August  the  4th,  when  he  spoke  in 
the  Reichstag  and  an  hour  later  had  his  conversa- 
tion with  Goschen,  he  had  "certain  indications" 
that  Belgium  had  forfeited  its  rights  as  an  indepen- 
dent nation  by  hostile  acts,  then  the  German  Chan- 
cellor took  such  a  serious  view  of  "  Germany's 
responsibilities"  that,  without  any  necessity  or 
justification,  he  indicted  his  country  at  the  bar 
of  the  whole  world  of  a  flagrant  wrong.  If  he 
could  not  at  that  time  justify  the  act  of  the 
German  General  Staff,  he  should  at  least  have 
been  silent,  but,  according  to  his  incredible  state- 
ment, although  he  had  these  "certain  indications" 


242        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

and  thus  knew  that  Germany,  in  invading  Belgium, 
was  simply  attacking  an  already  hostile  country, 
he  deliberately  explains,  not  only  to  his  nation 
but  to  the  whole  world,  that  such  invasion  was  a 
wrong  and  had  no  justification  in  international 
law.  How  can  any  reasonable  man,  whose  eyes 
are  not  blinded  with  the  passions  of  the  hour, 
accept  this  explanation? 

It  is  even  more  remarkable  that  immediately 
following  the  session  of  the  Reichstag,  when  he 
had  his  interview  with  Goschen,  the  German 
Chancellor  never  suggested  in  his  own  defense  or 
that  of  his  country,  that  he  had  "certain  indica- 
tions," which  justified  the  action  that  day  taken, 
although  he  then  knew  that,  unless  he  could  justify 
it,  England  would  immediately  join  the  already 
powerful  foes  of  Germany. 

The  reader  need  only  reread  Goschen 's  report 
of  that  interview  {ante,  p.  214)  to  know  how  dis- 
ingenuous this  belated  explanation  is.  With  the 
whole  world  ringing  with  the  infamous  phrase,  the 
German  Chancellor,  after  five  months  of  reflection, 
can  only  make  this  pitiful  defense.  Its  acceptance 
subjects  even  the  most  credulous  to  a  severe  strain. 
It  exhausts  the  limit  of  gullibility. 

The  defense  wholly  ignores  the  fact  that  the 
Chancellor  had  previously  sought  to  bribe  Eng- 


The  Case  of  Belgium  243 

land  to  condone  in  advance  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium by  Germany,  and  that  Germany  had  also 
coerced  Luxemburg  into  a  passive  acquiescence  in  a 
similar  invasion,  and  there  is  as  yet  no  pretense 
that  Luxemburg  had  failed  in  its  obligation  of 
neutrality. 

Should  the  judgment  of  the  civiHzed  world 
turn  from  the  terrible  fate  of  Belgium  and  con- 
sider the  wrong  that  was  done  to  Luxemburg, 
then  the  German  Chancellor  may,  unless  better 
advised,  frame  further  maladroit  excuses  with 
reference  to  that  country. 

All  these  explanations,  as  senseless  as  they  are 
false,  and  savoring  more  of  the  tone  of  a  crim- 
inal court  then  that  of  an  imperial  chancellery, 
should  shock  those  who  admire  historic  Germany. 
They  are  unworthy  of  so  great  a  nation.  Bis- 
marck would  never  have  stooped  to  such  pitiful 
and  transparent  deception.  The  blunt  candor  of 
Maximilian  Harden,  which  we  have  already 
quoted  on  page  12,  is  infinitely  preferable  and  the 
position  of  Germany  at  the  bar  of  the  civilized 
world  will  improve,  when  its  maladroit  Chancellor 
has  the  courage  and  the  candor  to  say,  as  Harden 
did,  that  all  this  was  done  because  Germany 
regarded  it  as  for  its  vital  interests  and  because 
"  we  willed  it. " 


244        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Unless  our  boasted  civilization  is  the  thinnest 
veneering  of  barbarism ;  unless  the  law  of  the  world 
is  in  fact  only  the  ethics  of  the  rifle  and  the  con- 
science of  the  cannon;  unless  mankind,  after 
uncounted  centuries,  has  made  no  real  advance  in 
political  morality  beyond  that  of  the  cave  dweller, 
then  this  answer  of  Germany  cannot  satisfy  the 
"decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind." 
It  is  the  negation  of  all  that  civilization  stands  for. 

Belgium  has  been  crucified  in  the  face  of  the 
world.  Its  innocence  of  any  offense,  until  it  was 
attacked,  is  too  clear  for  argument.  Its  volimtary 
immolation  to  preserve  its  solemn  guarantee  of 
neutrality  will  "plead  like  angels,  trumpet-tongued, 
against  the  deep  damnation  of  its  taking  off." 

It  may  be  questioned  whether,  since  the  fall  of 
Poland,  Civilization  has  been  stirred  to  more  pro- 
found pity  and  intense  indignation  than  by  this 
wanton  outrage.  Pity,  radiating  to  the  utmost 
comers  of  the  world  by  the  "sightless  couriers  of 
the  air," 

"Shall  blow  the  horrid  deed  in  every  eye 
That  tears  shall  drown  the  wind." 

Was  it  also,  as  with  Macbeth,  a  case  of 

"Vaulting  ambition  which  o'erleaps  itself 
And  falls  on  the  other"  ? 


The  Case  of  Belgium  245 

Time  will  tell. 

Had  Germany  not  invaded  Belgium,  it  is  an  even 
chance  that  England  wotild  not  have  intervened, 
at  least  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

Germany  could  have  detached  a  relatively 
small  part  of  its  army  to  defend  its  highly  fortified 
Western  frontier,  and  leaving  France  to  wasce  its 
strength  on  frontal  attacks  on  that  almost  im- 
pregnable line  of  defense,  Germany  with  the  bulk  of 
its  army  and  that  of  Austria  could  have  made  a 
swift  drive  at  Russia. 

Is  it  not  possible  that  that  course  would  have 
yielded  better  results  than  the  fiasco,  which 
followed  the  fruitless  drive  at  Paris? 

If  Germany  succeeds,  it  will  claim  that  "noth- 
ing succeeds  like  success,"  and  to  the  disciples  of 
Treitschke  and  Bernhardi  this  will  be  a  sufficing 
answer. 

If  it  fail,  posterity  will  be  at  a  loss  to  determine 
which  blundered  the  worst,  the  German  Foreign 
Office  or  its  General  Staff,  its  diplomats  or  its 
generals. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  JUDGMENT  OF  THE  WORLD 

The  record  has  now  been  laid  before  the  reader 
in  all  its  essential  details.  The  witnesses  for  the 
different  countries  have  taken  the  stand  and  we 
have  their  respective  contentions  in  their  own 
words.  Czar,  Emperor,  and  King,  as  well  as 
Prime  Minister,  Chancellor,  and  Ambassador,  have 
testified  as  to  the  fateful  events,  which  preceded 
the  outbreak  of  the  war,  with  a  fullness  of  detail, 
to  which  history  presents  few  parallels.  The 
evidence  which  Germany  and  Austria  have  sup- 
pressed does  not  prevent  the  determination  of 
the  issue. 

It  is  a  great  tribute  to  the  force  of  public  opinion 
and  a  clear  recognition  that  the  conscience  of  man- 
kind does  exist  as  something  more  than  a  visionary 
abstraction,  that  the  secrets  of  diplomacy  have 
been  laid  bare  by  most  of  the  contending  nations, 
and  that  there  is  an  earnest  desire  on  the  part  of 
all  of  them  to  justify  their  conduct  respectively 

at  the  bar  of  the  civilized  world. 

246  . 


The  Judgment  of  the  World       247 

Even  more  impressive  to  the  sincere  friends  of 
peace  is  the  significant  fact  that  concurrently  with 
the  most  amazing  display  of  physical  force  that 
the  world  has  ever  known  has  come  a  direct  appeal 
by  the  belligerent  nations  to  the  neutral  States, 
and  especially  to  the  United  States,  not  for  practi- 
cal co-operation  in  the  hostilities  but  for  moral 
sympathy. 

All  past  wars  are  insignificant  in  dimensions  in 
comparison  with  this.  The  standing  army  of  the 
Roman  Empire,  according  to  the  estimate  of 
Gibbon,  did  not  exceed  400,000,  and  guarded 
that  mighty  Empire  from  the  Euphrates  to  the 
Thames.  The  grand  army  of  Napoleon,  which  was 
supposed  to  mark  the  maximum  of  human  effort 
in  the  art  of  war  and  with  which  he  crossed  a 
century  ago  the  Niemen,  did  not  exceed  700,000. 
To-day  at  least  fifteen  millions  of  men  are  engaged 
in  a  titanic  struggle,  with  implements  of  destruc- 
tion, to  which  all  past  devices  in  the  science  of 
destruction  are  insignificant. 

Apparently,  therefore,  the  ideals  of  the  pacificist 
are  little  better  than  a  rainbow,  a  rainbow  of 
promise,  perhaps,  but  still  a  rainbow,  formed  by 
the  rays  of  God's  justice  shining  through  the  tears 
of  human  pity. 

But  when,  in  contrast  to  this  amazing  display  of 


248        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

physical  power,  there  is  contrasted  an  equally 
unprecedented  desire  on  the  part  of  the  contending 
nations  to  justify  their  case  at  the  bar  of  public 
opinion  and  to  gain  the  moral  sympathy  of  the 
neutral  States,  then  it  is  seen  that  the  "decent 
respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind"  is  still  a 
mighty  factor  in  human  affairs,  and  the  question  as 
to  the  judgment  of  the  world,  upon  the  moral 
issues  raised  by  this  great  controversy,  becomes  not 
merely  of  academic  but  of  great  practical  interest. 

What  that  judgment  will  be  it  is  not  difficult 
to  determine,  for  the  evidence  in  the  case  can 
admit  of  but  one  conclusion.  It  may  be,  as  Mr. 
George  Bernard  Shaw  says,  that  in  the  contending 
nations,  the  ears  are  too  greatly  deafened  by  the 
roar  of  the  cannon  and  the  eyes  too  blinded  by  the 
smoke  of  battle,  to  reach  a  dispassionate  conclu- 
sion. But  in  the  neutral  States  of  the  world,  and 
especially  in  thatgreatest  of  all  the  neutral  Powers, 
the  United  States  of  America,  a  judgment  has 
been  pronounced  that  is  unmistakable. 

The  great  Republic  is  more  free  than  any  other 
nation  to  reach  a  just  conclusion  "without  fear, 
favor,  or  affection."  Without  alliances  with  any 
Power  and  with  no  practical  interest  in  the  Euro- 
pean balance  of  power,  itself  composed  of  men 
Df  all  the  contending  nations,  it  can,  above  every 


The  Judgment  of  the  World      249 

other  people,  proceed  to  judgment,  "with  malice 
toward  none  and  with  charity  for  all." 

It  is  a  tribute  to  its  unique  position  among  the 
nations  of  the  world  that  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  each  of  the  contending  Powers  has  invoked 
its  judgment.  The  Kaiser,  the  President  of  the 
French  Republic,  and  the  King  of  Belgium  have 
each  in  an  especial  way  sought  its  moral  support, 
while  to  the  other  nations  the  question  of  the 
attitude  of  the  United  States  has  been  one  of 
practical  and  recognized  importance. 

If  the  United  States  is  thus  a  moral  arbiter  in  the 
greatest  war  of  history,  its  judgment  is  now,  and 
may  hereafter  increasingly  become,  a  potential 
factor  of  great  significance. 

The  nature  of  that  judgment  is  already  apparent 
to  all  men.  The  people  of  the  United  States, 
numbering  nearly  one  hundred  millions,  have 
reached,  with  an  amazing  approach  to  unanimity, 
certain  clear  and  definite  conclusions. 

These  conclusions  maybe  summarized  as  follows: 

I.  That  Germany  and  Austria  in  a  time  of 
profound  peace  secretly  concerted  to  impose  their 
will  upon  Europe  in  a  matter  affecting  the  balance 
of  power.  Whether  in  so  doing  they  intended  to 
precipitate  a  European  war  to  determine  the 
hegemony  of  Europe  is  not  satisfactorily  established, 


250         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

although  their  whole  course  of  conduct  suggests 
this  as  a  possibility.  They  made  war  almost  in- 
evitable by  (a)  issuing  an  ultimatum  that  was 
grossly  unreasonable  and  disproportionate  to  any 
grievance  that  Austria  may  have  had,  and  (b)  in 
giving  to  Scrvia  and  Europe  insufficient  time  to 
consider  the  rights  and  obligations  of  all  interested 
nations. 

2 .  That  Germany  had  at  all  times  the  power  to 
induce  Austria  to  preserve  a  reasonable  and  con- 
ciliatory course,  but  at  no  time  effectively  exerted 
its  influence.  On  the  contrary,  it  certainly 
abetted,  and  possibly  instigated,  Austria  in  its 
unreasonable  course. 

3.  That  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Russia 
throughout  the  diplomatic  controversy  sincerely 
worked  for  peace,  and  in  this  spirit  not  only 
overlooked  the  original  misconduct  of  Austria  but 
made  every  reasonable  concession  in  the  hope  of 
preserving  peace. 

4.  That  Austria,  having  mobilized  its  army, 
Russia  was  reasonably  justified  in  mobilizing  its 
forces.  Such  act  of  mobilization  is  the  right  of 
any  sovereign  State,  and  as  long  as  the  Russian 
armies  did  not  cross  the  border  or  take  any  aggres- 
sive action,  no  other  nation  had  any  just  right  to 
complain,  each  having  the  same  right  to  make 
similar  preparations. 

5.  That  Germany,  in  abruptly  declaring  war 
against  Russia  for  failure  to  demobilize,  when  the 
other  Powers  had  offered  to  make  any  reasonable 
concession  and  peace  parleys  were  still  in  progress, 
precipitated  the  war. 

6.  That  the  invasion  of  Belgium  by  Germany  was 


The  Judgment  of  the  World       251 

without  any  provocation  and  in  violation  of  Bel- 
gitim's  inherent  rights  as  a  sovereign  State.  The 
sanctity  of  its  territory  does  not  depend  exclusively 
upon  the  Treaty  of  1839  or  The  Hague  Convention, 
but  upon  fundamental  and  axiomatic  principles 
of  international  law.  These  treaties  were  simply 
declaratory  of  Belgium's  rights  as  a  sovereign 
nation  and  simply  reaffirmed  by  a  special  covenant 
the  duty  of  Germany  and  the  other  Powers  to 
respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

7.  England  was  justified  in  its  declaration  of 
war  upon  Germany,  not  only  because  of  its  direct 
interests  in  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  but  also 
because  of  the  ethical  duty  of  the  strong  nations 
to  protect  the  weak  upon  adequate  occasion 
from  indefensible  wrong.  Apart  from  this  general 
ethical  justification,  England  was,  under  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  under  an  especial  obligation  to 
defend  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  had  it  failed 
to  respect  that  obligation  it  would  have  broken  its 
solemn  covenant. 

If  they  are  "thrice  armed"  who  have  their 
^'quarrel  just,"  then  England,  France,  Russia,  and 
Belgium  can  await  with  confidence,  not  merely 
the  immediate  issue  of  the  titanic  conflict,  but 
also  the  equally  important  judgment  of  history. 


EPILOGUE 

On  the  evening  of  July  31,  1914,  the  author 
reached  Basle.  The  rapid  progress  of  events, 
narrated  in  this  volume,  suggested  the  wisdom  of 
continuing  the  journey  to  Paris  that  night,  but  as 
I  wanted  to  see  the  tomb  of  Erasmus  in  the  Basle 
Cathedral  I  determined  to  break  my  long  journey 
from  St.  Moritz. 

It  seemed  a  fitting  time  to  make  a  pilgrimage  to 
the  last  resting-place  of  the  great  humanist  phil- 
osopher of  Rotterdam  and  Louvain,  for  in  that 
prodigious  upheaval  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
which  has  passed  into  history  as  the  Reformation, 
Erasmus  was  the  one  noble  spirit  who  looked 
with  a  tolerant  and  philosophical  mind  upon 
both  parties  to  the  great  controversy.  He  suf- 
fered the  fate  of  the  conservative  in  a  radical 
time,  and  as  the  great  storm  convulsed  Europe  the 
author  of  the  Praise  of  Folly  probably  said  on  more 
than  one  occasion :  "  A  plague  o'  both  your  houses." 
Nearly  ioux  centuries  have  passed  since  he  joined 
the  "silent  majority,"  between  whom  is  no  quarrel- 
ing, and  the  desolated  Louvain,  which  he  loved,  is 

252 


Epilogue  253 

to-day  in  its  ruins  a  standing  witness  that  immeas- 
urable folly  still  rules  the  darkened  counsels  of  men. 

As  I  reached  Basle  and  saw  the  spires  of  the 
Cathedral  rising  above  the  Rhine,  it  seemed  to  me 
that  the  great  convulsion,  which  was  then  rock- 
ing all  Europe  with  seismic  violence,  was  the  great- 
est since  that  of  the  French  Revolution  and  might 
have  as  lasting  results  as  the  great  schism  of  the 
sixteenth  century. 

I  was  not  fated  to  see  the  tomb,  for  when  I 
reached  my  hotel  the  facilities  of  civilization  had 
broken  down  so  abruptly  that  if  I  did  not  wish  to 
be  interned  in  Switzerland  I  must  leave  early  on 
the  following  morning  for  Paris.  Transportation 
had  almost  entirely  collapsed,  communication  was 
difficult,  and  credit  itself  was  so  strained  that 
"mine  host"  of  the  Three  Kings  was  disposed 
to  look  askance  even  at  gold. 

Our  journey  took  us  to  France  by  way  of  Delle. 
Twenty-four  hours  after  we  passed  that  frontier 
town,  German  soldiers  entered  and  blew  out  the 
brains  of  a  French  custom-house  officer,  thus  the 
first  victim  in  the  greatest  war  that  the  world  has 
ever  kno^m. 

As  we  joiimeyed  from  Basle  to  Paris  on  that 
last  day  of  July  the  fair  fields  of  France  never 
looked  more  beautiful.     In  the  gleaming  summer 


254        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

sun  they  made  a  new  "field  of  the  cloth  of  gold,'* 
and  the  hayricks  looked  like  the  aureate  tents  of 
a  mighty  army.  It  was  harvest  time,  but  already 
the  laborers  had  deserted  their  fields  which,  al- 
though "white  unto  the  harvest,"  seemed  bereft  of 
the  tillers.  Some  had  left  the  bounty  of  nature  to 
join  in  the  harvest  of  death.  From  the  high  pas- 
ture lands  of  the  Alps  the  herdsmen  at  the  ringing 
of  the  village  church  bells  had  left  their  herds  and 
before  night  had  fallen  were  on  their  way  to  the 
front. 

At  Belfort  the  station  was  crowded  with  French 
troops  and  an  elderly  French  couple  came  into  our 
compartment.  The  eyes  of  the  wife  were  red  with 
weeping,  while  the  man  sank  into  his  seat  and  with 
his  head  upon  his  breast  gazed  moodily  into  va- 
cancy. They  had  just  parted  with  their  son,  who 
had  joined  the  colors.  I  stood  for  a  time  with  this 
French  gentleman  in  the  corridor  of  the  train, 
but  as  he  could  not  speak  English  or  German  and 
I  could  not  speak  French,  it  was  impossible  for  us 
to  communicate  the  intense  and  tragical  thoughts 
that  were  passing  through  our  minds.  Suddenly 
he  pointed  to  the  smiling  harvest  fields,  by  which 
we  passed  so  swiftly,  and  said  ''Perdu!  perdu!" 
This  word  of  tragical  import  could  have  been 
applied  to  all  civilization  as  well. 


Epilogue  255 

The  night  of  our  arrival  in  Paris  I  fully  expected 
to  see  a  half  a  million  Frenchmen  parading  the 
streets  and  enthusiastically  cheering  for  war  and 
crying,  as  in  1870,  "a  Berlin!"  I  was  to  witness 
an  extraordinary  transformation  of  a  great  nation. 
An  unusual  silence  brooded  over  the  city.  A  few 
hundred  people  paraded  the  chief  avenues,  crying 
"down  with  war!",  while  a  separate  crowd  of 
equal  size  sang  the  national  hymn.  With  these 
exceptions  there  was  no  cheering  or  enthusiasm, 
such  as  I  would  have  expected  from  my  precon- 
ceived idea  of  French  excitability.  Men  spoke  in 
undertones,  with  a  quiet  but  subdued  intensity  of 
feeling  rather  than  with  frenzied  enthusiasm. 

With  a  devotion  that  was  extraordinary  and  a 
pathetically  brave  submission  to  a  possible  fate, 
they  seemed  to  be  sternly  resolved  to  die  to  the 
last  man,  if  necessary,  in  defense  of  their  noble 
nation.  Although  I  subsequently  saw  in  the 
thrilling  days  of  mobilization  many  thousands 
of  soldiers  pass  through  the  railroad  stations  on 
their  way  to  the  front,  I  never  heard  the  rumble 
of  a  drum  or  saw  the  waving  of  regimental  colors. 

No  sacrifice  seemed  to  be  too  great,  whether 
it  was  asked  of  man,  woman,  or  child.  The  spirit 
of  materialism  for  the  time  being  vanished.  The 
newspapers  shrunk  to  a  single  sheet  and  all  com- 


256,        The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

mercial  advertisements  disappeared.  Theaters, 
art  galleries,  museums,  libraries,  closed  their  doors. 
Upon  some  streets  nearly  every  shop  was  closed, 
with  the  simple  but  eloquent  placard  "  Gone  to  join 
the  colors."  The  French  people  neither  exulted, 
boasted,  nor  complained.  The  only  querulous 
element  was  a  small  minority  of  the  large  body  of 
American  tourists,  so  suddenly  caught  in  a  terrific 
storm  of  human  passions,  who  seemed  to  feel  that 
this  Red  Sea  of  blood  should  part  until  they  could 
walk  dry-shod  to  the  shore  of  safety. 

In  Germany  similar  scenes  were  enacted  and  a 
like  spirit  of  courage  and  self-sacrifice  was  shown. 

It  is  a  reflection  upon  civilization  that  two  na- 
tions, each  so  brave,  heroic,  and  self-sacrificing, 
should,  without  their  consent  and  by  the  miserable 
and  iniquitous  folly  of  scheming  statesmen  and 
diplomats,  be  plunged  into  a  war,  of  which  no  man 
can  see  the  end  and  which  has  already  swept  away 
the  flower  of  their  manhood. 

One  great  lesson  of  this  conflict  may  be  that  no 
aggressive  war  ought  to  be  initiated  unless  the 
policy  of  that  war  is  first  submitted  to  the  masses 
of  the  people,  upon  whom  the  burdens  in  the  last 
analysis  fall  and  who  must  pay  the  dreadful  penalty 
with  their  treasure  and  their  lives. 

If  the  policy  of  this  war  had  been  submitted  by 


Epilogue  257 

a  referendum  to  the  Austrian  and  German  peoples 
with  a  full  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  Servian 
controversy,  would  they  not  have  rejected  a 
form  of  arbitrament,  which  creates  but  does  not 
settle  questions,  convinces  no  one,  and  only  sows 
the  seeds  of  greater  hatred  for  future  and  richer 
harvests  of  death?  If  the  be-ribboned  diplomats 
and  decorated  generals  of  the  General  Staffs  at 
Berlin  and  Vienna  had  been  without  power  to 
precipitate  this  war,  unless  they  themselves  were 
willing  to  occupy  the  trenches  on  the  firing  line, 
this  war  might  never  have  been. 

Nearly  five  months  have  passed  since  that  sum- 
mer day,  when  I  passed  through  smiling  harvest 
fields  from  the  mountains  to  the  Seine.  The 
trenches,  in  which  innumerable  brave  men  are 
writing  with  their  blood  the  records  of  their  states- 
men's follies,  are  filled  with  snow.  The  blackest 
Christmas  Eve  within  the  memory  of  living  man 
has  come  and  gone,  perhaps  the  blackest,  since  in 
the  stillness  of  the  night  there  fell  upon  the  wonder- 
ing ears  of  the  shepherds  the  gracious  refrain  of 
"  Peace  on  earth,  good  will  among  men. "  On  that 
night  devout  German  soldiers  sang  in  their  trenches 
in  Flanders  and  along  the  Vistula  the  hymn  of 

Christmas  Eve,  "Stille  Nacht,  heilige  Nachty 
17 


258         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

Was  this  unconscious  mockery,  an  expression 
of  invincible  faith,  or  a  reversion  from  habit  to  the 
gentler  associations  of  childhood?  The  spirit  of 
Christmas  was  not  wholly  dead,  for  it  is  narrated 
that  these  brave  men  in  English  and  German 
trenches  on  this  saddest  of  Christmas  Eves  de- 
clared for  a  few  hours  of  their  own  volition  a 
Christmas  truce. 

*  Some  say  that  ever  'gainst  that  season  comes 
Wherein  our  Saviour's  birth  is  celebrated 
The  bird  of  dawning  singeth  all  night  long, 
And  then,  they  say,  no  spirit  dare  stir  abroad, 
The  nights  are  wholesome,  then  no  planets  strike, 
So  hallowed  and  so  gracious  is  the  time. " 

There  is  not  between  the  men  in  one  trench  and 
those  in  another,  each  seeking  the  speediest  oppor- 
tunity to  kill  the  other,  any  personal  quarrel.  On 
occasion  they  even  fraternize,  only  to  resume 
the  work  of  mutual  extermination.  They  would 
not  have  quarreled,  if  the  Berchtolds,  the  von 
Bethmann-Hollwegs,  and  the  von  Jagows  had 
had  sufficient  loyalty  to  civilization  to  submit 
any  possible  grievance,  which  either  had,  to  the 
judgment  of  Europe. 

A  spectacle  more  ghastly  than  this  "far-flung 
battle  line"  has  never  been  witnessed  since  the 


Epilogue  259 

world  began,  for  these  soldiers  in  gray  or  khaki 
are  not  savages  but  are  beings  of  an  advanced 
civilization.  Their  fighting  can  have  in  method 
none  of  the  old-time  chivalry,  such  as  was  wit- 
nessed at  Fontenoy  when  the  French  commander 
courteously  invited  his  English  rival  to  fire  first. 
The  present  is  a  chemical,  mechanical  war,  than 
which  no  circle  in  Dante's  Inferno  is  more  horribly 
repellent. 

"When  was  better  justified  the  terrible  but  beau- 
tiful imagery  in  Milton's  poem  of  The  Nativity,  when 
he  says  of  Nature: 

"  Only  with  speeches  fair 
She  woos  the  gentle  air 

To  hide  her  guilty  front  with  innocent  snow, 
And  on  her  naked  shame 
Pollute  with  sinful  blame 
The  saintly  veil  of  maiden  white  to  throw; 
Confounded  that  her  Maker's  eyes 
Should  look  so  near  upon  her  foul  deformities/ 

The  snow  cannot  hide  the  horrors  of  the  present 
conflict.  Even  night,  in  other  wars  more  merciful, 
no  longer  throws  its  sable  mantle  of  mercy  over 
the  dying  and  the  dead.  By  the  use  of  powerful 
searchlights  the  work  of  destruction  continues. 
As  though  the  surface  of  the  earth  were  no  longer 
sufficient  for  this  malignant  exercise  of  the  genius 


26o         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

of  man,  the  heavens  above  and  the  waters  under 
the  earth  have  become  at  length  the  battlefields 
of  the  nations.     Even  from  the  infinite  azure  falls 

"    .  .  .  .  a  ghastly  dew 

From  the  nations'   airy   navies,    grappling   in   the 
central  blue." 

Can  all  history  afford  a  parallel  in  malignity  to 
the  submarine,  which,  having  sunk  one  vessel 
with  all  its  human  lives,  calmly  awaits,  with  its 
periscope  projecting  above  the  water  like  the  ma- 
lignant eye  of  a  devil  fish,  the  arrival  of  rescuing 
ships  to  sink  them  also? 

Was  the  gracious  refrain  of  "Peace  on  earth, 
good  will  among  men,"  merely  a  mockery  of  man's 
hope,  making  of  his  civilization  a  mere  mirage? 
Will 

"  Cipsar's  spirit  ranging  for  revenge 
With  Ate  from  his  side  come  hot  from  Hell" — 
forever  crucify  afresh  and  put  to  an  open  shame 
the  gentle  Galilean? 

The  angelic  song  of  Bethlehem  was  neither  the 
statement  of  a  fact  nor  even  a  prophecy.  In  its 
true  translation  it  was  the  statement  of  a  pro- 
found moral  truth,  upon  which  in  the  last  analysis 
the  pacification  of  humanity  must  depend.  The 
great  promise  was  "Peace  on  earth  to  men  of  good 

wiiir 


Epilogue  261 

Peace  to  the  pacific,  that  was  the  great  message. 
For  all  others  the  great  Teacher  had  but  one  pre- 
diction and  that  was  "the  distress  of  nations, 
.  .  .  men's  hearts  failing  them  for  fear. "  Until 
civilization  can  grasp  the  truth  that  there  can  be 
no  peace  until  there  is  among  all  nations  a  spirit 
of  conciliation  and  a  common  desire  of  justice, 
the  cause  of  peace  can  be  little  more  than  a 
beautiful  dream.  Hague  conventions,  inter- 
national tribunals,  and  agreements  to  arbitrate, 
while  minimizing  the  causes  of  war  and  affording 
the  machinery  for  the  pacific  adjustment  of  justici- 
able questions,  will  yet  prove  altogether  ineilec- 
tual,  irrespective  of  the  size  of  the  parchment, 
the  imposing  character  of  the  seals,  or  the  length 
of  the  red  tape,  unless  the  nations  which  execute 
them  have  sufficient  loyalty  to  civilization  to  ask 
only  that  which  seems  just  and  to  submit  any  dis- 
putable question  to  the  pacific  adjustment  of  an 
impartial  tribunal. 

I  appreciate  that  some  questions  are  not  justici- 
able and  cannot  be  arbitrated.  The  historic 
movements  of  races,  like  those  of  glaciers,  cannot 
be  stopped  by  mortal  hands,  and  yet  even  these 
slow-moving  masses  of  ice  are  stayed  by  an  In- 
visible Hand  and  melt  at  length  into  gentle  and 
fructifying  streams.     To  create  the  universal  state 


262         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

and  to  develop  a  spirit  of  paramount  loyalty  to  it 
affords  the  only  solution  of  this  seemingly  in- 
soluble problem. 

History  affords  no  more  striking  illustration  of 
this  fact  than  the  present  war.  Each  of  the  con- 
tending nations  was  pledged  to  peace.  All  of 
the  greater  ones  were  signatories  to  the  Hague 
Convention,  but  as  the  chain  can  never  be  stronger 
than  its  weakest  link,  the  pacific  efforts  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia  to  adjust  a  purcl}'  justiciable 
question  by  negotiation  and  mediation  wholly 
failed  because  Austria  and  Germany  had  deter- 
mined to  test  the  mastery  of  Europe  by  an 
appeal  to  the  sword.  The  fundamental  cause  of 
the  conflict  was  their  lack  of  loyalty  to  civilization, 
due  to  a  misguided  and  perverted  spirit  of  excessive 
nationalism. 

Until  with  the  slow-moving  progress  of  mankind 
the  greater  unit  of  the  Universal  State  can  be  cre- 
ated, it  should  be  the  common  and  equal  concern 
of  all  nations,  not  merely  to  defeat  this  primitive 
appeal  to  brute  force  but  to  make  impossible  the 
recurrence  of  such  an  iniquitous  reversion  to  bar- 
barism. To  do  this,  while  any  nation  unjustly 
appeals  to  force,  force  is  unhappily  necessary,  but 
there  would  be  few  occasions  to  repel  force  by 
force  if  there  were  suIFicient  solidarity  in  mankind 


Epilogue  263 

to  make  it  the  common  concern  of  the  civilized 
world  to  suppress  promptly  and  effectually  any 
disturber  of  its  peace. 

If  the  present  wanton  attack  upon  the  very 
foundations  of  civilization  had  been  regarded  as 
the  common  concern  of  all  nations,  it  would  never 
have  taken  place  and  might  never  occur  again. 
To  prevent  such  recurrence,  thoughtful  men  of  all 
nations  should  cooperate,  so  that  when  the  present 
titanic  struggle  is  over,  an  earnest  and  universal 
effort  can  be  made  to  create  such  a  compact  be- 
tween the  civilized  nations  as  will  insure  coopera- 
tive effort  when  any  nation  attempts  to  apply  the 
torch  of  war  to  the  stately  edifice  of  civilization. 
May  not  this  great  war  prove  the  supreme  travail 
of  humanity,  whereof  this  nobler  era  will  be 
born? 

It  should  be  the  especial  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  lead  in  this  onward  movement.  It  has 
been  in  no  small  measure  the  liberator  of  mankind. 
Let  it  now  be  its  pacificator!  Can  it  do  so  in  any 
better  spirit  than  that  voiced  by  one  of  the 
noblest  of  its  Presidents  at  the  close  of  another 
gigantic  conflict,  of  which  he  was  to  be  the  last  and 
greatest  martyr,  when  he  said: 

With  malice  toward  none,  with  charity  for  all, 
with  firmness  in  the  right  as  God  gives  us  to  see 


264         The  Evidence  in  the  Case 

the  right,  let  us  strive  to  finish  the  work  we  are  in; 
to  bind  up  the  nation's  wounds;  to  care  for  him 
who  shall  have  borne  the  battle,  and  for  his  widow 
and  orphan;  and  to  do  all  ivhich  may  achieve  and 
cherish  a  just  and  lasting  peace. 


INDEX 


Albert,  King  of  the  Belgians, 
conversation  of,  with  Kaiser, 
107  ff.;  appeal  of,  to  Eng- 
land, 218 

Attila,  Kaiser's  reference  to, 
quoted,  14 

Austria,  given  carte  blanche,  x ; 
refuses  peace  proposals,  xi; 
underlying  causes  of  her 
ultimatum  to  Servia,  19  ff.; 
annexes  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina, 20;  keeps  secret 
diplomatic  correspondence, 
23;  Crown  Prince  of,  assas- 
sinated, 20,  31;  silence  of, 
proves  guilt,  25,  26;  refuses 
England's  propositions,  28; 
Gennany's  communications 
to,  withheld  from  public,  28, 
29;  Red  Book  of,  analyzed, 
30;  attitude  of,  false,  34; 
ignorance  of  ultimatum  of, 
among  diplomatic  corps,  33 ; 
insists  situation  will  "be 
cleared  up,"  35;  of  neces- 
sity supported  by  Germany 
before  ultimatum,  36,  37; 
would  not  have  sent  ultima- 
tum without  Germany's 
backing,  36  ff . ;  ultimatum  of, 
examined  and  characterized, 
40,  41 ;  ultimatum  of,  to  Ser- 
via quoted  in  full,  47  et  seq. ; 
population  of,  55;  Austria- 
Servian  relations,  56 ; 
promises  to  respect  Servian 


265 


territory,  59,  60;  effect  of 
ultimatum  of ,  61 ;  attitude  of, 
towards  Servia's  reply,  83, 
84;  most  discreditable  action 
of,  86;  mobilizes,  86;  not 
urged  by  Gennany  to  con- 
sider peace  proposals,  88; 
does  not  reply  to  Russian 
proposal,  91;  claims  Servia 
to  be  aggressor  in  first 
skirmish,  96;  refuses  dis- 
cussion of  Servian  note,  98; 
again  refuses  Russia's  pleas 
for  peace,  99,  100;  suppres- 
sion of  news  in,  113;  offered 
reparation  by  Servia,  114: 
knew  that  Servia  would 
refuse  demand  of  "judiciary 
co-operation,"  115;  sounds 
Italy  regarding  war  on  Ser- 
via, 119;  ultimatum  design- 
edly withheld  from  powers, 
121;  pettj-  finesse  of,  123; 
ultimatum  issued  when 
foreign  diplomats  were  out 
of  the  way,  123,  124;  avoids 
foreign  diplomats,  125;  be- 
lieves its  interests  require 
punishment  of  Servia,  136; 
national  selfishness,  136; 
bombards  Belgrade,  149;  in- 
sists upon  pursuing  action 
against  Servia,  170;  at 
last  agrees  to  discuss 
Servian  note  with  Russia, 
1 73 ;  causes  of  partial  reversal 
of  policy,  175  ff.;  offer  of 
July  31,    1914,    190  et  seq.; 


266 


Index 


Austria — Continued 

offer  to  discuss  ultimatum 
merely  nominal,  190;  refuses 
Russia's  stipulation  con- 
cerning mediation,  191; coun- 
ter suggestions  of,  to  British 
Government,  191;  proposal 
of,  absurd,  192;  signs  "neu- 
trality of  Belgium"  treaty, 
198;  suppression  of  evidence 
by,  useless,  246;  conclusions 
concerning  actions  of,  249 
et  scq.;  see  Berchtold,  Sza- 
pdry,  Triple  Alliance 


B 


Balkans,  existing  status  of,  up- 
set, 20 

Balko-Turkish  War,  34 

Ballin,  223 

Beck,  James  M.,  ancestry  of, 
vii 

Belgium,  invasion  of,  a  crime, 
vii;  German  demand  on,  xi; 
the  proof  of  Germany's 
belief  in  von  Bernhardi,  11; 
publishes  Gray  Paper,  23; 
Germany's  disregard  of 
rights  of,  196  ff. ;  took  no 
part  in  preliminary  war 
controversy,  197;  held  no 
interest  in  Servian  question, 
197;  treaty  of  neutrality 
signed,  198;  restricts  sale  of 
munitions  of  war  in  1870, 
200;  Bismarck's  letter  to, 
200;  feared  invasion  by 
Germany,  201;  Germany 
professes  intention  of  re- 
specting neutrality  of,  201  ff. ; 
government  fears  German 
invasion,  205,  206;  requests 
further  assurance  of  Ger- 
many's intentions  to  respect 
neutrality,  206;  reassured  by 
France,  208;  adxiscd  by 
Germany  of  intended  in- 
vasion,   210;    reply    of,    to 


German  ultimatum,  212; 
hopes  that  Germany  would 
respect  neutrality,  213,  214; 
offered  military  support  by 
France,  214;  refuses  French 
aid,  214;  fined  by  Germany, 
217,218 '.compared to  Poland, 
218;  appeal  of,  to  England, 
218;  effect  of  German  in- 
vasion, 229,  230;  French 
officers  in,  230;  German 
officers  and  spies  in,  230; 
Germany  claims  neutrality 
of,  a  sham,  235;  anticipating 
German  invasion,  236  ff . ; 
German  railroads  on  frontier 
of,  237;  "guilt  of,"  238;  con- 
clusions concerning  actions 
of,  249  et  seg.;  see  Albert, 
Davignon,  Von  der  Elst 

Berchtold,  Count,  removes 
himself  beyond  reach  of 
personal  parleys,  70,  71; 
conversation  of,  with  Rus- 
sian Ambassador,  99,  100; 
assures  Russia  that  "claim 
against  Servia  would  be 
acceptable,"  123;  contends 
that  British  suggestions  for 
peace  came  too  late,  190; 
offer  of,  concerning  media- 
tion, 191;  see  Austria 

Bernhardi,  doctrines  of,  xviii 
opinions  of,  on  war  quoted, 
7  ff.;  influence  of,  10,  li; 
indictment  of,  15,  16;  failure 
of,  17;  opinion  of,  concerning 
England's  attitude  to  Amer- 
ica during  Civil  War,  17; 
205 

Bertheld,  M.,  prepares  Yellow 
Book,  102 

Bertie,  Sir  F.,  207 

Bethmann-HoUwcg,  Dr.  von, 
quoted,  viii;  message  of,  to 
Federated  Governments  of 
Germany  quoted,  44,  45; 
blunders  of,  194;  declares 
Germany   will   respect   Bel- 


Index 


267 


Bethmann-Hollwep;,  Dr. — Con. 
gianneutrality,202  ;attempts 
to  justify  Germany's  actions 
toward  Belgium,  215,  216; 
"scrap  of  paper"  speech 
quoted,  220,  221;  speech  of, 
concerning  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium, 238;  discusses  "scrap 
of  paper"  remark,  239  ff.; 
see  Germany 

Bismarck,  and  militarism,  xix 
ft". ;  attitude  of,  during  peace 
negotiations,  xix;  and 
"spread  cagleism,"  xix,  xx; 
respects  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, 200;  103 

Bosnia  annexed  by  Austria,  20 

Brussels,  secret  documents  in, 
235 

Bunsen,  Sir  M.  de,  report 
of,  to  Sir  Edward  Grey 
regarding  ignorance  of 
Diplomatic  Corps  concern- 
ing Austria's  ultimatum,  32, 
33;  quoted  regarding  Ger- 
many's knowledge  of  Aus- 
trian ultimatum,  37 

Burgess,  Prof.  John  W.,  sup- 
ports Germany,  222 


Cambon,  Jules,  prepares  Yel- 
low Book,  102 ;  an  estimate  of 
his  abilities,  104,  105;  advises 
France  of  Germany's  early 
mobilization,  120;  inter- 
views Von  Jagow  on  Austrian 
ultimatum,  121  ff. ;  urges 
peace  conference,  133;  see 
France 

Cook,  Dr.,  Germany  compared 
to,  232 

Crackenthorpe,  Mr.,  British 
Ambassador  at  Belgrade, 
instructions  to,  82  ff. 

Crown  Prince  of  Germany,  the, 
an  adherent  of  brute  force, 
13 


Czar,  "the  champion  of  Chris- 
tianity," xxii;  despatch  to, 
from  Kaiser  regarding  mur- 
der of  Archduke,  147;  reply 
of,  to  Kaiser,  148;  reply  to 
third  message  of  Kaiser,  151; 
last  message  of,  to  Kaiser, 
184,  185;  telegram  of,  to 
King  George,  189;  telegram 
of,  to  Kaiser,  suppressed  by 
German  Foreign  Oilice,  189; 
"not  guilty,"  189 

D 

Davignon,  M.,  conversation 
of,  with  Von  Below  quoted, 
206 

"Decent  respect  to  the  opin- 
ions of  mankind,"  vi 

Declaration  of  Independence 
cited,  3 

Dernberg,  Dr.,  224;  claims 
France  violated  Belgian  neu- 
trality, 228 

Disfurth,  Major-General  von, 
on  Germany's  war  policy, 
quoted,  12,  13 

Dryander,  Dr.,  197,  223 


E 


England,  anticipation  of  war 
in,  xii;  fear  of,  for  Germany, 
xxi;  has  also  had  its  "Bem- 
hardis,"  15;  Bernhardi's 
opinion  of  attitude  during 
Civil  War,  17;  publishes 
White  Paper,  22;  testimony 
of  British  Ambassador  at 
Vienna  cited,  32,  33;  prob- 
ability of  intervention  of, 
66;  requests  time,  70,  71; 
assured  of  French  and 
Russian  alliance,  77;  refuses 
to  align  definitely  with 
Russia  and  France,  79;  sug- 
gests peace  conference  in 
London,    93;    assures    Ger- 


268 


Index 


England — Continued 

many  of  her  desire  for 
peace,  153;  requested  to  act 
as  mediator,  191;  reason  for 
use  of  word  instead  of 
"Great  Britain,"  195;  signs 
"neutrality  of  Belgium" 
treaty,  198;  inquires  as  to 
German  and  French  inten- 
tions toward  Belgium,  207; 
requests  Belgium  to  main- 
tain her  neutrality,  207; 
questions  Germany  as  to 
intentions  concerning  Bel- 
gium, 208;  ultimatum  of,  to 
Germany,  218;  reply  of,  to 
Belgian  appeal,  219;  antici- 
pating German  invasion  of 
Belgium,  236  flf.;  entered 
war  because  of  invasion  of 
Belgium,  245;  conclusions 
concerning  actions  of,  249 
et  seq.;  see  Bertie,  Bunsen, 
George,  King,  Goschen, 
Grey,  Triple  Entente 


France,  preparation  in,  for  war, 
xii;  fear  of  Germany  for, 
xxi;  publishes  Yellow  Book, 
23;  French  Premier  quoted 
on  Austrian  Servian  troubles, 
31,  32;  relations  of,  with 
Germany,  56;  assures  Russia 
and  England  of  her  support, 
77;  refuses  Germany's  re- 
quest to  influence  Russia,  92 ; 
urges  Germany  to  join 
Powers  in  preventing  inva- 
sion of  Servia,  95;  assured 
that  Germany  wishes  peace, 
131;  suspicion  of,  toward 
Germany,  132 ; supports  Eng- 
land's request  for  confer- 
ence, 133;  declaration  of  war 
on,  delayed,  192;  ultimatum 
to,  192;  invasion  of,  192 
et   seq.;    reason   of,    for   not 


assummg  aggressive,  193; 
invasion  of,  to  follow  im- 
mediately or  to  precede 
severance  of  diplomatic  re- 
lations, 194;  signs  "neu- 
trality of  Belgium"  treaty, 
198;  respects  Belgium  neu- 
trality, 200;  reaffirms  inten- 
tion of  respecting  Belgian 
neutrality,  206;  reply  of,  to 
England's  query  regarding 
Belgian  neutrality,  207;  de- 
clares to  Belgium  intention 
of  respecting  neutrality,  208; 
cited  by  Germany  as  cause 
for  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality, 210,  211;  offers  mili- 
tary support  to  Belgium, 
214;  "overt  acts  of,"  238, 
239;  first  death  in  war,  253; 
attitude  of  peojjle  in,  254  ff. ; 
see  Bcrthclot,  Cambon,  Tri- 
ple Entente,  V'iviani 
Franco-German  War,  cause  of, 

19 

Frederick   the  Great,  2;  effect 

of ,  on  Germany  today,  10 
Fuchs,  Dr.,  on  hatred,  quoted, 

1 1 ;  on  preparedness  for  war, 

quoted,  1 1 
Furor       Tciifonicus      directed 

against  England,  xxii 


George,  King  of  England, 
message  of,  to  Kaiser,  153; 
telegram  of,  to  Czar,  155; 
message  to,  from  Kaiser 
regarding  neutrality  of 
France,  187 

Germany,  confesses  its  crime, 
viii;  suppression  of  evidence 
by,  ix;  gives  Austria  carte 
blanche,  x;  refuses  to  accept 
peace  proposals,  xi;  invades 
Luxemburg,  xi;  "fears  God 
but  nothing  else,"  xix  ff. ; 
attitude  of,   toward   rest  of 


Index 


269 


Germany — Continued 

world,  xix  et  seq.;  foreign 
policy  of,  xxii;  real  attitude 
of  people,  xxiii;  German 
people  misled,  xxvi;  en- 
deavors to  gain  approval  of 
America,  4;  espouses  visions 
of  Maehiavelli,  5  ff. ;  attitude 
of,  toward  war,  6  fT. ;  avowed 
attitude  of,  towards  world, 
6  et  seq.;  doctrine  of,  11  et 
seq.;  war  policies  of,  shown 
by  quotations,  11  et  seq.; 
spirit  of  the  ruling  classes, 
13;  domination  of  Europe 
established,  19,  20;  attitude 
of,  on  the  Balkans,  19  et  seq.; 
publishes  White  Paper,  22; 
suppression  of  facts  by,  27; 
communications  of,  to  Aus- 
tria withheld  from  White 
Paper,  28,  29;  advance 
knowledge  of  Austria's  ulti- 
matum, 32  et  seq.;  only 
power  to  know  of  Austria's 
ultimatum,  33;  attitude  of, 
false,  34;  Ambassador  to 
England  suggests  Russia  as 
"mediator  with  regard  to 
Servia,"  35;  Ambassador  to 
England  denies  knowledge 
of  Austria's  actions,  35;  dis- 
claims knowledge  of  Aus- 
tria's ultimatum,  36;  guilty 
of  duplicity  regarding  Aus- 
tria's ultimatum,  36;  unques- 
tionably had  previous  knowl- 
edge of  Austria's  ultimatum, 
37;  sincerity  of  attitude 
examined,  38  ff.;  pacific 
protestations  of,  insincere, 
38;  first  statement  of  Ger- 
many's position  regarding 
Austro-Servian  problem,  39 
ff.;  greatest  diplomatic  blun- 
der, 39,  40;  furtlier  proof  of 
her  knowledge  of  Austrian 
ultimatum,  41 ;  supports  Aus- 
tria, 41 ;  anticipates  Servia's 


refusal,  42;  instructions  to 
Ambassador,  43 ;  Ambassa- 
dor to  U.  S.  admits  ad- 
vance knowledge  of  Austrian 
ultimatum,  46;  takes  steps 
to  allay  indignation  of  U.  S., 
46;  warnings  of,  to  Servia, 
56;  relations  of,  with  France, 
56;  reason  for  actions  of,  65 
ff. ;  fails  to  move  for  peace, 
69,  70;  excuses  for  not  grant- 
ing time  extension,  71  ff. ; 
refuses  Russia's  request  for 
time  extension,  73  ff . ;  fear  of, 
for  England's,  79;  principal 
fear  of,  79;  attitude  of,  to- 
ward Servia's  reply,  83,  84; 
witliholds  from  people  ade- 
quate information  on  Servia's 
reply,  85;  reply  to  England's 
further  requests  for  time, 
87;  disclaims  any  responsi- 
bility for  Austrian  ultima- 
tum, 89,  90;  willing  to  have 
England  mediate  between 
Austria  and  Russia,  89; 
states  that  Austria  cannot 
draw  liack  in  Servian  matter, 
89;  fatal  policy  of,  91;  de- 
clares Russia  responsible  for 
war,  92;  requests  France  to 
influence  Russia,  92;  refuses 
to  attend  peace  conference 
in  London,  93;  refuses  Rus- 
sia's request  to  urge  con- 
ciliation in  Austria,  95;  re- 
fuses France's  request  to 
prevent  invasion  of  Servia, 
96;  insists  on  "exclusion  of 
all  possibility  of  mediation," 
97;  claims  efforts  for  media- 
tion came  too  late,  98;  ex- 
cuse of,  for  not  assenting  to 
peace  conference,  100,  101; 
incapable  diplomats  of,  103; 
attitude  of  people  toward 
Kaiser,  109  ff. ;  knew  that 
Servia  would  refuse  demand 
of  "judiciary  cooperation," 


270 


Index 


Germany — Continued 

115;  further  proof  of  Ger- 
many's advance  knowledge 
of  Austria's  ultimatum,  116; 
petty  finesse  of,  123;  excuse 
of,  for  not  getting  extension 
of  time,  124;  avoids  foreign 
diplomats,  125;  diplomats 
reluctant  to  leave  copies  of 
notes,  127  ff.;  Ambassador 
to  France  denies  agreement 
with  Austria  over  note  to 
Servia,  129;  assures  France 
that  she  is  for  peace,  130; 
refuses  France's  request  for 
peace  conference,  133;  "clos- 
est interests"  of,  136;  na- 
tional selfishness,  136  ;  be- 
lieves Russia  wall  keep  out, 
140;  believes  France  "in  no 
position  for  war,"  140; 
belief  of,  regarding  war 
preparedness  and  action  of 
other  nations,  140,  141; 
ultimatum  to  Russia,  114; 
preparedness  for  war,  142; 
assured  of  no  provocative 
action  on  part  of  Russia, 
152;  offer  of,  to  England, 
159  ff.;  advances  upon 
France,  161;  French  report 
of  army  movements,  161, 
162;  evades  England's  re- 
quest for  peace  suggestion, 
169;  declaration  of  war  by, 
quoted,  183,  184;  proof  of 
preparedness  of,  188,  189; 
declares  war  on  Russia,  192; 
ultimatum  of,  to  France,  192 ; 
delays  declaration  of  war 
upon  France,  192;  awaits 
French  act  of  aggression, 
192;  Ambassador  leaves 
Paris,  192;  ready  for  inva- 
sion of  France,  193;  pacific 
intentions  of,  false,  193,  194; 
inconsistency  in  policies  of, 
194;  diplomats  and  army  not 
in  harmony,   194;  disregard 


of,  for  rights  of  Belgium,  196; 
respected  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium in  1870,  200;  pro- 
fesses intention  of  respect- 
ing Belgian  neutralit}',  201 
fl.;  recognizes  obligations  of 
neutrality  treaty,  202;  For- 
eign Office  suppresses  tele- 
gram of  Czar,  189;  places 
responsibility  for  war  upon 
Russia,  192;  evades  Eng- 
land's question  concerning 
Belgian  neutrality,  208;  in- 
sists she  is  forced  to  invade 
Belgium,  210;  declares 
France  will  invade  Belgium, 
210;  excuses  of,  for  invasion 
of  Belgium,  210  fT.;  declares 
war  upon  Belgium,  215;  in- 
vades Belgium,  215;  invasion 
of  Belgium  considered  and 
analyzed,  217  If.;  imposes 
fines  u])on  Belgium,  217  ff.; 
reply  of,  to  English  ultima- 
tum, 220;  declares  necessity 
forces  invasion  of  Belgium, 
220;  defense  of,  for  invasion 
of  Belgium,  224;  moral  isola- 
tion of,  229;  compared  to  Dr. 
Cook,  232;  plea  of  guilty, 
233  ff. ;  claims  discovery  of 
secret  documents  in  Brussels, 
235;  strategic  railrr^ads  cf, 
237;  campaign  wl^iich  should 
have  been  followed,  245; 
suppression  of  evidence  by, 
useless,  246;  conclusicns 
concerning  actions  of,  249 
et  seq.;  attitude  of  people  in, 
256;  see  Kaiser,  Lichnow- 
sicy,  Prussia,  Triple  Alliance, 
von  Below,  Bcthmann-HoU- 
weg,  von  Heeringen,  von 
Jagow,  von  Schoen 
Gladstone  did  not  rely  on  "neu- 
trality of  Belgium"  treaty, 
198;  speech  of,  concerning 
Belgium,  quoted,  199;  speech 
of,  cited  by  Shaw,  199 


Index 


271 


Goschen,  Sir  E.,  on  Germany's 
position  in  Austro-Servian 
trouble,  quoted,  39 ;  report  of, 
regarding  England's  request 
for  time,  72 ;  conversation  of, 
with  Von  Jagow  preceding 
England's  declaration  of  war, 
220  ff.;  instructions  to, 
August  4th,  219 

Gray  Paper  (Belgium),  Bel- 
gium publishes,  23;  quoted, 
202,  208,  210,  211,  21S 

Great  Britain,  see  England 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  compared  to 
Pitt,  22;  conversation  of, 
with  German  Ambassador 
regarding  Austro-Servian 
trouble,  35  ff. ;  advised  that 
Gemiany  had  knowledge  of 
Austrian  ultimatum,  37;  re- 
port to,  from  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin,  July  22d, 
38,  39;  28;  did  not  anticipate 
Austrian  ultimatum;  de- 
ceived by  Germany,  36;  con- 
versation of,  with  Austrian 
Minister,  quoted,  70,  71; 
restrictions  binding  actions 
off  79,  80;  instructions  of,  to 
British  Ambassador  at  Bel- 
grade, 82;  further  plea  for 
time,  86;  frnther  proposals 
of,  for  peace,  89;  suggests 
peace  conference  of  Powers 
in  London,  93 ;  chief  merit  of, 
105;  report  of,  by  France, 
of  German  army  movements, 
161,  162;  replies  to  Germany 
on  neutrality  of  England, 
162;  that  Germany  suggest 
means  of  preventing  Austro- 
Servian  war,  167;  continues 
his  eflforts  for  peace,  172,  173; 
last  attempt  of,  to  preserve 
peace,  180,  181;  conversa- 
tion of,  cited  by  Germany, 
191;  inquiry  of,  concerning 
results  of  England's  neu- 
trality, 193 ;  conversations  of, 


with  German  Ambassador 
concerning  Belgian  neutral- 
ity, 209;  instructions  to 
British  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, August  4th,  219;  refutes 
statement  concerning  secret 
documents,  236;  see  JBunsen; 
England;  George,  King; 
Goschen 

H 

Haeckel,  Ernst,  197 

Hague  Tribunal,  due  to  Czar's 
initiative,  189;  Russia  desires 
Austro-Servian  problem  re- 
ferred to,  189;  actions  taken 
by,  in  1907,  204  ff.;  226;  251 

Hamburger  Nachtrichten,  quot- 
ed, 12,  13 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  quoted, 

227 

Harden,  Maximilian,  on  Ger- 
many's war  policies,  quoted, 
12; 243 

Harnack,  222 

Herzegovina  annexed  by  Aus- 
tria, 20 


Italy,  not  bound  by  Triple 
Alliance,  x;  attitude  of,  23 
flf. ;  as  affected  by  Triple 
Alliance,  24;  attitude  of,  24, 
25;  German  messages  to,  sup- 
pressed, 29;  told  that  situa- 
tion would  "be  cleared  up," 
35;  cooperation  of,  depend- 
ent upon  Russia's  actions, 
65;  not  advised  of  intended 
actions  of  Germany  and 
Austria,  117;  previously 
sounded  by  Austria,  119; 
Germany  schemes  to  acquire 
support  of,  191,  192;  see 
San   Giuliano 


Jefferson,  Thomas,  quoted,  vi 
Junkerdom,  see  Prussia 


272 


Index 


K 

Kaiser,  returns  to  Berlin  from 
Norway,  xi;  extols  the  Czar, 
xxii ;  spirit  of  absolutism  of,  9 ; 
"divine  right"  of,  9;  quoted, 
9;  fanatic  absolutism  of,  9; 
an  adherent  of  brute  force, 
13;     "China    speech"      of, 
quoted,  14;  "Hun"  speech, 
quoted,    14;    Cambon    191 3 
report  concerning,  107;  posi- 
tion of,  109  et  scq.;  attitude 
and     actions    of,     in     early 
part  of  trouble,   138  et  seq.; 
ultimatum  of,  to  Russia,  141 ; 
responsibility    of,    for    war, 
141,   142;  character  of,   142 
ff.;  does  not  act  in  interests 
of  peace,  145  ff.;  despatch  of, 
to    Czar   regarding    murder 
of  Archduke,    quoted,    147; 
second  message  to  Czar,  149; 
fatal    error    of,     150;    third 
message  to  Czar,  151;  reply 
of,    to    King    George,     154; 
message  of,  to  Czar  regard- 
ing    Russia's     mobilization, 
155;  estimate  and  discussion 
of  actions  of,  157;  preparing 
for  war,  159;  taking  steps  to 
alienate  England  from  Allies, 
159  fT.;  issues  ultimatum  to 
Russia,  176;  reply  of,  to  last 
message  of  Czar,   185,    186; 
message  of,  to  England  re- 
garding neutrality  of  France, 
187;     "awful    responsibility 
of,"  1 88;  telegram  of,  to  King 
George,  quoted,  193;  reason 
of,    for    telegram    to    King 
George,    193;    telegram    of, 
analyzed,    193;  blunders  of, 
194;  see  Germany 
Kudachef,   Prince,   action    of, 
regarding  time  extension,  73 


Lamprecht,  223 


Lichnowsky,  Prince,  affects 
ignorance,  121;  conversation 
with,  cited,  191;  query  to, 
regarding  results  of  Eng- 
land's neutrality,  193;  ccn- 
versation  of,  with  Sir  Edward 
Grey  concerning  Belgian 
neutrality,  209;  89,  90;  see 
Germany 
Li6ge,  French  officers  at,  230 
Luxemburg,  invaded,  xi;  wrong 
done  to,  243 

M 

Machiavelli,  vicious  principles 

of,   4;   Bemhardi  compared 

to,  16 
Mahan,  Admiral,  1 1 
Margerie,     M.     de,     prepares 

Yellow  Book,  102 
MilitdKsche  Rtmdschau,quoted, 

114 
Moltke,  von,  opinion  of,  cited, 

6,  7 
IVlurocco  controversy,  109  ff. 


N 


Namur,  French  officers  at,  230 
Napoleon  III.,  honor  of,  201 
Newspapers,  American,  lack  of 

Austrian      dispatches       to, 

before  war,  31 
Nietzsche,  6 


O 


Orange  Paper  (Russia),  Russia 
publishes,  22;  quoted  re- 
garding Germany's  knowl- 
edge of  Austrian  ultimatum, 
36;  quoted,  36,  68,  69,  73,  74, 
^^'5-91.92,95,97 


Pachitch,  Servian  Premier,  ab- 
sent from  Belgrade,  32 


Index 


273 


Penn,  William,  treaty  of,  com- 
pared to  the  "scrap  of 
l)apor,"  xvi 

Poland,  compared  to  Belgium, 
218 

Prussia,  Prussian  Junkerdom, 
8  ff.;  sij^ns  "neutrality  of 
Belgium,"  treaty,  198 


R 


Red  Book,  analyzed,  30;  dis- 
closes true  Austrian  policy, 
190;  quoted,  190,  191 

Reichstag,  debate  in,  quoted, 
201;  202;  240,  241 

Rumbold,  Sir  H.,  letter  to, 
quoted  in  While  Paper,  35 

Russia,  intimidated  by  Ger- 
many, 20;  forced  to  submit 
in  i3alkans,  20;  publishes 
Orange  Paper,  22;  suggested 
by  Germany  as  mediator 
between  Austria  and  Servia, 
35;  assured  of  Germany's 
ignorance  of  Austrian  ulti- 
matum, 36;  assured  that 
Austria  will  not  seize  Servian 
territory,  59,  60;  possibility 
of  intervention  of,  65;  atti- 
tude of,  67  (T. ;  message  of, 
to  Austria,  quoted,  68,  69; 
request  for  time  refused,  71; 
assured  that  Austria  con- 
templates no  acquisition  of 
Servian  territory,  74,  75; 
confers  with  France  and 
England,  77;  suggestions  of, 
to  avoid  conflict,  77,  78; 
willing  to  leave  Austro-Ser- 
vian  trouble  in  hands  of  the 
Powers,  80,  81;  proposal  of, 
to  Austria,  91;  requests 
Germany  to  urge  concilia- 
tion with  Austria,  95; 
promises  its  services  in  keep- 
ing Servia  quiet,  96;  again 
proposes  peace  conference, 
99;    assured    that    Austria's 


claims  would  be  acceptable, 
123;  charge  put  off  until  too 
late,  125;  ultimatum  of  Ger- 
many to,  141;  assures  Ger- 
many of  no  provocative 
action  upon  her  part,  152; 
offers  to  stop  all  military 
preparations,  164  ff.;  orders 
general  mobilization,  171; 
refuses  to  reply  to  Ger- 
many's ultimatum,  178;  sug- 
gests referring  Austro-Ser- 
vian  problem  to  Hague,  189; 
"not  guilty,"  189;  offer  of, 
to  suspend  military  prepara- 
tions, 190;  cannot  treat 
direct  with  Austria,  191; 
requests  England  to  act  as 
mediator,  191 ;  stipulates  sus- 
pension of  hostilities  during 
mediation,  191;  signs  "neu- 
trality of  Belgium"  treaty, 
198;  see  Czar;  Kudachef; 
Sazonof;  see  also  Triple 
Entente 
Russo-Japanese  war,  xxii 


San  Giuliano,  Marquis  di, 
Italian  Foreign  Alinister, 
quoted,    119 

Sazonof,  suggestion  of,  to 
avoid  conflict,  77,  78;  good 
work  of,  105;  message  of,  to 
Austria  regarding  ultimatum, 
126; 28 

Schmidt,  223 

"Scrap  of  Paper,"  vi;  xvi; 
Bethmann  -  HoUweg's  re- 
mark, quoted,  220,  221;  dis- 
cusses his  remark,  239  ff.; 
defense  for,  use  of  phrase, 
239  ff;  "Secret  Documents," 
contents  of  supposed,  235  ff. 

Sedan,  battle  of,  result  of  Bel- 
gium neutrality,  201 

Serajcvo,  murder  of  Crown 
Prince  of  Austria  at,  20;  31 


274 


Index 


Servia,  ultimatum  to,  19;  ad- 
vised by  France,  Russia,  and 
Great  Britain,  31;  formally 
disclaims  responsibility  for 
murder  of  Archduke,  33;  pro- 
bable effect  of  humiliation  of, 
40;  refusal  of  Austrian  de- 
mands anticipated,  42 ;  reply 
to  Austrian  ultimatum 
quoted  in  full,  47  et  seq. ;  popu- 
lation of,  55;  warned  by  Ger- 
many, 56;  Austro-Scrvian  re- 
lations, 56;  result  of  acquies- 
cence to  Austria,  60;  re- 
quested by  Triple  Entente  to 
make  conciliatory  reply,  80; 
reply  of,  in  accord  with 
requests  of  Triple  Entente, 
83 ;  offers  Austria  ample  rep- 
aration, 114;  subjugation  of, 
the  "bone  of  contention," 
192 

Shaw,  George  Bernard,  opin- 
ions of,  cited,  14,  15;  defense 
of  Germany,  14  ff.;  quoted 
regarding  "  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium" treaty,  198;  quoted, 
248 

Siemens,  223 

Slav,  the,  fear  of  Germany  for, 
xxi 

Symonds,  John  Addington, 
quoted,  4,  5 

Szdpiry,  Count,  126 


Tisza,  Count,  refuses  to  dis- 
close results  of  judicial  in- 
quiry into  murder  of  Arch- 
duke, 113 

Treitschke,  doctrines  of,  xvii; 
Polilik,  cited,  6;  doctrines  of, 
based  on  Machiavelli,  6; 
influence  of,  10 

Treaty  of  1870,  198  ff. 

Treaty  of  1839,  198  ff.;  225:251 


Triple  Alliance,  x;  as  affecting 
Italy,  24;  terms  of,  24;  192; 
see  Austria,  Germany,  Italy 

Triple  Entente,  proposes  peace, 
xi;  lulled  into  false  security, 
32  ff. ;  movements  and  re- 
ports of  leading  statesmen  of, 
just  previous  to  declaration 
of  war,  32  ff. ;  ignorant  of 
Austria's  ultimatum,  33, 
65;  still  labors  for  peace,  86; 
see  also,  France,  Great  Bri- 
tain, Russia 

Turkey,  German  officers  in, 
230 

U 

United  States,  supposititious 
invasion  of,  by  Germany, 
225  ff. ;  position  of,  248  ff. 


Viviani,  Premier,  quoted  re- 
garding Austro  -  Servian 
trouble,  31,  32;  reply  of,  to 
Germany,  192;  reply  of,  to 
England's  query  regarding 
Belgian  neutrality,  207;  see 
France 

Voltaire,  quoted,  xvi 

Von  Below,  declares  Germany 
will  respect  Belgian  neu- 
trality, 203;  206;  see  Ger- 
many 

Von  Bulow,  223 

Von  der  Elst,  Baron,  210,  211; 
see  Belgium 

Von  Gwinner,  223 

Von  Heeringen,  declares  Bel- 
gian neutrality  will  be  re- 
spected, 203;  5ee  Germany 

Von  Jagow,  Ilerr,  conversation 
of,  cited,  38,  39;  representa- 
tions of,  on  Germany's  posi- 
tion in  Austro-Ser\aan  mat- 
ter, 39;  refuses  to  attend 
peace  conference  in  London, 


Index 


275 


Von  Jagow,  Herr — Continued 
93;  on  Austrian  ultimatum, 
quoted,  94;  conversations  of, 
with  Cambon,  122  fT.;  re- 
fuses peace  conference,  133; 
blunders  of,  194;  declares 
Germany  will  respect  Belgian 
neutrality, 202 ;  conversations 
with  Sir  Edward  Goschen 
preceding  England's  declara- 
tion of  war,  219  ff.;  states 
real  purpose  of  Germany's 
invasion  of  Belgium,  222; 
see   Germany 

Von  Mach,  claims  France 
violated  Belgian  neutrality, 
228;  on  French  ofTiccrs  in 
Belgium,  quoted,  231,  232; 
What  Germany  Wants,  233; 
arguments  of,  in  defense  of 
Germany,  233  fT.;  197 

Von  Moltke,  General,  blunders 
of,  194 

Von  Posadowsky,  223 

Von  Schmoller,  223 

Von  Schoen,  Baron,  assures 
France  that  Germany  is  for 
peace,  130;  makes  public 
statement  through  French 
Foreign  Office,  131  ff. 

Von  Wilamowitz,  223 

W 
WJiat   Germany   Wants,   cited, 
233 


White  Paper  (English),  pub- 
lished, 22;  analyzed,  27  ff. ; 
quoted,  34  ff.;  36;  37;  38; 
39;  41;  56;  76;  82,  83;  86:93; 
94;  97;  99;  159  ff.;  167,  168, 
169;  207,  20S;  209;  219  et 
seq.;  see  England 

White  Paper  (German),  pub- 
lished, 22;  suppression  of 
facts  in,  27  ff. ;  suppresses 
instructions  to  Ambassador, 
191;  quoted,  28;  38;  41;  43, 
44;  45;  67;  75;  87;  147; 
149  ff.;  ix;  192;  193;  see 
Germany 


Yellow  Book  (France),  pub- 
lished, 23;  additional  data  in, 
102  ff.;  contents  of  first 
chapter  of,  106  ff.;  throws 
light  on  petty  finesse  of 
Germany  and  Austria,  123; 
cited,  46;  quoted,  107  ff.; 
second  chapter  of,  113  et  seq. ; 
quoted,  113,  114,  115;  u6, 
117;  122,  123;  125;  129;  133 
ff.;  see  France 


Zabem  incident,  the,  attitude 
of  Crown  Prince  toward,  14 


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veiled  lady  who  lives  in  solitude  and  whose  features  her  neighbors 
have  never  seen.  There  is  a  mystery  at  the  heart  of  the  book  that 
throws  over  it  the  glamour  of  romance, 

THE    MASTER'S    VIOLIN, 

A  love  story  in  a  musical  atmosphere.  A  picturesque^  old  Ger- 
man virtuoso  is  the  reverent  possessor  of  a  genuine  "Cremona."  He 
consents  to  take  for  his  pupil  a  handsome  youth  who  proves  to  have 
an  aptitude  for  technique,  but  not  the  soul  of  an  artist.  The  youth 
has  led  the  happy,  careless  life  of  a  modem,  well-to-do  young  Amer- 
ican and  he  cannot,  with  his  meagre  past,  express  the  love,  the  passion 
and  the  tragedies  of  life  and  all  its  happy  phases  as  can  the  master 
who  has  lived  life  in  all  its  fulness.  But  a  girl  comes  into  his  life — a 
beautiful  bit  of  human  driftwood  that  his  aunt  had  taken  into  her 
heart  and  home,  ana  through  his  passionate  love  for  her,  he  learns 
the  lessons  that  life  has  to  give — and  his  soul  awakes. 

Founded  on  a  fact  that  all  artists  realize. 

Jii.iK  for  a  complete  free  list  of  G.  &  D.  Popular  Copyrighted  fiction 


Grosset  &  DuNi.AP,  526  West  26th  St.,  New  York 


ZANE  GREY'S  NOVELS 

May  be  had  wherever  books  are  sold.      Ask  fer  Grosset  &  Dunlap's  list 

THE  LIGHT  OF  WESTERN  STARS 

Colored  frontispiece  by  W.  Herbert  Dunton. 

Most  of  the  action  of  this  story  takes  place  near  the  turbulent 
Mexican  border  of  the  present  day.  A  New  York  society  girl  buys 
a  ranch  which  becomes  the  center  of  frontier  warfare.  Her  loyal 
cowboys  defend  her  property  from  bandits,  and  her  superintendent 
rescues  her  when  she  is  captured  by  them.  A  surprising  climax 
brings  the  story  to  a  delightful  close. 

DESERT  GOLD 
Illustrated  by  Douglas  Duer, 

Another  fascinating  story  of  the  Mexican  border.  Two  men, 
lost  in  the  desert,  discover  gold  when,  overcome  by  weakness,  they 
can  go  no  farther.  The  rest  of  the  story  describes  the  recent  uprising 
along  the  border,  and  ends  with  the  finding  of  the  gold  which  the 
two  prospectors  had  willed  to  the  girl  who  is  the  story's  heroine. 

RIDERS  OF  THE  PURPLE  SAGE 
Illustrated  by  Douglas  Duer. 

A  picturesque  romance  of  Utah  of  some  forty  3'ears  ago  when 
Mormon  authority  ruled.  In  the  persecution  of  Jane  Withersteen,  a 
rich  ranch  owner,  we  are  permitted  to  see  the  methods  employed  by 
the  invisible  hand  of  the  Mormon  Church  to  break  her  will. 

THE  LAST  OF  THE  PLAINSMEN 

Illustrated  with  photograph  reproductions. 

This  is  the  record  of  a  trip  which  the  author  took  with  Buffalo 
Jones,  known  as  the  preserver  of  the  American  bison,  across  the 
Arizona  desert  and  of  a  hunt  in  "that  wonderful  country  of  yellow 
crags,  deep  canons   and  giant  pines."     It  is  a  fascinating  story. 

THE  HERITAGE  OF  THE  DESERT 

Jacket  in  color.     Frontispiece. 

This  big  human  drama  is  played  in  the  Painted  Desert.  A 
lovely  girl,  who  has  been  reared  among  Mormons,  learns  to  love  a 
young  New  Englander.  The  Mormon  religion,  however,  demands 
that  the  girl  shall  become  the  second  wife  of  one  of  the  Mormons — 

Well,  that's  the  problem  of  this  sensational,  big  selling  story. 

BETTY  ZANE 

Illustrated  by  Louis  F.  Grant. 

This  story  tells  of  the  bravery  and  heroism  of  Betty,  the  beauti- 
ful young  sister  of  old  Colonel  Zane,  one  of  the  bravest  pioneers. 
Life  along  the  frontier,  attacks  by  Indians,  Betty's  heroic  defense 
of  the  beleaguered  garrison  at  Wheeling,  the  burning  of  the  Fort, 
and  Betty's  final  race  for  life,  make  up  this  never-to-be-forgotten  story. 

Grosset  &  Dunlap,    Publishers,   New  York 


JOHN  FOX,  JR'S. 

STORIES  OF  THE  KENTUCKY  MOUNTAINS 

May  be  had  wrtnrever  books  ara  sold.      Ask  for  Crosset  and  Danlap's  lltt 

THE  TRAIL   OF  THE    LONESOME  PINE. 
Illustrated  by  F.  C.  Yohn. 

The  "lonesome  pine"  from  which  the 
story  takes  its  name  was  a  tall  tree  that 
stood  in  solitary  splendor  on  a  mountain 
top.  The  fame  of  the  pine  lured  a  young 
engineer  through  Kentucky  to  catch  the 
trail,  and  when  he  finally  climbed  to  its 
shelter  he  found  not  only  the  pine  but  the 
foot-prints  of  a  girl.  And  the  girl  proved 
to  be  lovely,  piquant,  and  the  trail  of 
these  girlish  foot-prints  led  the  youug 
engineer  a  madder  chase  than  "the  trail 
of  the  lonesome  pine." 

THE     LITTLE    SHEPHERD    OF    KINGDOM    COME 

Illustrated  by  F.  C.  Yohn. 

This  is  a  story  of  Kentucky,  in  a  settlement  known  as  "King- 
dom Come."  It  is  a  li^  rude,  semi-barbarous;  but  natural 
and  honest,  from  which  often  springs  the  flower  of  civilization. 

*'  Chad."  the  "little  shepherd"  did  not  know  who  he  was  nor 
v/hence  he  came — he  had  just  wandered  from  doer  to  door  since 
early  childhood,  seeking  shelter  with  kindly  mountaineers  who 
gladly  fathered  and  mothered  this  waif  about  whom  there  was 
such  a  mystery — a  charming  waif,  by  the  way,  who  could  play 
the  banjo  better  that  anyone  else  in  the  mountains, 

A'KNIGHT  OF  THE    CUMBERLAND. 

Illustrated    by  F.  C.  Yohn. 

The  scenes  are  laid  along  the  waters  of  the  Cumberland' 
the  lair  of  moonshiner  and  feudsman.  The  knight  is  a  moon- 
shiner's son,  and  the  heroine  a  beautiful  girl  perversely  chris- 
tened "The  Blight."  Two  impetuous  young  Southerners'  fall 
under  the  spell  of  "The  Blight's  "  charms  and  she  learns  what 
a  large  part  jealousy  and  pistols  have  in  the  love  making  of  the 
mountaineers. 

Included  in  this  volume  is  "Hell  fer-Sartain"  and  other 
stories,  some  of  Mr.  Fox's  most  entertaining  Cumberland  valley 
narratives. 

Aak  for  com§ltt€  fret  list  of  G.  &  D.  Popular  Cof>yrigJit*d  Fiction 


Grosset  &  DuNLAP,  526  West  26th  St.,  New  York 


JACK    LON^DON^S    NOVELS 

May  be  had  wherever  books  are  sold.     Ask  for  Grosset  &  Dunlap's  list 

JOHN  BARLEYCORN.    Illustrated  by  H.  T.  Dunn. 

Tliis  remarkable  book  is  a  record  of  the  author's  own  amazing 
experiences.  This  big,  brawny  world  rover,  who  has  been  ac- 
quainted with  alcohol  from  boyhood,  comes  out  boldly  against  John 
Barleycorn.  It  is  a  string  of  exciting  adventures,  yet  it  forcefully 
conveys  an  unforgetable  idea  and  makes  a  typical  Jack  London  book. 

THE  VALLEY  OF  THE  MOON.    Frontispiece  by  George  Harper. 

The  story  opens  in  the  city  slums  where  Billy  Roberts,  teamster 
and  ex-prize  fighter,  and  Saxon  Brown,  laundry  worker,  meet  and 
love  and  marry.  They  tramp  from  one  end  of  California  to  the 
other,  and  in  the  Valley  of  the  Moon  find  the  farm  paradise  that  is 
to  be  their  salvation. 

BURNING  DA\T:.IGHT.    Four  illustrations. 

The  story  of  an  adventurer  who  went  to  Alaska  and  laid  the 
foundations  of  his  fortune  before  the  gold  hunters  arrived.  Bringing 
his  fortunes  to  the  States  he  is  cheated  out  of  it  by  a  crowd  of  money 
kings,  and  recovers  it  only  at  the  muzzle  of  his  gun.  He  then  starts 
out  as  a  merciless  exploiter  on  his  own  account.  Finally  he  takes  to 
drinking  and  becomes  a  picture  of  degeneration.  About  this  time 
he  falls  in  love  with  his  stenographer  and  wins  her  heart  but  not 
her  hand  and  then — but  read  the  story! 
A  SONOFTHESLTSr.  Illustrated  by  A.  O .  Fischer  and  C .  W .  Ashley. 

David  Grief  was  once  a  light-haired,  blue-eyed  youth  who  came 
from  England  to  the  South  .Seas  in  search  of  adventure.  Tanned 
like  a  native  and  as  lithe  as  a  tiger,  he  became  a  real  son  of  the  sun. 
The  life  appealed  to  him  and  he  remained  and  became  very  wealthy. 
THE  CALL  OF  THE  WILD.  Illustrations  by  Philip  R.  Goodwin  and 
Charles  Livingston  Bull.     Decorations  by  Charles  E.  Hooper. 

A  book  ot  dog  adventures  as  exciting  as  any  man's  exploits 
could  be.  Here  is  excitement  to  stir  the  blood  and  here  is  pictur- 
esque color  to  transport  the  reader  to  primitive  scenes. 

THE  SEA  WOLF.    Illustrated  by  W.  J.  Aylward. 

Told  by  a  man  whom  Fate  suddenly  swings  from  his  fastidious 
life  into  the  power  of  the  brutal  captain  of  a  sealing  schooner.  A 
novel  of  adventure  warmed  by  a  beautiful  love  episode  that  every 
reader  will  hail  with  delight. 

WHITE  FANG.    Illustrated  by  Charles  Livingston  Bull. 

"White  Fang"  is  part  dog,  part  wolf  and  all  brute,  living  in  the 
frozen  north  ;  he  gradually  comes  under  the  spell  of  man's  com- 
panionship, and  surrenders  all  at  the  last  in  a  fight  with  a  bull  dog. 
Thereafter  he  is  man's  loving  slave. 

Grosset    &    Dunlap,   Publishers',    New    York 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

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